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**AN INTRODUCTION
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BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY**

**AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE
TARKABHĀṢĀ OF MOKṢĀKARAGUPTA**

**BY
YUICHI KAJIYAMA**

CONTENTS

1. Introduction	p. 1
2. Abbreviations	p. 15
3. Contents of the <i>Tarkabhāṣā</i>	p. 19
4. Translation with Annotations	
Chapter I : Indeterminate knowledge	p. 23
Chapter II : Determinate knowledge	p. 63
Chapter III : Syllogism and polemics	p. 86
5. Appendix	p. 151
6. Sanskrit Index	p. 159

INTRODUCTION

1 **The Tarkabhāṣā (The Language of Logic)**: The present work is an annotated translation of the *Tarkabhāṣā* (TBh) of Mokṣākaragupta who wrote it some time between 1050-1202 A.D. This TBh should be distinguished from two other works bearing the same name, viz. the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra and the *Jaina-tarkabhāṣā* of Yaśovijaya, though these three share the same character of being a compendium of the system of a particular Indian philosophical school. While the latter two texts are devoted to the Naiyāyika and the Jaina philosophy respectively, Mokṣākaragupta's TBh forms a brief but excellent introduction to Buddhist philosophy including epistemology and logic. This is the earliest of the three texts and seems to have set an example for the other two.

Apart from great works on Buddhist logic and epistemology such as those by Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra etc., we know, so far as Sanskrit originals are available, three compendiums which systematically describe *bauddhanyāya*, dividing it into the three chapters of *pratyakṣa*, *svārthānumāna*, and *parārthānumāna*: Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (NB) with Dharmottara's *Ṭikā* (NBT), Vidyākaraśānti's *Tarkasopāna* (TSop), and our TBh. The latter two works of course owe much to NB and NBT, but they have their own merits of incorporating later developments of Buddhist philosophy which were not known to Dharmottara. Most parts of NBT are concerned with the explanation of formal logic and epistemology viewed from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika, omitting elucidations of other topics which are very important in Buddhist philosophy in general. TSop is a small book which is so much indebted to Dharmottara that it looks like a digest of NBT, and in places where it goes beyond the latter it probably owes much to TBh. Compared with these two works, TBh is far richer in information, a large portion of which has remained unknown to the scholarly world.

This quality of TBh is due to the fact that Mokṣākara based his work on many texts which were not utilized by Dharmottara or Vidyākaraśānti.

He refers to most of the important works of Dharmakīrti and their commentaries, and cites many passages from Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. The third chapter of his work may be called an abridgement of the theories of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, and this fact is valuable to us, since TBh forms a good introduction to the works of the said two scholars which have not been well studied as yet.

To illustrate the said character of our text, it may not be irrelevant here to refer to some of the important theories discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta¹. In § 4 where he establishes the Buddhist theory that valid cognition is of two kinds, indeterminate (*pratyakṣa*) and determinate knowledge (*anumāna*), he enters into the criticism of other means of knowledge maintained by different schools of Indian philosophy, i. e. *śabda*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *abhāva*, and criticises also the Cārvāka's view that *pratyakṣa* alone is the means of valid knowledge. In this discussion his main source is Ratnakīrti's *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa*. For the refutation of the connection of the word and the thing meant by it, Mokṣākara adopts the same criticism of connection which was put forward by Dharmakīrti in his *Sambandhaṭṭhārikā* (§ 4.2). When he discusses the Buddhist attitude towards the vexed problem of whether the validity of knowledge is known by itself independently, or dependently on another proof attesting it (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam* or *parataḥ*), he follows Śāntirakṣita and Manorathanandin in saying that neither of the two principles should be applied to knowledge in general, some kinds of knowledge being known to be valid by themselves and others by another proof (§ 2.4). Special importance is attached by Mokṣākara-gupta to the theory of self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*), which he discusses in detail, quoting from Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, and Śāntirakṣita and criticising the objections of Kumārilabhaṭṭha and Trilocana (§ 6.2).

A traditional doctrine of Buddhist logic says that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the extreme particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). But this theory entailed a difficult problem as to how universal concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*), which forms the basis of inference and which is the relationship between two universals, can be grasped by *pratyakṣa*.

i) The following illustrations are taken out of the content of the present work, and for a detailed discussion and information the reader is referred to the section indicated by § 4, etc.

Following Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti, our author answers the question by saying that a universal can (also) be an object of *pratyakṣa*. For this new interpretation, he takes advantage of the theory of two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), which was originally expounded by Dharmakīrti in relation to another problem. An affirmative proposition ‘*x* is *y*’ may be interpreted in two ways by putting on either *x* or *y* a restriction or stress which is expressed in Sanskrit by the particle *eva*. When the proposition ‘A particular is the object of *pratyakṣa*’ is construed by *anyayogavyavaccheda*, it means ‘A particular alone is the object of *pratyakṣa*’; but when construed by *ayogavyavaccheda* the same sentence means ‘A particular is rightly included among the objects of *pratyakṣa*’. Once a universal was permitted to be grasped by indeterminate knowledge, it came to be classified under a universal of an individual which is produced by the accumulation of many moments of the momentary stream of a thing and which may be exemplified by the idea of ‘this’, and a universal of a class which denotes all the members of a class, say, jar. These two universals are respectively named *ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa-* and *tiryaglakṣaṇa-sāmānya*. This classification is made by Jñānaśrimitra as well as Ratnakīrti, but seems to have originated from Māṇikyanandin, the Jaina author of the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, if he can be dated in the 9th century A. D. (§ 7.1).

Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a negative proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by understanding the negation as of a term (*paryudāsa-*) and as of a proposition (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) (cf. n. 62). A proposition ‘*x* is not *y*’ means ‘*x* is a non-*y* or *z*’ when the negation is understood as *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*; but if it is construed as *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the same proposition means only ‘It is false that *x* is *y*’ without allowing a positive interpretation. Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to philosophy first by Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka. Buddhist logicians followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doctrines. According to Buddhist logic the non-cognition of a thing is nothing but the cognition of the other things contained in the range of one and the same cognition. That we do not see a jar here means that we see here things other than the jar. This is an example of *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* being applied to the explanation of non-cognition (§ 13). The

theory of *apoha* (discrimination) which was propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had found various interpretations by the time of Mokṣākaragupta, who mentions three : *nivṛtṭyapohavāda*, *vidhivāda* and *apohaviśiṣṭa-vidhivāda*. The latter two were made possible by applying wholly or partly *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha* to *anyāpoha* (negation of other things) (§ 26).

In the second chapter dealing with formal logic, Mokṣākaragupta follows mainly NB and NBT, though not without new information. The most important of the latter may be his classification of negative inference into 16 formulae. Dharmakīrti himself classified negative inference into 4 kinds with 4 subordinate forms in PV, 3 kinds in HB and 11 kinds in NB. The classification into 16 is found in the works of Durvekamiśra, Mokṣākaragupta and Vidyākaraśānti. Durveka, the Brāhmaṇa commentator on NBT, did know the classification into 16, but it is unlikely that he borrowed it from our author, since he is usually supposed to have been contemporary with Jñānaśrimitra who was older than Mokṣākaragupta by more than two generations. Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop probably owes the same to our author. We are not informed of the person who first proposed this classification, although we have a vague clue through which we might be permitted to ascribe it to Jñānaśrimitra (§ 13.5).

Another important piece of information we get from TBh II consists of two theories of how to determine a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). Jñānaśrimitra was of the opinion that a causal relation is ascertained by three cognitions - one perception and two non-perceptions or one non-perception and two perceptions - and criticised Dharmottara who proclaimed that at least five cognitions are necessary for the determination of a causal relation. Mokṣākara refers to these two theories without showing a bias towards either of them (§ 11.3).

In the third chapter Mokṣākaragupta discusses various topics which form important problems of Buddhist philosophy : the proof of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*) (§ 16.1); the refutation of the existence of God (*iśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa*) (§ 20. 1-2 ; § 28-28.1) ; the problem of solipsism (*saṃtānāntara*) (§ 20. 2. 4) ; the problem of how to ascertain the universal concomitance of two terms and two theories about it, viz. *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti* which are respectively represented by Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra (§ 22) ; the definitions and illustrations

of *prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* and *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, the syllogistic forms which played important roles in Buddhist polemics in the later period (§ 24); the problem of the import of the word (*apoha*), of which our author clearly distinguishes between three interpretations held by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Śāntirakṣita, and Jñānaśrimitra (§ 26); the refutation of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) (§ 28.2); the proof of two kinds of omniscient beings (*sarvajña* and *sarvasarvajña*) (§ 29-29.1); the proof of succession of lives (§ 29.2) and so forth. Vācaspatimiśra, as well as his teacher Trilocana, appears often as an opponent in these discussions. Following the method of Dharmakīrti in PV, Mokṣākaragupta inserted these topics as illustrations of particular logical rules, fallacies and confutations, and he bases his opinions mostly on Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti.

At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārin and Mādhyamika (§ 30-33). This portion is particularly interesting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when Guṇaratna (and probably Mādhava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doctrines in the *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (and the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*). Mokṣākaragupta's representation of the theories of the four schools are closely related also to the same kind of summary in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, falsely ascribed to Āryadeva, and its commentary by Bodhibhadra. The verses 21, 22a-b, 23, 25, 26a-b and 27 of the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* are found in TBh too. And Bodhibhadra's review of *sākāravāda* and *nirākāravāda* of the Yogācārins finds a counterpart in TBh § 32.1. Though our author does not enter into a detailed discussion of the important schisms among Yogācārins, he seems to have been well aware of the *sākāravāda* of Jñānaśrimitra and the *nirākāravāda* of Ratnākaraśānti (§ 32.1).

TBh was counted among ten great works of Buddhist philosophy enumerated by Guṇaratna¹¹ who evidently owed much to Mokṣākaragupta when writing the portion of the *Bauddhadarśana* in the *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*. R. Iyengar points out another reference to our text in an unpublished Jaina work, the *Nyāyamaṇidīpikā*, a commentary on the *Pra-*

ii) TRD 47, 20; Iyengar's preface to M, iv.

meyaratnamālā of Anantavīryaⁱⁱⁱ. Malliṣeṇa quotes the passages of TBh on universal momentariness, the succession of lives and other problems in his *Syādvādamāñjarī*^{iv}. As stated above, TSop and the *Jñānasāra-samuccayanibandhana* of Bodhibhadra have much to do with our text, though we are not sure if these two Buddhist authors are posterior to Mokṣākaragupta.

2 Date of the Author : In the colophon of TBh Mokṣākaragupta is mentioned as a resident of the Mahājagaddhala-vihāra^v. We know from substantial evidence^{vi} that the Jagaddhala (or Jagaddala) Vihāra existed in Varendrī, the paternal land of the Pāla dynasty, which might be placed so as to include the junction of the present Rājshāhī, Bogra and Malda of Bengal and an unknown amount of territory to the north^{vii}. But the implication of the colophon is only this, further presumptions read in it being uncertain^{viii}. The Vihāra is sometimes said to have

iii) M Preface iv.

iv) See n. 235, 374, 382 and 383.

v) *śrīmanmahājagaddhalavihāriyamahāpañḍitabhikṣumokṣākaraguptaviracitāyāṁ tarka-bhāṣāyāṁ parārthānumānaparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ*. G has -*rājajagaddhala-* for *mahājagaddhala-*.

vi) RC III, 7 : *mandrāṇāṁ sthitimūḍhāṁ jagaddalamahāvihāracitarāgāṁ, dadhatīm lokeśam api mahattārodiritorumahimānam*, which Majumdar translates : “(Varendrī) -which had elephants of the Mandra type imported (into its forests) -where in the great monastery at Jagaddala kindly love for all was found accumulated -which country bore (in its heart) the image of (Bodhisattva) Lokeśa -and whose great glory was still more increased (or pronounced) by (the presence of) the great (heads of monasteries) and the (images of) Tārā (the Buddhist goddess)”. This is among 27 verses (III, 2-28) in which the poet gives a glowing account of Varendra (cf. Intro. xxxi).

vii) SR Intro. xxxvii, n. 6.

viii) Cf. SR Intro. xxxvii, n. 8. Haraprasad Sāstrī, R. D. Banerjee, Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana, etc. ascribe the construction of the Jagaddala to Rāmapāla. E. Krishnamacharya, following Haraprasād Sāstrī, states (G Bhūmikā, 1) : *ayaṁ hi rājajagaddalavihāraḥ uttara-vaṅgeṣu varendradēse gaṅgākaratoyāsamgamapavitrīte rāmāvatīnagare rāmapālena rājñā pratiṣṭhāpitaḥ*. As Majumdar points out (RC xxxi), H. Sāstrī confounded the verses of RC describing Varendrī and those describing Rāmavati, the capital founded by Rāmapāla. This seems to have led many scholars to think that Rāmapāla constructed the Jagaddala-vihāra in Rāmavati. In fact, however, RC says that the Vihāra was in Varendrī and not that it was in Rāmavati, nor that it was founded by Rāmapāla.

Another source which led Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana to make the reference to Jagaddala having been built in the seventh year of Rāmapāla's reign is the colophon of Jagaddala-nivāsi's *Bhagavatyaṁnāyānusārīṇi vyākhyā* (Cordier Cat. Mdo, XV) which runs in *Peking Reprint Edition* no. 5209 : *mi yi bdag po rāmapālas sa skyoṅ mdsad paḥi gnas kyi mu tig phreṅ pa ni, dpal ldan rgyal po dsagattalar gnas par byed pa bdag gis rnam bśad ḥdi byas so... dpal ldan na rgyal skyoṅ gis rgyal srid mdsad paḥi lo bdun pa la dgun zla ḥbriṅ poḥi tshes bzi la dpal byaṅ chub chen poḥi lha khaṅ du bris paḥo*. This may be rendered : This

been established by Rāmapāla (c. 1100 A. D.), the 14th king of the Pāla dynasty, after his recovery of Varendrī which had been once lost. This information, however, is not trustworthy, though a possibility of the construction of the Vihāra by Rāmapāla may not be totally excluded. Varendrī was existent long before and after this king, and there is no positive evidence for the theory mentioned above. Such being the case, we are not certain of the termini of the Vihāra, and hence of the date of Mokṣākaragupta.

In the absence of external evidence, we have to rely on internal data for determining the date of our author. Considering the many scholars to whom Mokṣākaragupta refers and who cite from him, we can safely place him between Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti on the one hand and Malliṣeṇa on the other^{ix}. In 1292 A. D. Malliṣeṇa wrote his *Syādvādamāñjarī*, in which he cites several times passages from TBh, referring twice to our author by name^x. The three Buddhist logicians named above from whom our author quotes passages so profusely are more or less associated with Dipaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa) who left the Vikramaśīla Vihāra in 1040 A. D. and entered Tibet in 1042 A. D.

To begin with, Jñānaśrimitra seems to have been a younger contemporary of Ratnākaraśānti, since he cites passages from the latter's

vyākhyā was made by me, a resident of Srīrājajagattala, which is the necklace of the land protected by King Rāmapāla... It was transcribed at the Srī-Mahābodhi temple on the fourth day of the month of *Pauṣa* in the seventh year of the coronation of Srī-Mānapāla. I think it is impossible to derive from this colophon the conclusion that the Jagaddala Vihāra was built by Rāmapāla. After all, what we know from these sources is no more than this : The Jagaddala Vihāra was existent in Varendrī, and flourished under Rāmapāla too. Rāmapāla's date is also a vexed problem, on which R. D. Banerjee and R. C. Majumdar had exchanged a long series of discussions. But for our present purpose, it is enough if we follow Kosambi and Gokhale in taking A. D. 1100 as a fair date in Rāmapāla's reign.

ix) Vidyabhushana (*A History of Indian Logic*) places Mokṣākaragupta at 1100 A. D., Krishnamacharya between c. 1100-1200, and Iyengar at 1110. None of these datings is based on evidence, though they seem to have been inferred from the date of Rāmapāla. Among other scholars who are close in time to Mokṣākaragupta, we may mention Sucaritamīśra who is criticised by Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti, Manorathanandin whom our author seems to follow in a few discussions and who completed his com. on PV before 1200 A. D., Durvekamīśra to whom Mokṣākaragupta seems to owe a few theories, Bodhibhadra, and Vidyākaraśānti who was probably indebted to our author. But the dates of all these scholars are not fixed beyond doubt, and cannot be taken into account for determining the date of our author.

x) Malliṣeṇa states in the colophon of SVM that he completed the work in 1214 Śaka = 1292 A. D. (cf. SVM Intro. xiii).

Prajñāpāramitopadeśa in his *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*^{xi}. Both are enumerated among the teachers of Atīśa. Ratnakīrti made the summaries of Jñānaśrīmitra's works and was refuted by Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (ATV) together with his master^{xii}. Ratnakīrti is, therefore, most probably a direct disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra, and may have been younger than the latter at least by one generation. About these three Buddhists and their contemporaries, we may collect a good amount of information from Tibetan sources; but the Tibetan tradition is such that the more we learn from it, the more we become confused. Therefore, we should be satisfied with the unanimous opinion that Jñānaśrīmitra was an elder contemporary of Atīśa^{xiii}.

Almost all the works of Jñānaśrīmitra contain abundant citations from Vācaspatiśra, especially from his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (NVT)^{xiv}. S. Dasgupta, E. Frauwallner and A. Thakur argued from different materials to the same conclusion that Vācaspatiśra should be placed after Jayantabhaṭṭa, not before as had been so long believed^{xv}. P. Hacker established the date of Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* as about 890 A. D. on the basis of substantial evidence that he was in the court of Śaṅkaravar-

xi) For the relation of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti see n. 418 below.

xii) JNA Intro. 34-36 ; RNA Intro. 21-22.

xiii) Cf. Bhattacharya 53. When Tibetan monks came to Vikramaśīla to invite Atīśa to their country, they found that Ratnakīrti was among the eminent pandits under Atīśa. Atīśa, receiving the invitation, acted according to the instruction of Jñānaśrī. Sometime later when Naropa came on his last visit to Vikramaśīla, "he leaned on the right arm of Atīśa while Jñānaśrīmitra helped him with his left arm". This information is derived from S. C. Das's *Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow* (Journal of Buddhist Text Society, I, i., 1893, 7 ff.) But some other pieces of information contradict the last story; the biographer of Naropa, for instance, dates him in 1016-1100 A. D. which means that Naropa was younger than Atīśa, let alone Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. H. V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Naropa*, Intro.). So far as Jñānaśrīmitra is concerned, however, *Blue Annals*, Tāranātha and other sources agree in enumerating him together with Ratnākaraśānti among the teachers of Atīśa. SR lxxviii introduces Jñānaśrīmitra, a poet whose two verses are included in SR as "perhaps identical with the younger contemporary of Atīśa, Dīpaṃkara (Tār. p. 241)". But this is a mistake on the part of the editor of SR, since Tāranātha says in the page referred to by him: Jñānaśrīmitra ist... der Lehrer, dem Sri Atīśa zu grossen Dank verpflichtet war. Now it is almost certain that the poet is the same as Jñānaśrīmitra, the philosopher.

xiv) Cf. JNA Intro. 21 ; Index, Vācaspati, Tātparyāṭikākāra.

xv) Dasgupta, II, 107 (1932) ; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya, WZKM, 43, S. 266-277 (1937) ; RNA Intro. 21.

man of Kaśmir who ruled 883-902 A. D.^{xvi} Thakur holds the same, though he seems not to have seen Hacker's article.^{xvii} This discovery, however, entailed another problem, the date of Vācaspatimiśra himself who had been usually placed around 841 A. D. on the basis of the date 898 which is given in the manuscripts of his *Nyāyasūcinibandha* (NSN) and which is construed as referring to Vikrama Saṁvat. Hacker, D. Bhattacharya and Thakur solve this question by taking the date 898 as of Śaka Saṁvat and accordingly placing Vācaspati at 976 A. D.^{xviii} Considering this date of Vācaspatimiśra and the Tibetan information that Jñānaśrimitra was an elder contemporary of Atīśa (982-1055 A. D.) we may place the activity of Jñānaśrimitra in c. 980-1030 A. D. and that of Ratnakīrti in c. 1000-1050 A. D.

There is, however, information which might contradict the date of Jñānaśrimitra as given just above. As is well known, one of the manuscripts of Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvali* bears the date 906 Śaka (984 A. D.). ATV in which Udayana criticises most of the works of Jñānaśrimitra and some of Ratnakīrti's is certainly the oldest of his major works, though we are not sure if it was written before his two smaller tracts, *Lakṣaṇāvali* and *Lakṣaṇamālā*.^{xix} Thus, ATV must be placed before 984 A. D. or at latest at a date soon after it. It then follows that Jñānaśrimitra wrote most of his works in a very short period between 976 or 980 and c. 984, which is very unlikely. This assumption becomes absolutely impossible when we trust the tradition that in ATV Udayana referred to Ratnakīrti, who must have made the summaries of his master's works at least a generation after his master wrote them.^{xx}

xvi) Jayantabhaṭṭa und Vācaspatimiśra, ihre Zeit und ihre Bedeutung für die Chronologie des Vedānta, Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, *Festschrift W. Schubring*, S. 162-163 (1951).

xvii) RNA Intro. 21.

xviii) Hacker, op. cit., 163; Bhattacharya, op. cit. 29, 54 etc. (1958); RNA Intro. 2, 3 with n. 2.

xix) Bhattacharya 4-5; Frauwallner, Jñānaśrī, WZKM Bd. 38, 231 with A. 1 (1931): Chronological order of Udayana's works is: ATV, *Kusumāñjali*, *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, *Kiraṇāvali*. Two small works, *Lakṣaṇāvali* and *Lakṣaṇamālā* were, according to Bhattacharya, written after *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, from which they borrow benedictive verses. In the above mentioned work, Frauwallner placed Ratnakīrti at c. 950 and his master Jñānaśrī in the first half of 10th cent. A. D. For an argument against this see n. 333 below.

xx) According to Śaṅkaramiśra, a commentator on ATV, Udayana refuted in ATV Ratnakīrti's *Citrādvaitasiddhi* (cf. Bhattacharya 18); Thakur says on the basis of a passage in ATV that Udayana seems to have been aware of the relationship between Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti (JNA Intro. 31).

We may suppose that Vācaspatimiśra had already written his masterpiece, NVT, and the *Nyāyakanikā*, both of which were the objects of Jñānaśrimitra's refutation, earlier than 976 A. D., say, by about 950 A. D. This may push back the beginning of the activity of Jñānaśrimitra by 30 years and make it possible to insert him and Ratnakīrti in between Vācaspati and Udayana. But we can assume with equal weight that Vācaspati must have written NVT together with NSN, which is a supplement to the former.^{xxi} Bhattacharya enumerates many factors which are inconsistent with the supposition which places the activity of Vācaspati and Jñānaśrī at so early a date as 950 A. D. Is the date 984 A. D. in which Udayana is said to have written the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* so certain as to disprove the Tibetan tradition that Jñānaśrimitra was an older contemporary of Atīśa?

Hacker does not touch the date of Udayana, appreciating that the latter gives the date 906 Śaka with a clear reference to the era. But Bhattacharya and Thakur are of the opinion that the date, which is written only in a single manuscript dated so late as 1708 Samvat, should be reconsidered as the date of Vācaspati was. And Bhattacharya actually proposes 1025-1100 A. D. for Udayana's life.^{xxii} Bhattacharya's proposal is based mainly on two traditions: the Tibetan one relating to Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti to which we have referred above, and the other concerning the debate between Udayana and the father of Śriharṣa whose date can be known with a fair certainty.^{xxiii} Bhattacharya's prolonged argument seems to lack incontestable evidence, but it is persuasive enough at least to make us doubt the date given in the manuscript of the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. And when Udayana's date is in the balance, we should derive the most natural conclusion from the date of Vācaspatimiśra, which is now agreed to by many scholars, and we may return to our former suggestion in assessing Jñānaśrimitra's activity as 980-1030 and that of Ratnakīrti as 1,000-1050 A. D.

To come back to Mokṣākaragupta, he may thus be placed between

xxi) This is maintained by Bhattacharya, 29.

xxii) Bhattacharya 54.

xxiii) Bhattacharya, 49-50. This event is stated by Bhāgiratha, a commentator of the 18th century on the *Naiṣadha*. Śriharṣa's father Śrihira had an academic contest with Udayana. In other words Udayana was older than Śriharṣa by only one generation. Bhattacharya thinks that the debate took place probably in the decade 1075-85 A. D.

1050 and 1292 A. D. It is almost certain that the Jagaddhala Vihāra was finally destroyed by the sack of the Muslims in 1202 A. D. when Śākyaśribhadra of Kaśmir is said to have fled, on seeing the devastation of the Vikramaśīla, to Jagaddala of Oḍiṣa, at last entering Tibet in 1204 A. D.^{xxiv} We are not absolutely sure if this Jagaddala of Oḍiṣa is in reality identical with the Jagaddhala Vihāra of Bengal, as is supposed by scholars.^{xxv} Apart from it, however, Cordier Catalogue, Rgyud XXVI, 50 and Mdo XXVII, 8 mention Dānaśīla and Vibhūticandra, who entered Tibet also at the very beginning of the 13th century, as of Varendra-jagaddala and Jagaddalavihāra respectively, both of which must be understood as our Jagaddhala Vihāra itself. Hence we have to assume that the Vihāra existed until it was destroyed in 1202 A. D. Although it is very natural to think that Buddhist activities dwindled rapidly under the Senas, the Vaiṣṇavas, who had overwhelmed the Pālas by about 1150 A. D., we are not sure that the Senas did persecute Buddhists or that the Vihāra perished with the Pālas. Until the Tibetan information mentioned immediately above is disproved, therefore, we should not put back the date of the Vihāra or that of Mokṣākaragupta. Nor can the fact that he does not refer to Udayana indicate with certainty that he lived before Udayana. Thus, until we get other evidence, we cannot narrow the duration of time 1050-1202 A. D. within which Mokṣākaragupta's activity must fall.

3 The Text : The Sanskrit text of TBh was edited twice : once by Embar Krishnamacharya as Vol. XCIV of the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series* (G), and secondly by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar as a part of the *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna* published in Mysore in 1952 (M). The manuscripts used by both the editors are not perfect. G omits many passages found in M, and especially in the first few pages it is unreliable owing to the corruption of the Mss. utilised. According to Iyengar, three leaves are missing out of the Mss. of the Mysore Oriental Library on which M is based. In general, however, M is a far better edition than G, and agrees well with the Tibetan translation except in some details. The Tibetan translation *Rtog geḥi skad* is listed in the *Tohoku Catalogue*

xxiv) Cf. Tāranātha, 255 ; Sumpa Khan-po's *Pag sam Jon zang*, ed. S. C. Das, 122.

xxv) Cf. e. g. SR xxxvii, n. 7. But we are not absolutely sure that the Jagaddalavihāra and Jagaddala of Oḍiṣa are the same. B. B. Basu, for example, refers to a place named Jagaddala in Orissa which is different from the Jagaddalavihāra of Bengal (Basu, *Archaeological Survey Reports of Mayurbhanj*).

as no. 4246, in the *Catalogue of Peking Reprint Edition* as no. 5762, and in *Cordier Catalogue* as Mdo CXII, 28. This is the largest and complete text, complementing the lacunae of the Sanskrit text.

The following translation is made from M in principle ; but whenever the better reading is found in G or T, it is adopted with the necessary notification ; the lacunae in the Sanskrit text are filled up by translating the corresponding portions of the Tibetan. Sectioning and titling of the sections are made by the translator ; in order to make the context of the translation clearer, supplementary words are inserted in brackets ; Sanskrit words equivalent to the preceding English translation or English words corresponding to the Sanskrit words used in the translation are given in parentheses when necessary ; in footnotes, numbers refer to the pages and lines of the texts concerned in principle, but with s., k., or v. they refer to the number of sūtra or verse ; in the footnote, when a citation from another text is marked by the preceding =, it is exactly identical with the concerned passage in TBh, and when not so marked, the reader is asked to compare both. The translator believes that TBh, presenting rich information in brief and lucid language, could be used at least as the basis of a dictionary of Buddhist logical terminology which he is attempting. In view of this, he has tried in footnotes to trace back the citation in TBh to the original and to supply the theory discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta with a brief survey of the tradition behind it, though the range of his search is limited mainly to Sanskrit editions. Although he does not imagine that he has fully succeeded, it is hoped that the present work with detailed notes and commentaries could serve as a handbook of Buddhist philosophy.

During his stay in London in 1962, the translator read and discussed some portions of Chap. III of TBh with Professor John Brough of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, many of whose valuable suggestions are incorporated into the present work. Especially when reading § 20. 2.4 in which our text, Sanskrit as well as Tibetan, is far from perfect, his analysis and partial rendering proved to be extremely helpful. The translator expresses his sincere gratitude. Of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, the translator has derived information from the works of Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University (the part on epistemology) and Professor H. Kitagawa of Nagoya University (the

part on logic). Prof. Kitagawa's work in its final form was published just as the present work was completed for the press ; Prof. Hattori's work is to be published in the *Harvard Oriental Series*, but the translator could refer to the typescripts which were made available to him by the kindness of the author. Professor Y. Ojihara has been ready to help the translator whenever the latter approached him with questions, especially those concerning Sanskrit grammar. The translator acknowledges his indebtedness to all these scholars. Thanks are also due to Mr. Peter Challis, who read through the English translation and helped the translator revise it.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AK=L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin.
- ATV=Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayana. Bibliotheca Indica 5 & Chowkhamba Skt. Series.
- AYV=Hemacandra's Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā, included in SVM.
- BCA & BCAP=Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati, ed. P. L. Vaidya. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12.
- Bhattacharya=D. Bhattacharya, History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.
- Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra=Śloka-vārttikaṭikā (Śarkarikā) of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra, ed. Kunhan Rāja.
- Blue Annals=G. N. Roerich, The Blue Annals (Deb-ther sñon-po).
- BSOAS=Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Dasgupta=S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy.
- DP=Dharmottarapradīpa of Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra, ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 2.
- Fragment; Randle, Fragment=H. N. Randle, Fragments from Dīhānāga.
- G=Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta, ed. Emba Krishnamācharya, with a Skt. commentary by the editor. GOS no. XCIV.
- Gnoli=PV Chap. I, with Dharmakīrti's Svavṛtti.
- Hattori=Masaaki Hattori, The Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga (Book 1, pratyakṣa-pariccheda)-Tibetan Text and an annotated English Translation. Typescripts.
- HB=Hetubindu of Dharmakīrti, a Skt. reconstruction included in HBT & the Tib. edition (Peking Reprint ed. no. 5712).
- HBT=Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, GOS CXIII.
- IBK=Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.
- JBRs=Journal of the Bihar Research Society.
- JNA=Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī, ed. A. Thakur. Tibetan Skt. Works Series Vol. V.
- JSS and JSSN=Jñānasārasamuccaya falsely ascribed to Āryadeva & its com. Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra. The Tibetan text of JSS is available in S. Yamaguchi, Chūkan Bukkyō Ronkō (中觀佛教論攷) pp. 265-341. For JSSN Peking Reprint Edition No. 5252 is used.
- Karṇakagomin=Karṇakagomin's Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana. Kitāb Mahāl, 1943.
- Kitagawa=北川秀則, インド古典論理學の研究 (Hidenori Kitagawa, A Study of Indian Classical Logic-Dignāga's System).
- Kunst=Arnold Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha.
- M=Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta, included in Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna, ed. H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore, 1952.
- Mānameyodaya=Mānameyodaya by Nārāyaṇa, ed. & tr. Kunhan Rāja, Adyar.
- MIK=Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia.
- Mīmāṃsābhāṣya=Śabara's Mīmāṃsābhāṣya in Mīmāṃsādarśanaṃ sabhāṣyaṃ, ed. Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya, Calcutta.
- Mookerjee=Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux.
- Mookerjee and Nagasaki=S. Mookerjee and H. Nagasaki, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, Eng. tr. (Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication Vol. IV).
- NB & NBT=Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara, ed. T. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica VII.
- NBh=Nyāyabhāṣya, See NS.

- NBTT=Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī, ed. T. Stcherbatsky. Bib. Bud. XI.
- NK=M. Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, Nyāyakośa. Bombay Skt. and Prakrit Series No. XLIX, 1928.
- NKan=Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśra. Paṇḍit New Series Vol. XXVI.
- NS & NBh=Nyāyasūtra of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya, ed. G. Jhā. Poona Oriental Series No. 58.
- NV & NVT=Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara & Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra, included in Nyāyadarśanam, ed. A. M. Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Skt. Series No. XVIII.
- NVV=Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa of Śrī Vādirājasūri, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Kāshi, 1954.
- Parikṣāmukhasūtra, of Māṇikyanandin, included in PKM.
- PKM=Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa by Prabhācandra, ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Bombay, 1941.
- PPU=Prajñāpāramitopadeśa of Ratnākaraśānti. Peking Reprint Edition No. 5579.
- Prasannapadā=(Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec) la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti (Bib. Bud.), ed. de la Vallée Poussin.
- PS, PSV=Pramāṇasamuccaya & -vṛtti. Peking Reprint Edition Nos. 5700, 5701 (V=Vasudhrarakṣita's tr.), 5702 (K=Kaṇakavarman's tr.)
- PV=Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti. For Chap. 1 (Svārthānumāna) R. Gnoli's ed (SOR XXIII) is used : For Chaps. II (Pramāṇasiddhi), III (Pratyakṣa) & IV (Parārthānumāna) Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana (Tib. Skt. works Series, 1) is used.
- PVBh=Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya or -alaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana.
- PVn=Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti. Peking Reprint Edition, No. 5710.
- PVnT=Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā of Dharmottara. Peking Reprint Edition, No. 5727.
- PVV=Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana. 1937.
- Randle=H. N. Randle, Indian logic in the early schools.
- RC=The Rāmacarita of Sandhyākaranandin, ed & tr. R. C. Majumdar & others. 1939.
- RNA=Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī, ed. A. Thakur. Tib. Skt. Works Series Vol. III.
- Sambandhaparikṣā=Dharmakīrti's Sambandhaparikṣā by E. Frauwallner, WZKM Bd. 41.
- Śāstradīpikā=Śāstradīpikā of Pārthasārathimiśra, ed. Laxman Shastri Drāvida. Chowkhamba Skt. Series, No. 188.
- SBNT=Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, ed. M. M. Haraprasād Shāstri. Bibliotheca Indica, New Series No. 1226.
- SDS=Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, ed. V. S. Abhyankar. Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 4, Poona.
- Siddhi=L. de la Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang.
- SR=The Subhāṣitaratnakośa, ed. Kosambi and Gokhale. HOS 42.
- Stcherbatsky=T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 2 vols. Bib. Bud. XXVI.
- SV & SVK=Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārttika with Sucaritamīśra's Kāśikā, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstri. Trivandrum Skt. Series, No. XC. 3 parts.
- SVM=Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa, ed. A. B. Dhruva with Intro. & Notes etc. Poona 1933.
- T=Tarkabhāṣā, Tibetan Edition : Tn=Nārthan ed. ; Tp=Peking ed. ; Td=Derge ed.
- Tāranātha=A. Schiefner, Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus.
- TBh=Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta.
- TRD=(Shaddarśanasamuchchaya by Hari-bhadra with) Guṇaratna's Com. Tarkarahasyadīpikā, ed. L. Suali. Bib. Ind. CLXVII.
- TS & TSP=Tattvasamgraha with the com. (Pañjikā) of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Krishnamacharya. GOS No. XXXI.
- TSop=Tarkasopāna of Vidyākaraśānti, in G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part 1

(SOR IX).
Viṃśatikā=Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ, ed. S. Lévi.
Viśālāmalavati=Viśālāmalavati nāma Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā by Jinendrabuddhi.
Peking Reprint Edition, No. 5766.
VP=The Vākyapadiya by Bhartrihari

(Brahmakāṇḍa), ed. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla.
Kashi Skt. Series, 124.
WZKM=Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
des Morgenlandes.
WZKSO=Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
Süd- und Ostasiens.

CONTENTS OF THE TARKABHĀṢĀ

Chapter 1. Indeterminate Knowledge

Prefatory verse § 1.	p. 23
Valid cognition defined and discussed : <i>pramāṇam saṁyagjñānam apūrvagocaram</i> § 2.	p. 23
Function of valid cognition and the meaning of <i>prāpakatva</i> § 2.1.	p. 24
The logical difficulty arising from universal momentariness is solved § 2.2.	p. 25
Is auditory knowledge valid? The meaning of <i>arthakriyāsthiti</i> explained § 2.3.	p. 26
Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? § 2.4.	p. 27
<i>Apūrvagocara</i> explained § 2.5.	p. 28
Sense-organ is not a means of valid knowledge § 2.6.	p. 28
Classification of valid cognition § 3.	p. 29
Valid knowledge is of only two kinds § 4.	p. 30
Refutation of the Cārvāka's view of <i>pramāṇa</i> § 4.1.	p. 31
Refutation of verbal testimony (<i>śabda</i>) § 4.2.	p. 32
Refutation of identification (<i>upamāna</i>) § 4.3.	p. 35
Refutation of presumption (<i>arthāpatti</i>) § 4.4.	p. 38
Refutation of non-existence (<i>abhāva</i>) § 4.5.	p. 38
Indeterminate knowledge (<i>pratyakṣa</i>) defined and discussed ; <i>kalpanāpoḍham</i> explained § 5.	p. 40
<i>Abhrānta</i> explained § 5.1.	p. 43
Classification of indeterminate knowledge ; sense-perception § 6.	p. 44
Mental perception § 6.1.	p. 45
Self-consciousness § 6.2.	p. 47

Mystic intuition of a seer § 6.3.	p. 53
Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered § 6.3.1.	p. 54
Object of indeterminate knowledge § 7.	p. 56
That the particular is the object of indeterminate knowledge must be construed by <i>ayogavyavaccheda</i> and not by <i>anayogavyavaccheda</i> § 7.1.	p. 56
Object of valid knowledge is twofold : <i>grāhya</i> and <i>adhyavaseya</i> § 7.1.1.	p. 58
Two kinds of universals : <i>ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa</i> and <i>tiryaglakṣaṇa</i> as the object of <i>sādhana</i> - and <i>vyāptigrāhaka-pratyakṣa</i> respectively § 7.1.2.	p. 58
Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold § 7.1.3.	p. 59
Refutation of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika § 7.2.	p. 59
Identity of the cause and effect of cognition § 8.	p. 60
Knowledge is necessarily endowed with the image of its object (<i>sākārajñāna-vāda</i>) § 8.1.	p. 61

Chapter II. Inference for oneself

Classification of determinate knowledge or inference § 9.	p. 63
Function or object of inference : different opinions § 9.1.	p. 64
The three characteristics of a logical mark ; <i>pakṣadharmatā</i> § 10.	p. 65
<i>Anvaya</i> § 10.1.	p. 67
<i>Vyatireka</i> § 10.2.	p. 69
Different opinions as to why both <i>anvaya</i> and <i>vyatireka</i> are necessary § 10.3.	p. 70
Logical mark is of only three kinds § 11.	p. 72
Logical mark as effect § 11.1.	p. 72
Formal statement of an inference or a	

syllogism is two-membered ; refutation of the five-membered syllogism of the Naiyāyika § 11.2.	p. 72	Syllogism of negation by the method of agreement § 19.	p. 94
How to establish a causal relation § 11.3.	p. 74	Syllogism of negation by the method of difference § 19.1.	p. 94
Logical mark of essential identity § 12.	p. 76	Pervasion (<i>vyāpti</i>) explained in relation to the two syllogistic methods § 20.	p. 95
Logical mark of non-cognition § 13.	p. 77	The Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue <i>vyāpti</i> § 20.1.	p. 95
Non-cognition establishes not absence itself but practical activities concerning absence § 13.1.	p. 78	Its refutation § 20.2.	p. 98
Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality § 13.2.	p. 79	Trilocana's objection rejected § 20.2.1.	p. 100
Significance of the qualifier <i>upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāpta</i> § 13.3.	p. 80	<i>Vyatireka</i> (negative pervasion) cannot be established by mere non-perception § 20.2.2.	p. 104
Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience § 13.4.	p. 81	Vācaspatimiśra's objection rejected § 20.2.3.	p. 105
Classification of negative inference into 16 formulae § 13.5.	p. 81	The problem of solipsism discussed § 20.2.4.	p. 106
Chapter III. Inference for others		Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out § 20.2.5.	p. 108
Inference for others defined § 14.	p. 86	The relation of <i>anvaya</i> and <i>vyatireka</i> § 21.	p. 111
Two kinds of syllogism: method of agreement and that of difference § 15.	p. 86	<i>Antarvyāpti</i> and <i>bahirvyāpti</i> ; how to determine a <i>vyāpti</i> § 22.	p. 111
Syllogism by the method of agreement and with a logical mark of identity § 16.	p. 86	Untrue <i>vyāpti</i> effects the fallacy of <i>anaikāntikatva</i> § 23.	p. 113
Proof of universal momentariness § 16.1.	p. 87	Reasoning to an undesired conclusion (<i>prasaṅga</i>) defined § 24.	p. 114
Recognition (<i>pratyabhijñā</i>) is merely constructive imagination § 16.2.	p. 88	<i>Prasaṅga</i> , <i>prasaṅgaviṣayaya</i> and <i>sādhyaṣayayabādhakapramāṇa</i> illustrated § 24.1.	p. 114
Four kinds of the syllogism based on identity : <i>nirviśeṣaṇa-prayoga</i> § 16.3.	p. 89	Function of <i>prasaṅga</i> § 24.3.	p. 117
<i>Saviśeṣaṇa-prayoga</i> § 16.3.1.	p. 90	Confutation (<i>dūṣaṇa</i>) defined ; <i>vaiyarthya</i> , <i>asāmarthya</i> , <i>atiprasaṅga</i> etc. are not different from the fallacies of <i>asiddha</i> -, <i>viruddha</i> - and <i>anaikāntika-hetu</i> § 25.	p. 118
<i>Bhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga</i> § 16.3.2.	p. 91	Confutation of <i>āśrayāsiddhahetu</i> illustrated by the refutation of <i>ātman</i> § 25.1.	p. 119
<i>Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga</i> § 16.3.3.	p. 92	Confutation of <i>svarūpāsiddhi</i> ; untrue <i>vyāpti</i> is not different from <i>anaikāntikatva</i> § 25.2.	p. 121
Syllogism by the method of difference and with a logical mark of identity § 17.	p. 92	The theory of <i>apoha</i> ; <i>vidhivāda</i> and <i>nivṛttypohavāda</i> are both criticised and the theory of <i>apohaviśiṣṭavidhi</i> is established § 26.	p. 122
Syllogism by the method of agreement and with a logical mark of causality § 18.	p. 93	Refutation of a universal § 27.	p. 126
Syllogism by the method of difference and with a logical mark of causality § 18.1.	p. 94		

Refutation of God as the permanent agent § 28.	p.130	Proof of the succession of lives § 29.2.	p.137
The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually § 28.1.	p.131	The doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika § 30	p.139
Refutation of recognition appended § 28.2	p.132	The doctrine of the Sautrāntika : <i>sākhā-rajñānavāda</i> and the proof of the external reality § 31.	p.139
<i>Karman</i> or the mind is the sole cause of the world § 28.3.	p.134	Refutation of the soul § 31.1.	p.140
The existence of two kinds of omniscient persons proved : 1) Person who knows the absolute truth (<i>sarvajña</i>) § 29.	p.134	Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind § 31.2.	p.142
2) All-knowing person (<i>sarvasarvajña</i>) § 29.1.	p.136	Refutation of earth, water, fire and air § 31.3.	p.143
		The doctrine of the Yogācārin § 32.	p.145
		<i>Sākāravāda</i> and <i>nirākāravāda</i> of the Yogācārins § 32.1.	p.148
		The doctrine of the Mādhyamika § 33.	p.148

THE LANGUAGE OF LOGIC

Chapter 1. Indeterminate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*)

1. **Prefatory verse.** (1.2) ¹Having done reverence to the master, the lord of the world², I [here begin to] elucidate the language of logic in order that [even] students of little intelligence may learn the thought of Dharmakīrti.

2. **Valid cognition defined.** (1.4) Since those who act with deliberation in the world, desirous [for some object], follow the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) which are able to make us attain all human aims, the means of valid knowledge is to be first discussed³.

(1.6) The means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is true knowledge (*saṃyagjñāna*) referring to an object not known before⁴. [It is called] *pramāṇa* since by means of it an object is measured. However, it is not different from true knowledge itself,⁵ because it is free from the fault of uncertainty (*saṃdeha*) and erroneousness (*viparyāsa*). In the world, knowledge not disagreeing [with experience] (*avisamvādaka*) is called true knowledge.⁶ And this non-disagreement is not found in uncertain know-

1. As stated by the editor in G 1, n. 1 the first few pages of this edition are based on the very defective manuscripts, and the parenthesized words are not those of the author of TBh. Until p. 4 of G, I disregard the variant readings found in it except at important places.

2. According to RC III, v. 7, an image of the Bodhisattva Lokeśa [probably the same as Avalokiteśvara] was placed at the center of the city of Varendrī, where Mokṣākaragupta resided in a monastery called Jagaddhala.

3. Cf. NB s. 1: *saṃyagjñānapūrvakā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti tad vyutpādyate*; NBT 3, 23: *arthakriyārthibhiś cārthakriyāsamarthapṛāptinimittam jñānam mṛgyate yac ca tair mṛgyate tad eva śāstre vicāryate*.

4. PVV 3, n. 2: *pramāṇam saṃyagjñānam apūrvagocaram iti lakṣaṇam*.

5. The Buddhist theory that the means and the result of cognition are one and the same is dealt with in § 8. See also PS I, v. 8 c-d: *savyāpārapratitātvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat*. (Hattori, Part II, Section 1, n. 55); PV III, v. 308 a-b: *sā ca tasyātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaram phalam*; NB I, s. 18: *tad eva ca pratyakṣam jñānam pramāṇaphalam*; PVBh 23, 5: *pramāṇataḥ phalam nānyat pramāṇam na phalāt param*, etc.; TS v. 1344-1349.

6. NBT 3, 5: *avisamvādakam jñānam saṃyagjñānam*; PV II, v. 1: *pramāṇam avisamvādirjñānam*.

ledge as e.g. the knowledge [which cannot determine its object] to be either a man or a post, nor in erroneous knowledge as the knowledge of water seen in a desert.⁷ ‘Referring to an object [not yet known’ (*apūrvagocara*)⁸ means that the object of it [=valid knowledge] has not been experienced before, *gocara* (range) denoting an object (*viṣaya*) such as a jar. Knowledge which has been produced by it [=an object] and which is capable of making us attain⁹ the object is the means of valid knowledge.

2.1. Function of valid cognition. (1.13) [The following objection may be raised:] “Knowledge is the maker (*kartṛ*) [of an action], a person [possessing the knowledge] the agent (*prayojya*), and a thing the object (*karman*). But how can you call knowledge a *pramāṇa* if sometimes it does not [actually] make a man reach [an object] and thus is unable to cause him to attain it”

[The author:] We reply. We do not mean that a person is forcibly caused to act by knowledge as in the way of trampling on the neck,¹⁰ but that determination in the form ‘the essential quality of this thing is such and not otherwise’ is to be produced [by knowledge]; and if it is produced by knowledge, this much [of function] is called the validity of cognition, compatible [with experience]. As for a person possessing knowledge, he may actually take action towards the object because of a particular need (*prayojana*), or may not act owing to the lack of the need. And the object may also be snatched away by a yogin or a devil [who makes it unattainable]. But how is knowledge affected [through such

7. NBT 3, 18: *ābhyām pramāṇābhyām anyena jñānena pradarsito'rthaḥ kaścīd atyanta-viṣaryastaḥ, yathā maricikāsu jalam. sa cāsattvāt prāptum aśakyah. kaścīd aniyato bhāvābhāvayoḥ yathā saṁśayārthaḥ.*

8. *Apūrvagocaram* or *anadhigatārthagantṛ* is the qualification given to the *pramāṇa* by the Mimāṃsaka and the Buddhist. Stcherbatsky, II, 372, n. 6; PS I, k. 2d- 3 b: *na ca punaḥ punar abhijñāne'niṣṭhāsakteḥ smṛtādivat*=PVBh 242, 29 (Hattori, II, 1, n. 20; 22); PV II, v. 3: *gṛhitagrahaṇān nêṣṭam sāmvyutam*; v. 5 a: *ajñātārthaḥ prakāśo vā*; PVBh 21, 12 f. b.: *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānam niścitam bādhavarjitam, aduṣṭakāraṇārabdham pramāṇam lokasammatam*. Dharmottara explains the theory in NBT 3, 10 ff.: *ata evānadhigataviṣayaṁ pramāṇam... tato 'dhigataviṣayam apramāṇam*. Ratnakirti defines *pramāṇya* (RNA 90, 7): *pramāṇyam ca pramāṇāntarāgṛhitaniścitaḥ pravṛttiviṣayārthatayā tatprāpaṇe śaktiḥ*. Cf. n. 4 above.

9. For the expression *prāpaṇayogyā* see PVBh 22, 8-7 f. b.: *prāpakatvāt pramāṇam iti cet, na, prāpaṇayogyatvāt pramāṇasya*; TSop 275, 10-12: *prāpaṇam api prāpakatvaṁ tad-yogyatā ca*.

10. T *mgrin pa nas bkug pa* (Td *paḥi*) *tshul du* (in the way of pulling a person by the neck).

hindrances against actual attainment of the object]?¹¹

2.2. Logical difficulty arising from universal momentariness is solved. (2.4) [The opponent:] “The validity of cognition is [according to you] testified by its agreeing with experience (*avisamvādatva*), and the agreement with experience is proved by the attainment of the object seen. We cannot, however, attain the same thing which we have seen, because of its momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) [i. e. the thing seen is different from the thing reached]. Furthermore, what is seen is the colour-form (*rūpa*) [of an object], but what is reached is the tangibility (*spraṣṭavya*) [of the object]. Thus, one thing is seen and another is reached. Accordingly what you reach is not the thing that you have seen. How then does this cognition become valid?”

[The author: This argument is] untenable. For even if we reach what is in reality different [from the thing we have seen], we still get the logical imagination (*adhyavasāya*) of identity ‘I reach the very same object which I have seen’; and this is meant by the expression ‘attainment of what has been apprehended’ (*pratītaprāpana*). On the other hand, the knowledge of water derived from a mirage etc. is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain this [*adhyavasāya*].¹²

[The opponent:] “Is it not that apart from the attainment of efficient operation¹³ (*arthakriyā*) we cannot ascertain that this [knowledge] is capable of causing to reach and that [knowledge] is not? And the difference between a valid and an invalid knowledge cannot be determined by [perceiving] the mere origination of knowledge. Therefore, how can it [i. e. knowledge determining the essential quality of an object] be valid knowledge?”

[The author:] There is not this fault [in our theory]. It is true that such a distinction cannot be determined by the origination of knowledge in general; yet we can point out how one is distinguished [from the other]

11. For a similar argument cf. NBT 3, 8: *pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviśaya-pradarśakam eva, na hi puruṣaṁ haṭhāt pravartayitum śaknoti vijñānam*. See also E. Frauwallner, Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, WZKM 42, 251.

12. NBT 4, 8-11: *nanu deśaniyatam ākāranīyatam ca prāpayitum śakyam, yatkālam tu paricchinnam tatkālam na śakyam prāpayitum. nōcyate yasmīn eva kāle paricchidyate tasmīn eva kāle prāpayitavyam iti. anyo hi darśanakālo 'nyaś ca prāptikālaḥ. kiṁ tu yatkālam paricchinnam tad eva prāpanīyam. abhedādhyavasāyāc ca saṁtānagatam ekatvam draṣṭavyam iti*.

13. PV II, v. 1 b-c: *arthakriyāsthitiḥ avisamvādanam*.

when we get the knowledge specific¹⁴ [to an object]. For instance, one who gets a dull cognition may be unable to determine the validity of knowledge at the moment of its origination, but he determines [the validity of his knowledge of fire or water] through perceiving efficient operation such as burning, cooking, immersion in water, ¹⁴... bathing, drinking, ...¹⁴ emergence, etc. when he sees them afar, or through perceiving rising smoke etc. One who gets a sharp cognition, on the other hand, determines it not through the attainment of efficient operation, but only by the sharper perception (*paṭutarapratyakṣa*).

2.3. The meaning of arthakriyāsthiti explained (2.20) [The opponent may raise another question:] “If the validity of cognition is defined to be agreement [with actual experience], then how can an auditory knowledge (*śrotrajñāna*), which by its nature does not cause [the hearer actually to] reach the object he understands, be valid?”¹⁵

[The author:] This is untenable. For we mean that the validity of cognition is the apprehension of the essential quality (*svarūpa*) of an object; and this is possible without the actual attainment of efficient operation referring to an external object. This is expressed [by Dharmakīrti in PV 1.1 reading:]

“Non-disagreeing knowledge is valid cognition; non-disagreement [here] means the existence of efficient operation.”

[and the subsequent verse].¹⁶ In the case of the sound [of a word], hearing is the existence of efficient operation, since the purpose of sound is fulfilled if it is simply heard, just as the existence of efficient operation consists in the simple act of seeing in the cases of [the perceptions of] the sun, moon, cloud and sky. [This is meant by a Buddhist logician] when he says:

“The apprehension of the essential quality of an object is here

14. Tp, n, and a Skt. Mss (cf. G 2, n. 2) have, instead of *jñānaviśeṣa*, *snānapānajñānaviśeṣa* = *śeṣa paṇi khrus dañ btun* (Read *btuñ*) *pa dañ* (Read *paṇi*) *khyad par*... and omit *snānapāna* out of the enumeration of the examples in the next line.

15. The problem is treated as a *pūrvapakṣa* of PV II, v. 1 c-d (see n. 16 below) by almost all commentators on PV. See e.g. PVBh 4, 17-18: ... *śabdaviśaye tu jñāne na dāha-pākādyarthakriyā, svataḥ parataś cārthakriyā'bhāvāt*...

16. PV II, v. 1-2: *pramāṇaṁ avisaṁvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ, avisaṁvādanam śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt. vaktṛvyāpāraviśayo yo'rtho buddhau prakāśate, pramāṇyam tatra śābdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam*.

admitted as the existence of [efficient] operation.”¹⁷

2.4. Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? (3.7) However, when cognizing fire, water, etc. for the first time, a reasonable person wishing for effective operation proceeds to them, starting from the mere uncertain knowledge about the efficiency [of the object].¹⁸... Even if he is not clearly conscious that he has the doubt, [the situation is not different,] since the uncertainty which is attached [to his undertaking] can be by no means removed owing to the absence of a positive (*sādhaka*) or negative proof (*bādhaka*)...¹⁸

Therefore [the problem] has been settled : one acts for an object by virtue of his obtaining only sharper perception, which, as soon as it is obtained, apprehends [by intuition] the customary efficiency [of the object]. But one who gets merely the dull cognition [of an object] begins to act after he has inferred the same [efficiency]. Thus, the validity of indeterminate knowledge [or direct perception] is established by itself (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*) [in the case of sharper one], but by another cognition (*parataḥ*) in some cases [in which the cognizer is unable to confirm the efficiency of an object at the first moment of the cognition]. As for the knowledge of a yogin (*yogijñāna*) and self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*), the validity is established by themselves. As for inference which is by nature certain, its validity is confirmed by itself.¹⁹

17. Probably this is a verse by Prajñākaragupta. PVBh 5, 21 (v. 9) : *jñeyasvarūpasam-siddhir eva tatra kriyā matā, citre'pi dṛṣṭamātreṇa phalaṃ parisamāptimat.*

18. T *gal te de la ḥdi lta buḥi the tshom med par ḥjug* (*par ḥjug* omitted in d) *du chug kyañ, ḥon kyañ sgrub par byed pa dañ gnod par byed paḥi tshad ma med paḥi phyir ro, gañ gsuñs pa, the tshom ḥbyuñ* (*ḥgyur*, d. n.) *ba gañ gis bzlog* (*zlog* d, n) *par byed, ces so.* My tr. follows M. I am reluctant to regard *saṃśayo bhavan kena vāryate* as a citation as T and G do, nor have I so far identified it.

19. Contextually the discussion in § 2.4 directly follows that in § 2.2 [Our text in § 2.2-2.4 may have some confusion]. Both the sections deal with the problem of whether the validity of cognition is intrinsically proved or not (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam* or *parataḥ prā-*). Buddhist attitude towards the problem is most clearly stated by Kamalaśīla : He enumerates under TS v. 2811 four possible theories regarding the problem, viz. 1) both validity and non-validity are established intrinsically; 2) they are both proved through external cognition; 3) validity is proved intrinsically and non-validity by external cognition; 4) validity is proved by external cognition and non-validity intrinsically (TSP 745, 3-5). After a detailed examination he concludes : The Buddhist does not follow any one of these four theories, but holds that the validity of a cognition is proved sometimes intrinsically and another time by another cognition, there being no definite principle (TSP 811, 17-18 : *na hi bauddhair eṣāṃ catuṇṇāṃ ekatamo'pi pakṣo 'bhiṣṭo 'niyama pakṣasyeṣṭatvāt*). The Bud-

2.5. Apūrvagocara explained. (3.16) The following is implied in the [discussion made above]: Knowledge which occurs of an object for the first time is alone a valid cognition, all other knowledge which occurs later regarding the same object being excluded. For the latter is not valid because it grasps what has been once grasped as e. g. in the case of the determinate knowledge (*savikalpakam jñānam*) in the form ‘This is a jar’, which we, having seen a jar by means of indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpakam jñānam*), get later with regard to the very same object, and which is accordingly of the nature of remembrance; or again, if we, having once obtained inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ through the perception of smoke, get again, a moment later, the inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ regarding the same place, [this latter knowledge is not valid because it is not probative].²⁰

2.6. Sense-organs are not the means of valid knowledge. (4.5) When it is said that the means of valid knowledge is true knowledge, things such as sense-organs which are by nature insentient are by implication (*sāmarthyāt*) denied to be the means of valid knowledge, because they are incapable of ascertaining [the object]. Determining operation (*paricchedakatva*) is the function of a knower (*boddhṛtva*), and this is innate only in knowledge. How then can it be the nature of such things as sense-organs which are by nature deprived of consciousness?²¹

dhist logician divides sense-perception into two kinds: 1) perception of which the object has been repeatedly cognized by us, and of which the particular nature, i.e. the efficiency, is discerned as soon as we get it. The validity of perception is in this case proved by itself. 2) But when we are not accustomed to an object, we get perception of which the validity is uncertain; then we need another cognition, perception representing the effective action of the object or inference, in order to determine the validity of the first perception; then its validity is proved by external cognition. The problem is easily solved in the case of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, *yogi-jñāna*, *svasaṃvedana* or inference, since these kinds of knowledge do not depend on an external object and are by nature intrinsically determinate. This problem is also treated by all the commentators on PV II, 1. For a brief but useful explanation see PVV 3, 3f. b.-4, 8 to which the description in TBh is very similar. See also TS v. 2966, 2974-2976, with TSP.

20. n. 8 above.

21. PV II, v. 3: ...*dhī pramāṇatā, pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyoṣādeyavastuni*. Mokṣā-kara interprets this verse in § 2.5 and 2.6. TS v. 2029; TSop 281, 6-19 refutes the Vai-bhāṣika who asserts the sense-organ to be the knower as follows: The Vaibhāṣika considers the sense-organ as knower (*draṣṭṛ*), thinking that if knowledge—which is not a resisting substance—were the knower, it would grasp even a concealed object. But this is untenable, you could say that knowledge would grasp even a concealed thing since nothing would hinder its movement, only if we asserted that knowledge travels to an object to grasp it.

3. **Classification of the valid knowledge.** (4.9) This [valid cognition] is twofold: indeterminate (*pratyakṣa*) and determinate cognition (*anumāna*).²² *Pratyakṣa* is [a *tatpuruṣa* compound which can be analysed into] *akṣam pratigata*.²³ i. e. 'connected with or depending on the sense-organ', *akṣa* here standing for *indriya* (sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by them is named indeterminate cognition [or direct perception].

[The opponent:] "If indeterminate knowledge is that depending on sense-organs, the three kinds of knowledge, mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), [self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*) and the knowledge of a seer (*yogipratyakṣa*)], which are to be soon dealt with, would not be indeterminate, since they are not produced from sense-organs."²⁴

[The author:] We reply to this. When we say 'connected with the sense-organ', it is simply the etymological definition (*vyutpattinimitta*) of the word *pratyakṣa*. The definition of the usage of the word *pratyakṣa*

But we say that knowledge grasps an image with which it is endowed. Moreover, an object at an inaccessible place has no resemblance with knowledge. How then can it be grasped by knowledge? Again, if the sense-organ were the knower, an object separated by glass etc. could not be grasped, since your doctrine tells that ten kinds of material *dhātus* [to which the sense-organ belongs] are resisting substances [cf. AK I, v. 29]. You may contend: "Why is it said in the scripture that colour-form is grasped by the eyes?" We reply to this: This teaching is a metaphorical one.

22. PS I, k. 2 a-b (=PVBh 169, 3): *pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe* (Hattori, II, 1. n. 11); NB s. 2-3: *dvidvidham saṃyagjñānam, pratyakṣam anumānam ca*.

23. NBT 6, 2-4: *pratyakṣam iti, pratigatam āśritam akṣam. atyādayaḥ krāntādyarthe dvitīyayēti samāsaḥ. prāptāpannālaṃgatisamāseṣu paravalliṅgaḥpratiṣedhād abhidheyavalliṅge sati sarvaliṅgaḥ pratyakṣaśabdaḥ siddhaḥ*. This explanation is almost verbally quoted in TSop 276, 2-6. Mokṣākara presupposes this grammatical interpretation given by Dharmottara, though he does not cite it. '*Pratyakṣa*- is a compound word which may be analysed into *akṣam* (Pāṇ. sū. 3. 4. 223) *pratigata*-, *pratigata*- meaning *āśrita*-, i.e. 'connected with or depending on the senses'. [That is to say, it is a *tatpuruṣa* belonging to the group *gatisamāsa* taught in sū 2. 2. 18]. However, it is formed according to the rule [in Bh. ad 2. 2. 18 vt. 4]: *atyādayaḥ krāntādyarthe dvitīyayā* (prefixes like *ati*- etc. in the sense of (*ati*-) *krānta*- etc. can enter into composition with [their complement] in the accusative case). [If it is a *tatpuruṣa*, *pratyakṣa* would agree in gender with that of the last member, *akṣam*, as taught in sū 2. 4. 26, and would be always of the neuter gender. But it is not so, for the agreement of the gender of a *tatpuruṣa* with its last member is denied [by 2. 4. 26 vt.] in compounds whose first members are *prāpta*- *āpanna*-, or *alam*- and '*gati samāsa*'. Thus, the gender of the word *pratyakṣa* [as described at the beginning of Bh. ad 2. 2. 29] agrees with the subject to be related, and it is established as an adjective taking all the three genders.

24. NBT 6, 6-7.

[in its particular signification] (*pravṛttinimitta*) is to be understood as 'direct apprehension' (*sākṣātkāritva*) according to its conventional sense (*rūdhivaśāt*), just as [we understand not only 'mud-born' but also a species of lotus when we hear the word] *pañkaja*. Thus it is established that self-consciousness and the others are also denoted by the term *pratyakṣa*, because they directly apprehend knowledge as the content of self-consciousness and the others.²⁵

(4.18) By *māna* [of *anumāna*] is meant that an object is measured by this means. The [prefix] *anu-* is in the sense of 'later' (*paścāt*). Thus, determinate knowledge or inference (*anumāna*) means 'subsequent measure'. That is to say, 'after' having grasped a logical mark (*liṅga* or probans) and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which possesses the mark (*liṅgin*, probandum), we get, regarding the concerned locus (*dharmin*) such as a mountain, knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant by the term 'inference'.²⁶ Such [usage of the word in its particular signification] is to be understood according to the conventional sense [of the word].

4. **Valid knowledge is of only two kinds.** (5.3) By the word 'two-fold' are refuted the different opinions which [classify valid knowledge into] one, three, four, five, and six kinds. That is to say, the Cārvāka recognizes only one valid cognition, i. e. perception; the Sāṃkhya perception, inference and verbal testimony (*śabda*); the Naiyāyika perception, inference, identification (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony; the Prābhākara perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification and presumption or postulation (*arthāpatti*); the [Bhāṭṭa-] Mīmāṃsaka perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification, presumption and non-existence (*abhāva*).²⁷

We have enumerated indeterminate and determinate knowledge when it has been already understood that there are two valid cognitions by the

25. NBT 6, 4-6; TSop 276, 6-8.

26. NBT 6, 10-13.

27. This description of various theories on the classification of *pramāṇa* is quoted with slight variations in TSop 277, 4-10. TSop 277, 9-10 *abhāvo hi pratyakṣam śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ* seems to be confused, and it can be bettered by emending into *abhāvo'pi mīmāṃsakānām. pratyakṣam śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ* (cf. the following passage in TBh). In this connection a verse in *Mānameyodaya* 8 is interesting: *cār-vākās tāvad ekaṃ dvitayam api punar bauddhavaiśeṣikau dvau bhāsarvajñāś ca sāmṃkhyas tritayam udayanādyāś catuṣkaṃ vadanti, prāhuḥ prābhākarāḥ pañcakam api ca vayaṃ te'pi vedāntavijñāḥ ṣaṭkaṃ paurāṇikās tv aṣṭakam abhidadhire sambhavitihyayogāt.*

word 'twofold'. The reason for this is to reject [the theory of] twofold cognition with different members. For the Vaiyākaraṇa says that twofold valid knowledge consists of perception and verbal testimony.²⁸

4.1. Refutation of the Cārvāka's view of pramāṇa. (5.12) First of all, we assert that the Cārvāka has necessarily to admit the validity of inference. For he (1) advances the definition of perception [which is the same as inference proving the identity of *pratyakṣa* and *pramāṇa*] in order to teach others [the characteristic common to valid perceptions and that common to false perceptions]. (2) Other people's thought is not perceptible but is to be inferred through its effect such as the operation of their body and words. From this, it follows that when he [says he] understands another person's thought, he is forced to admit the inference based on the logical mark of an effect. Again, (3) when he denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (*anupalambha*) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore, how can the Cārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge.²⁹

[From the fact that you, the Cārvākas, establish the common nature of valid knowledge and that of invalid knowledge, that you understand the thought of another person, and that you negate something, it follows that [inference which is] a *pramāṇa* other than perception exists.]³⁰

28. For the Vaiyākaraṇa's refutation of inference as valid knowledge see *Vākyapadīya*, I, v. 32-34. They are cited for criticism's sake in TS v. 1460-1462. Cf. Mookerjee 366-367. G adds here an oft quoted verse of Dharmakīrti: *pramāṇetarasāmānyasthiter anyadhiyo gateḥ, pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ pratiśedhāc ca kasyacit*. This verse, originally found in PVn Peking ed. Ce 251, b 6 ff., is quoted in Ratnakīrti's *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa* (RNA 90, 2-3). It is also cited in SDS II, 19, 38-39; PKM 180, 5; 324, 4; NVV 1, 386, 2 etc. In § 4 Mokṣākara follows the argument of Ratnakīrti; so it is quite possible that as in G he actually quoted this verse from Ratnakīrti. But G misplaces the verse, since it is meant for proving the existence of inference against the Cārvāka who admits only perception as valid cognition and accordingly should be brought under § 4. 1.

29. Our author closely follows the argument of Ratnakīrti. RNA 89, 25-29: *na ca cārvāko'py anumānam anavasthāpya sthātum prabhavati, vyāpārātrayakaraṇāt, tacchāstre hi pratyakṣetarasāmānyayoḥ pramāṇetaravidhānam lakṣaṇapraṇayanato vidhātavyam, tac ca lakṣaṇam pratyakṣe dharminī lakṣye prāmāṇye pratyetavye svabhāvo hetuḥ, parabuddhipratipattau ca kāyādivyāpāraḥ kāryahetuḥ, paralokapratīśedhe ca dṛśyānupalambho 'ṅgikartavya iti katham anumānāpalāpaḥ*. ... See also SDS 18, 25-19, 40; TS v. 1456-1459 gives the Cārvāka's criticism of inference which is refuted in the following verses by Śāntirakṣita. But this refutation is made in a way different from that in our text.

30. n. 28 above.

4.2. Refutation of verbal testimony. (6.1) ³¹Knowledge derived from verbal testimony could be admitted as valid only if it agreed with the external object; and this agreement (*avisamvādatva*) is not possible without a relationship (*sambandha*). There is not, however, any relation between the word and the external object. The reason is as follows: If there were a relationship between the word and the thing-meant, it would be either identity (*tādātmya*) or causality (*adutpatti*). Of these, an identical relationship does not anyhow exist between the word and the thing-meant, since the two are manifested as completely different [from each other]. For unity (*ekatva*) is called identity. And if unity were to be admitted even between two differently manifested things, a cow and a horse would be one thing. Nor is a causal relationship [possible between the word and the thing-meant], since neither concomitance in agreement (*anvaya*) nor in difference (*vyatireka*) is observed [between them]. You cannot, therefore, assert that there is a causal connection between the two. For we see a jar, etc. being produced out of a lump of clay, a stick, water, a potter, and a wheel without [depending on] the operation of words, and a word for its part is produced only through the palate, etc. operated by the mere will of a man, even when there is no external object.³²

(6.12) If there were, apart from identity and causality, another real relationship³³ marked by the verbal expression and its meaning between the word and the thing-meant, then it would follow that when a word is spoken, even one³⁴ who does not know the verbal convention can under-

31. Verbal testimony is advocated mainly by the Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The first half of the author's criticism (§ 4.2) is directed to the Mimāṃsakas who regard the Vedic injunction as a means of valid knowledge, and the last half (§ 4.2.1) to the Naiyāyikas who define verbal testimony as the words of a reliable person. Our author follows Ratnakīrti's discussion in RNA 92 ff.

32. RNA 92, 11-19: *codanāyās tāvad bāhye'rthe pratibandhābhāvān na prāmāṇyam, prayogaḥ, yasya yatra pratibandho nāsti na tasya tatra prāmāṇyam, yathā dahane'pratibaddhasya rāsabhasya, apratibaddhāś ca bahirarthe vaidikāḥ śabdā iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ. na tāvad ayam asiddho hetuḥ, śabdānāṃ vastutaḥ pratibandhābhāvāt. pratibaddhasvabhāvatā hi pratibandhaḥ, na ca sā nirbandhanā, sarveṣāṃ sarvatra pratibaddhasvabhāvatāprasaṅgāt. nibandhanam cāsyās tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ anyan nōpalabhyate. atatsvabhāvasyātadutpattēś ca tatrāpratibaddhasvabhāvatvāt. na hi śabdānāṃ bahirarthasvabhāvatāsti bhinnapratibhāsāvarodhaviṣayatvāt. nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antareṇāpi puruṣasyēcchāpratibaddhavṛtteḥ śabdasyōtpādadarśanāt.*

33. M, T *vāstavaḥ*; G *svābhāvikaḥ*.

34. M, T *puruṣasya*; G *pramātuḥ*.

stand the definite meaning by virtue of the natural capacity (*yogyatā*)³⁵ [of a word], just as he apprehends a jar, etc.³⁶ when it is lighted up by a lamp. But such is not the case, since, for example, a man who has newly arrived from the Nālikera (Nicobar) islands does not understand any meaning from the word *agni* when he hears it.³⁷

(6.17) [The opponent may contend:] “The word is born³⁸ with such a nature that it is able to denote such and such an object according to such and such an agreement.” But this is untenable, because there is no evidence for this argument, for any agreement (*saṃketa*) can be applied to anything, and accordingly we do not know if someone really means what he says or another thing.³⁹

(7.2) Or, admitting that there is a connection other [than identity and causality], we should ask by what connection this [connection] is connected with the two [i. e. the word and the thing-meant]. If you propose that it is by another connection which is the fourth [entity], we should ask by what connection the fourth is connected with the [other three] entities. If you produce the fifth, the same question would be asked again with regard to the fifth. Thus, there being an infinite regress (*anavasthā*), the last is never established, which makes all the preceding ones illegitimate.⁴⁰

(7.6) Or if⁴¹ you say that the connection of the word and the thing-

35. RNA 92, 20-23: *nanu yogyatayaiva kiṃcit pratibaddhasvabhāvam upalabhyate, yathā cakṣurindriyaṃ rūpe. cakṣuḥ khalu vyāpāryamāṇaṃ rūpaṃ evôpalambhayati, tathaivaite vaidikāḥ śabdās tādātmyatadutpattiviyuktāpi yogyatāmātreṇātindriyam arthaṃ bodhayiṣyanti . . .*

36. M, T *ghaṭādi-*; G *ghaṭapaṭādi-*.

37. RNA 93, 24-27: *tarhi vācyavācakaalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandho bhaviṣyati . . . iti cet, nanu tasya vāstavatve 'saṃketavido'py arthapratipattir bhaved ity uktam . . .*

38. M *jāyate*; G *jātaḥ*.

39. RNA 93, 21-24: *atha tattatsaṃketāpekṣas tadarthapratyāyanayogya evāyaṃ jāta ity ucyate, tad api na prastutopayogi, na hy evam asya prāmāṇyam avatiṣṭhate. yadā hi saṃketenāpuruṣārthapratipādanam api sambhāvyata eva, tadā na śakyam upakalpayitum kim ayam abhimatasyaivārthasya dyotako na vēti.*

40. The following argument seems to originate from Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparikṣā* v. 4: *dvayor ekābhisambandhāt sambandho yadi taddvayoḥ, kaḥ sambandho 'navasthā ca na sambandhamatis tathā* (Frauwallner translates: Wenn die beiden [verbundenen Dinge] durch die Verbindung mit einem einzigen [Ding] verbunden sind, welche Verbindung besteht dann bei den beiden? Ferner [ergibt sich] eine endlose Reihe. Auf diese Weise kann es keine Erkenntnis einer Verbindung geben.) Frauwallner, Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparikṣā*, WZKM Bd. 41, 264, 270 and 280.

41. M=T (*ci ste*) *atha*; G *artha-*.

meant is possible without being connected [by another connection], this is not correct. How can a thing which is not connected [with another] be a connecting link itself, as in the case of a piece of cloth with regard to a jar. [The opponent may contend:] “It should be said that a connection is by nature such that it connects others without requiring another connection.”⁴² [The author:] This is untenable. No objection (*uttara*) may be raised when the nature [of a thing] is established by a proof as when a nature such as burning is [established by a proof] as belonging only to fire and not to other things such as ether. On the contrary, we, in spite of our scrutiny, do not find any justification for the establishment of a connection. You should not contend that the word, having by nature an expressive capacity (*śabdaśakti*), never deviates from the thing-meant determined by it. For if the word ‘jar’ denotes by nature the category (*padārtha*) which, having a conch-shaped neck, is able to hold water, then how can it denote a horse and other things when depending on another agreement and the particular will of a speaker. It will indeed be impossible for a seed of rice, which is produced by its own causes with the nature of yielding its shoot, to give birth to an ass, even if it is understood according to another agreement.⁴³

4.2.1 (7.19) It is also not acceptable that the words spoken by trustworthy persons⁴⁴ are a means of valid knowledge, since trustworthiness is impossible to be ascertained. The state of being emancipated from all faults (*kṣīṇadoṣatva*) is called trustworthiness (*āptatva*). Emancipation from all faults refers to a certain state belonging to another person’s mind. And this is hardly visible [i. e. determinable], since we see [sometimes] that physical and lingual actions [supposed] to be the logical mark⁴⁵ [through which we infer the trustworthiness of the concerned person] occur⁴⁶ in persons who are not [really trustworthy]. When it is usual that a man

42. M *sambaddhnāti*; G=T *sambadhnātīti*.

43. RNA 93, 16-20: *atha svahetubhir evāyam idṛśas teṣāṃ svabhāvo datto yena te saṃketaviśeṣasahāyā eva kam api artham avabodhayanti, na tarhi saṃketaparāvṛttau padārthāntaravṛttayo bhaveyuh. yadi hy ayam agnihotraśabdaḥ saṃketāpekṣo yāgaviśeṣapratipādayaḥ, katham saṃketānyatvenārthāntaram pratipādayati. na hi kṣityādyapekṣeṇa bijena svahetor aṅkurajananasvabhāvenōtpannena rāsabhaḥ śakyo janayitum, tathā śabdo’py yadarthapratipādananiyatas tam eva prakāśayet.*

44. NS 1. 1. 7: *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*.

45. M *kāyavāgvyāpārādikāryaliṅgasya*; G *kāyavāgvyāpārasya kāryaliṅgasya tu*.

46. M=T *vṛttidarśanāt*; G *saṃdarśanāt*.

having passions pretends to be free from passions, how can you ascertain trustworthiness? ⁴⁷

4.2.2 (8.4) Since the validity of the words of the Veda is negated through our refutation of a connection [between the word and the thing-meant], we do not deal with it separately. [The opponent may ask :] “ If so, how about all verbal usage in the world which is not to be doubted? ” [The author :] It is not hurt at all, because [the words convey their meaning] by virtue of the desire of a speaker [who expresses himself] according to such and such an agreement. It is said :

The words are to refer to the mere intention of a speaker [and not to the external object meant by it]. ⁴⁸

4.3. **Refutation of identification.** (8.9) The Naiyāyika explains⁴⁹ identification (*upamāna*) as follows : “ Suppose that there is a man, operator of identification, who knows a cow but not a *gavaya*, and that he is directed by his master to go to a forest to bring a *gavaya*. Not acquainted with the object denoted by the word *gavaya*, he asks an inhabitant of a forest or⁵⁰ another man who knows it : My friend, what is a *gavaya* like? And the latter answers : A *gavaya* is like a cow. Now the servant, when he is in a forest, gets the knowledge of the resemblance (*sārūpyajñāna*) of a *gavaya* [to a cow] which, being assisted by the remembrance of the object suggested by the analogical expression (*atideśavākya-rthasmarāṇasahakārin*),⁵¹ produces the comprehension (*pratipatti*) that this is the very object designated by the word *gavaya* ; here the knowledge of resemblance, being the agent (*karṭṛ*), is a means of knowledge, and the

47. RNA 94, 11-13 : *āpta-praṇītasya punar vacanasya... na prāmāṇyam upagantum śakyate, paracittavṛttinām aśakya-niścayatvenāptatvāparijñānāt.*

48. Not identified. But cf. PV II, v. 2 : *vaktṛvyāpāraviśayo yo'rtho buddhau prakāśate, prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam.*

49. NBh, NV and NVT ad NS 1.1.6. There is difference of opinion on what is the means of knowledge in the case of *upamāna* between NBh and NV-NVT (cf. Jhā's note 2 in NS 28). Mokṣākara, as well as Ratnakīrti, reproduces here the view of Vācaspati-miśra that in identification *sārūpyajñāna* (the knowledge of the similarity, say, of a *gavaya* with a cow) is the *pramāṇa*, which being aided by the *atideśasmarāṇa* produces the *pramiti* in the form ‘This object is what is named *gavaya*’ (cf. NVT 169, 5ff. : *piṇḍasya hi gavaya-śabdavācya-tām puruṣo'tideśavākya-smaraṇasahakāriṇaḥ pratyakṣād gavayagatād gosādrśyāt prajānan tena prajñāpyata iti pramāṇavyāpāraḥ prajñāpaṇam uktam iti.*)

50. Insert *vā* between *anyam* and *tajjñam* (cf. n. 52 below).

51. M *atideśa* ; G *āptā-tideśa* ; T *bstan pa* = *ādeśa*.

comprehension [produced by it] is its effect (*phala*).’’⁵²

[The author:] This is untenable. For the validity of any kind of knowledge must be pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the state of having its object. But in this case, in spite of a careful investigation, we do not find⁵³ the object. For it is said [by you] that the connection of the designation [with the thing designated] (*samākhyāsambandha*) is the object (*viṣaya*) of this [identification].⁵⁴ But such a connection is not existent in reality. For if it is [by nature] visible, its [presence] is negated by the actual non-perception of it, and if, on the contrary, it is invisible, we do not see any justification for establishing its existence.

(9.3) Furthermore, is this connection existent separately from the two terms which are connected or not? If it is separate, it should be explained by what connection the two terms are connected [with the connection itself]. If you here imagine another connection, then an infinite regress would follow. Or, if it is not separate [from the two connected terms], then you should admit the existence of the two connected things alone, but not anything which is called a designating connection (*samākhyā*).⁵⁵ If you again say that the connection [here] means [a separate entity which] produces the idea of the connected, it is not reasonable. For the idea that these two are connected originates from the two connected things by virtue of their own causes, and is not able to win over a relationship

52. RNA 91, 20-25: *ayam asya prapañcaḥ, yaḥ pratipattā gāṃ jānāti na gavayam, ādiṣṭaś ca svāmīnā gacchāraṇyaṃ gavayam ānayāsmād iti, gavayaśabdavācyaṃ artham ajānāno vanecaram anyam vā tajjñam pṛṣṭavān, bhrātāḥ kiḍṛśo gavaya iti. tena cādiṣṭam yathā gaus tathā gavaya iti. tasya śrutātideśavākyaṣya kasyāṃcid araṇyaṃ upagatasyātideśavākyaṛthasmarāṇasahakāri yad gavayasārūpyajñānaṃ tat prathamata evāsau gavayaśabdavācyo 'rtha iti pratipattiṃ prastuvānam upamānaṃ pramāṇam iti.*

53. M *saṃpāśyāmaḥ*; G *pāśyāmaḥ*.

54. NBh 20, 3: *samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtha ity āha*; NVT 169, 15: *samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārthaḥ phalam*. RNA 95, 25: *tathā hi samākhyāsambandhas tasya viṣayo varṇyate, sa ca paramārthato nāsti*. The meaning of the Buddhist criticism here is as follows: *sārūpyajñāna* is, as Vācaspati himself says, none other than *pratyakṣa*, *atideśasmarāṇa* is the same as *āptopadeśa* or *śabda*, and the last characteristic particular to *upamāna*, *samākhyāsambandha*, is not existent in reality, because as already refuted in § 4.2, *sambandha* in general is not admitted. For a similar criticism by Dignāga see Randle, 317.

55. RNA 95, 26-27: *sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṃ bhinno 'bhinno vā. yadi bhinnas tadā tayoṛ iti kutāḥ. na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam, tad api katham teṣāṃ iti cintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ* (cf. n. 40 above too). RNA 96, 1-2: *athābhinnāḥ, tadā sambandhinav eva kevalav iti na samākhyāsambandho nāma, yaḥ kaścid upamānasya viṣayaḥ syāt*.

which is another entity.⁵⁶

4.3.1. (9.11) In the same way, the validity of [identification] described by the Mīmāṃsaka is also to be repudiated. For an object qualified by resemblance (*sādrśyaviśiṣṭaḥ piṇḍaḥ*) or resemblance qualified by object-ness (*piṇḍaviśiṣṭam sādrśyam*) is proposed by them as the object of identification. However, resemblance separate from the things similar cannot be established, just because there is no proof for knowing it. That is to say, if resemblance which is separate from the similar things is visible, then [the existence of] it is eclipsed by the non-perception of a perceptible object (*dṛśyānupalambhagrasta*). And if it is an invisible entity, how then⁵⁷ can it be established even by inference, since we do not find any logical mark which is necessarily connected with it? On the other hand, the idea of resemblance can be produced by an object resembling [another] which is so produced by its own causes as to give rise to the idea. You are unable to establish [an entity called resemblance] through the idea of [resemblance].

The opponent may contend that resemblance is established by means of identification, [but not vice versa]. But this is untenable, because the opponent school speculates that the relation of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*) found only between two similar bodily objects which have been established by a proof other [than identification] holds good as the object of identification. How then can resemblance alone be established by identification? ⁵⁸

56. RNA 95, 31-96, 1: *ayam anayoḥ sambandhaḥ sambaddhav etav iti tu buddhiḥ svahetu-
balāt sambaddhavastudvayād api sambhāvyamānā na sambandham ākṣeptum prabhavati. tasmān
na bhinnasambandhasiddhiḥ.* (Read *samākhyāsambandho nāma* instead of *samākhyā nāma
sambandhaḥ* in M 9, 6-7).

57. M=T *tadā*; G *tad api*.

58. RNA 95, 1-17: *tathā hi sādrśyaviśiṣṭaḥ piṇḍaḥ piṇḍaviśiṣṭam vā sādrśyam upamānasya
viśayo varṇyate, na sādrśyavastuvyatiriktaḥ sādrśyam vyavasthāpayitum śakyate pramāṇenā-
pratitativāt. nanu sādrśyam vastu durvāram eva, yad āha, sādrśyasya ca vastutvaḥ na śakyam
apabādhitum, bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo jātyantarasya tat. (cf. SV Upamāna, v. 18) iti. atrô-
cyate, yadi sādrśyatiriktaḥ sādrśyam vastu dṛśyam syāt, tadā dṛśyānupalambhagrastam eva...
athādrśyam tat sādrśyam upeyate, tathāpi tatra prasiddhalingābhāvād asiddham eva...sādrśya-
pratyayas tu svahetos tathotpannena sādrśyavastunāpi kriyamāṇo ghaṭata evēti na sādrśyam
utthāpayitum prabhavati. upamānapramāṇabalād eva sādrśyasiddhir iti cet, na, pramāṇāntarasid-
dhayor eva sādrśyapiṇḍayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvavasyôpamāṇaviśayatvāt. katham sādrśyamātrasyô-
pamānāt siddhiḥ. tataś ca sādrśyasyāsiddher na tadviśiṣṭaḥ piṇḍaḥ piṇḍaviśiṣṭam vā sādrśyam
upamānasya viśayaḥ.*

4.4. Refutation of presumption. (10.5) Presumption or postulation (*arthāpatti*) is not accepted as a separate means of valid knowledge. Presumption is defined⁵⁹: Presumption is the supposition of a thing without which another thing apprehended by a proof, perception or else, would become unintelligible.

The following should be considered here: If the thing perceived by a means of valid knowledge is connected with the unseen, supposed thing through either the relation characterised by identity or that characterised by causality, then this is knowledge produced either from a logical mark of identity or from a logical mark of causality; it follows that the [so-called] presumption is none other than inference. Or, if there is no such connection, then presumption cannot be a means of valid knowledge, just because there is no necessary connection as in the case of understanding a piece of cloth from a jar.⁶⁰

4.5. Refutation of non-existence. (10.13) By no means do we cognize the essential quality of the [so-called] non-existence (*abhāva*). How then can it be a *pramāṇa*? [Defining non-existence] the Mīmāṃsaka says: “The non-production of [the five] means of valid knowledge beginning with perception is [itself] a means of valid knowledge called non-existence.”⁶¹

What do you here mean by ‘non-production’? Is it 1) the mere negation of the proposition ‘knowledge is produced’ (*prasajyavṛtti*)? Or 2) does it mean something positive, being construed as the negation of a term (*paryudāsavṛtti*)?⁶² If something positive is meant, is it 2. a) an

59. *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*, 12, 4-5: *arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nōpapadyata ity arthakalpanā*; NBh ad NS 2.2.1.: *yatrābhidhiyamāne'rthe yo'nyo'rthaḥ prasajyate so 'rthāpattiḥ*; SV *Arthāpatti*, v. 1: *pramāṇaṣaṭkavijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet, adṛṣṭam kalpayet anyam sārthāpattir udāhṛtā*. RNA 91, 27-29: *pratyakṣādibhi ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddho yo'rthaḥ sa yena vinā na yujyate tasyārthasya kalpanam arthāpattir iti...*

60. RNA 96, 16-25: *atra vicāryate, yasyārthasya darśanād yo'rthaḥ parikalpyate tayoṛ yadi pratibandho'sti tadārthāpattir anumānam eva...anyathā tena vinā nōpapadyata ity ahrikād anyo na brūyāt, ghaṭaḥ paṭavat... tatra svabhāvapratibandhe svabhāvahetujaiva sārthāpattiḥ, tadutpattipratibandhe kāryaliṅgajaiva*.

61. RNA 92, 1-9: *pratyakṣānumānādipramāṇapañcakābhāvasvabhāvam abhāvākhyam pramāṇam. prameyam ghaṭādyabhāvaḥ. nāstiha ghaṭāditi jñānam ghaṭādyabhāvālambanam phalam. yad āha kumārilaḥ: pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva ucyate, sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānam vānyavastuni* (SV *Abhāva*, v. 11). *pramāṇapañcakam yatra vasturūpe na jāyate, vastusattāvabodhārtham tatrābhāvapramāṇatā* (SV *Abhāva*, v. 1) *iti...*

62. J. F. Staal gives an excellent logistic interpretation of the two kinds of negation, *paryudāsa*- and *prasajya-pratiṣedha* as classified by the Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians (cf.

insentient thing (*jaḍarūpa*) or 2. b) a form of knowledge? If it is a form of knowledge, 2. b. 1) is it knowledge in general (*jñānamātra*) or 2. b. 2) the knowledge of a positive thing related to one and the same knowledge [which grasps non-existence] (*ekajñānasamsargivastuno jñānam*)?

Among these, 1) the negation of a proposition (*prasajyarūpo'bhāvaḥ*) is not appropriate. How can the mere negation devoid of [further] function possess the ability of discrimination (*paricchedakatva*) or of producing

Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: a comparative study, BSOAS xxv, 1, 1962). A verse in the *Mimāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* expresses their main doctrine: *paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrôttarapadena nañ, pratiṣedhaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ kriyayā saha yatra nañ*. Staal's tr. (ibid. 58): 'Exclusion (*paryudāsa*) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the next word; prohibition (*pratiṣedha*) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the verb(al ending)'. An almost identical verse (having *prasajyapraṭiṣedhas tu* for *pratiṣedhaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ*) is quoted in grammar (ibid. 59). In the field of Buddhist philosophy, it is Bhāvaviveka (-570 A. D.) who first made the distinction between the two kinds of negation in order to clarify the absolutist standpoint of the Mādhyamika philosophy. Cf. My Bhāvaviveka's *Praññāpradīpaḥ* (1. Kapitel) WZKSO Bd. VII, S. 48. Avalokitavrata, a commentator on the *Praññāpradīpa*, quotes an interesting verse explaining this distinction (ibid. 48, n. 11): *dgag pa don gyis bstan pa dañ, tshig gcig sgrub par byed pa dañ, de ldan rañ tshig mi ston pa, ma yin gāan pa gāan yin no*. Dr. E. Steinkellner of Vienna was kind enough to inform me of the existence of Arcaṭa's elucidation of the two kinds of negation in HBT; and on examining it, I found in HBT 171, 4ff. a Sanskrit passage which is in sense parallel to the Tibetan verse cited above. This reads: *yatra vidheḥ prādhānyaṁ pratiṣedho 'rthagṛhitaḥ vidhibhāk svapadena nōcyate ekavākyatā ca tatra paryudāsavṛttitā... prasajyapraṭiṣedhaḥ punar etadviparīto mantavyaḥ, tatra hi pratiṣedhasya prādhānyaṁ vidhir arthād gamyate vākyabhedaḥ svapadena nañ pratiṣedhabhāk sambadhyate*. 'In [a compound word or proposition] where the mode of *paryudāsa* (the negation of a term) is applied the main motive is affirmation, negation is understood by implication alone, the object to be affirmed is not expressed by its own word, and the negation means the same sense as the affirmative proposition derived from it, [e.g. 'He is a non-brāhmaṇa' is the same in sense as 'He is a kṣatriya']... *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* (the negation of a proposition) is to be considered as opposite to this, i.e. in the case of [*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*] the main motive is negation, affirmation is understood by implication, [the negation] conveys a different sense from the affirmative proposition related to it, [e.g. 'They do not look at the sun' conveys a different meaning from 'They look at the sun'] and the object to be negated, being expressed by its own word, is connected with the negative'. In his exposition Arcaṭa refers also to the fact that in *paryudāsa* the negative is related only to *subanta* or nominal inflected forms, whereas in *prasajya* it is related to *tiñanta* or verbal inflected forms. For a detailed exposition see my article '仏教哲学における命題解釈—evaの意味制限機能' (Analysis of a proposition by Buddhist philosophers with special reference to the particle *eva* restricting the meaning of a sentence) in *Dr. Ensho Kanakura Commemoration Volume*. This distinction is applied by Arcaṭa to the Buddhist theory of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*), which should be understood as the cognition of other things (*anyopalabdhi*), the negation being construed as *paryudāsa*. Mokṣākara discusses the same in § 13.

knowledge (*jñānajanakatva*)? Thus, no one will have resort to it.⁶³ Paṇḍita Cakracūḍāmaṇi says in this connection:⁶⁴

Non-existence is not apprehension of any object, nor a cause of knowledge; How can it be known [as a means of knowledge]?

2. a) [What is meant by non-existence] cannot be an insentient thing, because an insentient thing has no discriminating function. We have not anywhere seen nor heard that insentient things such as a cart discriminate a jar.

2.b.1) Nor can it be knowledge in general, for in this case it would follow that Mt. Sumeru, Śaṅkha, the future emperor, and a demon, though inaccessible in space, time and essence, are [known to be] absent by means of the proof of non-existence as knowledge in general [when in reality these things cannot be judged to be either existent or non-existent].

2.b.2) If again non-existence here means the knowledge of a positive thing such as a piece of ground forming a part of the same knowledge [which grasps the non-existence of a jar], then it is in essence a particular kind of perception (*pratyakṣaviśeṣa*), though given another name 'non-existence'. Then there should be no difference of opinion [between you and us].⁶⁵

Thus it has been established that the means of valid knowledge is twofold and only twofold, viz. indeterminate and determinate knowledge.

5. Indeterminate knowledge defined and discussed. (11.15) Among these, indeterminate knowledge is devoid of fictional constructs or deter-

63. M=T (*de sgrub par byed pa ma yin no*): *na tat pratipadyate*; G *tat pratipadyate*.

64. The words of Cakracūḍāmaṇi are cited also in the passage of Ratnakīrti (see l. 7 in n. 65 below), though he does not mention him by name. So far I have not identified the words, nor do I know who Cakracūḍāmaṇi is.

65. RNA 97, 20-98, 1: *atha vābhāvaprāmāṇyasvarūpam eva nirūpyatām. kaḥ punaḥ pramāṇābhāvātmābhīmato bhavatām, kiṃ prasajyavṛtṭyā pramāṇānutpattimātram, atha vā pariyudāsavṛtṭyā bhāvāntaram. vastvantaram api jaḍarūpam jñānarūpam vā. jñānarūpam api jñānamātrakam ekajñānasamsargivastujñānam vēti śaḍ vikalpāḥ. tatra na tāvan nivṛttirūpo 'bhāvo yujyate, sa khalu nikhilāśaktivikalatayā na kiṃcit. yac ca na kiṃcit tat katham abhāvam paricchindiyāt, tadviśayaṃ vā jñānam janayet. pratitam vā tat katham iti sarvam andhakāranartanam, yad āhuḥ: "na hy abhāvaḥ kasyacit pratipattiḥ pratipattihetur vā tasyāpi katham pratipattir" iti. nāpi vastvaṇtaratāpakṣe jaḍarūpo 'bhāvaḥ saṃgacchate, tasyābhāvalakṣaṇaprameya-paricchedābhāvāt, paricchedasya jñānadharmatvāt. nāpi jñānamātrasvabhāvo 'bhāvo vaktavyaḥ, deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasyāpi tato 'bhāvaprasaṅgāt, tadapekṣayāpi jñānamātratvāt tasya. athaikajñānasamsargivastujñānasvabhāvo 'numanyate tadāstam abhāvapramāṇapratyāśayā, pratyakṣaviśeṣasyaivābhāvanāmakaraṇāt, tasya cāsmābhir dṛśyānupalambhākhyasādhanaatvena svikṛtatvāt.*

mining factors (*kalpanā*) and unerring (*abhrānta*).⁶⁶ The determining factor consists of comprehending [an object] in association with a word-sound (*śabda*) or internal notion (or inarticulate representation, *antarjalpa*), while linking together the preceding and subsequent moments [of the momentary object]. This may be illustrated by a clever man's comprehension in the form 'This is a jar', the comprehension of a baby, dumb person or animal in the form of internal notion or reflection (*parāmarśa*). In this connection the following is said [by Dharmakīrti :]⁶⁷

Determination is the cognition of a representation which is capable of being associated with words.

(12.3) [It may be asked :] "How do you ascertain that a baby, a dumb person etc. have determinate knowledge (*kalpanājñāna*) in the form of inarticulate representation?" [We infer it] from the effects of determining factors such as taking what is desired and avoiding what is not desired.⁶⁸ And such effects are perceived in a baby and a dumb person, who indeed claim what they want and abandon what they do not.⁶⁹

By pointing out that the knowledge of a baby, dumb person etc. contains fictional constructs it is taught that even simple perception (*ālocanājñāna*) said by Kumārilabhaṭṭa⁷⁰ (to be indeterminate knowledge) is determinate.

(12.8) [The opponent :] "Why is knowledge associated with constructs or by nature erring not indeterminate knowledge?"⁷¹ [The author :] It is not, because it is well known⁷² to all scholars that indeterminate know-

66. PS I, k. 3c : *pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham* (Hattori, II. 1, n. 25); NB I, s. 4 : *tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*; PV III, v. 123 a-b : *pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati*.

67. PS I, k. 3d : *nāmajātyādiyojanā* (Hattori, II. 1, n. 26); =NB I, s. 5 : *abhilāpasam-sargayogyapratibhāsapratitiḥ kalpanā*. NBT under this *sūtra* interprets the word *yogya* as denoting not only explicit connection with a name but also a baby's notion which is not connected with a clear name.

68. M=T; G *vikalpakāryasyeṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparihārasyōdayāt*.

69. The present argument is followed by Vidyākaraśānti in TSop 278, 6 ff.

70. SV *Pratyakṣa*, v. 112 : *asti hy ālocanājñānaṁ prathamam nirvikalpam, bālamū-kādivijñānasadrśam mugdhavastujam*. Cf. Randle, 120, n. 2 : There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real, -like the apprehension of infants and the dumb. See also Dasgupta, I, 378. The verse is cited also in TSop 280, 1-2.

71. M=T *pratyakṣam na syād iti cen na*; G *na pramāṇam iti cet*.

72. M=T *prasiddham*; G *sammatam*.

ledge is knowledge directly intuiting the real nature⁷³ of an object. For knowledge grasping an object is the effect of the object, and the object which is grasped is the cause of the knowledge, as is said [by Dharmakīrti]:⁷⁴

How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the indeterminate cognition grasping it] be an object of the indeterminate cognition? We reply: Philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge.

[On the contrary], determinate knowledge is produced from the past impression alone even when there is no [corresponding] object. Being neither positively nor negatively concomitant with the external object (*anvayavyatirekābhāvāt*), how can it be an effect of an object? For if *x* can exist without *y*, then *x* is not the effect of *y*. Otherwise the unwarrantable consequences (*atiprasaṅga*) would follow. If determinate knowledge were produced out of an object, then an object such as a jar could be seen just because of that knowledge; it would mean that even a blind person could see a colour-form. But such is not the case. Therefore it is said:

Determinate knowledge has no function of intuiting an object, since the object is not manifested in verbal knowledge as in indeterminate perception.⁷⁵

The present argument serves to repudiate the following opinion stated by another scholar⁷⁶ [i. e. Bhartṛhari]:⁷⁷

“There is in this world no cognition which is not followed by a word; All knowledge appears as if penetrated by words.”

73. G *artham*; M *artharūpam*; but T *don gyi rañ gi ño bo*=*arthasvarūpam*, which is best.

74. =PV III, v. 248 =PVn Derge ed. 158, b 1: *bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti cet grāhyatāṃ viduḥ, hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam*. Cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 360; Mookerjee, 338. G and T of our present text omit the part *bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti*.

75. *śābdyāṃ buddhāv arthasya pratyakṣa iva pratibhāsābhāvāt nāsti kalpanāyā arthasākṣātkāritvam*. Not identified.

76. M 13, n. 2 and G *yad uktaṃ sāmṅhyena*, but T *yad uktaṃ pareṇa*.

77. =VP I, v. 123: *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śābdānugamād ṛte, anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śābdena bhāsate*. The verse is often quoted by Buddhist logicians for criticism's sake (cf. TSP 68, 8; 70, 13; TSop 279, etc), *bhāsate* being sometimes replaced by *jāyate* or *vidyate*.

For example, while [the word 'jar'] is pronounced with regard to a jar placed before us, other knowledge concerning a piece of ground etc. close to the jar is experienced as well, though they are not referred to by the pronounced word.⁷⁸ In such a case we do not find the association with a word.⁷⁹ This is [testified by the rule that] two concepts (*vikapa*) cannot occur at the same time.

5.1. Abhrānta explained. (13.13) Erring knowledge (*bhrāntam jñānam*) is also unable to intuit [the reality of] its object. For 'erring' means to be opposite to the real thing capable of effective operation. The nature of a real thing capable of effective operation is determined in space, time and form. Then, how can it be intuited by erring knowledge whose content is falsely presented? As Ācārya [Dharmakīrti] says:

Indeterminate perception is knowledge which is not affected by illusion produced through the darkness of the eyes, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, a violent blow or other causes.⁸⁰

By this, the following are referred to: One suffering from jaundice, seeing a white shell, gets the knowledge presenting itself as yellow; One gets the knowledge⁸¹ presenting itself as a circle while seeing a fire-brand being swung⁸² in a circular motion; one who is sitting on a boat in motion gets the erroneous knowledge⁸¹ of running trees⁸³; when one is severely hit in vulnerable parts of the body, we get the knowledge⁸¹ presenting itself as a flaming⁸⁴ post; all [the erroneous knowledge referred to] is not [valid indeterminate] perception.

[The following objection may be raised:] "If such [erroneous] cognition is not valid indeterminate knowledge, how do you explain the fact that we [sometimes] reach a real object even through erroneous knowledge

78. TSop 278, 15-16: *avyāpytendriyasya darśanavad buddhau śabdenāpratibhāsanād artharūpasya*. (...Since the form of an object is not manifested in consciousness in association with the word as when we see unconsciously objects for which our sense-organ is not operating with attention.)

79. G=T *śabdānugamo*; M *śabdānugato*; M 13, n. 3 *tadanugamo*.

80. =NB I, s. 6: (*tayā rahitam*) *timirāsubhramaṇanaudyānasamkṣobhādyānāhitavibhramam jñānam pratyakṣam*. NBT explains each of the instances mentioned here and Mokṣākara reproduces it.

81. G omits *jñānam*.

82. G=T (*bskor ba*) *bhramad-alātāda*; M *bhramād*.

83. M *caladvṛkṣādibhrāntijñānam*; T *śiñ la sogs pa g'yo bar ḥdsin paḥi śes pa* = *caladvṛkṣādigrāhijñānam*; G *bhramadvṛkṣādigrāhi*.

84. M *jvalat*; G *prajvalat*.

of it?" [The author:] Some scholars [such as Dharmottara, Śāntirakṣita etc.] replying to this question, say that we do not reach the [corresponding] object through erroneous cognition, but only through another [valid cognition].⁸⁵

6. **Classification of indeterminate knowledge : sense-perception.**(14.5)
This is fourfold, ⁸⁶viz., sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*), mental perception (*mānasa*), self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) and the cognition of a yogin (*yogijñāna*).

Sense-perception is [cognition] which, being produced⁸⁷ depending on the five senses beginning with the eyes, has as its object the five external things such as colour and so on. Among them, visual perception has as its object a colour-form; auditory perception has as its object a sound; olfactory perception has as its object smell; gustatory perception has as its object taste; tactual perception has as its object a tangible thing. The designation 'sense-perception' is made after the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) [of this perception] as in the cases of 'the sound of a kettle-drum (*bherīśabda*)' and 'the shoot of barley (*yavāṅkura*).'^{87a}

This kind of indeterminate cognition is regarded as a means of valid knowledge only as to the object of which it produces [a moment later] the determinate knowledge corresponding to the sensation, for the validity

85. Our author makes a mere mention of a difficult problem regarding the qualifier *abhrāntam* in Dharmakīrti's definition of *pratyakṣa*, without going further into a detailed discussion. The qualifier is added by Dharmakīrti to the definition of Dignāga *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*. It is known from TS k. 1324 and TSP that there were some Buddhist logicians who regarded the qualifier redundant and misleading. They argued that erroneous perception sometimes makes us reach the object, as the knowledge of a yellow shell does, and that this is the reason why Dignāga did not qualify perception by *abhrāntam*. The argument is presupposed when Dharmottara says (NBT 7,5 ff.): *tato [= gacchadvṛkṣadarśanād] hi pravṛttena vṛkṣamātram avāpyata iti saṃvādakavāt saṃyagjñānam kalpanāpoḍhatvāc ca pratyakṣam iti syād āśaṅkā, tannivṛttyartham abhrāntagrahaṇam... yadi mityājñānam katham tato vṛkṣāvāptir iti cet, na tato vṛkṣāvāptiḥ, nānādeśagāmī hi vṛkṣas tena paricchinnaḥ, ekadeśaniyataś ca vṛkṣo'vāpyate. tato yaddeśo gacchadvṛkṣo dṛṣṭas tadddeśo nāvāpyate, yaddeśaś cāvāpyate sa na dṛṣṭa iti. na tasmāt kaścid artho 'vāpyate, jñānāntarād eva tu vṛkṣādir artho 'vāpyate, ity evam abhrāntagrahaṇam vipratipattinirāsārtham. Vinitadeva tried to understand *abhrānta* as meaning *avisamvādakam*: and Dharmottara and Śāntirakṣita (TS v. 1325-1327) repudiate this view. For a useful and interesting exposition of the problem see Mookerjee, 276-281. See also Stcherbatsky, II, 17, n. 3.*

86. =NB I, s. 7: *tac caturvidham*.

87. M *utpadyamāna*; G *utpanna*-

87a. NBT 10, 4: *indriyasya jñānam indriyajñānam, indriyāśritam yat tat pratyakṣam*; PS I, k. 4a-b: *asādhāraṇahetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate* (Hattori, II, 1, n. 32).

in the sense of the empirical truth (*sāṃvryavahārikapramāṇa*) is here referred to.⁸⁸

6.1. Mental perception. (14.14) *Mānasa*⁸⁹ or mental perception is the product of a sense-perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i. e. the second moment] of its proper object.⁹⁰

The words 'its proper (*sva*)' refers to a sense-perception, 'its proper object' referring to an external object such as a jar. [The compound word] *svaviṣayānantara* is construed as *svaviṣayānantaraḥ* [*viṣayaḥ*], i. e., the immediately succeeding facsimile of its proper object, and refers to the second moment of a jar etc. which is different from the original object of the sense-perception. 'Cooperating with it' (*tena sahakāriṇā*) means [the sense-perception] concurs with it [i. e. the second moment of the object]. This sense-perception is the material cause (*upādāna*) [of the mental perception] and called *samanantarapratyaya* (the cause which immediately precedes, and is similar to, its effect, i. e. the next moment of the cause). What is produced from this is called mental perception.

(15.1) By this [definition of mental perception] are refuted the objections raised by others, viz. 1) that [mental perception is not valid knowledge, since] it cognizes what has already been cognized [by sense-perception]⁹¹; 2) that [if, on the other hand, it is supposed to cognize the external object without the mediacy of sense-perception] the blind, the deaf etc. could not exist; 3) that the knowledge of a yogin would also be a mental perception; and 4) that it is not commonly recognized (*avyava-*

88. NBT 16, 7-8: *tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati...*; NBTT 31, 10-12: *kiṃ cēndriyavijñānasya kathaṃ prāmāṇyam. yadi svavyāpāraṃ karoti, svavyāpāras tu svaviṣaye vikalpajanakatvaṃ nāma*; TS v. 1306 with TSP: *avikalpam api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimat, niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavaty ataḥ*; Stcherbatsky II, 318; Mookerjee 314-315: The very validity of sense-perception depends on the generative efficiency of itself and it can be regarded as an efficient cause of knowledge only if it exercises a function, and this functioning is nothing but the generation of conceptual knowledge itself.

89. *mānasam* omitted in G, T.

90. =NB I, s. 9: *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇēndriyajñānena samanantarapratyayaṇa janitaṃ tan manovijñānam*. PS I, k. 6a-b (=PVBh 303, 23): *mānasam cārtharāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā*. For a detailed exposition of mental perception and problems regarding it the reader is referred to Stcherbatsky II, 311-335; Mookerjee, 311-315; Hattori II, 1, n. 45-47.

91. Read *gṛhitagrāhitvam andha-* instead of *-tvabhandha-* in M.

hāritva).⁹²

For, since [mental perception] cognizes the second moment [which is different from the first moment of the object cognized by the sense-perception, the first objection] that mental perception grasps what has been once grasped is rejected.

A mental perception is produced by virtue of sense-perception, while the blind etc. do not have the respective sense-perception which is cognizant of the object such as colour etc. How then can they have a mental perception produced by it [i. e. sense-perception]? Therefore, our theory is not liable to the fault that the blind and others would not exist.

By putting [into the definition] the determinant '[produced from] the immediately preceding homogeneous cause (*samanantarapratyaya*), the possibility of the false conclusion that the knowledge of a yogin⁹³ would be identical with mental perception is removed. It is well known that the word *samanantarapratyaya* in the sense of its conventional usage (*rūḍhyā*) means [the immediately preceding knowledge as] the material cause [of the succeeding], when both of them occur in the same personality (*samtāna*). Thus, when [the mental perception belonging to] the mind of an ordinary person is supposed to be identical with the knowledge of a yogin, the content of which belongs to a personality different from that of the cognizer [the yogin himself], the designation *samanantarapratyaya* could not be used here.

Neither is it tenable that [mental perception] is not commonly recognized, for mental perception, pertaining to extremely subtle duration of time, cannot be observed by ordinary people. Moreover, we do not in fact recognize it as part of the convention (*vyavahāra*). Mental perception⁹⁴ is indeed testified by the sacred text of Buddhism (*āgama*), but there is no [logical] justification for it. The Blessed One said :

92. The first two of the four kinds of criticisms are ascribed to Kumārilabhaṭṭa by the author of NBTT (26, 12-27, 2): *tat paraiḥ kumārilādibhir lakṣaṇam ajānadbhir dūṣitam. tan manojñānaṁ yadindriyavijñānaviṣaye pravartate tadā gṛhitagrāhitayā 'pramāṇam, athānyaviṣaye pravartate, vyavahite pratyakṣaṁ bhavat kiṁ tanmanovijñānam indriyasavyapekṣaṁ syān nirāpekṣaṁ vā. indriyasavyapekṣatve satindriyavijñānam eva, nirapekṣatve vānindriyasāpi manovijñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ syād ity andhabadhirādyabhāvacyodyaṁ kṛtam.* See also TSop 281, 19-25: *yad api kumārilādibhir uktam...* Our author follows fairly faithfully the discussion of Dharmottara, who enumerates and answers the first three objections explicitly and the fourth implicitly.

93. Insert *yogijñānasya* between M 15, 7, *-viśeṣaṇena* and *mānasa*.

94. Read *mānasa-* instead of M 15, 12 *gānasa-*.

Colour-form is cognized, Oh monks, by twofold cognition, the visual perception and the mental perception induced by it.⁹⁵

[The opponent:] “What is the use of explaining what is not applicable to common discourse?” [The author:] If mental perception fits in with such a definition as made above, there is no [logical] fault found. Thus the testimony of the sacred text is shown to be impeccable. This is the purpose [of admitting mental perception] as a species of indeterminate knowledge].

6. 2. Self-consciousness. (15.18) All cognitions (*citta*) and feelings (*caitta*) are self-cognizant;⁹⁶ this is called self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*).⁹⁷ Cognition [or consciousness in general] is knowledge grasping the object in its general aspect. Feeling or mental activity stands for what occurs in the mind; it cognizes specific aspects of the object and is characterised by pleasure, pain or indifference.⁹⁸

Self-consciousness is that form [of cognition] by which the self of all cognitions and feelings is cognized; it is called [a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring, because its nature consists in direct intuition of the nature of itself.

(16.4) Against this, some opponents raise the objection: “[The theory of] self-consciousness of cognitions and feelings is not tenable, because the action [of a thing] towards its own self is a contradiction. For instance, a dancing boy, no matter how well-trained he may be, cannot climb up his own shoulder; the blade of a sword, however sharp it may be, does not cut itself; a body of fire, though vehemently burning, cannot burn itself. Likewise, how can the cognition or feeling feel itself? The relation of the feeler and the felt (*vedyavedakabhāva*) is none other than the relation of the agent and the object (*karmakarṭṛbhāva*). And the object and the

95. M *gr̥hṇate*; G *gr̥hyate*; *kadācit* is omitted in G, T. Cf. NBT 26, 10–11: *dvābhyāṃ bhikṣavo rūpaṃ dṛśyate cakṣurviññānena tadākṛṣṭena manoviññānenēti tadāgamasiddhaṃ manoviññānam*. . . .

96. =NB I, s. 10: *sarvacittacaittānāṃ ātmasaṃvedanam*. See n. 90 above.

97. T omits *svasaṃvedanam*.

98. Read *-upekṣā-* instead of *-apekṣā-* in M. This passage of Mokṣākara is verbally cited in TRD 40, 2–3. Cf. NBT 11, 5: *cittam arthamātragrāhi caittā viśeṣāvasthāgrāhiṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ*; *Prasannapadā* 65, 2–3: *arthamātradarśanaṃ cittasya vyāpāro'rthaviśeṣadarśanaṃ caitasānāṃ; tatrārthadr̥ṣṭir viññānaṃ tadviśeṣe tu caitasāḥ, ity abhyupagamāt*. For details see AK i, 30, n. 3; Siddhi, I, 296; *Prasannapadā*, 65, n. 3; Stcherbatsky II, 29; Mookerjee 319–320, etc.

agent in it are well established by common sense to be always distinct from each other as e. g. a tree and a carpenter.”

[The author :] We reply to this : The relation of the feeler and the felt in consciousness is not considered as object-agent relation, but as the relation of the determinant and the determinable (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*).⁹⁹ As a lamp illuminates itself, so is also knowledge considered to know itself, since it is, quite differently from insentient things (*jaḍapadārtha*), produced by its own cause with the nature of self-luminosity. In this connection [Śāntirakṣita] says :¹⁰⁰

Knowledge is by nature opposed to insentient matter ; this immateriality is nothing but the self-consciousness of knowledge.¹⁰¹

The self-consciousness of knowledge is not to be analysed into action and its agent, since knowledge, being a single unity without compartments, cannot be divided into the three parts [viz. the knower, the known and the knowing].¹⁰²

The Alamkāra-kāra [Prajñākaragupta] also says :

The agent, the object [and the means] are mere fictional constructs and not [existent in] reality ; it is explained that the self touches itself by means of itself.¹⁰³

(17.4) On the other hand, it is not possible for cognition and feelings to be illuminated by another cognition. For firstly it cannot be said that cognition and feelings are illumined by another cognition which occurs

99. NBT 15, 18-21 : *na cātra janyajanakabhāvanibandhanah sādhyasāadhanabhāvo yenaika-smiṇ vastuni virodhaḥ syāt, api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena. tata ekasya vastunah kiṁcid rūpaṁ pramāṇaṁ kiṁcit pramāṇaphalaṁ na virudhyate.* This passage is concerned with the problem of the identity of the *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇaphala*, which is soon dealt with by our author as well. Udayana in his *Pariśuddhi* reproduces the Sautrāntika theory that there are cases of cognition in which the logical antecedent and its consequence are included in the same concrete entity, examples being : *svapraśāśajñāna* or *svasaṁvedana* in which the subject and the object are the same entity, and the judgment that an *aśoka* is a tree, in which the tree is not different from the *aśoka* (cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 375-376).

100. G *yathôktaṁ nyāyavādinā* instead of *tathā cōktaṁ* in M. G places this verse at the very end of § 6.2.

101. =TS v. 2000 : *viññānaṁ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate, iyaṁ evātmasaṁvittir asya yājaḍarūpatā.*

102. =TS v. 2001 : *kriyākāraabhāvena na svasaṁvittir asya tu, ekasyānaṁśarūpasya trairūpyānupapattitaḥ.* This verse is given only in T.

103. =PVBh III, 369, 19 (v. 757) : *kalpitaḥ karmakartrādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate, ātmānam ātmanaiwātmā nihantīti nirucyate.*

at the same time as they do, because [between them] there is no relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (*upakāryopakārahāva*) just as in the case of the right and the left horns of a cow. Nor [can they be illumined] by another cognition existing at a different time, because the former or that which is to be illumined, has disappeared [when the latter takes place] because of the momentariness [of all things].¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, if knowledge were not self-cognizant, then we would not be able to state¹⁰⁵ [the judgment] that the object is known, because of the accepted principle¹⁰⁶ that cognition the qualifier of which is not cognized does not occur in [an object, which is] the qualificand. For [in cognition] the object is the qualificand; the state of being known is the qualifier. And 'known' means 'qualified by knowledge'. If knowledge itself is not apprehended through its self-luminosity, how then can the object qualified by the knowledge be apprehended? It is logically impossible that we cognize a stick-holder without cognizing the stick.

(17.13) Trilocana¹⁰⁷ raised the following objection :

“Just as colour-form as the object of the visual sense is cognized even when the visual organ itself is not cognized, just so will it be possible for the object to be known even if the knowledge is not perceived itself.”

104. G places here the Alambkāra's verse *parokṣaṃ yadi tat...* which appears in M 18, 15-16. This argument of Mokṣākara is cited almost verbatim in TSop 282, 15-20. The Mimāṃsaka theory that knowledge is cognized by another cognition is refuted in almost all the logical works of Buddhists, see e.g. : PS I, k. 12 : *jñānāntareṇānubhave'niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ, viśayāntarasamcāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate* (Hattori, II. 1, n. 77-80); PV III, v. 513-521, which is followed by TS k. 2023-2028 and TSP on them. But the argument of our author here is in a different way

105. G has *vyapadeśe* after *iti* (M 17,6).

106. *nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇabuddhir viśeṣye vartate*. Not identified, but the verse or its variant is often quoted in various texts with regard to discussions of various subjects. E.g. SV *Apoha.*, v. 88c-d : *viśeṣyabuddhir iṣṭēha na cājñāte viśeṣaṇe*, on which Bhaṭṭaputrajayamiśra comments : *na cāpratiyamāne 'bhāvarūpe' pohe tadviśiṣṭavastupratitir yuktā, nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇā viśiṣṭe buddhir utpadyate...* This verse of SV is concerned with the refutation of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*, in which the negation of the opposite of the meaning of a word is considered to be the qualifer, the qualificand being the object of the word ; SVK II, 122, 2-3 : *jñānaviśiṣṭā hi jñātātā, sā katham ajñāte viśeṣaṇe jñāyate* ; PKM 210, 6-7 ; 473, 13-14, etc. : *nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇā viśeṣye buddhiḥ* ; NVV I, 503, 27 ; PVV 211, n. 3 etc. Mokṣākara cites this verse considering it to mean the same as the famous verse of Dharmakīrti : *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati* (cf. M 18, 13).

107. Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspatimiśra is one of the important opponents of Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti and our author. For detailed information of him see JNA Intro. 20 ; A. Thakur, The Nyāyamañjarī of Gurn Trilocana, JBRS XLI, 4, 507 ff. ; Mookerjee, 15.

[The author :] This is also not well-founded because [the example] is not applicable to the present subject. For the qualifier of colour is not the eyes, but visual knowledge (*caṣṣurviññāna*). When visual knowledge is not cognized itself, how can colour be cognized? Thus our criticism is not nullified.¹⁰⁸

(18.1) ¹⁰⁹Kumārilabhaṭṭa, in order to teach the imperceptibility (*parokṣatva*) of knowledge, says as follows : “The existence of the senses is established since otherwise [i. e. without their existence] the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of colour and other [objects] remains inexplicable ; in the same way, the existence of knowledge is established [as the cause of the cognizedness in the object (*jñātātā*) through inference]. The *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* relevant to this problem runs : No one [directly] cognizes his own knowledge when an object is not cognized ; the existence of knowledge is inferred when an object is cognized. [Therefore, knowledge is not directly perceived.]¹¹⁰ And the [*Śloka*-] *vārttika* says on this point :

The existence of knowledge [is inferred] by virtue of the cogni-

108. TS v. 2007–2008 with TSP ; Mookerjee (321) writes on them : “The proposition of the realistic philosophers, i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, that cognition makes known the object by keeping itself in the background like the sense-organ, has, therefore, no sense in it and contains a contradiction in terms. The analogy of the sense-organ is absolutely out of place, because, it ignores a fundamental difference between cognition and the sense-organ. The sense-organ is the efficient cause, the *causa essendi*, of cognition, whereas cognition only reveals the object already in existence. It has no generative efficiency, it is what is termed a *causa cognoscendi* in regard to the object”. According to SV *Śūnya*. v. 65–67, the Mīmāṃsaka position in this problem is as follows : Fire which is the illuminator of a jar etc. is not illuminated itself. When fire is cognized, it is only a sense-organ which is the cognizer. The sense-organ is cognized by an idea, and this idea is cognized by another idea. SVK in the introductory commentary to these verses says (II, 120, 20 ff.) : *ajñāto jñāpakahetuḥ katham jñāpayatīti nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, ajñātasyāpi caṣṣuṣo jñānajanānopālabdheḥ nanu caṣṣur aṅkurasyēva bījaṃ jñānasya kāraṇam evēti yuktaṃ ajñātasyāpi janakatvam...*

109. M 18,1–19,7 missing in G.

110. *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* 11, 5–6 : *na hy ajñāte 'rthe kaścid buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tu anumānād avagacchati. tatra yaugapadyam anupapannam.* SV *Śūnya*., v. 184–186a-b : *vyāpṛtaṃ cārthasamvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati, tena prakāśakatve'pi bodhāyānyat pratiyate. idṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃ tasyārthānubhavātmakam, na cātmānubhavo'sty asyēty ātmano na prakāśakam. sati prakāśakatve ca vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā, rūpādaḥ caṣṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati. prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye'rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani.* These are cited in TS v. 2013–2016. See also *Śāstradīpikā* 157, 13–15 : *jñānakriyā hi sakarmikā karmabhūte'rthe phalaṃ janayati pakādivat... tad eva ca phalaṃ kāryabhūtaṃ kāraṇabhūtaṃ vijñānam upa-*

zedness (*jñātatā*) [of the object].”¹¹¹

(18.5) [The author:] Cognizedness here means the manifestation (*prākāṣya*) of an object.¹¹² But this theory [of the Mīmāṃsakas] is not correct. For, 1. a) if this manifestation, being [an independent entity] distinct from the knowledge, becomes visible in the form of the object, it would be insentient (*jada*) and [your theory then would fall to the ground] since an insentient thing cannot become visible. 1. b) Or, if it exists as a thing different from the object, it would again be insentient, [and your theory would be untenable] since such a thing would not become visible by itself. 1. c) Thirdly, if it is made visible by another manifestation, an infinite regress would follow, [since the second manifestation would also require the third, and so forth to infinity]. 2) If, on the contrary, manifestation is the essential quality of knowledge, it would also¹¹³ be imperceptible [just like knowledge]. [In either case cognizedness is unintelligible]. Therefore it is necessary to state that knowledge is by nature self-cognizing.

Moreover, self-consciousness is established by our own experience. How then can it be denied?¹¹⁴ In connection with this [Dharmakīrti] says:

If cognition were itself not perceived, perception of an object is never possible.¹¹⁵

The author of the [*Pramāṇavārttika*] *Alaṃkāra* [Prajñākaragupta] also

111. *tasya jñānaṃ tu jñātatāvaśāt*. Despite of our author's mention by name, this is not found in SV Śūnya. But see SVK ad SV Śūnya. v. 32 (II, 107, 18-20): *ye tu viśayavittipurassārīṃ buddhisamvidam ātiṣṭhante teṣāṃ asiddhaḥ sahopalambhaniyamaḥ, sadaiva hi viśayasamvedanottarakālam eva samvid upalabhyate. yathāhuḥ: pūrvam samgrhyate paścāj jñānaṃ taj jñātatāvaśāt*. Cf. Śabara in n. 110 above. The knowledge of an object and of the cognition do not occur simultaneously. The object is always known before, and the cognition is inferred afterwards from the cognizedness, which, being a separate entity produced by the activity of the cognition, inheres in the object. See also Stcherbatsky II, 355, n. 1.

112. NK, 302,7: *bhaṭṭamīmāṃsakās tu jñāta iti pratīṣiddho jñānājanyo viśayasamavetaḥ prākāṣyāparanāmā atirīkṭapadārthaviśeṣaḥ... ity āhuḥ*. This is taken from the *Mūlamathuranāthi tattvacintāmaṇivākyā*, but well corresponds to our author's argument.

113. Read *prākāṣyasyāpi* instead of M 18, 10 *prākāṣyasyāpi*.

114. TSop 282, 13-15: *na tāvac cittacaittānāṃ prakāśo nāsty eva, prakāśasya sarvaprāṇinām anubhavasiddhatvāt*.

115. This half-verse originally occurs in PVn, Td, 166 a7: *dmigs pa mñon sum ma yin na, de* (Read, don) *mthoñ rab tu ḥgrub mi ḥgyur*. Being one of the most famous verses of Dharmakīrti, it is quoted in many texts, Buddhist, Brāhmanical as well as Jaina. See e.g., TSP 401, 4: *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*; JNA, 478, 7; TS v. 2074: *aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittīḥ prasidhyati* is an apparent modification.

says :¹¹⁶

If knowledge is imperceptible, how can it be possible for [an object] to be known? Who can define the nature of what is imperceptible?

(18.17) [The opponent:] “If all knowledge is aware of itself by self-consciousness, determinate knowledge such as ‘This is a jar’, etc. would become indeterminate. Again, how cannot [erroneous] knowledge such as [the cognition of] a yellow shell, etc. be correct knowledge?”

[The author:] We reply. Even determinate knowledge is indeterminate as such. The judgment ‘This is a jar’ is determinative of the external object alone, but not of itself. [Regarding this point, Dharma-kīrti] said :

The knowledge which apprehends the thing meant by a word is determinative of the thing alone; but the nature [of the knowledge itself] is not identical with the object of the word. In its nature all [knowledge] is [not conceptual, but] intuitive.¹¹⁷

Likewise, erroneous knowledge is in itself non-erroneous, since it is manifested in the form of self-illumination (*svaprakāśarūpeṇa*). It is said to be erring simply because it has a wrong object, as is said as follows :

Every knowledge is correct in itself, but it may be erring in relation to [the external object which is] another.¹¹⁸

Thus it is to be maintained that whatever is manifested is manifested because it is so produced out of its own causes; otherwise manifestation

116. =PVBh 345, 4 f. b. (v. 619) : *parokṣaṁ yadi taj jñānam ity eva tat kutaḥ, parokṣasya svarūpaṁ kaś tasya lakṣayitum kṣamaḥ*. M changes *jñānam* in Pāda a into *jñātam*.

117. =PV III, v. 288 : *śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṁ tatra kalpanā, svarūpaṁ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣaṁ ato'khilam*. *artham* and *abhilaṣam* in M should be accordingly corrected into *-arthas* and *akhilam*. Cf. PVBh 331, 19-20 : *kalpanāpi svasaṁvittav iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt, svarūpasyāvikalpatvāt parokṣatvāprasiddhitāḥ*. The first half of this verse is identical with PS I, k. 7a-b (Hattori, II. 1, n. 51). M. reads *jñānaṁ tat* for *taj jñānam*.

118. *svarūpe sarvaṁ abhrāntaṁ pararūpe viparyayaḥ*. Not identified, but see PVBh 331, 13-14 : *svarūpaṁ tad eva spaṣṭākāram arthas tu na tathā. tataḥ svarūpe tan nirvikalpakam, arthe tat savikalpakam iti smaraṇam. arthasmarāṇaṁ svarūpe pratyakṣaṁ, kuta etat, svarūpe tad abhrāntam arthe bhrāntam iti*. G resumes its course here (cf. n. 109) with the following passage, at the end of which the verse of Śāntirakṣita that appeared in M 16, 15-16 is placed : *prakāśakatvāsiddher yady amī prakāśante tadā svahetor eva prakāśasvabhāvā utpannāḥ santa iti svikartavyam*. In M *prakāśāsiddher* and *prakāśasvabhāvād* are found instead of the underlined words respectively and *prakāśanta* is inserted between *santa* and *iti*. G seems better in these respects.

would remain inexplicable.¹¹⁸

6.3. **Mystic intuition of a seer.** (19.10) The mystic intuition of a seer (*yogijñāna*) is the knowledge that is produced on the termination of intensive meditation on a true object.¹¹⁹ This is also [a species of indeterminate knowledge]. *Yoga* (meditation) here is *samādhi* (concentration)¹²⁰ and it is characterised by intent attention of the mind on one object (*cittaikāgratā*). This is the same as wisdom (*prajñā*) discerning the truth of all things. *Yogin* (a seer) is so called because he is possessed of *yoga*. The knowledge of a yogin is indeterminate knowledge. What kind of knowledge is it? ^{120a} It is explained as what is produced after the termination of intensive meditation (*bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta*) on a true object (*bhūtārtha*). 'True object' is an object compatible with valid knowledge. Meditation practice (*bhāvanā*) means to imagine (*samāropa*) [an object] repeatedly in the mind. The knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the truth is devoid of determining factors (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous. The true object is the fourfold noble truth (*caturāryasatya*) named pain, the causes [of pain], the extinction [of pain] and the way to the extinction (*duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga*). We should understand the five groups (*pañca-skandha*) in the manner that they are by nature momentary (*kṣanika*), void (*śūnya*),¹²¹ soulless (*nirātmaka*), painful, and so forth. And this truth

119. =NB I, s. 11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ cēti*, PS I, k. 6c-d: *yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātrādṛk* (Hattori, II, 1, n. 48); PV III, v. 282: *prāguktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayaṃ, vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ spaṣṭaṃ evāva-bhāsate*. NBT 12, 1-3 divides the meditation process into three stages: *bhāvanāprakarṣa* in which a yogin's vision begins to be clear; *prakarṣaparyantāvasthā*, in which the yogin contemplates the object as though it were veiled by a thin cloud; *yogināḥ pratyakṣam* in which the object is perceived just as clearly as though it were a small grain on the palm of his hand. Mokṣākara follows this theory: *Yogijñāna* realized in the third stage is produced immediately after the second, *prakarṣaparyanta*, which in its turn follows the first, *bhāvanāprakarṣa*. See Stcherbatsky, II, 31, n. 2: "According to Vinītadeva, p. 47, the *bhāvanāprakarṣa* comprises 4 degrees, *smṛty-upasthāna*, *uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan* and *kṣānti*; the *prakarṣaparyanta* is the same as *laukikāgradharma*. About these so called *nirvedhabhāgiya* stages and the *smṛty-upasthānas* cp. AK VI, 14 ff. and VI 20 ff. After that comes the decisive moment, the meditating man suddenly acquires the faculty of transcendental intuition (*yogipratyakṣa*), he changes completely, it is another pudgala, a saint, an ārya, a bodhisattva...."

120. M, G *yogaḥ samādhiḥ*. T has *rnal ḥbyor ni tiñ ṇe ḥdsin dan̄ śes rab bo* (=yogaḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ca).

120a. G omits *kidṛśaṃ tad iti cet*.

121. M 19, n. 1 *aśuci*, but G, T *śūnya*.

should be known to be compatible with inferential knowledge such as ‘Whatever is existent is momentary’ and others [which are to be fully discussed in Chapter III].

6.3.1. Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered.¹²²

(20.1) [The opponent] raises the following questions: 1) Meditation is [concerned with] fictional constructs (*vikalpa*); fictional constructs refer to unreal objects. How then can a real thing vividly manifest itself [in the meditation]? 2) How can [*yogijñāna* which is by nature] conceptual attain indeterminateness? 3) How can the mind which is momentary be fixed upon one object? 4) [When the mind is momentary] by whom and how is the superiority (*viśeṣa*) [of the seer in comparison with common people] attained? 5) How can a man who has a body be emancipated (*mukta*) through detachment from passions (*rāga*) and so forth? [Thus, your theory of yogic intuition] is not intelligible in all these respects.”

(20.5) [The author :] Our reply is this: 1) Although fictional constructs are [primarily] concerned with an imaginary object (*avastuviṣaya*), it indirectly envisages (*adhyavasyati*)¹²³ [the form of] an actual object. This is the reason why actual things are manifested vividly in this [yogic intuition] because of meditation.

2) We do not say that a fictional construct [or determinate knowledge] is identical with indeterminate knowledge, but that indeterminate knowledge is produced from determinate knowledge [through *adhyavasāya*]. Furthermore, it is well established by direct experience (*anubhavasiddha*) that the non-conceptual vision manifests itself to one who constantly meditates [on the object], as in the case of love, sorrow¹²⁴, etc. Indeed there is no irrelevance whatsoever in such an experience (*drṣṭa*).

122. G omits the whole section corresponding to M 20, 1-21,7 (§ 6.3.1).

123. The author deals with the Buddhist theory of *adhyavasāya* in § 7.1.1.

124. T omits *kāmaśokādivat*. Cf. PV III, v. 283: *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvaṇnādyuṣa-plutāḥ, abhūtān api paśyanti purato'vasthātān iva*. The simile of a lover to whom the figure of his beloved is clearly manifested is a favourite corroborative example of *yogijñāna*. Jñānasrīmitra (JNA 323, 3-5) formulates the following syllogism to prove the possibility of *yogijñāna*: *yad yad bhāvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakarṣaparyante sphuṭābhaṁ sambhavati, yathā kāmukasya kāmīnyākāraḥ; bhāvyante ca paramaṇuṣārthinā kṣaṇikatve nairātmyādayo vastu-dharmāḥ* (Whatever is meditated on possibly manifests itself clearly at the end of intensive meditation, as the figure of a beloved girl appears to her lover; real teachings such as the non-existence of the soul proved from universal momentariness are meditated upon by one who seeks for the supreme good of human being.) The theory is applied also to the proof of a Buddha's omniscience, which is a kind of *yogijñāna* (cf. § 29).

3) Momentary as the mind may be, it is called 'fixed on one object' when it is intent on grasping [the object] during all the period consisting of a series of homogeneous [mental] moments (*sajāṭīyakṣaṇeṣu*).

4) As for the superiority [of the seer, we must say that] it can be produced just because of the momentariness [of the mind] and not because of permanency [i. e. non-momentariness], since it is not feasible that a permanent thing is increased with additional qualities (*atīśaya*). Regarding this [Dharmakīrti] says :

A thing whose essential nature never perishes is called 'permanent' by the wise.¹²⁵ Who can destroy the [permanent] capacity or non-capacity abiding by nature as such in a thing, which, due to its eternalness, is incurable [i. e. unchangeable]?¹²⁶

5) You have said : "A man who has a body is liable to happiness and unhappiness due to favour and disfavour shown to him. It is therefore not possible that he is emancipated by virtue of renouncing passions, etc. while he still has a body." But this is untenable. For it is not the body, but nescience (*avidyā*) which is the cause of passions, etc., this nescience being wrong conception, the nature of which consists of the four kinds of delusions (*viparyāsa*), viz., imagining what is impermanent as permanent, what is not the self as the self, what is painful as pleasant, and what is impure as pure. From this [nescience] originates thirst (*trṣṇā*) for pleasurable objects. To him who regards the self (*ātman*) as eternal, the causes of longings for pleasure will be his own belongings (*ātmīya*).¹²⁷ Attachment to these [belongings] is passion, and with the latter are connected hatred (*dveṣa*) and other [defilements]. Thus, it is nescience, but not the body that is the root of passion etc. How is one who has got rid of nescience bound to passion etc. even if he has a body? Therefore, even while living with a body those who have no passion can accomplish emancipation-which is characterised by the abandonment of all the attachment-when he is freed from nescience. Thus it has been

125. =PV II, v. 205 a-b : *nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati*. M reads *yatsvabhāvo* instead of *yaḥ svabhāvo*.

126. =PV III, v. 22 : *tasya śaktir aśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṁsthitā, nityatvād acikitsasya kas tāṃ kṣāpayitum kṣamaḥ*. M has *acikitsasya* for *acikitsasya*.

127. T *bdag rtag par mthoṅ ba kho naḥo, bde ba mñon par ḥdod pa la sogs paḥi rgyu yaṅ bdag gi bar ḥgyur ro* (= *ātmānaṃ nityaṃ paśyati, sukhābhikāṅkṣaṇādihetur ātmīyaḥ syāt*). Tr. follows M, but omits *sukha* of *sukhaheṭur*.

fully established.

7. Object of indeterminate knowledge. (21.8) Its object is the extremely particular characteristic.¹²⁸ It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is determined in space, time and form (*deśakālākāranīyata*). The following is meant by this statement : [To take the example of] a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows : it is capable of containing water etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined in space, time and form ; is free from ideas (*dharma*), impermanence and others ; and, as object of our purposive action (*pravṛtti*), is distinct from things both of the same and of a different class (*sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛtta*).¹²⁹

7.1. Ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda. (21.13)¹³⁰ [The opponent:] “If only the particular can be the object of indeterminate knowledge, and not the universal (*sāmānya*), how then can you grasp by indeterminate knowledge the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the two universals of smoke and fire?”¹³¹

[The author:] There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [indeterminate

128. =NB I, s. 12: *tasya viśayaḥ svalakṣaṇam*. PS I, k. 2a-c: *pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayam, prameyam...* (Hattori, II. 1, n. 11, 13); PSV on it: *svalakṣaṇaviśayaṁ (hi) pratyakṣam sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ* (=PVBh 169, 9-10) (Hattori, II. 1, n. 14).

129. NBT, 12, 14 ff.: *tasya caturvidhapratyakṣasya viśayo boddhavyaḥ svalakṣaṇam, svam asādhāraṇam lakṣaṇam tattvaṁ svalakṣaṇam. vastuno hy asādhāraṇam ca tattvaṁ asti sāmānyam ca. yad asādhāraṇam pratyakṣagrāhyam...*

130. G omits § 7.1 (M 21, 13-22, 7).

131. This criticism is reproduced as of Trilocana in JNA 161, 17-23: *trilocanas tv āha, pratyakṣānupalambhayor viśeṣaviśayatvāt katham tābhyāṁ sāmānyayoḥ sambandhapratitiḥ...* Trilocana's argument is in brief as follows: Perception and non-cognition, having by nature only the particular as their object, cannot comprehend the relation between two universals. The Buddhist contention that the relation of the absence of fire with the absence of smoke is understood does not hold good. Because such a relation is not an object of perception which cognizes only the particular; nor is it understood by inference, because inference presupposes perception. Moreover, there is no relation between two concepts which are merely discrimination from the opposite (Read *vyāvṛtayoḥ*). Buddhists may contend that a concept occurring just after perception envisages by logical imagination the determinate form of the object, though actually every moment of the object is different from another. But this is untenable, since, according to Buddhists, a reality never becomes an object of conceptual knowledge, always remaining imperceptible to it. The criticism is cited verbatim also in RNA 99, 13-23.

knowledge] (*svalakṣaṇam tasya viṣaya eva*), the non-connection [of the former with the latter] being negated (*ayogavyavaccheda*), and not that the particular alone is its object (*svalakṣaṇam eva tasya viṣayaḥ*), all other [than the particular] being excluded (*anyayogavyavaccheda*)¹³². What

132. The theory of two or three kinds of *vyavaccheda* was first propounded by Dharmakīrti, and maintained throughout the subsequent development of Buddhist logic. It was applied to various problems of logic as often as the theory of *prasajya*- and *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*. In fact, the theory of *vyavaccheda* is concerned with the restriction of the meaning of an affirmative proposition, or more precisely, the affirmative relation of two terms, while the theory of two kinds of *pratiṣedha* is for the purpose of restricting the meaning of a negative proposition. (About the latter see n. 62 above.) The original verses stating the theory of *vyavaccheda* occur in PV IV, v. 190-192 and PVn II (Peking ed. 266, b3-5), and are cited verbatim in TRD 35, 11-17: *ayogaṃ yogaṃ aparair atyantāyogaṃ eva ca, vyavacchinatti dharmasya nipāto vyatirecakaḥ. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyāṃ kriyayā ca saḥôditaḥ, vivakṣāto 'prayoge'pi tasyārtho'yaṃ pratiyate. vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ yatas caitro dhanurdharaḥ, pārtho dhanurdharo nīlaṃ sarojaṃ iti vā yathā*. The particle *eva*, which implies the significance of separation, restricts the relation of two terms [or of a proposition] in three ways: (1) When it is stated with the qualifier, the non-connection of the qualifier [with the qualificand] is negated; (2) when it is stated with the qualificand, the connection of all qualities other [than the stated qualifier] with the qualificand is negated; (3) when it is stated with the verb, the absolute non-connection of two terms is negated, i.e. the possibility of the connection of the two terms in some cases is admitted. The examples are: (1) *caitro dhanurdhara eva* (Caitra is an archer), meaning that Caitra is surely one of the many archers—this is called *ayogavyavaccheda*, since the force of the particle negates simply the disconnection of Caitra and archery; (2) *pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ* (Pārtha alone is the archer), meaning that only Pārtha is worthy of being called an archer, all the others being unworthy of the appellation—this is *anyayogavyavaccheda*; (3) *nīlaṃ sarojaṃ sambhavaty eva* (There are some lotus blooms which are blue), showing the possibility of the existence of blue lotus—this is *atyantāyogavyavaccheda*. Any of these meanings is understood in any proposition through the intention of the speaker even if the particle is not actually applied, for the expression of a sentence is the effect of separation [intended by the speaker].

Dharmottara in PVnT (Peking ed. 216, b8 ff.) gives another example which is adopted by Jñānaśrīmitra (JNA 206, 6 ff.) as well as Ratnakīrti (RNA 55, 6-9): *eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhate*. This may be restricted by any of the three *vyavacchedas* according as we put *eva* with *eṣa panthāḥ*, *śrughnam* and *upatiṣṭhate* respectively: This way alone leads to Śrughna; this way surely, i.e. without break, leads to Śrughna; it is possible that this way also leads to Śrughna. Dharmakīrti's discussion on *vyavaccheda* cited above is made regarding the relation of *p* and *h* (*pakṣadharmā*), while Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti give the example of a way to Śrughna with regard to the theory of *apoha*. Ratnakīrti interprets also the theory of *vyāpti* by means of *vyavaccheda* (RNA 70, 7-10; Mookerjee, 10-12). Jñānaśrīmitra makes use of the same for solving a difficulty in establishing a causal relation in his *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi* (JNA 321, 12-13): *sāmagryapekṣayānyasya cchede dravya-vyapekṣayā, yogyatāyām ayogasya siddho'tyantam ca karmaṇi*. On this verse he comments: When by the word 'fire' we mean as a whole the entire things [fire, fuel, moisture etc.] (*sāmagri*) implied by it, that much alone is [the cause of smoke] (*sa eva kāraṇam*) and

then follows is that the universal can be its object as well.¹³³

7.1.1 Grāhya and adhyavaseya. (21.18) The object of valid cognition is indeed twofold: the directly apprehended (*grāhya*) and the indirectly determined (*adhyavaseya*). Of these, the directly apprehended object of indeterminate knowledge is the single moment of the individual characteristic that is seen.¹³⁴ The indirectly determined [or envisaged] object is the universal which is manifested when the determining factor (*vikalpa*) occurs following indeterminate cognition.¹³⁵

7.1.2 ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam and tiryaglakṣaṇam sāmānyam. (22.2) This universal is again twofold: the concept of an individual (*ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam*, lit. vertical universal) and the concept of a class (*tiryaglakṣaṇam*, lit. horizontal universal). Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual

in this case the relation involved is *anyayogavyavaccheda*. When only the substance of fire is meant and also when cause-ness means fitness or latent force (*yogyatā*), then [fire] is fit to be [one of] the causes [of smoke] (*dahanaḥ kāraṇam eva*). This is *ayogavyavaccheda*. When furthermore an actual action is meant, [it means that fire] actually can be [a cause] (*dahanaḥ kāraṇam bhavaty eva*). In this case the relation of *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* is admitted. (For details see my *Trikapañcakacintā*—Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality, MIK Nos. 4-5, 1 ff. and the additional note in 15). From these explanations it is clear that 1) in *anyayogavyavaccheda* the qualificand and the qualifier completely pervade each other or are coextensive, 2) that in *ayogavyavaccheda* the qualifier pervades the qualificand, or the qualifier is of wider extension than the qualificand, and 3) that in *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* only some part of the qualificand is pervaded by some part of the qualifier. The theory appears in various texts of other Indian schools as well, though they are probably indebted to Buddhist logicians for it. See e.g. *Saptabhāṅgitarāṅgiṇī*, ed. Thākuraśrīprasādaśarma, 25, 8-12; 26, 3-5; 26, 15-20 etc. NK s. v. *eva*.

133. Ratnakīrti, following JNA 166, 11-21, replies to the criticism by Trilocana referred to in n. 131 above as follows: *trilocanacodye'pi brūmaḥ. yadi pratyakṣam svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ ity ayogavyavacchedenôcyate tadā siddhasādhanaṃ. anyayogavyavacchedas tv asiddhaḥ, pratyakṣānumānādisarvajñānānam grāhyāvaseyabhedena viśayadvaividhyānatikramāt. yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate tad grāhyam, yatra yataḥ pravartate tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛttisvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ* (RNA 102, 8-13). Mokṣākara argues after this passage of Ratnakīrti here and in § 7.1.3. below.

134. *T de la mñon sum gyi gzuñ bya ni snan bzin paḥi skad cig gcig go* (= *tatra pratyakṣasya pratibhāsamānaḥ kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ*). *eko grāhyaḥ* in M should be *kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ*. Cf. also NBT 12, 18: *pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ*.

135. NBT 12, 16 ff.: *dviividho hi viśayaḥ pramāṇasya, grāhyaś ca yad ākāram utpadyate, prāpaṇīyaś ca yam adhyavaseyati. anyo hi grāhyo 'nyaś cādhyavaseyaḥ. pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣabalotpannena niścayena saṃtāna eva. saṃtāna eva ca pratyakṣasya prāpaṇīyaḥ, kṣaṇasya prāpayitum āśakyatvāt*. See also Intro. of the *Pramāṇā-vārttikā*, ed. Malvaniya.

object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same class;¹³⁶ and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining [an object] (*sādhanaṣpratyakṣa*). The universal of a class comprises [as the members] all the individuals [belonging to one class] which are distinguished from [those of] other classes; this universal is the object of the perception grasping pervasion (*vyāptigrāhakaṣpratyakṣa*).¹³⁷

7.1.3 Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold. (22.6) [The opposite process is taken by] determinate knowledge, to which the universal (*sāmānya*) is the directly apprehended object (*grāhya*) and the indirectly apprehended object (*adhyavasāya*) is the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*).

7.2. Refutation of the six categories. (22.7) ¹³⁸By the instruction that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the particular, it is implied that the six categories (*padārtha*)¹³⁹ maintained by other schools [viz. the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika] are not its objects. [The six kinds of categories, viz.] substance as the composite whole of an individual object (*avayavidravaya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), ultimate specifier (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), are not manifested (*pratibhāsa*) in indeterminate cognition. What is not manifested cannot be its object, because otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (*atiprasaṅgāt*). For, while perceiving a jar, etc. we do not cognize a single substance as the 'whole' apart from parts such as the front, the

136. T rigs mthun pa (dañ rigs mi mthun pa la sogs pa gcig kho na) la skad cig ma du ma tshogs paḥi spyi ni... The parenthesized portion must be omitted.

137. JNA 166, 16 ff.: *tatra sādhanapratyakṣam tadaivārthakriyārthināḥ kṣaṇavikṣane 'pi saṁtānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviśayam. vyāptigrahaṇaparakaraṇe punar ekavyaktidarśane 'pi sarvasajātivyavyaktiviśayatvena sāmānyaviśayam.* See also RNA 102, 13-17. In another place Ratnakīrti gives the name *ūrdhva* and *tiryak* (RNA 136, 2-3): *yathōrdhvam indriyapratyakṣataḥ kṣaṇabhede pratite 'py avidyāvaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ. tathā tiryaksvasaṁvedanapratyakṣeṇākārābhede 'dhigate'py avidyāvaśād eva bhedāvasāyaḥ...* Our author inherits the designations from Ratnakīrti. However, the same designations appear in Māṇikyanandin's *Parikṣāmukhasūtra* (Chap. IV, s. 3: *sāmānyam dvedhā, tiryagūrdhvatābhedāt*) as well as PKM 466, 20 ff. If Māṇikyanandin is, as generally accepted, dated in 9th cent. it follows that Ratnakīrti is indebted to him for the classification. Prabhācandra is dated by Mahendur Kumar in 980-1065, which almost concides with the date of Ratnakīrti.

138. G resumes its discourse here with a slightly different statement: *etena yad uktaṁ pareṇa śatpadārthāḥ pratyakṣeṇa paricchidyante te ca pratyakṣasya viśayā iti tan nirastam.*

139. As for the problem of a suitable English tr. of the word *padārtha*, see K. H. Potter, *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam*, Intro. and the counter-argument by J. Brough in BSOAS. XXII, 1, 161

back etc. The supreme lord of logic (Nyāyaparamēśvara, i. e. Dharmakīrti?) says in this connection :

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i. e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.¹⁴⁰

It should be understood that a similar criticism may be directed towards [the other categories], quality, motion, etc.¹⁴¹

8. Identity of the cause and the effect of cognition. (22.17) ¹⁴²[The opponent :] “ It is well known that *pramāṇa* [the instrument of knowledge]

140. =HBT 106, 25-26: *bhāgā eva ca bhāsante sanniviṣṭās tathā tathā, tadvān kaścit punar naiva nirbhāgaḥ pratibhāsate*. M, however, reads *hi* instead of *ca*, and *tadvān naiva punaḥ kaścid vibhāgaḥ sampratiyate* in c-d. *Vibhāga* in M must be corrected into *nirbhāga*, since the latter reading is given in M 66, 15-16 (§ 31.3) where the same verse appears again. The first half of this verse is cited in NVV I, 468,8. Mokṣākara ascribes this verse to Nyāyaparamēśvara, which is the epithet used for Dharmakīrti in TSop 304, 21-22; HBT seems to quote this verse from some other work; and it is most likely that this is a verse of Dharmakīrti, though I have not so far identified it.

141. Detailed criticism of these categories is made again in M 64, 10 ff. (§ 31. 1-31. 3).

142. It is now necessary to collect and rearrange theories scattered in the various places of our text in order to understand the whole process of perception as interpreted by the Sautrāntika. Indeterminate sensation –which alone is really worthy of the name *pratyakṣa* has as its object a unique moment of an extra-mental object (§ 7). This pure sensation is, as Mookerjee says (344,8 ff.), “a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a lump” (cf. § 8). But pure sensation as such has no practical utility unless and until it is made determinate, although indeterminateness is the only criterion to distinguish perception from logical imagination or inference. Thus it is proposed that pure sensation has the power to produce determinate knowledge, and that if it does not so, it cannot be called valid (§ 6). This determinate knowledge produced from pure sensation is twofold: the image or concept of an object and the consciousness or understanding of the object (§ 8). This dichotomy is not real, but fictional constructs, which are made determinate through the negation of others. The image of blue is determined as such because it is distinguished from the non-blue; consciousness is also likewise determined (§ 8). The distinction of the means and the effect of cognition is made only in this realm of determinate knowledge, though in reality there is no distinction at all. But the opponent here questions how the means and the effect can be separately established in one and the same cognition (§ 8; 6.2). The Buddhist reply to this is that the distinction of the determinant and the determinable can be made in one and the same cognition, since the relation between the determinant and the determinable is different from the relation of the actor and the object of an action (§ 6.2). This reply is given by Dharmottara in his com. on NB I, s. 2 which is parallel to § 8 of our text, while our author has already given it in the section dealing with *svasamvedana* (§ 6.2). The theory of the generative efficiency of indeterminate knowledge makes it possible that perception has also a universal as its object, although this is said only in the realm of practical utility (§ 7.1-7.2).

is knowing (*jñāna*) which brings about as its effect (*phalabhūta*) the act (*kriyā*) in the form of knowledge (*pramitirūpa*). What is in your theory to be regarded as [the resultant content of] knowledge (*pramiti*) in relation to which the knowing as the cause (*janayaj jñānam*) is called the instrument of knowledge?"¹⁴³

[The author :] The right answer to this question is as follows : From an object such as blue is produced twofold [determinate] knowledge : one is the image or concept of blue (*nīlākāra*), the other consists of the consciousness of blue (*nīlabodhasvabhāva*). The knowledge consisting of the image of blue is [determined as] distinct (*vyāvṛtṭyā*) from the image of non-blue, and is regarded as the instrument of knowledge. The knowledge consisting in the consciousness of blue is also [determined as] distinct from the consciousness of non-blue, and is the knowledge as resultant (*pramiti*). This is the same as the effect [of cognition].¹⁴⁴ Concerning this, [Dharmakīrti] says :

This resemblance (*sārūpya*) [of the mental image] to its [extra-mental] object is the instrument of knowledge ; the understanding (*adhigati*) of the object is the effect of cognition.¹⁴⁵

However, the distinction as such has been set up by conceptual analysis (*vikalpapratyaya*). In reality (*paramārthatas*) there is no distinction, as is said [by Dharmakīrti] :

The indeterminate knowing is none other than the effect of cognition.¹⁴⁶

8.1. Knowledge is necessarily endowed with an image (*sākārajñāna*).
(23.7) ¹⁴⁷...Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of

143, NBT 15, 11-12: *nanu ca jñānād avyতিরিক্তাং সাদৃশ্যম, তথা ca satī tad eva jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ tad eva pramāṇaphalam. na caikam vastu sādhyam sādhanam cōpapadyate....* PV III, v. 319: *kriyākāraṇayor aikyavirodha iti cet (asat, dharmabhedābhyupagamād vastvabhinnam itīṣyate.)*

144. For an excellent exposition of this theory see Mookerjee 337-354. NBT 16, 3 ff.: *tasmād asārūpyavyāvṛtṭiyā sārūpyam jñānasya vyavasthāpanahetuḥ, anīlabodhavyāvṛtṭiyā ca nīlabodharūpatvaṁ vyavasthāpyam. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyakṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ....*

145. =NB I, s. 20: *arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam*. The passage *arthādhigatiḥ pramāṇaphalam* which our Author ascribes to Dharmakīrti is not found in NB, but NB I, s. 18-19 expresses the same meaning :... *pramāṇaphalam arthapratitirūpatvāt*.

146. =NB I, s. 18: *tad eva ca pratyakṣam jñānaṁ pramāṇaphalam*; PS I, k. 8c-d: *savyāpārapratititvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat* (Hattori, II. 1, n. 55). PV III, v. 308a-b: *sā [=arthādhigatiḥ] ca tasya [=jñānasya] ātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaram phalam*.

147. Missing in G, T.

its object (*sākāra*).¹⁴⁷ If knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since such knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects.¹⁴⁸

8.2. (23.9) Again, some scholars hold that the preceding knowledge is the cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*) while the subsequent knowledge is

148. DP 82, 24-26 : *yadi jñānam arthasarūpaṃ na syāt kiṃ tu nirākāraṃ bodhaikarūpaṃ tadānubhavaikarūpatayā tad aviśiṣṭaṃ, sarvatra paricchedyatayā karmasthānaprāpte nilapitādāv iti nilasyaivēdaṃ saṃvedanaṃ, idaṃ pītasyaivēty anubhavasiddhaḥ pratikarmavibhāgo hiyate ;* TSop 284,2 f. b.-285,4 : *atatsarūpeṇa jñānenārthavedanāyogāt, tathā hi (yadā) vijñānaṃ bodhamātrasvabhāvam utpadyate, tadā nilasyēdaṃ vedanaṃ pītasyeti pratikarmavyavasthā na syāt. yādṛśaṃ hi tan nīle pite ' pī tādṛśaṃ vēti. arthasārūpye tu sati yasyaivākāraṃ anukaroti jñānaṃ tatsaṃvedanaṃ bhavati nānyasya.*

The *sākāravāda* is maintained by the Śāṃkhya, Vedānta as well as the Sautrāntikabauddha. The theory, in Mookerjee's words (77), "holds that knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impress of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness." Refer to the verse *bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti cet...* in n. 74 above. The *nirākāravāda* is maintained by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣikabauddha, and "the theory maintains that our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution." Cf. TSP 564, 8-9 : *...anākāravādināḥ, yasyēdaṃ darśanam, ākāravān bāhyo 'rtho nirākārā buddhir iti.* TS v. 1999, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism's sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes regarding the relation of knowledge and its object : *Nirākāravāda* (*anirbhāsa-jñānavāda*) according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object : *sākāravāda* (*sanirbhāsa-jñānavāda*)—the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; *anyanirbhāsa-jñānavāda*—the object is cognized by knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the perspective of *ākāravāda*. The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as *nirākāravādin* while the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin are *sākāravādin*. When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vijñānavādin as well as the Mādhyamika are again divided into both parties. Our author comes to deal with this division of the Vijñānavādin in § 32.1 (M 69, 11 ff.) and I will give a detailed note on that occasion. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties see TRD 46-47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying : *nirākāro bodho'rthasahabhāvy ekasāmagryadhīnas tatrārthe pramāṇam*; the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin : *sākāro bodhaḥ pramāṇam*; and the Mādhyamika : *svapṇopamaḥ pramāṇaprameyayoḥ pratibhāgaḥ, muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ... kecit tu mādhyamikāḥ svasthāṃ jñānam āhuḥ*. SDS 46, 368-371 : *artho jñānānvito vaibhāṣikeṇa bahu manyate, sautrāntikena pratyakṣagrāhyo'rtho na bahir mataḥ. ākārasahitā buddhir yogācārasya sammatā, kevalāṃ saṃvidāṃ svasthāṃ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ*. Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here, a group of the Mādhyamikas who maintain pure consciousness independent of *ākāras* seems to represent *nirākāravāda*.

the effect of the cognition (*pramāṇaphala*). But this is untenable. For the preceding knowledge cannot be a *pramāṇa*¹⁴⁹ because the subsequent knowledge which is supposed to be the *pramāṇaphala* is then not yet produced. When the [so-called] resultant knowledge is produced, the preceding knowledge, being momentary, has already disappeared. How can it be a *pramāṇa*, even if it has an object such as a jar? Nor can the one of [two cognitions existing at the same time be called the effect [of the other], since between them is not found the relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (*upakāryopakāraśatva*) as in the case of the right and left horns of a cow.

8.3. ¹⁵⁰...Therefore, there is in the level of the highest truth (*paramārthatas*) no difference between the instrumental cognition and the resultant cognition; the difference which, being brought about by conceptual distinction [from their opposite] (*vyāvṛttikṛta*), is established in determinate knowledge as simply imaginary (*kālpānīka*).¹⁵⁰

Here ends the chapter on indeterminate knowledge of the *Tarka-bhāṣā*.

Chapter II. Inference for oneself (*svārthanumāna*).

9. **Classification of determinate knowledge.** (24.2) Determinate knowledge or inference is twofold: that for oneself and that for others.¹⁵¹ [Inference] which is made for one's own sake is inference for oneself (*svārtham anumānam*); this consists in [inferential] knowledge [of a person who infers]. Having seen [a logical mark] smoke, etc. in its locus (*dharmin*), say a mountain, a person who infers gets the knowledge of fire [existing on the mountain]. By means of this knowledge he himself comes to comprehend the object which is not directly perceived (*parokṣa*), but nothing more is aimed at. This is why it is called inference for one's own sake.

[Inference] which is made for others is inference for others. This inference for others (*parārthanumāna*) consists of words. Since the statement expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics (*tri-*

149. Insert *na pramāṇam* after *tāvajjñānam*. It is attested by G, T.

150. G, T omit § 8.3.

151. NB II, s. 1-2: *anumānam dvidhā, svārtham parārtham ca*. PS II, k. 1a-b: *anumānam dvidhā, svārtham trirūpāl liṅgato'rthadyk* (Cited in PVV Appendix 524, 1) (Kitagawa, 74, n. 7).

rūpaliṅga) leads others to, i. e. causes others to know [what is not directly perceived], the statement is also meant by the word *anumāna* through the metaphorical use (*upacāra*) of the word¹⁵², just as the expression ‘Clarified butter is life’ (*āyur ghr̥tam*).

9.1. Function of inference. (24.8) Of these, the knowledge which is, in reference to the object of inference (*anumeya*), produced by the logical mark having the triple characteristic is the inference for oneself.¹⁵³ [The following is meant:] From the logical mark (*h*) which has the triple characteristic, knowledge is obtained by the inferring person in regard to the object of inference [i. e. the fact that locus *p* is qualified by *s*]¹⁵⁴ which is not directly perceived. This knowledge is the inference for oneself.

However, some are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine the necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the probandum (*s*) [with the probans (*h*)] as connected (also) with the particular locus (*p*. *dharmiviśeṣa*).¹⁵⁵

Others are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine indirectly the existence of [the probandum (*s*) such as] fire.¹⁵⁶

152. NBT 17.6: *parārthānumānaṁ śabdātmakam, svārthānumānaṁ tu jñānātmakam*; NB III, s. 1-2: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṁ parārthānumānam, kāraṇe kāryopacārāt*; TSop 296, 6-7: *anumānakāraṇe trirūpaliṅge kāryasyānumānasyōpacārāt samāropāt yathā naḍvalodakam pādaroga iti*.

153. NB II, s. 3: *tatra trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānaṁ tad anumānam*. Cf. n. 151.

154. *Anumeya* here means the conclusion to be proved, the collection of *pakṣadharmin* (*p*) and *sādhya* (*s*), or to be more precise, *p* qualified by *s*. Cf. DP 90, 22: *anumeyo dharmadharminisamudāyaḥ*. Hereafter I use the sign *p* for *pakṣadharmin*=*sādhya*, the locus or substratum of inference, illustrated here by a mountain; *s* for *sādhya*, the quality to be inferred or *probandum*, illustrated here by fire; *h* for *hetu*=*liṅga*=*sādhana*, the logical mark or the probans, illustrated here by smoke. It is necessary because the Skt. terms for them are multivalent and must be determined in one sense according to the context. The word *anumeya* is used in three senses: 1) It means *p* when used in relation to the definition of the probans; 2) the collection of *p* and *s*, or *p* qualified by *s* when used in relation to the understanding of the subject-matter of inference; 3) and *s* when a *vyāpti* (pervasion between the probans and the probandum) is to be determined. Cf. NBT 20, 16-17: *hetulakṣaṇe niścetavye dharmy anumeyaḥ, anyatra tu sādhyaḥ pratipattikāle samudāyo’numeyaḥ, vyāptiniścayakāle tv dharmo’numeya iti*. The present passage in our text is concerned with the understanding of the object or the subject-matter of inference, so *anumeya* is here used in the second sense of the word.

155. M *dharmaviśeṣa*, but G, T read *dharmiviśeṣa*, which is supported by the context. See n. 156.

156. Dignāga introduces and refutes two theories regarding the problem of what is the subject-matter of an inference in PS II, k. 8-11. The Skt. text is preserved in NVT 152, 11 ff. which is cited here together with Vācaspati’s introducing remark: *atra dignāgena*

10. Three characteristics of the logical mark : pakṣadharmatā. (24.
13) Now the triple characteristic possessed by the logical mark is to
be explained.¹⁵⁷

1) Its [*h*'s] definite (*niścitam*) presence in all [the members of the
class of] the locus (*p*) of inference [as well as in other classes].¹⁵⁸

*Anumeya*¹⁵⁹ here means the locus of inference (*dharmin*) such as a

*dhūmād agnirūpadharmāntarānumānam agnideśayoḥ sambandhānumānam ca dūṣayitvāgni-
viśiṣṭadeśānumānam samarthitam, tathā cāha, kecid dharmāntaram meyaṁ liṅgasyāvyabhi-
cārataḥ, sambandham kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharminoḥ* (k. 8). *liṅgaṁ dharme
prasiddham cet kim anyat tena miyate, atha dharmini, tasyaiva kim arthaṁ nānumeyatā* (k. 9).
*sambandhe 'pi dvayaṁ nāsti, śaṣṭhi śrūyeta tadvatī, avācya, 'nugṛhitatvān, na cāsau liṅgasam-
gataḥ* (k. 10). *liṅgasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmenānyatra dṛśyate, tatra prasiddham tadyuktaṁ
dharmināṁ gamayiṣyati* (k. 11). These verses are translated and interpreted by several
modern scholars, among whom are : Randle, Fragment F (18-21) ; Mookerjee, 349-355 ; Kita-
gawa, 103-110. It is clear that the two views reproduced by our author correspond to the
two views criticised by Dignāga. Uddyotakara as well as Vācaspatimiśra in their turn
criticise Dignāga's view that *anumeya* is *p* qualified by *s*. But our author does not go
farther into a detailed controversy.

157. Dignāga states the three characteristics of the logical mark in PS II, k. 5c-d :
anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitā'sati (Fragment H ; Kitagawa, 96). Dharmakīrti's
definition of the logical mark in PV I, v. 1 is *pakṣadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetuḥ*. This
is borrowed from Dignāga's stanza : *grāhyadharmas tadamśena vyāpto hetuḥ*, which was
probably contained in his lost work *Hetumukha* (cf. Frauwallner, Dignāga, sein Werk und
seine Entwicklung, WZKSO III, 164 ; Gnoli, 1, n. 10). In this verse of Dharmakīrti, *pakṣa-
dharmatva* represent the first characteristic, and *vyāpti* between *h* and *s* (= *tadamśa*) both
the second and the third. But Mokṣākara follows Dharmakīrti's statement in NB.

158. NB II, s. 5 : *liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva (niścitam)*. In NB the word *niścitam* is
stated at the end of II, s. 7, and Dharmottara says that it must be read with II, s. 5 and
6 as well. *p* here stands for all the members of the class of *p*. When *p* is a proper name
or a definite individual, it may be regarded as a unit class.

159. *Anumeya* in this context means *p*. Cf. NB II, s. 8 : *anumeyo 'tra jijñāsitaviśeṣo
dharmi*. (*Anumeya* here stands for the *dharmin* whose determinant or property it is wanted
to know.) When he explained the first characteristic of the *liṅga*, *anumeye'stitā*, in PSV
ad PS II, k. 5c-d (n. 157 above), Dignāga defined *anumeya* as *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeyaḥ*
(Fragment 4 : Kitagawa, 96). This definition was rather confusing, since *anumeya* here
must be in its first sense, i.e. *p*, while Dignāga's definition is more suggestive of the
second, *p* qualified by *s*. Commentators on PS were conscious of this difficulty. Jinendra-
buddhi (*Viśālāmālavatī*, Peking, 106, a5-7), for instance, introduces a criticism of some
people, who, classifying the usage of the word *anumeya* into the above three, say that
the existence of *s* is not yet known when a logical mark is perceived, and that *p* therefore
cannot be qualified by *s* at that time. Jinendrabuddhi, therefore, interprets Dignāga's
definition as meaning *jijñāsitadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmi*, as Dharmakīrti does. However, it is
not that Dignāga was unconscious of this problem, for he answers it, not in Chap. II, but
in Chap. III. PSV, just before PS III. k. 10 (Kitagawa, 151) introduces an opponent who
contends that *sādhana* should not be called *pakṣadharmatva* (the property of *p*) as Dignāga

mountain etc. A logical mark must really (*eva*) subsist in it. This is one of the three characteristics [of a logical mark] and is named *pakṣa-dharmatā* [*h*'s being a property of *s*]. The word *sattvam* (presence) is employed to guard against the fallacy of an illegitimate *h* (*asiddha*). For instance, in the inference 'Sound is impermanent because of visibility',¹⁶⁰ visibility (*h*) which means to be an object of the visual organ, does not truly exist in *p* or sound.

By the particle *eva* the fallacy of *h*'s non-existence in part [i. e. some members] of *p* is rejected. For instance, the Digambara Jaina formulates the syllogism 'Trees have consciousness because they sleep'. By sleeping here is meant the state of shrivelled leaves; but this is not found in all trees.

The word *niscitam* (definitely) is employed in order to reject the fallacy of *h*'s dubious reality (*saṃdigdhāsiddha*). For instance, [the following inference is to be rejected:] 'Here there is fire because of the existence of a mass of [smoke-like] elements which, however, is suspected to be vapour'.¹⁶¹

The significance of the word *eva* being placed [not before] but after

does. This opponent is represented in PVBh 580, 12-14 as saying: *nanu ca dharmidharma-mātratayōpasamhriyamāṇo dharmaḥ sādhanam, na pakṣadharmatayā, asti cātra pradeśe vanagahanādau dhūma iti dharmimātre pradarśanāt. na ca dharmimātram pakṣo, na hi dharmī sādhyas, tasya siddhatvāt, dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeya iti vacanāt.* (Indeed, *sādhana* is a property which, as a property in general, is brought into contact with a locus in general, and not as the property of *pakṣa*, for it is shown in a locus in general, as when we say: in this place, say, a forest, there is smoke. And a locus in general cannot be called *pakṣa*, since a locus, being already established, is not to be proved, and since you say that the subject-matter of an inference is the locus qualified by a property-to-be-proved.) Dignāga's reply to this runs: *samudāyārthasādhyatvād dharmamātre'tha dharminī, amukhye'py ekadeśatvāt sādhyatvam upacaryate* (PS III, k. 10=PVBh 580, 16). That is to say, according to Dignāga, the first sense of *anumeya*, i.e. *p* and the third sense, *s*—though they are not the primary meaning of the word—are metaphorically said to be the object of proof, since they constitute parts of the collection '*p* qualified by *s*', which is to be proved. In PVBh the opponent questions farther (580, 31): But in Dignāga's definition '*anumeya* is *p* qualified by *s*' there is no metaphorical usage found. And Prajñākara replies: *na, jijñāsītadharma-viśiṣṭa iti tatrābhiprāyāt.* Dignāga's intention in the definition of *anumeya* in Chap II is that *anumeya* is *p* qualified by *s* which it is wanted to know. This is a kind of metaphor because the *dharma* as the determinant of the *dharmin* is not yet proved. This interpretation of Prajñākaragupta is parallel to that of Jinendrabuddhi mentioned above. Both of them, of course, presuppose Dharmakīrti's interpretation in NB II, s. 8.

160. NB III, s. 60: *yathānityaḥ śabda iti sādhye cākṣuṣatvam ubhayāsiddham.*

161. NB III, s. 64: *yathā bāṣpādibhāvena saṃdhiyamāno bhūtasamghāto 'gnisiddhāv upadiśyamānaḥ saṃdigdhāsiddhaḥ.*

the word *sattvam*¹⁶² is to reject the fallacy of *h* subsisting only in *p* (*asādhāraṇa*). For instance, ‘Sound is impermanent because of its audibility’¹⁶³ [is an inconclusive inference, because the *h*, audibility, is an exclusive property of sound].

10.1. **Anvaya.** (25.7) [The second characteristic is] defined as follows :

2) Its definite presence only in things similar to *p* [*sapakṣa* i.e. the members of the class of *s*].¹⁶⁴

What is homogeneous to *p* is called the co-members of *p* (*sapakṣa*), that is to say, objects in the examples (*drṣṭāntadharmin*) similar to *p* [in respect of being a member of *s*]¹⁶⁵. Thus, the second character named *anvaya* (positive pervasion) is that *h* must be present only in [the members of the class of] *s*.

In this definition too, the word *sattvam* (presence) aims at precluding

162. Note that *eva* here represents *ayogavyavaccheda* (n. 132), i.e. it is not meant that *h* must subsist only in *p*, but that *h* must truly subsist in *p* as in other things. This restriction is to exclude the fallacy of *asādhāraṇahetu*. If the definition is interpreted in the sense of *anyayogavyavaccheda*, *p* and *h* would completely pervade each other, i.e. would be coextensive, and this necessitates *asādhāraṇānaikāntikatva*. Cf. NBT 19, 9-10: *yadi hy anumeya eva sattvam iti kuryāc chrāvaṇatvam eva hetuḥ syāt*. Inference in such a case is prohibited in the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, though later Buddhist logicians like Ratnākaraśānti remove the prohibition (n. 301 below). But the interpretation by the theory of *vyavaccheda* is inapplicable to the second characteristic of the *hetu*. See n. 169 below.

163. NBT 19, 6-10. The author follows Dharmottara in all the three illustrations. See also NB III, s. 69; 71-73.

164. =NB II, s. 6: *sapakṣa eva sattvam (niścitam)*.

165. NB II, s. 9: *sādhya dharmasāmānyena samāno'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ*. *Sapakṣa* must be understood as a *karmadhāraya*-compound standing for *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ*, *sa-* being the substitute for *samāna* according to Pāṇini sū. 6.3.84 (*samānasya cchandasy amūrdhaprabhṛtyudārkeṣu*). For this rule is to be interpreted by *yogavibhāga*, i.e. by dividing its wording into two parts, *samānasya* and the rest—the first part, “*samānasya saḥ [uttarapade]*” (under the recurrence of *saḥ* 6. 3. 78 and *uttarapade* 6. 3. 1.) meaning that (in classical Sanskrit *sa* is substituted for the word *samāna*—(used as the prior member of a compound). Again, *pakṣa* is used in the metaphorical sense (*upacāra*) of the word and means *artha* (thing). Thus, *sapakṣa* or *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ* comes to signify a thing which is similar to *p* by the common possession of *s*. *Sapakṣa* should not be understood as a *bahuvrihi*-compound meaning that which possesses a *samānaḥ pakṣa*. This is, according to DP, just because Dharmakīrti himself defines *sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa* as follows in PVn: *sādhya dharmasāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadabhāvo'sapakṣaḥ*, and according to TSop, because if it is a *bahubrihi*-compound, not the similarity of *sapakṣa* to *pakṣa*, but only the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa* is expressed, which is however untenable, since then *sapakṣa* remains unexplained (cf. DP 97-98; TSop 288, 12-20).

the fallacy of the incompatible *hetu* as, for instance, in the inference that sound is permanent because of its being a product (*kṛtakatva*) as a jar.¹⁶⁶ For product-ness is pervaded (*vyāpta*) not by permanency but by non-permanency which is incompatible [*vipakṣa* or anti-*pakṣa*] with permanency.¹⁶⁷

The word *eva* (only) is to preclude the non-exclusive (*sādhāraṇa*-) *hetu* as in the inference 'Sound is permanent because it is an object of cognition as a jar'.¹⁶⁸ The words 'being an object of cognition' (*prameyatva*) mean [i. e. is inclusive of] 'being the content of a fictional construct' (*vikalpaviśayikṛtatva*), but this is found in everything, in a member of the class of *s* (*sapakṣa*) such as ether as well as in a member of the class of not-*s* (*vipakṣa*) such as a jar. This is why the mark is called 'non-exclusive'.

That the particle *eva* is placed before the word *sattvam* means that *h* pervading not all the members but some of the members of the class of *s* can be valid [as well]. For instance, the *hetu* 'produced immediately after human effort' (*prayatnānantariyakatva*) can be valid in the inference, 'Sound is impermanent, because it is produced immediately after human effort'. [Sound is] similar to a jar [insofar as both are produced by effort and impermanent], but not totally to lightning [which is impermanent but not produced by effort; but this fact that *h* is found only in some of the members of *s* does not prevent *h* from being valid].¹⁶⁹

166. NB III, s. 86.

167. The term *viruddha* or *virodha* denotes the contrary as well as the contradictory. Likewise, *vipakṣa* means anti-*pakṣa*; the *vipakṣa* of 'permanency' is 'non-permanency' but at the same time it means a member or the members of the class of the non-permanent.

168. NB III, s. 69.

169. The two terms *h* and *s* in a pervasion may be related either by *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*— in this case *h* and *s* pervade each other (*samavyāpti*)— or by *ayogavyavaccheda*— in this case *s* pervades *h* (*asamavyāpti*). The definition of the second characteristic of the *liṅga*, *sapakṣa eva sattvam*, shows in its expression that the relationship involved is *anyayogavyavaccheda*. And if the theory of *vyavaccheda* is to be strictly observed, the definition excludes *asamavyāpti*. However, this is exactly opposite to the statement of Dharmottara as well as our author that *eva* placed before *sattvam* effects the recognition as valid of *prayatnānantariyakatva*, an example of *asamavyāpti*. Dharmottara tries to overcome the difficulty saying: If *eva* is placed after *sattvam*, then we would get *sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetuḥ*, which would effect the exclusion of *prayatnānantariyakatva* from the realm of valid *hetu*. But this argument is not persuasive, since the changed sentence can also be construed by *ayogavyavaccheda*, so as to recognize *asamavyāpti*. A right answer must be to say that *sapakṣe sattvam* should be construed in two ways, *sapakṣa eva sattvam* and *sapakṣe sattvam eva*, since the relationship involved in the second characteristic should not be determined as either of *ayoga*- and *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*.

The employment of the word 'definite' is to preclude a dubious *anvaya* as in the following inference: 'This man is not omniscient because he speaks as any other person does'.¹⁷⁰ For we never know if, in any person as a member of the class of *s*, speaker-ness is pervaded by non-omniscience or not.

10.2. **Vyatireka.** (26.1) [The third characteristic of the logical mark is:]

3) Its definite, absolute absence in the anti-*pakṣa* [*vipakṣa* i.e. any member of the class incompatible with *s*].¹⁷¹

What is not the co-member of *p* [i.e. the member of the class incompatible with *s*] is the *vipakṣa*.¹⁷² The absolute absence of *h* in that is definite. This is the third characteristic of the logical mark named *vyatireka* (negative pervasion).

10.2.1. (26.2) In this definition too, the incompatible (*viruddha*-) *hetu* is precluded by the word 'absence' (*asattvam*),¹⁷³... an incompatible *hetu* being illustrated by the inference 'Sound is permanent because of productness as a jar'. The *hetu* here is incompatible because it is found [not in the *sapakṣa*] but in the *vipakṣa*. ...¹⁷³

10.2.2. (26.4) The word 'absolute' (*eva*) aims at precluding the non-exclusive *hetu* ¹⁷⁴... which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa* as in the inference 'Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency as a jar'. In this case *s* (*sādhya*=*sādhya**dharma*) is 'being produced immediately after human effort'. The *hetu*, non-permanency, however, is found in some of the *vipakṣa* [i.e. what is not produced by human effort] such as lightning etc., and not found in others of the *vipakṣa* such as ether etc. Therefore, this mark should necessarily be rejected. ...¹⁷⁴

10.2.3. (26.8) ¹⁷⁵... If the particle *eva* were placed before the word *asattvam*, the passage would mean that a *hetu* which is absent only in the [totality of the] *vipakṣa* is valid, with the absurd corollary that 'being produced immediately after human effort' is not a valid *hetu* because it is not found even in some of the *sapakṣa*. This is the reason

170. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)

171. NB II, s. 7 : *asapakṣe cāsatvam eva niścitam*.

172. NB II, s. 10 (first half) : *na sapakṣo'sapakṣaḥ*.

173. NB III, s. 85-86. G, T omit this exemplification.

174. Missing in G, T. The illustration is taken verbatim from NBT 19, 21-20, 1.

why [the particle *eva*] is not placed [before *asattvam*]. ...¹⁷⁵

10.2.4. (26.11) The employment of the word 'definite' is to preclude the fallacious *hetu* whose non-occurrence in the *vipakṣa* is doubtful (*saṁdig-dhavipakṣavyāvṛttika*). [This fallacy] may be illustrated in the following: 'This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a man on the highway';¹⁷⁶ for all the cases in which 'being not free from desire' is absent are the cases in which 'speaker-ness' is also absent, like a piece of rock'.¹⁷⁷ [This inference is wrong, because] though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone due to the absence of the state of being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) due to a dubious negative pervasion.

10.2.5. (26.17) By the particle *eva* (absolute) placed after the word *asattvam* (absence) is precluded [a logical mark] which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa* (*vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti*). For instance, 'Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency'¹⁷⁸ [is an invalid inference because the *hetu*] 'non-permanency' does not occur [in some of] the *vipakṣa*, say ether, but occurs in [others of the *vipakṣa*] such as lightning. Thus, it is a fallacious *hetu* which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa*.¹⁷⁹

10.3. Different opinions as to why both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are necessary. (27.1) [The opponent:] "When *h*'s presence only in the *sapakṣa* is stated, *h*'s absence in the *vipakṣa* is understood by implication (*sāmarthyāt*). Then, why are both [the characteristics] taken up?"¹⁸⁰

175. Missing in G, T. This is another verbatim citation from NBT 20, 1-3.

176. T *śin rta žon paḥi skyes bu* (= *rathya-puruṣa*), but M, G *rathyā-puruṣa*.

177. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)

178. NB III, s. 69 with NBT.

179. The exemplifications in §10.2.1 and 10.2.2 and the whole passage of §10.2.3 are missing in G, T. (Cf. n. 173-174 above). The exemplifications in §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are the verbal quotations from NBT ad NB II, s. 7 while those in 10.2.1 and 10.2.4 are not found in the same place of NBT, although they are mentioned in NB III. The *vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti* (§10.2.5) and the *sādhāraṇa* (§10.2.2) are one and the same fallacy; the former name is adopted by Mokṣākara in §10.2.5 and the latter by Dharmottara. The illustration is the same in both. It means either §10.2.2 or 10.2.5 is redundant. §10.2.5 is more succinct than the passage in NBT, while §10.2.2 is the exact citation of the latter. It is therefore likely that §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are later interpolations. Mokṣākara himself seems not to have given illustrations to all fallacious *hetus*, as we see in §10.2.1, 4, and 5.

180. NBT 20, 5-6: *nanu ca sapakṣa eva sattvam ity ukte vipakṣa 'sattvam evēti gamyata eva, tat kimarthaṁ punar ubhayor upādānaṁ kṛtam...*

[The author:] The logicians of olden times (*pūrvavṛddhāḥ*) [i. e. Dignāga and others] said that [both the second and third characteristics are stated] in order to determine [the nature of] *vipakṣa*. They were in fact of the opinion that the *vipakṣa* is of three kinds, viz., the simple absence of *s* (*sādhyābhāvamātra*), what is just different from *s* (*sādhyād anyah*) and what is against *s* (*sādhyena saha viruddhaḥ*).¹⁸¹

181. PS III, k. 19–20c (Peking ed. 7, a8–b1): *de las gzan dan de ḥgal ba, gñis paḥaṅ mi mthun phyogs ma yin, gtan tshigs med dan ḥgal ba las, rnam par gcod par thal bar ḥgyur. de phyir mthun phyogs med pa ṅid, de ltar mtshan ṅid la gcig kyaṅ, du maḥi don ni rtogs par rigs.* (Neither what is different from *sapakṣa*, nor what is against it is *vipakṣa*. For [if the former were *vipakṣa*,] nothing could be a *hetu*, and [if the latter were *vipakṣa*] it would follow that it separates [from the probandum] only what is against it. Therefore, [*vipakṣa* must be defined as] what is not the *sapakṣa*. When it is defined in this way, we know various objects [correctly] even [through the third characteristic of the logical mark] alone.) This is explained in PSV on the same *kārikās* as follows. Product-ness exists not only in what is impermanent, but also in what is different from it, say, the painful. Thus, if *vipakṣa* is defined as what is different (*anya*) from the *sapakṣa*, a valid logical mark like product-ness would be invalid, since it would be found in the *vipakṣa*. To avoid this difficulty, one may define *vipakṣa* as what is against (*viruddha*) the *sapakṣa*; in this case, however, it may exclude what is incompatible with *s*, but not what is contrary to *s*. For example, when fire (*h*) proves the existence of heat(*s*) in a place (*p*), if the *vipakṣa* is considered to be what is against heat, i. e. cold, *h*'s non-existence in *vipakṣa*, the third condition of the logical mark, would not exclude the existence of fire in what is neither hot nor cold; this would make the inference inconclusive. Therefore, Dignāga proposes that *vipakṣa* must be defined as what is not (*abhāva*) the *sapakṣa*. I owe the information to Kitagawa, 179–183. Kitagawa calls the reader's attention to the fact that contradiction is here referred to by the word *abhāva*. According to the same author (Kitagawa, 179, n. 321) however, Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭikā* on PSV gives an interpretation different from this original theory on *vipakṣa* held by Dignāga in PSV as well as *Nyāyamukha*. He changed the order of words in the passage which he commented and complemented words which were not existent in the passage so that Dignāga's verses may mean what is in effect identical with Dharmakīrti's theory of *vipakṣa* found in NB II, s. 10. Here, Dharmakīrti first defines *vipakṣa* as not-*sapakṣa* (n. 172 above), which means that which lacks *s* (Cf. DP 98, 18). And then he classifies *vipakṣa* into three kinds, viz. *tato'anyaḥ*, *tadviruddhaḥ*, and *tadabhāvaḥ*. *tadabhāva* is in the form of *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and constitutes the basic idea of *vipakṣa*, representing the absence of *sapakṣa* directly, while other two are those which are affirmed through the negation (*paryudasta*) and represent the absence of *sapakṣa* only indirectly. In other words, *tadabhāva* or the contradictory of *s* connotes those different from *s* and those contrary to it. Thus, all the three kinds are the species of *vipakṣa*. This interpretation is fairly different from Dignāga's theory. Mokṣākaragupta, when he describes that *vipakṣa* is of three kinds, refers to Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Jinendrabuddhi (or Dignāga as represented by Jinendrabuddhi). The designation *pūrvavṛddha*, however, most likely refers to Dignāga. It may be also possible that he refers to all of these logicians, neglecting the difference of opinion between them.

Some people are of the following opinion : It is for determining the appropriate kind of the formal statement of inference (*prayoga*); that is to say, either the formal statement with a positive pervasion (*anvaya-prayoga*) or that with a negative pervasion (*vyatireka-prayoga*), so far as it is a pervasion having logical necessity, should be alone made, but not both together.¹⁸²

Other people are of the opinion that it is for indicating that there are two possible forms of inference : one with a positive example (*sādharmya-prayoga*) and the other with a negative example (*vaidharmya-p*).

11. Logical mark is of only three kinds. (27.8) The logical mark endowed with [the above-named] three characteristics is of three and only three kinds.¹⁸³

Those [logical marks] which have the three characteristics are meant by the words *trirūpāṇi līṅgāni*. They are of three kinds. 1) The mark as the effect [of *s*] (*kārya*) has the threefold characteristic ; 2) the mark identical in essence [with *s*] (*svabhāva*) has the threefold characteristic ; 3) the mark as the non-cognition [of *s*] (*anupalabdhi*) has the threefold characteristic.¹⁸⁴ *Sādhana* (probans), *jñāpaka* (what makes known), *hetu* (logical ground), *vyāpya* (the pervaded) are all the synonyms of *līṅga* (logical mark).

11.1. Logical mark as effect. (27.11) [Among these three kinds] a logical mark as effect is illustrated : (*vyāpti*) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen ; (*pakṣadharmatā*) here there is smoke ; [therefore, here there is fire].

11.2. The syllogism consists of two members. (27.12) The statement of an inference (*sādhanavākya*) of the Buddhists consists of two members, respectively called *vyāpti* [the pervasion between *h* and *s*] and *pakṣadharmatā* [*h*'s presence in *p*].¹⁸⁵

182. NBT 20, 6-7 : *anvayo vyatireko vā niyamavān eva prayoktavyo nānyathēti darśayitum dvayor api upādānaṁ kṛtam....* From this we see that one necessary pervasion alone is enough for an inference and that even the two combined together, if not strictly applied, do not lead to a conclusion. NBT gives an illustration of the latter case.

183. =NB II, s. 11 : *trirūpāṇi ca triṇy eva līṅgāni*.

184. NB II, s. 12 : *anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvakāryaṁ cēti* ; NBT 21, 18-19 : *pratiśedhyasya sādhyasyānupalabdhis trirūpā, vidheyasya sādhyasya svabhāvas trirūpāḥ, kāryaṁ ca*.

185. The inference for others or the statement of an inference consists in the statement of a logical mark endowed with the three characteristics. The *pakṣa* or *pratiḥṇā* (thesis) does not express any of them and is not regarded as a necessary member of the

Other schools, however, assert that the statement of an inference consists of five members, viz., *pratijñā* (thesis), *hetu* (logical ground), *dṛṣṭānta* (corroborative example), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion), an example brought forward being as follows : Here there is fire; because of smoke; wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen; the present case is like this; therefore there is fire here.¹⁸⁶

But this is not reasonable. We cannot understand a probandum through the mere statement of a thesis having nothing to do with logical necessity or connection (*sambandha*). As for the non-existence of the connection (*sambandha*), we have already discussed it on the occasion when we refuted the connection between the word and the thing-meant [§ 4.2];¹⁸⁷ so we do not repeat it here. It is of no use to state a ground putting it into the ablative case, when the thesis is refuted as above. Apart from a ground, an explanatory example and an application serve nothing. How can a conclusion, which is no more than the repetition of the thesis, be possible in a case where there is no thesis. Thus, all [the

syllogism. This Buddhist theory is first maintained by Dignāga in PS III, k. 1 : *gṣan gyi don gyi rjes dpag ni, rañ gis mthoñ don gsal byed yin, de la dpag bya bstan pa ni, gañ phyir rtags kyi yul don yin*. (The inference for others is to make express the thing which is seen by oneself [or a logical mark with the three characteristics]; in this case the statment of *anumeya* is only for indicating the range of the logical mark.) (Cf. Fragment 1 : *parārthānumānaṁ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśakam*; Kitagawa, 126-128). PSV says on this verse that the fault of incomplete statement (*nyūnatā*) occurs only when any of the three characteristics is not stated, while the non-statement of *anumeya*, or *pratijñā*, does not affect the above-named condition of inference for others (Cf. Kitagawa, 128). In *Nyāyamukha* Dignāga says : I refute the theory of these logicians who consider the thesis, the application and the conclusion as separate members of the syllogism (Cf. Tucci's tr. 45; Stcherbatsky, I, 281). The assertion in PSV above is followed by Dharmakīrti in PV IV, v. 23 : *aruṭtāv api pakṣasya siddher apratibandhataḥ, triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir nyūnatôditā* (Since [the probandum] is proved through compatibility even when the *pakṣa* is not stated, the fault of incomplete statement is pointed out only when any of the three characteristics is not stated.) In NB III, s. 36 he says : *dvayor api anayoḥ prayoge nāvaśyam pakṣanirdeśaḥ*. See also TS v. 1430 : *pratijñādivaco'py anyaiḥ parārtham iti varṇyate, asā-dhanāṅgabhūtatvāt pratijñānupayoginī*, etc. The Buddhist discussion on the two-membered syllogism is briefly summarized also in TSop 299,3-27.

186. NS 1.1.32 : *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ*.

187. TS v. 1431 : *asambandhān na sākṣād dhi sā yuktārthopapādikā, asaktasūcanān nāpi pāramparyeṇa yujyate*. TSP 419,8 : *śabdānām arthena saha sambandhābhāvān na tāvat sākṣād upayujyate, nāpi hetuvacanavat pāramparyeṇa, saktāsamsūcakatvād iti*. Kamalaśīla here refers to PV IV v. 16-17a-b : *tat pakṣavacanāṁ vaktur abhiprāyanivedane....* (*cakrur* in GOS ed. must be corrected into *vaktur*-.)

members] are shattered to pieces.¹⁸⁸

11.3. **How to establish a causal relation.** (28.2) This logical mark as effect (*kāryahetu*) is classified into three kinds because of the variety of the term related to it (*viṣaya*): 1) When fire and the like are the object to be proved, smoke and the like are to be determined [as the effect] by means of the three kinds of cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhapratyakṣānupalambha*).¹⁸⁹ 2) When [the function of] the visual organ etc. is the object to be proved, knowledge [visual and other] is to be determined [as the effect] through the fact that the effect occurs occasionally [i. e. only when the organ functions] (*kādācitkakāryotpāda*). 3) When the colour etc. [of a citron etc.] is the object to be proved, the taste etc. is to be determined [as the logical mark as effect] through both being dependent [for their production] on one and the same set of causes, as [we infer] the colour of a citron from its taste.¹⁹⁰ In this last case, the preceding colour is the material cause in relation to the colour to be produced, and the [preceding] taste [which is the material cause of the subsequent taste, necessarily cooperates with the preceding colour] as the auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*) [for the production of the subsequent colour]. This is the logical [relation] involved in the production

188. M. *sarvam āmūlaṃ viśirṇam* (All is fundamentally shattered); G *sarvam ālūṇa-viśirṇam*; T *bcad zin pa gcod paḥo* (as useless as to cut what has been cut). My tr. follows G. There is partial parallelism between our text and TSP. In TS v. 1434, the opponent questions: How is the establishment of *sapakṣa* etc. possible when the thesis is not formulated? [If *sapakṣa* etc. is not established] there will be no triple characteristic, which depends for its determination on *sapakṣa*. Upon this objection Kamalaśīla comments: *asati hi pratijñānirdeśe tadapekṣānibandhanaṃ...trairūyam api nāstīti sarvam ālūṇavikīrṇam syād iti*. This is of course the opponent's objection against the Buddhist's omission of *pratijñā*. Mokṣākara's expression, however, has something to do with this passage. He seems to take advantage of the expression, making a reverse use of it for attacking the opponent. It is not impossible that the original manuscript reads *ālūṇaviśirṇam* for *ālūṇavisti(ki?)rṇam* in the present edition of TSP. For a detailed exposition of the two-membered syllogism see Mookerjee, 356-365.

189. The theory will be dealt with again in §22 (M 47). See n. 305 too.

190. M 28,7 inserts *na rūpād rasānumānam* after...*rasād rūpānumānam*, but G as well as T omits it. We can infer taste from colour as well as colour from taste. G, T must be followed in this case. But this should not be taken as a universally applicable rule, for although we can infer cinders from smoke, we cannot infer smoke from cinders, because the relation involves the problem of time. The cinders perceived at present does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of the present smoke, since it may have already disappeared. However, so far as the taste and colour of a citron is concerned, we can infer either one from the other.

of the lump [of a citron] at the subsequent moment from that at the preceding moment.¹⁹¹ [We infer from the present taste of a citron its material cause, which necessarily cooperates with the material cause of the colour, which in turn has necessarily produced the present colour. The knowledge of the present colour is implied in the process of the inference of the cause of the taste from its effect.]

[The opponent:] “What difference is there between the material cause and the auxiliary cause when both are identical insofar as they equally conform to the concomitance with the effect positively as well as negatively?”

[The author:] The following is the right answer: When x is produced due to the transformation of y in one and the same stream of a [momentary] entity, y is the material cause, prior in time, of x . The conditions which cause a particular quality to arise in the stream [of an entity] different [from those of the conditions] are the auxiliary cause.¹⁹² In relation to a rice shoot to be produced, for instance, a seed of rice is the material cause, and soil, water etc. are the auxiliary cause of the [shoot].

191. The theory is propounded by Dharmakīrti in PV I, v. 9: *ekasāmagryadhinasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ, hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat*. This is an oft quoted verse (TSP 417, 24 quotes it, but GOS ed. reads the first half wrongly. Cf Kunst, 58 with n. 1.; NVV II, 197, 2-3, etc.) TS v. 1424-1425 explains the inference of the proximity of the asterism Rohiṇī from the rise of the Kṛttikā as a case of inference by *kāryahetu*. TSP comments on them reducing the case to *ekasāmagryadhinatva*. But the most useful exposition of the theory is Dharmakīrti's own *vṛtti* on PV I, v. 9 (Gnoli, 7, 16-19; Mookerjee and Nagasaki 36). Inferring colour from taste when both are the co-products of the self-same set of causes, we actually infer a cause endowed with the causal efficiency (*hetudharma*) from the effect. The cause of taste which produces the next moment of taste is at the same time the auxiliary condition cooperating with the material cause of colour; this material cause, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, is surely to produce colour. Thus, while we infer the cause of taste from its effect, i.e. the present taste, we come to determine the present colour, with whose cause the cause of taste must have been cooperating. When we infer cinders from smoke, the procedure is the same. Cinders are produced by their material cause, fuel; fire is the auxiliary cause which cooperates with fuel for the production of cinders. We infer fire from smoke, and it involves the knowledge of fuel; the fuel, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, leads to the knowledge of cinders.

192. HBT 94, 26-95, 9: *syād etat, sarveṣāṃ anwayavyatirekāv anuvīdhiyete tadā... kuto 'yaṃ bhedaḥ-ihôpādānabhāvenēdam upayujyate, anyatra tu saha-kāribhāvenēti?...tasmād avasthā'bhede'pi yad ekākāra-parāmarśa-pratyayanibandhanatayā svasaṃtatīpatitakārya-prasūtinimittam tad upādānakāraṇam. yat saṃtānāntare prāgavasthāpekṣaviśeṣodayanibandhanam tat saha-kārikāraṇam*.

Thus, the logical mark as effect has been established to be a probans (*gamaka*) because of the causal relation.

12. **Logical mark of essential identity.** (28.16) [The logical mark representing] essential identity is [defined] as follows:¹⁹³ The nature [of *s*] itself is said [by Dharmakīrti to be] the *h* of the quality to be proved (*s*) when the latter depends for its existence on the existence of that (*h*) alone;¹⁹⁴ the probans thus defined is to be understood as the essential nature of the quality to be proved. For example, in the inference ‘This can be called a tree, because it can be called a *śimśapā*’, ‘this’ stands for *p*, i. e. a thing being seen in front [of the inferring person]; ‘because it can be called a *śimśapā*’ refers to *h*. What is the meaning of ‘because it can be called a *śimśapā*’? It means the applicability of the designation [*śimśapā* which connotes] particular branches, leaves, colour and form. The applicability of the designation ‘tree’ is *s*.

[The opponent:] “If two things are identical, they cannot be [related to each other by] the relation of probans and probandum, because [in this case both of them] would be [one and the same] part of the thesis.”

[The author:] The objection is untenable. It is true that both are not different in reality. But there may be a person who, seeing a certain thing, applies the name *śimśapā* which he learnt once, but does not identify it with the name ‘tree’, since he imagines [through the name *śimśapā* not the essential qualities of the tree, but] something else [say, tallness] owing to confusion. Such a person may be now persuaded by means of this inference based on identity.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, even if they are one in reality, they appear distinct when they occur in conceptual knowledge¹⁹⁶ which depends on distinction from others (*vyāvṛtti*).¹⁹⁷ This is the reason why [this kind of inference] is not incompatible with the relation of probans and probandum.

193. *svabhāvo yathā* is omitted in G, T. The definition is repeated twice in T, the whole passage running as follows: *svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvinī sādhyadharme hetuḥ, hetusattāmātrabhāvinī sādhyadharme yo hetur ucyate sa tasya sādhyasya dharmasya svabhāvo boddhavyaḥ*.

194. NB II, s. 16: *svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvinī sādhyadharme hetuḥ*.

195. This example is explained more lucidly by Dharmottara in NBT on NB II, s. 17.

196. T *rnam par rtog paḥi blo tha sñad la grub pa...*(=*vyavahārasiddhāvikalpabuddhau* ...) for *vikalpabuddhau* in M.

197. This refers to the Buddhist theory of *apoha* (discrimination) which is discussed in § 26.

13. Logical mark of non-cognition. (29.10) [The logical mark of] non-cognition is illustrated: In this place there is no jar, because it is not cognized though it is by nature perceptible.¹⁹⁸ 'Perceptible by nature (*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāpta*)' means 'to be seen' (*dṛśya*). [Question:] How can a non-existent thing be perceptible? [Answer:] When a place and other things are being cognized by one and the same sense-perception, if a jar were present, it would be necessarily perceived.¹⁹⁹ That is to say, it is hypothetically supposed as perceptible on the ground that all the other conditions for [its] perception are present.²⁰⁰ But we do not mean [a jar is] actually perceived.

'Because it is not cognized' is *h*. And this is ascertained by means of the [actually present] objects comprised in one and the same cognition [by which a jar, if it existed, would be also perceived] (*ekajñānasamsargi-padārtha*) or the knowledge of the objects comprised in one and the same cognition (*ekajñānasamsargi-padārthopalambha*);²⁰¹ thus, these two, standing in the relation of agent and object (*karmakartṛbhāva*), are each called non-cognition in the mode of [the affirmation of what is excluded through] the negation of a term (*paryudāsavṛtti*). But [this non-cognition] should not be understood in the mode of the negation of a proposition (*prasajya-vṛtti*), which means no more than the privation of perception.²⁰² For if

198. NB II, s. 13: *tatrānupalabdhir yathā, na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti*. See also NBT on it.

199. HB (Reconstruction), 64,27-65,2: *yatra yasminn upalabhyamāne niyamena yasyōpalabdhīḥ sa tatsamśṛṣṭaḥ, ekajñānasamsargāt tayoḥ sator naikarūpaniyatā pratipattir, asambhavāt*.

200. NB II, s. 14: *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyaṁ svabhāva-viśeṣaś ca*. See also NBT on it.

201. NBT 22, 15 ff.: *tasmāt sa eva ghaṭavivikṭapradeśas tadāmbanāṁ ca jñānaṁ dṛśyānupalambhaniścayahetutvād dṛśyānupalambha ucyate... tato vastu apy anupalambha ucyate tajjñānaṁ ca. darśananivṛttimātraṁ tu svayam anīcitatvāt agamakam*; HB (Reconstruction), 65, 7-9: *...uktam atra yathā paryudāsavṛttyā'pekṣātaḥ tadvivikto arthas tajjñānaṁ vābhāvo 'nupalabdhīś cōcyata iti, na pratiṣedhamātram, tasya sādhanāsiddher abhāvavyavahārāsiddhiprasaṅgāt. tasyāsamsrṣṭarūpasya bhāvasiddhir evāparasyābhāvasiddhir iti anyabhāvo'pi tadabhāva iti vyapadiśyate*.

202. For the general usage of *paryudāsa*- and *prasajya-pratiṣedha* see n. 62 above. Regarding the passage that concerns us now cf. HBT 171, 1-4: *...tadvad upalabdhir evānupalabdhir mantavyā. nañāḥ pratiṣedhaviśayatvāt katham bhāvaviśayatēti cet, āha, paryudāsavṛttyēti. paryudāsenā pratiṣedhyasyārthasya varjanena yā viśiṣṭe 'rthe vṛttis tayā, nañā āgrhītapratiṣedhasya bhāvaviśayatā....* The non-cognition of a pot must not be understood as the simple absence of cognition, the negation being construed by *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, but as the cognition of things other than the pot, esp. the cognition of the locus, the

so, it is itself not anything whatsoever ; and how can it become a probans? Nor is it the knowledge of other things in general which are different from the object to be denied, for in this case [the absurdity] would follow that the perception of the colour of an orange means the negation of its taste. Therefore, it is settled that either of the two things distinguished in the way characterised above from what is to be negated, i. e. its locus or the knowledge of the locus, is called non-cognition [though it is in fact a positive cognition].

13.1. Non-cognition establishes not absence itself, but practical activities concerning absence. (30.1) This is the reason why absence (*abhāva*) itself is not proved [by a negative inference], for the absence [of a jar] can be established by the mere perception cognizing the place without a jar.²⁰³ But [the logical mark of] non-cognition is aimed at establishing practical activities concerning absence (*abhāvavyavahāra*) [in order to convince] a stupefied person [of the absence of a certain thing]. For example, it is well known in the Sāṃkhya [thought] that the three primordial qualities beginning with *rajas* are [permanently] existent ; a certain follower [of the school] actually makes ordinary activities concerning absent things owing to their non-cognition ; he, however, is so much inculcated in the doctrine of his own school proclaiming the existence of every thing at every place that he confusedly does not now judge the

negation being construed by *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*. But this affirmation of the locus can be divided into two modes : when it is understood in relation to the subject of the cognition (*karṭṛdharmaṣakṣe*) it means the knowledge of the locus ; when it is understood in relation to the object (*karmadharmapakṣe*) it means the locus itself. According to HBT 174, 6 ff ; 176, 3 ff., the former is meant for refuting the view of Īśvarasena who regards *anupalabdhi* as the mere absence of cognition, while the latter is aimed at criticising Kumārilabhaṭṭa, who thinks that a negative judgment is formed in the mind when the locus is cognized and the object to be negated is remembered, and that this knowledge of absence is purely due to a mental activity without being conditioned by a sense-organ. Cf. SV Abhāva., v. 11 & 27 ; Mookerjee, 415. Though not concerning non-cognition, but cognition, PV 1, 4, 9-11 teaches the same : *tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva vastuyogyatālakṣanā tadāśrayā vā jñānapravṛttiḥ* (cf. Mookerjee & Nagasaki, 23) ; PVV 505, 26-27 : *yadi hy upalabdhiḥ karmadharman tadopalabhyamānatāstitvam, atha karṭṛdharman jñānam...* ; HB (Reconstruction), 64, 24-26 : *atra upalabdheḥ upalabdhamānadharmatve tajjñānam upalabdhiḥ... upalabhyamānadharmatve svaviśayavijñānanayanayogyatālakṣaṇo viśayasvabhāvo bhavati* ; PVBh, 633, 4-6 ; HBT 171, 16ff. : HBT 174, 19-21 ; TSop 289, 18-21. However, the distinction takes place only in our constructive thought, and in reality what is perceived and its cognition are one and the same thing.

203. NBT 28, 18 ff. : *ata evābhāvo na sādhyah svabhāvānupalabdheḥ siddhatvāt*.

absence [of a jar] in one particular place or another even though the jar is not actually perceived.²⁰⁴ To this man three kinds of convincing activities (*vyavahāra*) are to be demonstrated by means of non-cognition: the physical activity consists in moving about the place without hesitation; the verbal activity consists in [the statement] that there is no jar; the mental activity is the internal thought (*antarjalpa*) of the same judgment.²⁰⁵

13.2. Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality. (30.9) When considered from its objective mode (*karmadharmapakṣe*) [i.e. as the locus without a jar], non-cognition [*h*] should be understood to stand in the relation of identity with *s*.²⁰⁶ However, when

204. According to Dharmakīrti the non-existence of the object of negation is established by perception alone, but the inferential function of negation consists in persuading an ignorant person who will not recognize the absence of an object. PV I, v. 3, *Svavṛtti* (4, 18-5, 1): ...*athānyopalabdhya'nupalabdhisiddhir iti pratyakṣasiddhā 'nupalabdhīḥ, tathānyasattayā 'sattā kiṃ na sidhyatīti. yadā punar evaṃvidhānupalabdhir evāsatām asattā, tadā siddhe 'pi viśaye mohād viśayiṇo 'sajjñānaśabdavyavahārān apratipadyamāno viśaya-pradarśanena samaye pravartyate....*; PV IV, v. 263 c-d: *ity ajñajñāpanāyaikānupākhyo-dāhṛtir matā*: PVV on it: *tasmād abhāvaṃ paśyato 'py avyavaharato 'jñasya mūḍhasya jñāpanāyābhāvavyavahārāyaikā svabhāvānupalambhodāhṛtir matā*. PVBh gives the example of a foolish follower of the Sāṃkhya (633, 16-17): *yo vā sāmkyo 'tyantavimūḍhaḥ sarvaṃ sarvatra vidyata ity āgrahavān, tasyājñasya pratityartham ekā svabhāvānupalabdhīḥ....* According to Dharmakīrti, therefore, what is negated by the inference of negation is the subjective function, i.e. knowledge, verbal expression, or doubt regarding an object falsely imagined as existent. Cf. PV IV, v. 264: *viśayāsattvatas tatra viśayi pratiśidhyate, jñānābhīdhanasamdehaṃ yathā 'dāhād apāvakaḥ*. These arguments are made regarding *svabhāvānupalabdhī*, the principal form of negation. But when negation is classified into three, i. e. *svabhāvānupalabdhī*, *kāraṇānupalabdhī* and *vyāpakānupalabdhī*, the latter two are said to prove either *abhāva* itself or the *abhāvavyavahāra*, while the first is concerned only with *abhāvavyavahāra*, and not with *abhāva* itself. Cf. HBT, 174, 26-28: *kāraṇavyāpakānupalabdhī abhāvaṃ abhāvavyavahāraṃ ca sādhyataḥ, svabhāvānupalabdhis tu abhāvavyavahāraṃ eva*. This is because when we infer the absence of smoke (effect) and a *śiṃśapā* (the pervaded) from the non-cognition of fire (its cause) and that of trees (the pervader) respectively, we prove not only the negative activities concerning them but also their absence itself, while in the case of the direct negation of a perceptible object, its absence itself is proved by perception alone without needing inference.

205. PV I, v. 3a-b and *Svavṛtti*: *apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānām apravṛttiphālāsati* (v. 3a-b). *anupalabdhīḥ sajñānaśabdavyavahārapratīṣedhaphalā, upalabdhīpūrvakatvāt teṣāṃ iti....*; NBT 29, 22-23: *vyāpāraṃ darśayati. abhāvasya vyavahāro nāstīty evamākāraṃ jñānam, śabdaś caivamākāro, niḥśaṅkaṃ gamanāgamanalakṣaṇā ca pravṛttiḥ kāyiko'bhāvavyavahāraḥ*; HBT 174, 28-30: *abhāvavyavahāraś ca jñānābhīdhanāpravṛttīlakṣaṇaḥ. tatra nāsty atra ghaṭa ity evamākāraṃ jñānam, evaṃvidhavastvabhīdhyakam cābhīdhanam niḥśaṅkasya ca tatra pra-deśe gamanāgamanalakṣaṇā pravṛttir iti*.

206. M inserts *sādṛśye* between *saha* and *tādātmyalakṣaṇa*. G, T omit it.

seen from the subjective mode (*kartr̥dharmapakṣe*) [i. e. as the knowledge of the locus without a jar, the relation between non-cognition and *s*] is that of causality. For it has been said above that the locus without a jar or the knowledge of the locus is non-cognition. [The *s*] ‘a jar’s fitness to be judged as non-existent’ (*asadvyavahārayogyatva*), is the essential nature (*svabhāva*)²⁰⁷ of it [i. e. the locus without a jar]. But the knowledge [of the locus without a jar] is an effect of the locus itself, [and in the case where *h* is the knowledge, we infer from an effect to the cause].

(30.14) [The opponent:] “If there are in non-cognition two kinds of relationship, identical and causal, how is [the probans of] non-cognition differentiated from those of identity and causality?”

[The author:] The difference is made purely because of [the difference between] negation and affirmation, but not in reality. This is declared by Ācārya [Dharmakīrti] as follows :

Among [the three kinds of logical marks] the two [i. e. the identical and causal marks] are for establishing the existence of real entities, the other one [i. e. the mark of non-cognition] is the probans for negation.²⁰⁸

13.3. Significance of upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta. (30.7) The qualifier of non-cognition ‘being by nature perceptible’ means, [besides that all conditions for perception must be present] that the mere non-occurrence of cognition regarding objects which are inaccessible in space, time and essence, does not establish practical activities referring to the negation [of the object concerned]; such objects are illustrated by Mt. Sumeru [which is spatially inaccessible], the future emperor Śaṅkha [who is inaccessible in time] and a ghost [which is inaccessible in essence].²⁰⁹

207. M inserts *na kāryam* after *svabhāvaḥ*.

208. =NB II, 19 : *atra dvau vastusādhanau, ekaḥ pratiśedhahetuḥ*.

209. NB II, s. 14 (see n. 200 above) ; NBT on NB II, s. 15 ; NB II, s. 28 : *anyathā cānuṣalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpteṣu deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭeṣv ātmapratyakṣanivṛtter abhāvaniścayābhāvāt* : see NBT on it too. In PV I, v. 3 Dharmakīrti classifies non-cognition into two kinds, viz. the non-cognition of an imperceptible thing or the mere non-operation of cognitive means and the non-cognition of a perceptible object. In the *Svavṛtti* on it he states that these two non-cognitions have the same effect of negating the practical activities referring to an object wrongly supposed to be existent, although the former leads to the result through the absence of the proof, while the latter through the presence of the counter-proof ; i. e. the former through doubt while the latter through the definite knowledge of absence. One cannot be sure of the existence of an imperceptible object, say, a ghost, so its existence is neither denied nor asserted. And owing to this doubt one negates the posi-

13.4. Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience. (30.20)

This non-cognition can be a means of valid knowledge with regard to a present experience as well as to a past experience the details of which are still vivid in our memory. With regard to a future experience, however, non-cognition is itself doubtful and accordingly cannot be a means of valid knowledge.

²¹⁰...[We have before said that this non-cognition proves activities referring to the absence of an object, but not absence itself, because the latter is established by perception [without requiring inference]....²¹⁰

Regarding [these two problems] the Nyāyavādin [Dharmakīrti] says as follows:²¹¹

Non-cognition, i. e. the fact that perception does not occur to an observer with regard to a past object which he keeps in clear memory-impression or a present object, establishes practical activities referring to the absence of the object.

13.5. Classification of negative inference. (31.7) [Sometimes, however,] we are to negate a thing which is situated at a remote place and inaccessible and to which the non-cognition of an *ex hypothesi* perceptible object is not directly applicable. Then, the non-perception of an effect and other [indirect forms of negative inference] are applied. Thus we get sixteen forms [of non-cognition as probans] because of the variety of applied formulae.²¹²

(1) Firstly the non-cognition of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*) is illustrated: 'Here there is no smoke, because it, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived.' In this formula its own existence (*svabhāva*) of smoke, the thing to be denied, is not perceived.²¹³

(2) Non-cognition of an effect (*kāryānupalabdhi*): 'The actually

tive assertion of its existence. But one can be sure of the absence of a perceptible object when it is not cognized, and definitely negates its presence. Therefore, though both non-cognitions lead to the same result, they differ in certainty (*niścaya*) (cf. Gnoli's ed. 4, 5 ff.; Mookerjee & Nagasaki, 26-27).

210. This passage is found only in M and seems to be out of place. The same content is already stated in M 29, 21-30, 2.

211. =NB II, s. 29: *amūḍhasmṛtisaṃskārasyātītasya vartamānasya ca pratīpattīpratyakṣasya nivṛttir abhāvavyavahārasādhani*.

212. See Appendix I.

213. *svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā, nāsty atra dhūmaḥ, upalabdhi lakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ*=NB II, s. 32; TSop 290, No. 1.

efficient (*apratibaddhasāmarthya*, lit., whose efficiency is not impeded) causes producing smoke do not occur here, because there is no smoke. The presence of the causes of smoke [i. e., fire combined with wet fuel] is to be negated, and their effect is smoke which is not perceived here.²¹⁴

(3) Non-cognition of a cause (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*): ‘There is no smoke here, because there is no fire.’ The presence of smoke is to be negated; its cause is fire which is here not perceived.²¹⁵

(4) Non-cognition of a pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*): ‘There is no *aśoka* tree here, because there are no trees here.’ The presence of an *aśoka* tree is to be negated: the tree is its pervader which is here not perceived.²¹⁶

(5) Perception of something incompatible with the presence [of what is to be negated] (*svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ Fire is incompatible with the essence of the sensation of cold which is to be negated; fire is here perceived.²¹⁷

(6) Perception of what is incompatible with an effect (*kāryaviruddhopalabdhi*): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of the sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ A cause, only when it has reached

214. *kāryānupalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi, dhūmābhāvāt.* = NB II, s. 33; TSop 290, No. 4. As said above, this formula appears for the first time in NB. But Dharmakīrti already gave a hint for its possibility in PV when he said that the production of an effect is inferred from the totality of its causes, and that in this case the probans and the probandum stand in the relation of essential identity and not in that of causality; since the production of the effect in this case does not need any other condition (PV I, v. 7; *hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numiyate, arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ*). If we can infer an effect from the totality of its causes on the ground of essential identity, we are permitted also to infer the absence of the causes from the absence of their effect, under the following two conditions: 1) we infer from the absence of an effect only the absence of its causes existing at the last moment of their momentary stream, since they alone are ascertained to be unimpeded in their efficiency and thus may be called the totality of causes. All the other preceding moments of the causes may have been impeded in efficiency and may not bring about the effect. Thus we cannot infer the former's absence from the latter's absence. We are not sure that there was no fire yesterday, even if we do not see smoke today. 2) This formula is applied only when the cause is not visible itself. If seen, it can be negated by the first form of *anupalabdhi*. Cf. NBT 31, 10-13.

215. *kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā, nāsty atra dhūmaḥ dahanābhāvāt.* = NB II, s. 40; TSop 290, No. 2.

216. *vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā, nātra śīmśapā vṛkṣābhāvāt.* = NB II, s. 34; TSop 290, No. 3.

217. *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nātra śitasparśah, vahnēḥ* = NB II, 35; TSop 290 No. 5.

the last situation (*antyadaśāprāpta*) [of its own flux, i. e. the moment immediately preceding the production of the effect], produces its effect, but not a cause unconditioned. This is the reason why the qualifier [‘actually efficient’ (*apratibaddhasāmarthyā*)] is stated. [The existence of] the causes of cold are to be denied; their effect is cold; what is incompatible with it is [the presence of] fire, which is here perceived.²¹⁸

(7) Perception of something incompatible with a cause (*kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*): ‘He betrays no symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because he is near fire of a particular kind [i. e. efficient enough to dispel cold]. Symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold] are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.’²¹⁹

(8) Perception of what is incompatible with a pervader (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing, because there is fire here.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.²²⁰

(9) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the essence [of what is to be negated] (*svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is smoke here.’ The sensation of cold is to be negated; what is incompatible with the essence of it is fire; smoke is the latter’s effect and is here perceived.²²¹

(10) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the effect [of what is negated] (*kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of cold, because here there is smoke. ‘The causes of cold are to be negated; their effect is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.’²²²

(11) Perception of an effect of something incompatible with the causes

218. *kāryaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni śitakāraṇāni santi, vahneḥ* =NB II, s. 38; TSop 290, No. 8.

219. *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nāsya romaharṣādiviśeṣāḥ santi, sannihitadahana-viśeṣatvāt*=NB II, s. 41; TSop 290, No. 6.

220. *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt*=NB II, S. 39; TSop 290, No. 7.

221. *svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nātra śitasparśaḥ, dhūmāt*=NB II, s. 36; TSop 291, No. 13.

222. *kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni śitakāraṇāni santi dhūmāt*=TSop 292, No. 16; this form is lacking in NB.

[of what is to be negated] (*kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*): ‘In this place there is no one who betrays the sensation [of cold] connected with symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because here there is smoke.’ Particular symptoms such as bristling [specially caused by cold]²²³ are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is fire; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.²²⁴

(12) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with a pervader [of what is to be negated] (*vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing because here there is smoke.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived²²⁵

(13) Perception of what is pervaded by something incompatible with the existence [of what is to be negated] (*svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no fire because of the sensation of freezing.’ Fire is to be negated; cold is incompatible with the existence of fire; The sensation of freezing which is here perceived is pervaded by cold.²²⁶

223. G, T *romaharṣādiviśeṣāṇām* instead of M, 32, 19 *romaharṣādisparśaviśeṣāṇām*.

224. *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktasparśavān ayam pradēśo, dhūmāt*=NB II, s. 42; TSop 291, No. 14.

225. *vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dhūmāt*=TSop 292, No. 15; this is lacking in NB.

226. *svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nātra vahniḥ tuṣārasparśāt*=NB II, s. 37; TSop 291, No. 9. Dharmakīrti’s illustration of this formula in NB, *na dhruvabhāvi bhūta-syāpi bhāvasya vināśo, hetvantarāpekṣanāt*, offers a complication as it is related to the vexed problem of momentariness. Mokṣākara avoids it here, and takes another illustration which is quite easy to understand. The Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, which is hinted here by Dharmakīrti, is dealt with in §16 by our author. Stcherbatsky, in II, 92 as well as in I, 378, fails to understand the implication of the above mentioned inference of Dharmakīrti, partly because of the vagueness of Dharmottara’s commentary, and thinks “This is the argument of the realists against the Buddhist theory of instantaneous existence or constant evanescence”. He quotes in I, 92, n. 1 Rgyal tshab who correctly interprets this argument as a *prasaṅga*, but Stcherbatsky seems not to have properly understood Rgyal tshab. Durvekamiśra in DP 133, 5–6 interprets this inference as *viruddhavyāptopalabdhiprasaṅga*, pointing out that the word *api* in the *sūtra* means that this must be taken as a *prasaṅgasādhana* (*reductio ad absurdum*, see §24). In fact the inference is Dharmakīrti’s own argument in the form of *reductio ad absurdum* made against the Naiyāyikas, who recognize on the one hand the necessary connection between *kṛtakatva* and *anityatā*, and on the other explain *anityatā* as destruction by means of a special cause other than the own nature of a thing. If a produced thing, say, a jar, depends for its destruction on a special cause such as a shock by a hammer, its destruction

(14) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the effect [of the object of negation] (*kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of fire because of the sensation of freezing.’ The causes of fire are to be negated; fire is their effect; cold is incompatible with fire; the sensation of freezing which is here perceived is pervaded by cold.²²⁷

(15) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the cause [of the object of negation] (*kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*): ‘Here there is no smoke because of the sensation of freezing.’ Smoke is to be negated; its cause is fire; what is incompatible with fire is cold; the sensation of freezing, which is perceived here, is pervaded by cold.²²⁸

(16) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the pervader [of the object of negation] (*vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*): ‘This is not permanent because it produces the effect only occasionally (*kadācitkāryakāritva*).’ Permanency is to be negated; changelessness (*niratisāyatva*) is the pervader of permanency; changeableness (*sātiśāyatva*) is incompatible with it; ‘occasionally producing the effect’ which is here perceived, is pervaded by changeableness.²²⁹

(33.16) It is to be understood that these fifteen formulae beginning with the [second] *kāryānupalabdhi* are essentially identical with the [first] *svabhāvānupalabdhi* [and are derived from the latter]. Further subordinate forms may be enumerated according to the various circumstances of application (*prayuktibheda*).

cannot be due to the inherent nature of a jar; therefore destruction is not of necessity or constant. Thus, *anityatā* is not the essential nature of produced things, i. e. there is no identical, necessary connection between *anityatā* and *kṛtakatva*. This inconsistency in the theory of the Naiyāyika is criticised by this *prasaṅga*. It is also untenable that non-produced or permanent things the destruction of which is not admitted have the character of *anityatā*; this is also meant by the word *api* in the *sūtra*.

Dharmakīrti discusses this criticism of the Naiyāyika in PV I, v. 194-195 and HB (cf. Peking, 339, b6 ff; Reconstruction 55, 2-7); Arcaṭa minutely and precisely interprets it in HBT 57-61. Dharmakīrti and probably Dharmottara either did not enter into detailed explanation of the implication of the inference in question, since they are here concerned with the formula of negative inference.

227. *kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni vahnikāraṇāni santi, tuṣārasparśāt*=TSop 291, No. 12; NB lacks this.

228. *kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nātra dhūmas tuṣārasparśāt*=TSop 291, No. 10; NB lacks this.

229. *vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nāyaṁ nityaḥ, kadācitkāryakāritvāt*=TSop 291, No. 11; NB lacks this.

Of these, the *svabhāvānupalambha*, [the first and principal form of negation] establishes not the absence of an object, but the applicability of negative activities (*asadvyavahārayogyatva*) because the absence is proved by the perception itself. All the others establish the applicability of negative activity as well as the absence of an object, since they have as their object things not directly perceived [but indirectly inferred] (*parokṣa*).²³⁰

Here ends the chapter on inference for oneself of the *Tarkabhāṣā*.

Chapter III. Inference for others (*parārthānumāna*)

14. Inference for others defined. (34.6) Inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) is the statement of a logical mark having the [above mentioned] three characteristics. A formal argument stating the three characteristics, which are respectively called *anvaya* (positive pervasion), *vyatireka* (negative pervasion) and *pakṣadharmatā* (the fact that *h* is a property of *s*) is metaphorically (*upacārāt*) called inference [for others or syllogism].²³¹

15. Two kinds of syllogism. (34.9) This [inference for others] is of two kinds : syllogism formulated by the method of agreement (*sādharmyavat*) and that formulated by the method of difference (*vaidharmyavat*). Agreement [or homogeneity] here is the similarity between the locus of a probandum (*sādhyadharmin=p*) and the locus of its instance (*drṣṭāntadharmin=dp*) with regard to the presence of the logical mark [in them]. A syllogism comprising this agreement is called 'formal proof by the method of agreement' (*sādharmyavat sādhanavākya*). Difference [or heterogeneity] is the dissimilarity between *p* and *dp* with regard to the presence of *h* [i.e., *h* is present in *p* while it is not present in *dp*]. A syllogism comprising this difference is called 'formal proof by the method of difference' (*vaidharmyavat sādhanavākya*).²³²

16. Illustration of svabhāvahetoh sādharmyavān prayogaḥ. (34.13)

230. Cf. n. 204 above.

231. NB III, s. 1-2, cited in n. 152 above. A set of propositions is the cause of an inference which another person acquires by hearing it. Thus a verbal statement is called inference, not directly, but only metaphorically. For the three characteristics of a logical mark, see § 10 above.

232. NB III, s. 3-5 : *taddvividham, prayogabhedāt, sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac cēti* ; NBT on it : *drṣṭāntadharminā saha sādhyadharmināḥ sādṛśyaṁ hetukṛtaṁ sādharmyam ucyate. asādṛśyaṁ ca hetukṛtaṁ vaidharmyam ucyate....*

Of these, a syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of identity (*svabhāvahetoḥ sādharmyavān prayogaḥ*) may be illustrated by interpreting the Buddha's teaching 'All that is produced is momentary' in view of the Sautrāntika doctrine. What is produced (*samskṛta*) means all things that have originated as results of the causes and conditions aggregated together. They are said to be momentary (*kṣaṇika*) as they exist only for the moment in which they are produced.

16.1 Proof of universal momentariness. (34.18) Now we see that all things such as a jar etc. are destroyed by conjunction with a hammer etc. If the essential nature (*svarūpa*), by which a jar etc. in its last moment perishes, is existent in the [same thing] when it is just produced, then it should perish immediately after its production because of that [essential nature]. Therefore all things are evidently momentary.

(35.2) It may be contended that a thing is given by its own causes such an essential nature that it perishes after staying for a certain period of time. [But it is not reasonable, because] if so, a thing would not perish even when it is hit by a hammer, but continue to exist again for the given period of time, since such is its essential nature ; again this may be the case [when it receives another shock of a hammer, and thus it follows that] it would never perish. Therefore, if a thing were produced so as to stay for two moments, it would, at the second moment just as at the first, stay for another two moments due to its being durable for two moments. In this way it would not cease to exist at the third moment because it has even then the same nature.

(35.9) [Another opponent] may contend : "A thing is so made by its own cause as to be durable ; but it may be forcibly destroyed by an incompatible thing such as a hammer and the rest". This is not correct. How is it reasonable that the destruction of a thing is caused by an incompatible power, while the same thing does not perish because of its being permanent. For this is as unreasonable as to say that Devadatta is dead while he is living. In other words, if it perishes, how can you say that it is produced by its causes so as to be imperishable ? For you cannot say that an immortal quality dies. We hold, therefore, that a thing is produced by its own cause to be perishable, because perishing can be by no means connected with an imperishable thing, while the disappearance of a thing is actually experienced. Thus, it perishes at the

very moment of its birth. In this way the theory of momentary destruction [of every thing] (*kṣaṇakṣayitva*) has been proved. We may formulate [the discussion made above] into the following syllogism : ²³³

Whatever is by nature perishable perishes immediately [after its birth as e.g. a jar at the last moment of its existence];

Material objects etc. are by nature perishable at the time of their birth;

[Therefore, material] objects etc. perish immediately after their birth];

[This syllogism is] formulated with a logical mark of identity.

16.2 Recognition is merely constructive imagination. (36.1) “If things are perishing at every moment, how is our recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) in the form ‘This is the very same as that’ possible?” To this our reply is this : [This is said] because every moment [of the flux of a thing] is produced so as to be very similar to the immediately preceding moment and because our nescience (*avidyā*) continues to exist. At the very moment when a thing perishes, another at the next moment which is similar to it is born. In this way the difference in form [between the two moments] is neglected ; and the flux of moments is not interrupted by non-existence. Consequently an ordinary person gets, by means of constructive imagination (*adhyavasāya*), the idea of identity (*abheda*) that this is the same as that in spite of the actual difference [of the two moments]. We know by experience that one easily gets an idea of this being the same as that regarding completely different things such as grass, hair etc. which, having been once cut off, grow again (*lūṇapunarjātakuśakeśādi*)²³⁴. Why cannot the same kind of imagination occur in the present case ? We have thus proved that what is produced is all momentary²³⁵.

233. T *sbyor ba yañ śnar ltar bya ste=prayogaḥ punar pūrvavat kartavyaḥ*. G *ayam* instead of *punar* in M.

234. This is a stock-example of Buddhist logicians meant for the refutation of recognition. See for example, PVBh 144, 3 ; RNA 84, 3. The refutation of recognition is dealt with by our author in § 28.2. Ratnakīrti gives a systematic exposition of the problem (RNA 106-112).

235. Our author’s argument in § 16, 1-2 is a brief extract from the highly developed Buddhist theory of the momentary destruction of all things (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*). He seems to owe his argument here, directly or indirectly, to Kaṇvakagomin who demonstrates a similar discussion commenting on PV I. v. 195 (v. 197 in Kitāb Mahāla ed) and *Svavṛtti* (cf. Kaṇva-

16.3 Nirviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.9) The syllogism set forth above is of the formula with a simple, identical logical mark (*nirviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ*)²³⁶. The [same] formula with a simple, identical logical mark is illustrated by another syllogism :

All that exists is impermanent (*yat sat tat sarvam anityam*) as e. g. a jar;

kagomin, 368, 7-13 and 369, 3-8). This argument of Mokṣākara is in its turn quoted almost verbatim in SVM 104, 12-105, 15 for the sake of criticism. Malliṣeṇa clearly ascribes it to our author saying (SVM 105, 25-106, 1) : *yac ca kṣaṇikatvasthāpanāya mokṣākara-guṇtenānantaram eva pralapitaṁ tat....*

Dharmakīrti discusses the problem of *kṣaṇabhaṅga* in PV I, v. 193-196, and more extensively in HB II. Arcaṭa's commentary on HB II is a valuable dissertation on the problem. His separate work *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* is not extant. Durvekamiśra wrote another *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* which is also lost now, but his commentary *Āloka* on HBT is published together with HBT. Dharmottara's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* is preserved in Tibetan translation with its commentary by Muktākalaśa; the Tib. text of Dharmottara's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* is edited and translated by Frauwallner (WZKM 42, 217-258). Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the same problem in the *Sthirabhāva-parikṣā* of TS and TSP. Jñānaśrīmitra wrote a large article *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* (JNA, 1-159) which is the most important work on this theory; and this work was abridged by his student Ratnakīrti in his *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi* (RNA 62-88). The latter wrote another article, *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* (RNA 101-121). Ratnākaraśānti discusses logical problems concerning the proof of *kṣaṇabhaṅga* in his *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (SBNT 103-114; the work is translated into Japanese by me in Bukkyō Shigaku 仏教史学 VIII, no. 4, 21-40 「ラトナーカラシャーンティの論理學書」). The theories appearing in TS, TSP, Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* and Ratnākaraśānti's work are explained by Mookerjee (cf. the first three chapters of his *Universal Elux*).

236. PV I, v. 186 : *upādhibhedāpekṣo vā svabhāvaḥ kevalo 'tha vā, ucyate sādhyasiddhyartham nāśe kāryatvasattvavat*. Here Dharmakīrti classifies *svabhāvahetu* into two kinds, a) *kevala-* [illustrated by *sat*] and b) *upādhibhedāpekṣa-* [ill. by *kārya=kṛtaka*]; but he mentions c) *svabhāvabhūta-dharmaviśeṣa-* [ill. *utpattimat*] in his *Svavṛtti*. In NB III, s. 11-15 too, the above-named three kinds are enumerated. The idea of this classification is clear : The logical identity of the probandum and the probans does not mean the total sameness of both, but the sameness in essence. And this sameness in essence may be sometimes pure and simple as in the case of existence and impermanence, which do not permit the interference of any third entity; and another time it is understood together with a contingent, third entity which the probans necessarily presupposes, as in the case of product-ness and impermanence. Product-ness presupposes a cause. Dharmakīrti regards this third thing as a *upādhi* (contingent condition). But once this main classification is stated, one is tempted to subdivide. From existence we derive the idea of origination (*utpatti*) which Dharmakīrti considers a particular property belonging to the existent itself (*svabhāvabhūta-dharmaviśeṣa*), i. e. this origination is not the third thing separate from the existent, but a part of it. According to Dharmottara and other commentators this particular property, origination, is obtained through logical imagination in which one contrasts it to non-origination. Thus, this case is added in the list as a subdivision of a) (corresponding to No. 2 of NB & TBh). Concerning b) Dharmakīrti says

These things cognized by valid knowledge²³⁷ all exist;

[Therefore these things are all impermanent]²³⁸.

Another syllogism proving that the Vedas are human products can be formulated with [the same] identical mark :

Any verbal statement is a human product as e. g. the verbal statement of a passer-by²³⁹;

The Vedic injunction 'One who wants rebirth in heaven should perform the fire-sacrifice' is a verbal statement ;

[Therefore the Vedic injunction is a human product.]

16.3.1 Saviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.16) A syllogism of the formula with a qualified identical mark (*saviśeṣaṇa-prayoga*) is next shown :

All that have origin is impermanent (*yad yad utpattimat tat sarvam anityam*) as e. g. a jar;

Sound has origin ;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

Those things which are excluded from [the class of] what has no origin are called having origin. When we, saying 'the origination of a thing', mean that this distinct [aspect] (*vyāvṛtti*) is a different thing [from 'existence'] since it excludes other distinct [aspects incompatible with it] (*vyāvṛttyantaravyavaccheda*), then the identical mark [i. e. existence] is qualified by a property [having origin] which, though actually identical

that the idea of product necessarily presupposes the idea of cause, though the cause is not manifestly expressed. Dharmottara thinks in NBT on NB III, s. 15 that this presupposed third entity, cause, may be expressed by its own word as in the case of *pratyaya-bhedabheditva* or may not be so expressed as in the case of *kṛtakatva*, and that the presence and the absence of the actual usage of the word 'cause' do not change the significance. Therefore he concludes that the syllogistic form of *svabhāvahetu* is three-fold, viz. 1) *śuddha=a)=nirviśeṣaṇa* of TBh, 2) *avyatiriktaviśeṣaṇa* or *saviśeṣaṇa* and 3) *vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇa* or *bhinnaviśeṣaṇa*. Manorathanandin, commenting on PV I, v. 186 (III, v. 185 in Patna ed.) gives a similar exposition and classifies into *śuddha*, *abhinnaviśeṣaṇa* and *bhinnaviśeṣaṇa*. TSop follows Dharmottara. It seems to be Mokṣākaragupta alone who enumerates as the fourth the case of *pratyayabhedabheditva*, giving to this the name *prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa*. This cannot be a merit of his, because he gave only a separate name to what was actually recognized by Dharmakīrti and his commentators.

237. G *pramāṇapratitāḥ padārthāḥ* instead of *pramāṇapratitāḥ* in M; T, agreeing with G, reads *tshad mas rtogs paḥi dños po*.

238. NB III, s. 11 : *yat sat tat sarvam anityam yathā ghaṭādir iti śuddhasya svabhāva-hetoḥ prayogaḥ* ; and NBT.

239. The Tibetan translator may have had in his manuscript *rathya-puruṣa* instead of *rathyāpuruṣa* in M, G, as T reads : *śiñ rta žon pa* or one who rides a cart.

[with existence], is differentiated from it by imagination (*kalpitena bhedena*)²⁴⁰.

16.3.2 Bhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.20) The formula with an identical mark qualified by an contingent property (*bhinna-viśeṣaṇasya [svabhāvahetoḥ] prayogaḥ*) is next illustrated :

Whatever is produced is impermanent (*yat kṛtakam tad anityam*)

as a jar;

Sound is a product;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]²⁴¹

One may object: “You may call an expression such as ‘one who possesses a brindled cow’ a usage of a contingent property. However, in the word ‘product’ we do not recognize any such word signifying a contingent property²⁴² as we find in the word ‘a brindled cow’ [possessed by a person]. Thus, how can you call [the probans *kṛtaka*] an example of contingent property?” We reply: A thing which depends for its own origination on the operation of other things [i. e. its causes] is called a product. Therefore, the word ‘product’ connotes the nature of depending on the operation of others; this is why we call it ‘qualified

240. NB III, s. 12 : *yad utpattimat tad anityam iti svabhāvabhūtadharmabhedena svabhāvasya prayogaḥ*. Mokṣākara follows Dharmottara in explaining the formula, but perhaps with a misunderstanding. Commenting on the word *bheda*, Dharmottara says : *anutpannebhyaḥ hi vyāvṛttim āsṛityōtpanno bhāva ucyate saiva vyāvṛttir yadā vyāvṛttyantarānirapekṣā vaktum iṣyate tadā vyatirekiṇīva nirdiśyate bhāvasyōtpatir iti*. According to Durvekamiśra (DP 158, 6-8), the probans, what is originated, is so judged in view of the distinction from, or the exclusion of, what is not originated such as ether. But the question may be put forward : if a thing is called what is originated in contrast to what is not originated, why do you use the expression ‘it has origination’ (*utpatir asya = utpattimat*) ? Answer : When we express this distinction without regard to other distinctions such as magnitude (*mahattva*), [i.e. when we limit our contrast only to that of origination and non-origination], we must say ‘it has origination’. This is the meaning of the passage of NBT. However, Mokṣākara’s interpretation runs (36, 17 ff.) : *anutpannebhyaḥ vyāvṛtto bhāva utpanna ucyate, yadā saiva vyāvṛttir vyāvṛttyantaravyavacchedena vyatiriktōcyate bhāvasyōtpatir iti tadā kalpitena bhedena svabhāvabhūtadharmena viśiṣṭaḥ....* In this passage *vyāvṛttyantara* is used in a sense different from that in NBT. It is neither a misprint nor a mistake on the part of the editor since T is quite parallel. Our author uses the term as denoting *anutpanna*, and if it is made unconsciously, he misinterprets Dharmottara.

241. NB III, s. 13 : *yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity upādhibhedena*. NBT 45, 17-19 illustrates the differences between the three kinds of expressions, *śuddha*, *avyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśiṣṭaḥ* and *vyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśiṣṭaḥ* by the example of Devadatta : Devadatta may be referred to by the name Devadatta itself ; he may be called the long-eared ; he may be called the owner of a brindled cow.

242. Read *bhinnaviśeṣaṇa* for *bhinnaśeṣaṇa* in M.

by a contingent property'²⁴³.

16.3.3 Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (37.7) The formula with an identical mark manifestly expressing a contingent qualifier (*prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvasya prayogaḥ*) is illustrated lastly²⁴⁴.

Whatever is variable according to a change in its cause is a product (*yaḥ pratyayabhedabhedī sa kṛtakaḥ*) as smoke;

Sound is variable according to a change in its cause;

[Therefore, sound is a product.]

Pratyaya means *kāraṇa* (cause). A thing which is subject to change according as its cause varies, is here meant by the word *pratyayabhedabhedin*. It means that an effect is big when its cause is big, and is small if the cause is small. The word *pratyayabhedabhedin* which manifestly expresses a contingent qualifier is here used ; this is why the formula is called *prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa*.

Various kinds of the identical mark have been shown above in order to remove misunderstanding [about the logical mark of identity], that is to say, in order to teach that if different properties are imagined [of a logical mark], the fact of an identical mark being used remains the same.

17. Illustration of svabhāvahetor vaidharṃyavān prayogaḥ. (37.16) A syllogism by the method of difference formulated with a logical mark of identity (*svabhāvahetor vaidharṃyavān prayogaḥ*) is next illustrated :

1. Whatever is not immediately destructible at a given time is not of a perishable nature at that time as e. g. ether²⁴⁵;

Those things beginning with matter are, however, perishable at the time of their birth;

[Therefore, those beginning with matter are immediately destructible at the time of their birth.]

In a syllogism with a negative *vyāpti*, [i. e. that by the method of difference] (*vyatirekaprayoga=vaidharṃyavān prayogaḥ*) the negation of

243. The same objection is raised in NBT 45, 20-21 and the reply forms NB III, s. 14 : *apekṣitaparavyāpāro hi bhāvaḥ svabhāvaniṣpattau kṛtaka iti*.

244. NB III, s. 15 : *evaṃ pratyayabhedabheditvādayo draṣṭavyāḥ*. As said in n. 236, NBT as well as NB regards this as a special case of the third formula (*bhinnaviśeṣaṇa*), while our author takes it out as the fourth.

245. T : *gaṇ daṇ gaṇ... de daṇ de...* (= *yad yad...tat tad...*) instead of *yad yadā...tat tadā...* in M.

the probandum is pervaded by the negation of the probans, and accordingly the absence of the probandum is definitely known in the absence of the probans. In the same way we can formulate [the remaining forms of *svabhāvahetu*] by the method of difference.

2. Wherever there is no momentariness there is also no existence
(*yatra kṣaṇikatvaṃ nāsti tatra sattvaṃ api nāsti*) as e. g. in a
flower in the sky;

However, sound is existent;

[Therefore sound is momentary].

- 2.a Wherever there is no impermanence recognized, there is no origination as in the hair of a tortoise ;

Sound has origination ;

[Therefore, sound is impermanent.]

3. Wherever there is no impermanence there is no product-ness as
in a rabbit's horns;

Sound is a product;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

4. Wherever there is no product-ness there is no variation concomitant with the variation in its cause as in ether;

Sound is variable together with the change in its cause;

[Therefore, sound is a product.]²⁴⁶

18. Illustration of *kāryahetoḥ sādharmyavān prayogaḥ*. (38.8) A syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of causality is next illustrated.

Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen;

Here there is smoke;

[Therefore, here there is fire.]²⁴⁷

An effect should be applied as a probans for proving its cause, the probandum, only when the relation of a cause and an effect has been [beforehand] established through perception and non-perception (*pratya-*

246. These illustrations of *vaidharmyavatprayoga* correspond, as I number, to those four forms discussed in § 16.3 in relation to *sādharmyavatprayoga* of *svabhāvahetu*. NB III, s. 26 : *asaty anityatve nāsti sattvaṃ utpattimattvaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ vā, saṃś ca śabda utpattimān kṛtako vēti svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ*.

247. NB III, s. 23 : *kāryahetoḥ api prayogaḥ, yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir yathā mahānasādaḥ, asti cēha dhūma iti*.

kṣānupalambha)²⁴⁸.

18.1 Illustration of vaidharmya-prayoga. (38.11) A syllogism by the method of difference (*vaidharmya-prayoga*) [formulated with a logical mark of causality] :

Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a great tank;

However, here there is smoke;

[Therefore, here there is fire.]²⁴⁹

19. Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of agreement. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of agreement (*anupalabdheḥ sādharmaṇyavān prayogaḥ*), which is aimed at denying the existence of a composite whole (*avayavin*) :

A thing which, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived in a place, is to be judged as not existing in that place as the horns on the head of a man;

The composite whole [of a jar] which is asserted by the opponent to be perceptible is not perceived in the aggregated parts meant by the word 'jar';

[Therefore, a composite whole does not exist in a jar.]²⁵⁰

19.1 Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of difference. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of difference (*anupalabdher vaidharmyaṇyavān prayogaḥ*) :

A thing existent as perceptible by nature is necessarily perceived as a particular object of blue etc. which is admitted as perceptible²⁵¹;

In this particular place²⁵² we do not perceive a jar, although it is existent as perceptible by nature;

248. NBT 49, 11-12 : *yathā mahānasādāv iti, mahānasādau hi pratyakṣānuplambhābhyām kāryakāraṇabhāvāt māvinābhāvo niścitaḥ*. See also NB III, s. 24 : *ihāpi siddha eva kāryakāraṇabhāve kāraṇe sādhye kāryahetur vaktavyaḥ*. The Buddhist theory of the establishment of a causal relation by *pratyakṣānupalambha* will be soon dealt with again in § 22.

249. NB III, s. 27 : *asaty agnau na bhavaty eva dhūmaḥ, atra cāsti dhūma iti kāryahetoḥ prayogaḥ*.

250. NB III, s. 9 : *yad upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptaṁ san nōpalabhyate so 'sadvyavahāra-viṣayaḥ siddhaḥ, yathānyaḥ kaścīd dṛṣṭaḥ śaśaviṣānādiḥ. nōpalabhyate ca kvacit pradeśaviṣeṣa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpto ghaṭa iti*.

251. T *sñon po la sogs paḥi khyad par mñon sum ñid du mñon par ḥdod* = *dṛṣyatvenābhimatānīlādiviṣeṣaḥ* instead of *nālādiviṣeṣaḥ* of M.

252. T *phyogs kyi khyad par ḥdi na* = *iha pradeśaviṣeṣe* as we read in G.

[Therefore, there is no jar in this place]²⁵³.

20. Pervasion explained in relation to the two syllogistic forms.

(38.20) It should be understood that while the probans (*sādhana*) is pervaded by the probandum (*sādhya*) in all the syllogism (*sādhanavākya*) formulated by the method of agreement, the non-existence of the probandum (*sādhyābhāva*) is pervaded by the non-existence of the probans (*sādhanābhāva*) in the syllogism by the method of difference. Either the statement of the necessary existence (*niyatatva*) of the probans in the probandum or²⁵⁴ that of the necessary non-existence of the probandum in the non-existence of the probans is called 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*). Therefore when the pervasion [between the two terms] is established by means of valid knowledge, there should be no shade of doubt that the probandum might not exist in the same locus (*dharmin*) in which the probans exists.

20.1. The Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue vyāpti. (39.6) However, doubt arises inevitably when a universal (*sarvopasaṃhāravati*) *vyāpti* is not established by means of valid knowledge as, for instance, in the case of the inference from an effect which is aimed at proving the existence of God (*īśvara*). That is to say, they [i. e. the Naiyāyikas] state the following proof : ²⁵⁵

253. NB III, s. 25 : *vaidharmavataḥ prayogaḥ, yat sad upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptam tad upalabhyata eva, yathā nilādiviśeṣaḥ, na caivam ihopalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya sata upalabdhir ghaṭasyēti anupalabdhiprayogaḥ.*

254. G, T have *ca*, which is dropped in M.

255. The Buddhist campaign against the theism of the Naiyāyika was started by Dharmakīrti in PV II v. 10-29 ; commentators on PV including Prajñākaragupta further developed their criticism of theism. Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla devoted a chapter for the refutation of God in TS and TSP (TS v. 46-93). Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati deal with the problem in BCA and BCAP IX, v. 119-126. The theistic argument of the Naiyāyika which forms the object of criticism for these Buddhists seems to be set forth by Aviddhakarna, Uddyotakara, Praśastamati etc. as named in TSP. In the latest period of Indian Buddhism, Jñānaśrīmitra wrote a lengthy dissertation *Īśvaravādādhikāra* (JNA 233-322), which consisted of *Pūrvapakṣasamākṣepa*, *Īśvaradūṣaṇa* and *Vārttikasaptasloki-vyākhyāna*. The last chapter consists of three sections and is an elaborate commentary on the seven verses of Dharmakīrti, viz. PV II, v. 10-16. Ratnakīrti made a résumé of Jñānaśrī's *Īśvaravādādhikāra*. It is incorporated in RNA 29-52 under the title *Īśvarasā-dhanadūṣaṇa*. Mokṣākara, as usual, follows the latter two authors when he criticises the Naiyāyika's theism in the following text. The opponents of these three Buddhists are mainly Śaṅkara, Narasimha, Trilocana, Vācaspati-miśra, Vittoka, etc. (RNA 35-36). Vācaspati-miśra demonstrates his own theistic argument in NVT 953, 1 ff. (ad NS 4, 1, 21). Following Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākara introduces Vācaspati's theory of the classification of the existent things in the world into three kinds, his syllogism proving the existence of God, etc. But Buddhist criticism is logical and centers around Vācaspati's theory of *vyāpti*, which is found mainly in NVT 138, 25-140, 15 (see n. 270).

“We are able to prove the existence of the omniscient God, whether or not an omniscient lord [i. e. Buddha] really exists. For the existent in the world is of three kinds:²⁵⁶ 1) Some things such as a jar etc. which have been definitely produced by an agent (*niścítakartṛka*) ; 2) some things such as ether (*vyoman*) etc. which definitely have no agent (*niścítakartṛnivr̥tti*) ; 3) and the third group of things such as the earth etc. the existence of whose agents is doubted. There is no class of things other than the above [three]²⁵⁷. [Thus, our syllogism may be formulated as follows :]

Those which are classified as things the existence of whose agents is uncertain, trees in a forest whose origination we can actually see or the earth etc. which have remained very long since their creation, and so on, must be all considered to have an intelligent agent as their creator (*buddhimatkartṛka*);

Because they are effects (*kāryatvāt*);

For example a jar.²⁵⁸

The probans [of this inference] is not illegitimate (*asiddha*), because the

256. T omits *trayaḥ khalu*.

257. JNA 233, 15-16 : *trayo hi bhāvarāśayaḥ, buddhimatkartṛkāś ca ghaṭādayaḥ ; akartṛkāś cākāśādayaḥ ; saṁdigdhakartṛkāś ca bhūddharādayaḥ*. RNA 39, 25-28 : *nanu vṛkṣādayaḥ pakṣādayaḥ pakṣikṛtāḥ, katham tair vyabhicāraḥ. trividho hi bhāvarāśiḥ, saṁdigdhakartṛko yathā vṛkṣādiḥ ; prasiddhakartṛko yathā ghaṭādiḥ ; akartṛko yathākāśādiḥ. tatra prasiddhakartṛke ghaṭādayaḥ pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām vyāptim ādāya saṁdehāpade kṣmāruhādayaḥ kāryatvam upasaṁhṛtya buddhimān anumiyate....* This latter passage is parallel to that in JNA 284, 21-24. Cf. NVT 953, 1 ff. : *etāvad abhipretam ācāryasya, trayo hi khalu bhāvā jagati bhavanti, prasiddhacetanakartṛkāḥ yathā prāsādātṭīlagopuroraṇādayaḥ, prasiddhatadviparyayaḥ yathā paramāṇvākāśādayaḥ, saṁdigdhacetanakartṛkāḥ yathā tanutarumahidharādayaḥ*.

258. JNA 233, 6-10 : *iha pratyavasthānam anyeṣāṁ. vivādāspadibhūtaṁ bhūddharādi buddhimatkartṛpūrvakam, kāryatvāt ; yad yat kāryam tad buddhimatkartṛpūrvakam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭaḥ ; kāryam cēdam bhūddharādi ; tasmād buddhimatpūrvakam iti. na cēdam asiddham, bauddhasyāpi vindhyagandhamādanādinām kāryatve vivādābhāvāt. nāpi viruddham, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na cānaikāntikam, kvacid api kārye buddhimad adhiṣṭhānavyabhicārasya darśayitum āśakyatvāt....* Cf. NVT 953, 5ff. : *vivādādhyāsītās tarumahidharādaya upādānābhijñanakartṛkā utpattimattvāt, acetanopādānatvād vā, yad utpattimad acetanopādānakam vā tat sarvam upādānābhijñanapūrvakam yathā prāsādādi, tathā ca vivādādhyāsītās tanutarumahidharādayaḥ, tasmāt tathēti, na caiṣām utpattimattvam asiddham....* A similar syllogism is quoted in RNA 29, 13-17. RNA 36, 14-19 ascribes the same kind of syllogism to Vācaspati : *tathā ca vācaspatiḥ pramāṇayati. vivādādhyāsītābhinnatarugirisāgarādayaḥ upādānādyabhijñanakartṛkāḥ ; kāryatvāt ; yad yat kāryam tat tad upādānādyabhijñanakartṛkam....* Similar inferences meant for proving the existence of God are proposed by many Naiyāyikas and quoted by Ratnakīrti in his *Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa*. The inference with *kāryatva* as the probans is the most representative argument of the Naiyāyika.

effect-ness of all [these] things is established by valid knowledge. Nor is it incompatible (*viruddha*), since it is present in the *sapakṣa*. Nor is it inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because there is a proof contradicting the opposite of the assertion to be proved (*sādhya viparyaye bādhakapramānasadbhāvāt*) [i. e. we can argue by the following *reductio ad absurdum* to prove the *vyāpti* :]

We cognize by a mental perception accompanied by repeated past experience (*bhūyodarśanasahāyena mānasapratyakṣeṇa*)²⁵⁹ [the pervasion] that an effect (*kārya*) [say, a jar] is always produced through the agency of a potter who is endowed with intelligence (*buddhimat*). If [on the contrary] a thing could come into existence without [being mediated by some] intelligent [agent], then it [e. g. a jar] might sometimes not be produced even when the intelligent agent [e. g. a potter] intends [to make it]. [But this is absurd], because an effect cannot even once arise without its cause. Therefore, we should in no case suppose that a thing can

259. T *mañ du mthoñ bañi rgyu can gyi yid dan mñons sum gyis....* = *bhūyodarśananibandhanamānasena pratyakṣeṇa ca....* T seems to understand *mānasapratyakṣa-* as a *dvandva* compound, which is wrong. Krishnamacharya condemned the same word as a mistake on the part of Mokṣākara, and suggested a correction into *alaukikapratyakṣeṇa* (G. *Ṭikā*, 77, 20 ff. : *atra mānasenēti viśeṣaṇam prāmādikam....*). He could be right, if Mokṣākara Gupta introduced here the theory of the syncretic school of Nyāyavaiśeṣika. However, Mokṣākara, following Ratnakīrti, refers to Trilocana and Vācaspatimiśra of the Naiyāyika and Kumārila and Sucaritmiśra (Kāśikākāra) of the Mīmāṃsaka, who all maintain that a universal concomitance is grasped by perception helped by repeated past experience. RNA 42, 3-5 : *bhūyodarśanagamyā hi vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayor* (SV Anu. v. 12a-b) *iti prasiddham eva. asyāyam arthaḥ kāśikākāreṇa vyākṛtāḥ : prācinānekadarśanajanitasamśkārasahāye carame [darśane] cetasi cakāsti dhūmasyāgniniyatasvabhāvatvam....* (SVK III, 16, 14-15) : RNA, 42, 10-11 : *trilocanena punar ayam arthaḥ kathitaḥ, bhūyodarśanasahāyena manasā tajjātiyānām sambandho gṛhīto bhavati. ato dhūmo 'gniḥ na vyabhicarati. tadvyabhicāre'py upādhirahitaḥ sambandham atikrāmet. hetor vipakṣasāṅkānivartakaḥ pramāṇam upalabdhi-lakṣaṇapṛāptopādhivirahaniścayahetur anupalambhākhyam pratyakṣam eva. tataḥ siddhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ tathēhāpīti svamataḥ vyavasthāpitam iti* (cf. n. 270 below).; RNA 42, 15 : *vācaspatināpīdam uktam, abhijātamañibhedattvavad bhūyodarśanajanitasamśkārasahāyam indriyam eva dhūmādinām bahnyādibhiḥ svābhāvikasambandhagrāhīti yuktam* (NVT 140, 5-6). These three passages are quoted again in RNA (*Vyāptinirṇaya*), 99, 11-12 ; 99, 20-21 ; 100, 22-24. Vācapati does not agree with Trilocana and say that *svābhāvika-sambandha* is grasped either *indriyapratyakṣa* or other means of valid knowledge according to circumstances, when it is produced through *bhūyodarśana*. At least the theory of Trilocana and Sucaritmiśra completely identical with what Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākara say, inasmuch as they admit that universal concomitance is grasped by mental perception helped by repeated past experience. Therefore our text in M needs no correction.

be an effect and at the same time not produced by an intelligent agent’’²⁶⁰.

20.2. Refutation. (40.5) To this the following reply can be made : All philosophers agree that in every case a probans proves its probandum if and only if the pervasive relation (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum has been established by valid knowledge generalising [all the cases of the probans and probandum] (*sarvopasaṃhāreṇa pramāṇena*)²⁶¹. Now, if the *vyāpti* [in your syllogism] is grasped between [an effect in general and] an intelligent being who is qualified by having a visible body (*dṛśyaśarīraviśiṣṭa- buddhimat-*), then this probans, just as the probans *prameyatva* (being an object of cognition), is inconclusive owing to non-exclusiveness (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*), because we find growing grass, which is not endowed with the said probandum [i. e. is not produced by a visible intelligent agent], is also an effect.²⁶²

(40.10) You cannot contend that [our criticism is irrelevant, as] the very grass etc. is comprised in *p* [of the above said inference]. For an object clearly deviating from the *vyāpti* (*vyabhicāraviṣaya*) cannot be put forward as *p*, since there is a rule [set forth by Dharmakīrti]²⁶³ : A

260. Jñānaśrīmitra reproduces five kinds of *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* which the Naiyāyika proposes in order to substantiate the *vyāpti* ‘an effect is produced by an intelligent agent’. Of these five, the first is parallel to what Mokṣākara refers to here. See JNA 237, 22–238, 3 : *yathā saugatānāṃ citrabhānor anumāne yadi citrabhānum antareṇa kāraṇāntarād api dhūmo deśāntare kālantare vā jāyeta, dṛṣṭayor api deśakālayor na citrabhānoḥ sakṛd apy ātmasattāṃ labheta, yasmān na tadabhāve bhavatas tatkāryaniyamo yuktaḥ, atiprasaṅgāt ; tataś ca tādṛśasya sarvasyaivātaddhetutvān na tataḥ sakṛd api jāyeta, bhavati ca, tasmān nātajjanyam tādṛśam iti viparyaye bādhakapramāṇavṛttyā pratibandhasiddhiḥ. tathāsmākam api yadi kiṃcid buddhimadadhiṣṭhānam antareṇānyato’pi kāryam upajāyeta, hanta na tarhi sakṛd api buddhimataḥ kumbhakārāder utpadyeta, bhavati ca, tatas tajjanyam ity ekaṃ bādhakaṃ pramāṇam.*

261. T *bsgub par bya ba dañ sgrub par byed pa gañ zag gi khyad par thams cad ñe bar sdus pañi tshad mas grub pa.... Gañ zag gi khyad par* should be read : *gañ dag gi khyab pa*. Tn has *khyab* for *khyad*.

262. RNA 39, 21–24, *kiṃ dṛśyaśariropādhiṇā buddhimanmātreṇa vyāptir grhyate, āho svid dṛśyaśariropādhiṇīdhureṇa dṛśyādṛśyasādhāraṇenēti vikalpau. yady ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tadā tathābhūtasādhyaṃ antareṇāpy utpadyamāne viṭapādaḥ kāryatvadarśanāt prameyatvādivat sādhāraṇānaikāntiko hetuḥ.* As for the fallacy of *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* illustrated by the probans *prameyatva* see § 10.1 and n. 168.

263. PV IV v. 91 : *aniṣiddhaḥ pramāṇābhyām sa cōpagama iṣyate, saṃdigdhe hetuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ. upagama* in this verse means *pakṣa*. M has *vyakto* instead of *vya-**sto*. But T *bsal*, PV, the same verse cited in JNA (244, 3), that in RNA (39.4 f. b.), etc. agree to *vyasto*. In the inference in question, the *p*, grass, is seen by valid perception not to have an intelligent agent with a visible body. Since grass is clearly rejected as belonging to the class of *s* by perception, it is absurd to try to prove by inference that it has an intelligent agent with a visible body as its cause, i.e. that it belongs to the class of *s*.

probans is stated only concerning a *p* which is not yet ascertained [to be *s* or non-*s*]; and what has been rejected [to be *s* by other valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans²⁶⁴.

(40.13) [The opponent may object :] “We see smoke without [seeing] fire on a mountain which is not climbable²⁶⁵. Thus, it is easy to point out the same deviation in the case of [a mountain put forward as the locus of] smoke”. This is not correct. Such a mountain is qualified to be an object which is doubtful [of having fire] (*saṃdigdhaviṣaya*) [and fit to be made a *p*], just because fire cannot be seen on the mountain as it is not climbable. In the problem under question, however, you want to grasp the *vyāpti* [between an effect] and ‘having an intelligent agent with a visible body’, [and yet we do not perceive the agent, who, if he existed, would be seen]; therefore, it is rightly said that the existence of an intelligent agent is contradicted by the non-perception of a perceptible object (*dr̥śyānupalambha*).

(40.18) Or otherwise, if you construe the *vyāpti* as that [between an effect] and an [intelligent agent] whose body is invisible²⁶⁶ or an intelligent agent in general, we cannot ascertain the negative *vyāpti* of such a probandum as an invisible one or an intelligent one in general by means of the non-perception of a perceptible object. Thus, yours is a fallacious probans named *saṃdigdhaviṣayavyāvṛttika*²⁶⁷. For in this case the *vyāpti* between the non-existence of the probandum and the non-existence of the probans is not available²⁶⁸ because [the probandum itself] is not established

264. RNA 39, 25 ff. : *nanu vṛkṣādayaḥ pakṣikṛtāḥ, katham tair vyabhicāraḥ...yad āha, na sādhyenaiva vyabhicāra ity ayuktam etat. na hi vyabhicāraṇaviṣaya eva pakṣo* (Read so instead of *pakṣe*) *bhavitum arhati, saṃdigdhe hetuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśraya iti nyāyāt. vyabhicāraṇaviṣayatā ca dr̥śyaśariroṇādher buddhimanmātrasya tṛṇādyutpattau dr̥śyānupalambhena pratikṣiptatvāt....* This is a citation from JNA 284, 21-285, 1.

265. For *aśakyārohaṇe parvate* T has *skyed* (p. *bskyed*) *par mi nus pa la la* (Even some places which are unable to give rise to [fire]). But here *ārohana* must be taken in the sense of climbing.

266. Read with G and T *adr̥śyaśarireṇa* for *dr̥śya-* in M.

267. For this fallacy see § 10.2.4.

268. M has *ākāśādaḥ* between *sādhanaḥ* and *asiddhatvena*; but better to omit it. Concerning our author’s argument in this paragraph, cf. RNA 40, 2 ff. : *atha vyabhicāracamatkāraś trividhabhāvarāśivavasthāpanārtham ca viṭapādaḥ pratyakṣāpratikṣiptena dr̥śyādr̥śyasādhāraṇena buddhimanmātreṇa vyāptir avagamyata iti dvitīyaḥ saṃkalpaḥ. tadā viṭapādaḥ buddhimanmātrasya sambhāvyaṃ natvāt na sādharmaṇānaikāntikatām brūmaḥ. kiṃ tarhi vyāptigrahaṇakāle dr̥śyādr̥śyasādhāraṇasya buddhimanmātrasya sādhyasyādr̥śyatayā dr̥śyānupalambhena vyatirekāśiddher vyāpter abhāvāt saṃdigdha [-vipakṣa-] vyāvṛttikatvam ācakṣmahe....*

[to be real]. In this connection the revered master Jñānaśrīmitra says :

If you, in order to remove [the fallacy that *h*] effect-ness, is found in the *vipakṣa* [i. e. in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause], imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the *vyāpti*, since it is deprived of confirmation by the negative *vyāpti* ?

Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative *vyāpti*, rely on a visible agent, then [*h*, effect-ness] is clearly seen in the *vipakṣa*, because grass etc. grows without it [i. e. the operation of a visible agent]²⁶⁹.

20.2.1. Trilocana's objection rejected. (41.7) Trilocana said as follows :²⁷⁰ "Just as smoke etc. is connected with fire etc. by the intrinsic

269. *Jñānaśrīmitrapādaiḥ* is found only in M. The first half of this verse can be certainly ascribed to him since it occurs in JNA 285, 7-8, but the second half cannot be traced in JNA. It is Ratnakīrti who put these two halves together as the summary of his preceding argument, and it is likely that the second half is a product of Ratnakīrti himself. RNA 41, 9-12 : *kāryatvasya vipakṣavṛttihataye sambhāvyate 'tindriyaḥ kartā ced vyatireka-siddhividhurā vyāptiḥ katham sidhyati, dṛśyo 'tha vyatirekasiddhimanasā kartā samāśriyate tattyāge' pi tadā tṛṇādikam iti vyaktaḥ vipakṣekṣaṇam*. M has *tadyogena vinā* instead of *tattyāge' pi tadā* in RNA and G. Tc-d : *ci ste ldog pa ḥgrub paḥi yid kyis bltar mi ruṅ baḥi byed pa po brten par bya ba yin na, de daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ deḥi rtsva la sogs paḥo ṣes pa bsal bar mi mthuṅ phyogs la mthoṅ baḥo*. *Mi* and *deḥi* should be omitted; *de daṅ ldan pa* should be read *de daṅ mi ldan pa*; *gsal bar* is better than *bsal bar*.

270. In § 20.2 the Buddhist criticised the Naiyāyika's argument, pointing out that the *vyāpti* between 'effect' and 'intelligent agent' does not represent a valid causal relation. But the Naiyāyika contends that it is not only causality but the intrinsic relation of a thing with another which forms valid *vyāpti*. Vācaspati on NS 1.1.5 refutes the Buddhist theory of *vyāpti* that invariable concomitance is determined not by mere perception and non-perception but by the principle of causality or essential identity (cf. PV I, v. 31 : *kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt, avinābhāvānīyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt*). After criticising the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika view of *vyāpti*, he proposes the intrinsic relation (*svābhāvikasambandha*) as the criterion of *vyāpti*, and says that this intrinsic relation is grasped by sense-perception or other *pramāṇas* helped by past repeated experience of perception and non-perception (cf. n. 259 above). In RNA 41, 17 ff. Ratnakīrti summarises this argument of Vācaspati and introduces it as a *pūrvapakṣa*. Mokṣākara here presupposes the same *pūrvapakṣa*, though he ascribes it to Trilocana, the *guru* of Vācaspati.

Vācaspati's argument may be recapitulated as follows : 'effect-ness' is a probans not because it is perceived in the *sapakṣa* and not in the *vipakṣa*, but because it possesses a *svābhāvika* relationship with 'intelligent agent'. This *svābhāvika* relationship is understood by perception in the *sapakṣa* and non-perception in the *vipakṣa* in such a manner as we explain in the following. Thus, mentioning perception and non-perception in connection with the *svābhāvika* relation is also not irrelevant. If it is ascertained that *x* is related with *y* by a *svābhāvikasambandha*, *x* is the probans and *y* the probandum. For instance, the relation of smoke with fire is *svābhāvika*, but that of fire with smoke is not, because fire without smoke can be seen as in the case of red-hot iron. Fire is connected with smoke

relationship (*svābhāvikah sambandhaḥ*), just so is 'being an effect' related with 'an intelligent agent', for in this case no limiting condition (*upādhi*) [of the relation] is found, nor is any case of deviation [from the relationship] (*vyabhicāra*) experienced".²⁷¹

But this is not correct, for by the word *upādhi* is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i. e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*]. This 'other thing', however, is not always perceptible ; and it may be existent, though invisible owing to its inaccessibility in place, time or nature. Therefore, there may be an *upādhi* even in the relation of smoke with fire, and yet it may not be seen. Thus, how can it be ascertained as absent just because it is not cognized?

(41.14) The other reason proposed [by Trilocana], "because no deviation is experienced" is not established because it is doubtful. Even if we do not see deviation repeatedly owing to the lack of other conditions

only when it is connected with wet fuel. Thus, when fire is related to smoke, the relation is limited by a contingent condition (*upādhi*), i.e. wet fuel, and it is not by nature. On the other hand, the relation of smoke with fire is intrinsically necessary because no limiting condition is found here, since no case of deviation is seen, and because we cannot harbour doubt about what is not experienced. You cannot suspect the validity of the intrinsic relation by imposing a limiting condition which is imagined simply because there is neither proof nor disproof and which is actually imperceptible by nature. That is nothing but excessive doubt (*śaṅkāpiśāci*). Therefore, if we do not find a limiting condition in spite of our effort to do so, then we come to know that no limiting condition is existent. And we can ascertain the intrinsic nature of the relation.

271. As explained above, *svābhāvikasambandha* is a term used by Trilocana and Vācaspati as meaning an intrinsic, necessary relation of a thing with another, its antonym being *aupādhika-* or *sopādhika-sambandha*. Ratnakīrti's representation corresponding to the passage that concerns us now runs : (RNA 42, 18-19) *svābhāvikas tu dhūmādinām vahnnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyamānatvāt, kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivāśya lakṣaṇam uktam*. This passage is identical with NVT 139, 2-3, where, however, Vācaspati adds as the third reason *anupalabhyamānasyāpi [vyabhicārasya] kalpanānupapatteḥ* (cf. n. 270 above, Ratnakīrti's summary of Vācaspati's argument). Buddhist reply to this reads (RNA 42, 20-23) : *etac cāsiddham, yata upādhiśabdena svato 'rthāntaram evāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaram dṛśyatānīyatam. adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sambhavāt. tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe syād upādhiḥ, na cōpalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ....*

The traditional definition of *upādhi* by the Naiyāyika after Udayana is : *sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakah*. (That which is not a pervader of *h*, while it is a pervader of *s*.) Vācaspati, however, explains *upādhi* by the illustration of wet fuel (NVT 138, 2 f.b.-139,2=RNA 41, 20-22. See n. 270 above). The definition of *upādhi* in RNA and TBh *arthāntaram kiṁcid apekṣaṇīyam* is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.

[for its cognition], we cannot negate [the possibility of deviation] in all the cases²⁷². This much [of scrutiny] is not to be blamed for transgressing the established custom of logicians (*prāmāṇikalokayātrā*)²⁷³, for the logician enjoins that doubt should be harboured about anything which is lacking a proof (*sādhaka*) or disproof (*bādhaka*). And even if we doubt in such a way, we would not fall into [the fault of] abstaining from action in all cases, for action is possible from doubt as much as from valid knowledge²⁷⁴.

(42.2) [The opponent says :]²⁷⁵ “Just as Buddhists call a thing an effect and another a cause, but not everything, despite the fact that all things are not different in respect of their individuality, just so we also maintain that a particular thing such as smoke etc. is connected by an intrinsic relation with [another such as] fire, but not everything [with

272. RNA 42, 27-29 : *kvacid vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tu yad uktam tat pratyuktam eva, adṛśyasyāpy upādheḥ sambhāvya mānatvāt, vyabhicārasya ca pratyayāntaravaikalyenāhatyādarśane 'pi niṣeddhum aśakyatvāt...* The passage recurs with slight differences in RNA 102, 30-33.

273. Vācaspati argues (RNA 38, 11-13 = 100, 10-11 = NVT 139, 9-11) : *tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayātrām anupālayatā yathādarśanaṁ śaṅkanīyam, na tv adṛṣṭam api. viśeṣasmṛtyapekṣo hi saṁśayo nāsmṛter bhavati, na ca smṛtir ananubhūtacare bhavati.* The Buddhist replies to it (RNA 43, 1 ff.) : *na caitāvātā prāmāṇikalokayātrātikramah. prāmāṇikair eva sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāve nyāyapṛāptasya saṁśayasya vihitatvāt.*

274. Vācaspati argues in NVT 139, 6-7 = RNA 38, 9-10 : Excessive suspicion, if it is given an opportunity beyond the limit of the world of knowledge, will move about at liberty and will not be checked anywhere. Thus, one will not take action in any matter (*nāyam kvacit pravarteta*), for all things may be somehow thrown into doubt. See also NVT 139, 21-140, I : *dhūmaviśeṣasya tu vinā vahnim anupalambhād, upādhibhedasya cādṛśyamānasya kalpanāyām pramāṇābhāvād, viśeṣasmṛtyapekṣasya ca saṁśayasyānupalabdhapūrve anutpādād, utpāde cātiprasaṅgāt prekṣāvatpravṛttyucchedāt svābhāvikaḥ sambandho'vadhāryate.* Ratnakīrti replies to this (RNA 43, 2-3) : *na ca sarvatṛāpravṛttiprasaṅgaḥ, pramāṇād artha-saṁśayāc ca pravṛtter upapatteḥ.*

275. Replying to Buddhist logicians, Vācaspati argues that *kāryatva* is a probans only because it is related to its probandum by *svābhāvikasambandha* (cf. n. 270 above). Buddhist logicians, criticising this theory, argues (NVT 139, 11-14 = RNA 41, 29-31 = RNA 100, 16-18) : If one thing is connected by *svābhāvikasambandha* with another which is not the former's cause, it would follow that everything is by nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) connected with any other ; and everything would be inferred from everything. Or on the contrary, if one thing is connected with another because the former is an effect of the latter, why is everything not an effect of any other, since all things are similar in their individuality (*anyatva*). Thus, if [i.e. *svābhāvikasambandha*] necessarily entails the fault of over-application (*atiprasaṅga*). To this Vācaspati replies : *na bhāvasvabhāvāḥ paryanuyojyāḥ, tasmād anyatvāviśeṣe'pi kiṁcid eva kāraṇaṁ kāryaṁ ca kiṁcid.* It is this passage that appears in our text 42, 2-5 in a slightly different form. Mokṣākara ascribes it to Trilocana.

any other]’.

(42.5) This is untenable²⁷⁶. Is *svābhāvikasambandha* established by a proof (*pramāṇa*) so that your assertion may be correct, just as the causal relation that a thing called smoke is dependent on fire is established through a proof? Again, what is the meaning of *svābhāvikasambandha*? There may be three alternative interpretations [of the word]: 1) self-born (*svato bhūtaḥ*); 2) Born out of its cause (*svahetor bhūtaḥ*); 3) Born without causes (*ahetuka*). Among them, however, the first alternative is unreasonable, because it is incongruent that a thing acts upon itself. Nor is the second tenable, because [by asserting it,] you would come to accept the causal relation (*tadutpattisambandha*) [which the Buddhist holds]. If the third is maintained, the theory of *svābhāvikasambandha* would be extremely irrational²⁷⁷, as it is not determined in place, time, and nature.

(42.12) Again, a *vyāpti* is not established²⁷⁸ by the mere existence of an example (*dṛṣṭānta*), be it that in agreement or in difference, because otherwise such a relationship would be recognized even between a camel and an ass which happen to be together by accident. Therefore, an instance which is called a corroborative example is applied to a probans in order to recall the proof establishing the necessary relation [of two things], which, once cognized, has been forgotten; but you cannot take up a case of mere accidental proximity (*svasamnidhimātra*) [as a corroborative example]. For, returning to ‘ether’ [which is the instance in difference of your syllogism], it is not known in this case that the absence of the probans [i. e. ‘not being an effect’] is necessitated by the absence of the probandum [i. e. ‘not having an intelligent agent as cause’] because we find in ether not only the absence of an intelligent agent but also the

276. In NVT 139, 15–16 as well as RNA 43, 5–6, the reply of Vācaspati cited above is criticised: You cannot say that the essential nature of a thing is not to be questioned. For the same indisputableness of the nature of a thing (Read *svābhāvānanuyogo*) could be maintained even when things other than effects and causes are supposed to be connected by nature.... Ratnakīrti continues his criticism and comes to say (43, 16–20): *kiṃ ca svābhāvikasambandha iti ko'rthaḥ. kiṃ svato bhūtaḥ, svahetuto bhūto, ahetoiko vēti trayāḥ pakṣāḥ. na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, svātmani kāritravirodhāt. dvitīyapakṣe tu tadutpattir eva sambandho mukhāntareṇa vīkṛta iti na kaścid vivādaḥ. ahetoikatve tu deśakālasvābhāvānīyamābhāvaprasaṅgād ity asaṅgataḥ svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ.*

277. *asaṅgaḥ* in M is a misprint for *asaṅgataḥ*.

278. Read *vyāpter asiddhiḥ* instead of *vyāptisiddhiḥ* in M, according to T (*khyab pa grub pa ma yin te*) and G.

absence of a not-intelligent cause²⁷⁹. What is the thing which necessitates by its own absence the absence of 'effect-ness'? This is the question to be solved in order to establish the negative *vyāpti* (*vyatireka*), viz., the absence of the probans necessitated by the absence of the probandum. [But it is not known from your example.] You may contend: "We see²⁸⁰ the positive *vyāpti* between effect-ness and an intelligent agent in the case of a jar; and this makes us know that in the case of ether too the absence of effect-ness is due to the absence of an intelligent agent alone". But this is not tenable. For the relation between the two [i. e. 'effect' and 'intelligent agent'], be it that of identity (*tādātmya*), or causality (*tadutpatti*) or of intrinsic nature (*svābhāviḥ*), has not yet been established by a proof beforehand²⁸¹.

20.2.2. Vyatireka cannot be established by mere non-perception. (43.5) Furthermore, a negative *vyāpti* is not established only by non-perception (*adarśanamātra*). For, by saying that *h* is not cognized in the *vipakṣa*, we mean the absence of the knowledge cognizing it [i. e. *h* in the *vipakṣa*]. And a cognition is the effect of its object, since there is a universal rule that what is not a cause is not an object of cognition. However, we cannot infer the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect, since fire without smoke can [sometimes] be perceived. Your argument [that there is no object when there is no cognition] may be valid if the presence of an object were pervaded by the presence of its cognition; but this *vyāpti* is an utter impossibility, because, otherwise, it would follow that everyone is omniscient (*sarvadarśin*). Thus, the negative *vyāpti* cannot be proved only by non-perception. In this connection the following is said:

Non-perception of [*h* in] all the *sapakṣa* means the uncertainty [of the *vyāpti*]; non-perception of [*h* in] one member of the *sapakṣa* alone [when *h* is seen in others of the *sapakṣa*] means a deviation [from the *vyāpti*];

For even a seed that is covered by soil or submerged in water is

279. M *acetanasya kāraṇasya nivṛttir nāsty eva* makes no sense here. G and T (*sems pa med paḥi rgyu yañ ldog pa yod pa kho na ste*) agree to the reading *nivṛttir asty eva*.

280. T *rjes su ḥgro ba ma mthoñ ba las (anvayādarśanād)...* *ma* must be omitted. G 24, 4-5 must be read according to the footnote 1.

281. G *sambandhaḥ pramānato na prasādhita ity uktam*. T agrees with M.

apparently seen to be absent²⁸².

20.2.3. **Vācaspatimiśra's objection refuted.** (43.15) Vācaspatimiśra said : "Doubt is [wavering knowledge] in which the memory of the details [of an object] is lacking. Therefore, it is customary to doubt when we see an object, [but not when we do not see an object at all.]"²⁸³

To this we reply : That principle is not universally applicable. We will argue, however, having hypothetically admitted it. ²⁸⁴Seen from your point of view, 'cognizability' (*prameyatva*), 'smokiness' (*dhūmatva*) and 'being an effect' (*kāryatva*) are all of the same kind, inasmuch as they all have the common quality of 'being deprived of the relations of identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*), [since you do not accept these two relations]. Among these, *prameyatva* has been shown to have the fault of deviation ; and this makes us throw doubt upon the other two. Thus it is that we doubt what we see²⁸⁵.

(44.3) Thus, [the Naiyāyika's syllogism for proving the existence of

282. Our author follows RNA 38, 19-26 : *tad etat pralāpamātram, na hi mahatāpi prayatnena vipakṣe mṛgyamāṇasya hetor adarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ sidhyati. tathā hi vipakṣe hetur nōpalabhyata ity anena tadupalambhakapramāṇanivṛttir ucyate, pramāṇaṁ ca prameyasya kāryam, nākāraṇam viśaya iti nyāyāt. na ca kāryanivṛttau kāraṇanivṛttir upalabdhā, nirdhūmasyāpi vahner upalambhāt. yadi punaḥ pramāṇasattayā prameyasattā vyāptā syāt tadā yuktam etat, kevalam iyam eva vyāptir asambhaviṇi, sarvasya sarvadarśitvaprasaṅgāt. tan nādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekasiddhiḥ, yathōktam : sarvādṛṣṭiś ca saṁdigdhā svādṛṣṭir vyabhicāriṇi ; vindhyādrirandhradūrvāder adṛṣṭāv api sattvataḥ.* The last half of the verse at the end (Because rocks, holes, Dūrb grass, and so forth on the Vindhya range of hills are really existent though not seen [from a distant place]) differs from that in M, where it reads : *bhūjalāntargatasāpi bijasyāsattvadarśanāt. T sbyaṇ (p. rjaṇ) gi nan du son paḥi sa bon yaṇ yod pa ṇid du mthoṇ baḥi phyir ro. Yod should be read med if Skt. is to be followed. sbyaṇ = washed off? rjaṇ=rdsāṇ ma=store room. G reads khalavila (granary pit) for bhūjala-*

283. This contention of Vācaspati is often quoted by Ratnakīrti. See, for instance, RNA 38, 11-13 : 100, 10-12 : *tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayātrām anupālayatā yathādarśanam eva śaṅkaniyam, na tv adṛṣṭam api. viśeṣasmyṭyapekṣo hi saṁśayo nāsmṛter bhavati, na ca smṛtir ananubhūtacare bhavati* (cf. n. 273 above). See also NS 1.1.23 : *samānānekadharmopapatter vipratipatter upalabdhyanupalabdhavyavasthātāś ca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ.*

284. M *tathā hi [kāryatvadhūmatvayoḥ] tādātmatadupattisambandhaviyogitvena sādharmaṇena dharmeṇa prameyatvadhūmatvakāryatvādināṁ tanmatenāpi sajātiyatvam.* The bracketed words are not found in G, T and are certainly redundant. G -*tyāgena* for *viyogitvena* ; T agrees with M. G *sādhāraṇadharmeṇa* for *sādhāraṇena dharmeṇa*. G, M *tanmatena*, but T and RNA (n. 285) have *tvanmatena*.

285. RNA 39, 7-10 : *evaṁ ca sati tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇapratibandhaviyogitvena sādharmaṇena dharmeṇa prameyatvadhūmatvakāryatvādināṁ tvanmatena sajātiyatvāt prameyatva-vyabhicāradarśanam eva śaṅkāṁ upasthāpayatīti yathādarśanam evēdam āśaṅkitam.*

God] cannot escape the criticism that the probans has the fallacy of *saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatva* (*h*'s exclusion from the *vipakṣa* being doubted) ; and this is a valid confutation (*saddūṣaṇa*). He [Vācaspati] however, objected : “Our probans is not fallacious, and is not to be refuted. By pointing out [a fallacy in it], you have fallen into a position of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) called ‘blaming what is not fallacious’ (*adoṣodbhāvana*)”²⁸⁶.

But, contending in this way, the disputant [Vācaspati] has been contradicted by his own doctrine of a position of defeat called ‘refuting what should not be refuted’ (*niranuyojyānuyoga*)²⁸⁷. We should not pay any more attention to this pitiable person (*devānām priyaḥ*)²⁸⁸.

20.2.4. The problem of solipsism discussed.²⁸⁹ (44.9) The objection

286. G *asaddoṣodbhāvana* ; T *skyon ma yin pa brjod pa* seems to agree with M.

287. NS 5, 2, 22 : *anigrahassthāne nigrahassthānābhiyogo niranuyojyānuyogaḥ*.

288. RNA 39, 13ff. : *tad evaṃ vipakṣe 'darśanamātreṇa hetor vyatirekāśiddheḥ saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvaṃ nāma hetudūṣaṇaṃ durvāram eva. ata evāsyôḥpanyāso' doṣodbhāvanaṃ nāma nigrahassthānam iti yad anenāveditam tad api sāvadyam. pratyutāsmīn hetau sadūṣaṇe parihartavye nāyaṃ hetudoṣo'to na parihartavyo 'sya cōpanyāso 'doṣodbhāvanaṃ nāma nigrahassthānam iti bruvaṇn ayam eva tapasvi svamatena niranuyojyānuyogalakṣaṇena nigrahassthānena nigrhyata iti kṛpām arhati.*

289. § 20.2.4 is entirely lacking in G and partially preserved in M, in which the meaning is not very clear : only T has maintained the whole section. Whether the existence of the minds of other persons can be inferred or not is a vexed problem in Buddhist philosophy, since the radical idealism of the Vijñānavādin easily leads to solipsism, while the Sautrāntika as *bāhyārthavādin* used to criticise the former for solipsism. However, the Vijñānavādin does not always hold solipsism. In fact, he recognizes the existence of other people's minds in the sense of *saṃvṛtisatya*, i.e. he thinks that the existence of other persons' minds as representations of one's own mind is established in the domain of logic ; but in his epistemology, which is a radical empiricism, he says that all things are representations of one's own mind, and that therefore the existence of another personality independent of one's own cannot be proved in the sense of *paramārtha*. Thus, it is often found that one and the same Vijñānavādin proves sometimes the existence of *saṃtānāntara* and another time disproves it. Ratnakīrti wrote *Samtānāntaradūṣaṇa* in which he demolished the opponent's inference of other people's minds from the standpoint of *paramārtha* ; but in his *Īśvarasāadhanadūṣaṇa*, in which he argues from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika or the *saṃvṛtisatya* of the Vijñānavāda, he says that the inference of the existence of *saṃtānāntara* is logically valid, whereas the inference of the existence of God is not. Regarding this double attitude toward the problem, see Introduction to my paper ‘Buddhist solipsism – a free translation of Ratnakīrti's *Samtānāntaradūṣaṇa*’ (IBK Vol. XIII, no. 1, pp. 9-24). In the Tibetan version of § 20.2.4 Mokṣākara follows Ratnakīrti as asserting that *saṃtānāntara* exists.

Mokṣākara's argument found in T is merely a digest of Ratnakīrti's discussion and can be reconstructed by the light of the latter's passages in RNA. The Tibetan is once restored into Skt. by Iyengar in M Appendix III. But we can better it, now that RNA is published. The following are Tibetan text and a Skt. reconstruction. The fragments

may be raised : “If *vyāpti*-since it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception -were a relation which holds between universals related as cause and effect only when both are perceptible, as in the example of the universals ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’, then one could not infer the existence of other personalities, since the mind of another person, being invisible by

in M are retained so far as they are identical with T. My tr. is based on T in principle.

Tibetan : *ho na bltar ruñ bañi me dañ du ba spyi dag gi bzin du bltar* (p, n. *ltar*) *ruñ bañi bdag ñid kho nañi hbras bu dañ rgyu spyi dag ñid kyi khyab pa mñon sum* [dañ] (Read so instead of *gyis*) *mi* (d. *ni*) *dmigs pa las yin na deñi tshe gzan gyis* (n. *gyis*) *sems rjes su dpag pa ñams te. gzan gyi sems ni bltar mi ruñ ba ñid kyi khyab pa hdsin pañi dus na nan du hdsu pa ma yin pañi phyir ro ze na ma yin te, gañ gi phyir rañ rig pa ni der khyab pa hdsin pa po ste, rañ dañ gzan gyi rgyud du son bañi rañ rig pa tsam la bltos* (d. *ltos*) *pas na, gzan gyi sems kyañ bltar ruñ ba tsam ñid kyi phyir ro. yañ na bltar ruñ bañi lus dañ dbyer med par hjug pa ñid kyi phyir gzan gyi sems kyañ bltar ruñ ba ñid do. de ltar tha sñad byed pa ni gañ gis hdi yañ bltar ruñ bar hgyur ba dbañ poñi mñon sum tsam gyi blo de ldan pa tsam mam, dsā-tha-ra tsi-tra la sogs pa thun moñ pañi me tsam spyod yul du rigs pa yañ ma yin te. deñi phyir bltar ruñ ba kho nañi mes du ba la khyab pa grub po zes gnas so. rañ dañ gzan gyi rgyud la thun moñ pa bltar mi ruñ bañi sems tsam gyis mñon sum gyis bltar ruñ ba g'yo ba la sogs pa la khyab pa hdsin pa* (p. inserts *mi byed pa*) *mi rigs pañi phyir ro šes kyañ brjod par* [mi] (Inserted by the translator) *byaño. phyi rol gyi* (n. *gyis*) *don gnas pa la ni, rañ dañ* (n. *dbañ*) *gzan gyi rgyud thun moñ pañi sems tsam ni rañ gi ño bos bltar mi ruñ ba ñid na yañ, bltar ruñ bañi lus dañ lhan cig tshogs pa gcig pas hbrel pañi phyir ro. rnam par dbyer med par hjug pañi rañ dañ gzan gyi rgyud thun moñ pañi sems tsam ni g'yo ba la sogs pañi khyab* (p. n. d. *khyad*) *par byed pa rtogs so. de ltar bltar ruñ bañi bdag ñid dam bltar ruñ ba dañ rnam par dbyer* (d. *dbye ba*) *med par hjug pañi dños po gñis ni tha sñad pañi šin tu gsar bañi mñon sum las grub pa dañ khyab pa hdsin pa yañ ste. de lta bu ñid med par byas* (p. n. d. *ma byas*) *pa dañ ldan pa* [bltar] (Inserted by the translator) *mi ruñ ba dañ thun moñ pañi sems tsam gyis ni ma yin no zes pa rgyud* (p. *rgyu*) *gzan rjes su dpag par rigs so. deñi phyir gal te mñon sum dañ mi dmigs pa dag gis khyab pa hdsin pa deñi tshe bltar ruñ ba kho nas bltar ruñ ba laño zes rigs paño.* (Td 355, b-356a ; p 384a-b ; n 397b)

Sanskrit restoration : *nanu yadi dṛśyāgnidhūmasāmānyayor iva dṛśyātmanor eva kārya-kāraṇasāmānyayoḥ pratyakṣānupalambhato vyāptis, tadā saṁtānāntarānumānaṁ na syāt* (T lit. *paracittānumānakṣatiḥ*), *paracittasyādṛśyātmakatayā vyāptigrahaṇakāle* nantarbhāvād iti cen na, *svasaṁvedanaṁ hi tatra vyāptigrāhakam. svaparasaṁtānagatasvasaṁvedanamātrāpekṣayā paracittasyāpi dṛśyatvāt. atha dṛśyaśarireṇa sahāvinirbhāgavartitvād paracittasyāpi dṛśyatvam. na “caivaṁ vyāvahārikendriyapratyakṣamātrasya buddhimanmātraṁ jaṭharacitra-sādhāraṇaṁ vahnimātraṁ vā gocare yujyate, yenāsyāpi dṛśyatā syāt ; tasmād dṛśyenaiva vahninā dhūmasya vyāptisiddhir iti sthitam ; svaparasaṁtānasādhāraṇādṛśyacittamātreṇa pratyakṣeṇa dṛśyacalanāder vyāptigrahaṇaṁ na yuktam” ity api vācyam. bāhyārthasthitau hi svaparasaṁtānasādhāraṇasya cinmātrasya svarūpeṇādṛśyatve 'pi dṛśyaśarireṇa sahaikasāmagriprati-bandhād ; avinirbhāgavarti svaparasaṁtānasādhāraṇaṁ cinmātraṁ kimpāder vyāpakam adhi-gamyate. tad evaṁ dṛśyātmano dṛśyāvinirbhāgavartino vā padārthadvayasya vyāvahārikapa-ṭupratyakṣataḥ siddhir vyāptigrahaś ca. na tu tathātvavinākṛtādṛśyasādhāraṇacinmātrasyēti saṁtānāntarānumānam ucitam. tasmād yadi pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṁ vyāptigrahas tadā dṛśyenaiva dṛśyasyēti nyāyaḥ.* (Cf. RNA 40,3 f. b.-1 f. b. ; 139, 6-9 ; 138,8 f.b.-4 ; 40, 1f.b-41,7).

nature, is not comprised [in the situation] at the time when the *vyāpti* is [said to be] grasped”.

But this is not acceptable, for in this situation self-consciousness is the factor which brings about the knowledge of the *vyāpti* ; because, on the basis of self-consciousness in general, located in one’s own and in another’s personality, the mind of another person is [in this sense] visible. Or alternatively, the mind of another person is ‘visible’ because it always occurs in conjunction with a visible body.

Nor is the following objection tenable : “If this were so, an intelligent being in general, or fire in general common to the fire of digestion or of a picture, would properly come within the range of normal sensory perception in general, so as to be visible ; [and this is obviously not so]. Therefore, *vyāpti* is established only between visible fire and smoke, and it is not valid to assert by direct perception a *vyāpti* between the motions [of a body] which are visible and non-visible minds common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, [since this rests on an illicit extrapolation from data visible to sense-perception]”.

[This argument is not correct] because, although a mind in general common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others is by nature invisible, it is related to a visible body so as to form a single unity, so far as we admit the existence of the external object. And such a mind in general as occurs inseparably [with a visible external object], though common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, is known to be the pervader of the motions [of a body]. Thus, two objects, when they are by nature visible or occur inseparably with a visible thing, are established by clear normal perception ; and the *vyāpti* between them is also grasped. But this does not hold good when a mind in general common even to invisible persons is concerned, since it is deprived of the said relation [to a visible body]. After all, therefore, another personality can be inferred. It is in this sense that the rule is set forth that a *vyāpti*, when it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception, holds good only between two visible things.

20.2.5. Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out. (45.1)

Again, if your reasoning is aimed at proving that [an effect] presupposes [as its cause] an intelligent being in general, the proof is to be criticised for asserting the obvious (*siddhasādhanatā*). [For we admit that all ef-

fects are produced by actions, which are caused by the mind.]

Alternatively if the precedent existence of the intelligent agent who is qualified by uniqueness, permanence, omniscience and other qualities, is to be proved, the *vyāpti* between the probans 'effect' and the probandum '[the intelligent agent] qualified by such special qualities' cannot be established in the locus of your corroborative instance [e. g. a jar] by means of any valid cognition, [for a potter is not omniscient etc.]. Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (*anaikāntikatva*)²⁹⁰.

(45.5) You may contend : "We grasp the *vyāpti* [between *h* and *s*] referring to [an intelligent being] in general, and then prove the existence of [the intelligent being qualified by] the particular qualities on the basis of *h* [effect] being found in *p* [trees, earth etc.] (*pakṣadharmatā*).'' But this is not allowed. You may establish by virtue of *pakṣadharmatā* the specific qualities belonging to *s* only when *h* does not fail to occur in *p* together with the qualities. For example, from smoke is inferred a general quality of fire, 'its occurrence on a mountain'²⁹¹, but not particular qualities [of fire] such as 'being caused by grass'. For we see smoke [caused by the leaves of trees]²⁹² on a mountain, even if there is no grass. Likewise, if you mean the existence of an intelligent being with a physical body, let it be proved ; but not his omniscience which is absolutely not the case. An effect can be produced without an omniscient being²⁹³.

290. RNA 30, 15-16 : *nanu buddhimatpūrvakatve sādhye siddhasāadhanam, abhimataṁ hi pareṣāṁ api karmajatvaṁ kāryajātasya, karmaṇas ca cetanātmakatvāt cetanāhetukatvād vā ; taddhetukatvaṁ ca jagataḥ*. At the beginning of his *Īśvarasāadhanadūṣaṇa* Ratnakīrti profusely cites arguments from the *Nyāyakanīkā* ; for the passage which concerns us now see NKan 212, 14ff. Mokṣākara's discussion in § 20.2.5 which is closely related to RNA has much to do with NKan too. See also RNA 30, 16-17 : *sarvajñapūrvakatve tu sādhyavyāptiḥ svapne'pi nōpalabdā, dṛṣṭāntas ca sādhyahinaḥ, kulālādinām asarvajñatvāt*. ; 49, 14ff. : *yad etat kāryatvaṁ sādhanam kim anena viśvasya buddhimanmātrapūrvakatvaṁ sādhyate, āho svid ekatvavibhutvasarvajñatvanityatvādiguṇaviśiṣṭabuddhimatpūrvakatvam. prathamapakṣe siddhasāadhanam, dvitiye tu vyāpter abhāvād anaikāntikatā*.

291. M *parvatadeśavṛttitva*, but G *parvataikadeśavṛttitva* and T (n, p) *dper na du ba las du baḥi phyogs su ḥjug pa ṇid kyi me bzin no* (= *dhūmād dhūmadeśavṛttitvasya*.... Tp has *la laḥi* instead of *las du baḥi*, but it is misleading.

292. M *tārṇatām antarenāpi parvate dhūmadarśanāt* ; G ... *api pārṇatve dhūmasya sambhavāt* ; T *śiṅ gi lo ma las byuṅ ba ṇid las*.

293. This paragraph is an abbreviation of RNA 30, 22-31.5 which consists of citations from NKan (*sāmānyamātravyāptāv apy antarbhāvitaviśeṣasya sāmānyasya pakṣadharmatāvaśena sādhyadharminy anumānād viśeṣaviśayam anumānam bhavaty eva* ... and The Buddhist reply to it). See also RNA 49, 17ff. : *nanu sāmānyena vyāptau pratitāyām api pakṣadharmatābalād viśeṣasiddhiḥ* ... and Ratnakīrti's reply to it.

(45.13) Omniscience cannot be proved even by [supposing the agent's] being perfectly conversant with [the nature,] materials, [auxiliary causes, recipients, objects to be given etc. of the world] (*upādānādyabhiññatva*)²⁹⁴. It might be proved if the uniqueness [of the intelligent being] were beforehand established, which is, however, not the case²⁹⁵. For 'effect' is made possible even by the 'previous existence of plural agents' as e. g. an ant-hill is made by a number of insects. If you mean by the probandum that an ant-hill also presupposes the supervision of God, then how can you set forth as the corroborative instance a jar, which according to you would also presuppose the unique, omniscient God [and which would be a part of *p*]? Or else, how can you deprive a potter of his agent-ness which is actually experienced? How again can you remove the cause-ness of the insects which is also well known? You may not assume that if there are many agents there would be differences of opinion [which may hinder producing an effect], just because we actually see [an ant-hill being made by many insects]²⁹⁶.

(46.1)²⁹⁷...Therefore, it is settled that the universal *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum must be shown in reference to the locus of the corroborative instance through the means of valid knowledge....²⁹⁷

(46.3) ²⁹⁸...Moreover, when the probandum is the intelligent being who is permanent, unique and omniscient, your [probans] is incompatible (*viruddha*). For 'effect' is actually pervaded by 'having intelligent agents who are impermanent, plural and of imperfect knowledge.' The kind of probans proving that which is incompatible with the probandum is called 'incompatible *hetu*' ; and your probans proves what is incompatible with the probandum....²⁹⁸

(46.6) ²⁹⁹...So much for our treatise demonstrating the criticisms of

294. RNA 49, 28 ff. [Opponent :] *yady evaṃ svasvarūpōpādānopakaraṇasaṃpradānaprayojanābhijñā eva kartā sādhyate, svarūpaṃ iha ca dvyanukaṃ kāryam ; upādānam iha paramāñujāticatuṣṭayam ; upakaraṇaṃ samastakṣetrajñāsamavāyidharmādharmau ; saṃpradānaṃ kṣetrajñāṇaḥ, yān ayaṃ bhagavān svakarmabhir abhipraiti ; prayojanaṃ sukhaduḥkhopabhogaḥ kṣetrajñānām, evaṃbhūte buddhimati sādhye kutaḥ siddhasādhanaṃ, na cāvyaṅgiḥ....* Ratnakīrti's reply follows in 50, 19 ff. See also RNA 29, 8-9 ; NKan 210, and Vācaspati's syllogism in n. 258 above.

295. RNA 51, 10 : *ekakartur na siddhau tu sarvajñatvaṃ kimāśrayam.*

296. RNA 32, 23-25 : *ekasya kartur abhāve bahūnāṃ vyāhatamanasāṃ svātantreṇa parasparavirodhena mithaḥ svānukūlābhiprāyānavarodhena yugapatkāryānutpattiḥ, utpannasya vā vilopādiprasaṅgaḥ syād iti. ekatve tu siddhe sarvajñatāsiddhir avirodhini.*

297. 298, 299. G has 298 before 297 and omits 299. T agrees with M.

God which had incidentally become a topic....²⁹⁹

21. Relation of anvaya and vyatireka. (46.8) [Objection :] “In the syllogism by the method of agreement the *anvaya* alone is stated, but not the *vyatireka* ; and in the syllogism by the method of difference the *vyatireka* alone is stated, but not the *anvaya*. How then can you say that the three characteristics of the probans are stated by [each of] these two syllogisms ?”

[Answer :] This is not a fault. For even when a syllogism is formulated by the method of agreement, the *vyatireka* is also understood by implication. And on the other hand, if the *vyatireka* is not grasped, the error (*viparyaya*) must be pointed out by supposing that the probans is not absent even when the probandum is absent. If so, even the *anvaya* would be invalid, because it is implied that the probandum is not present even when the probans is present. In the same way, when a syllogism is formulated by the method of difference the *anvaya* is also understood by implication. For if the *anvaya* is not grasped in this case, the error must be pointed out by supposing that the probandum may not be present even when the probans is ; and this renders even the *vyatireka* invalid, since it is implied that the probans is present even in the absence of the probandum. Thus both the syllogisms manifest in effect the three characteristics of the probans ; and there is no fault [in our theory]³⁰⁰.

22. Antaryyāpti and bahirvyāpti. (47.1) Now, the following summary is given in order to make two problems easily understood : In what locus is *vyāpti* between *h* (*sādhana*) and *s* (*sādhya*) grasped ? By what proof is it grasped ?

Regarding the *vyāpti* between ‘existence’ (*sattva*), *h* as essential nature (*svabhāvahetu*), and ‘momentariness’ (*kṣaṇikatva*) some logicians are of the opinion that it is to be grasped in *p* (*sādhya-dharmin*) itself ; they maintain the theory of intrinsic pervasion (*antarvyāpti*)³⁰¹.

300. This problem is discussed in NB III s. 28-32 and NBT. (NBT 51, 1-2) : *nanu ca sādharmyavati vyatireko nōktaḥ, vaidharmyavati cānvayaḥ ; tat katham etat trirūpaliṅgā-khyānam ity āha.* (NB III, s. 28) *sādharmyeṇāpi hi prayoge'rthād vaidharmyagatiḥ.... tathā vaidharmyeṇāpy anvayagatiḥ ;* (s. 31) *asati tasmin sādhyābhāve hetvabhāvasyāsiddheḥ....*

301. So far as I know, Ratnākaraśānti is the only Buddhist logician who openly propounded the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (*antarvāptivāda*). He wrote the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (SBNT 103-114), maintaining that the *vyāpti* between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped in *p* itself by means of *viparyaya-bādha-kapramāṇa* (cf. § 24.1). He discarded the necessity of a corroborative example and said

Others hold that the same *vyāpti* is to be grasped in *dp* (*dr̥ṣṭānta-dharmin*), say, a jar, by means of reasoning to an undesired conclusion (*prasaṅga*) and its reduction into a normal syllogism (*prasaṅgaviṣyaya*); they maintain the theory of extrinsic pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*)³⁰².

As for *hetus* as essential nature other than that of 'existence', *hetus* as effect and *hetus* as non-cognition, the *vyāpti* is to be grasped in *d*.

[To be more precise] the *vyāpti* between 'āsoka tree' and its probandum 'to be called a tree' is grasped in reference to a corroborative instance by means of perception and non-perception (*pratyakṣānupalambha*); the *vyāpti* between 'existence' and 'momentariness' is grasped by two proofs, *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviṣyaya*, or by the proof which refutes the opposite of the assertion to be proved and which is aimed at excluding successive and simultaneous action [the pervader of effective action or existence] from [what is not momentary, i. e. the permanent] (*sādhya-viṣyayabādhakapramāṇena kramayaugapadyanivṛttilakṣaṇena*)³⁰³. This *vipakṣa* taken as the locus [of the *sādhya-viṣyayabādhakapramāṇa*, i. e. what is not momentary] is not definite as to its reality, and is regarded as real when considered to be established by self-consciousness and as unreal when considered to be just imaginary³⁰⁴.

that *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, which necessarily follows in such an inference is not a *hetvābhāsa* for clever persons who do not rely on external examples for determining *vyāpti*. Mookerjee gives an excellent exposition of the theory, see 24 ff. My Japanese translation of the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* is available in Bukkyō Shigaku, (仏教史学) Vol. VIII, no. 4, 219-238 (ラトナーカレーションティの論理学書).

302. Buddhist logicians in general maintain *bahirvyāptivāda*; at the later stage of Buddhist logic Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti asserted it in contrast to *antarvyāptivāda* held by Ratnākaraśānti. The former two logicians recognized the necessity of a corroborative example even in the inference of the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, though they are not so far from Ratnākaraśānti inasmuch as they also rely on *viṣyaya-bādhakapramāṇa* when determining the *vyāpti* between existence and momentariness. See Jñānaśrimitra, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*; Ratnakīrti's digest of it, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, of which a detailed exposition is supplied by Mookerjee, 1-83. *prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgaviṣyaya*, and *viṣyaya-bādhakapramāṇa* are illustrated in § 24. 1, where our author again follows Ratnakīrti.

303. See § 24. 1.

304. The *p* of the *viṣyayabādhakapramāṇa* formulated by Buddhist logicians (cf. § 24. 1), viz. 'the permanent', is not real for Buddhists. Thus, the inference necessarily contains the fallacy of *asiddhi*. The Naiyāyika vehemently attacked this point and Ratnakīrti in RNA 78 ff. tries to prove that even the idea of 'the permanent' has a kind of reality and can be put forward as the subject of a proposition. The discussion is interpreted in Mookerjee 24 ff. See also my paper ラトナキールチの帰謬論証と内遍充論の生成 (塚本博士頌寿記念仏教史学論集 264-270.) But our author here seems to refer also to the theory of the *Sākāravijñānavādi yogācāri* who admits that every content of self-consciousness is real.

The *vyāpti* between 'smoke', *h* as effect, and 'fire' is grasped in a *dp* such as a kitchen ; and it is grasped by means of threefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhapratyakṣānupalambha*) [according to some], or by fivefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*pañcavidhapratyakṣānupalambha*) [according to others]³⁰⁵.

The *vyāpti* between 'non-perception' and 'to be called non-existent' is grasped by the perception [of things other than the denied object].

As for other cases, be they *h* as essential nature or as effect, we should grasp the *vyāpti* by making appropriate deductions according to the nature of a case.

23. Untrue *vyāpti* effects the fallacy of *anaikāntikatva*. (47.19)
When *vyāpti* is not definite, the probans has the fallacy of inconclusiveness. And this [inconclusive probans] is threefold : inconclusive due to *h* being subsistent only in *p* (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) ; inconclusive due to *h* being non-exclusive (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) ; inconclusive due to *h*'s non-occurrence in the *vipakṣa* being doubtful (*saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika*)³⁰⁶. Of these, an *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* [-*hetu*] is illustrated : [This] living body

305. In the Buddhist logic, causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), which together with identity (*svabhāva*) forms the two principles of valid pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, is said to be inductively understood through positive and negative perception (*pratyakṣānupalambha*). *Pratyakṣānupalambha* here means the observation of the concomitance in agreement, as well as in difference, of a cause and an effect. The theory was first propounded by Dharmakīrti and was maintained throughout the subsequent development of Indian Buddhist logic. However, Dharmakīrti did not definitely prescribe how many times cognitions are required as indispensable for determining a causal relation. Hence, the logicians following him came to hold different opinions on this point. The causal relation of fire and smoke, for instance, can be ascertained if we observe that smoke, which has not been there, occurs when fire has appeared, and that when the fire has gone, the smoke disappears as well. In this illustration we can count one prior non-perception of smoke, two successive perceptions (fire and smoke), and two successive non-perceptions (no fire and no smoke). Thus, some of Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmottara, asserted that all five of these cognitions are indispensable. Others such as Jñānaśrī-mitra, however, thought that either 1) one prior non-perception of fire and smoke as a unit, followed by two successive perceptions, or 2) one perception grasping fire and smoke together and followed by two successive non-perceptions can severally determine a causal relation without requiring all five, for either group contains in itself both perception and non-perception which respectively prove the concomitance in agreement and that in difference. Thus, in this theory the number of indispensable cognitions is reduced to three. I discussed the history of this problem in detail with an English translation of Jñānaśrī-mitra's *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi* in my paper 'Trikaṇvācācintā, Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality', MIK Nos. 4-5, 1-15.

306. See § 10 ; 10. 2. 4 with notes.

is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar. We are not certain if this *pro-bans* [breath] is pervaded by a soul in the case of another living body ; and we are also not certain if in the case of a *vipakṣa*, jar, breathing is not found exactly because it has no soul ; however, it is somehow found in *p*, this living body. For these reasons, it is called an exclusive, inconclusive *hetu*³⁰⁷. Another illustration of *asādhāraṇa* : Sound is impermanent because it is audible like a jar and unlike ether [where a homologous example is not available, since a jar is not audible]. *Sādhāraṇānaikāntika* [-*hetu*] is illustrated³⁰⁸ : Sound is permanent, because it is an object of cognition like a jar and unlike ether. *Samdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika* [-*hetu*] is illustrated : He must be black, because he is a son of that man as other sons of that man who are actually seen.

24. Prasāṅga defined. (48.11) We have said before that the *vyāpti* between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is to be understood by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. What is here meant by *prasaṅga*? *Prasaṅga* is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on a *vyāpti* established by proof (*pramāṇaprasiddhavyāptikena vākyena parasyāniṣṭāpādanāya prasaṅjanam prasaṅgaḥ*)³⁰⁹.

24.1. Illustrations of *prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, and *sādhavipar-*

307. The illustration is borrowed from NB III, s. 99 : *yathā sātmaḥ jīvaccharīram prāṇādīmativād iti*. Mokṣākara does not give a detailed explanation of the fallacy, which is discussed by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara in NB III, s. 100-107. About the history of this proof of *ātman*, see Stcherbatsky’s note i in II, 208.

308. Read *yathā* instead of *kathā*.

309. After this, T has the passage illustrating *prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, and *sādhaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, which are taken evidently from the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti. R Iyengar gave his Skt. restoration of this part of the Tibetan text (M 92-93). His restoration is quite good except at a few places. I present here the Tibetan text and my Skt. translation in which I tried to make Prof. Iyengar’s restoration more faithful to the Tibetan.

T (d. 358, a2-358, b1) : *dper na grub* [Read *bum pa*] *la sogs pa rnams ḥdas pa dañ ma ḥoṅs paḥi dus dag na ḥo bo gcig pa ṇid du khas len pa la, ḥdas pa dañ ma ḥoṅs paḥi dus su ḥbyuñ baḥi don bya ba byed pa ṇid du thal bar byed pa lta bu ste. de ltar ni, gañ ṣig gañ gi tshe gañ bya bar nus pa de ni deḥi tshe* [de] *byed pa kho na ste ; dper na rgyu tshogs pa thams cad* [p. omits *cad*] *rañ gi ḥbras bu bzin ; bum pa ḥdi yañ ḥdas pa dañ ma ḥoṅs paḥi dus kyī dños poḥi* [p. po *paḥi*] *don bya ba da ltar gyi dus su byed par nus pa yin no ṣes pa rañ bzin gtan tshigs kyī thal bar ḥgyur baḥo. byed pa yañ ma yin no ṣes pa bzlog paḥo. gañ ṣig gañ* [d. omits *gañ*] *gi tshe gañ mi byed pa de ni deḥi tshe de la nus pa ma yin te, dper na ṣaḥa-liḥi myu gu mi byed paḥi ko-la-pas ṣaḥa-li myu gu la bzin ; bum pa ḥdi yañ ḥdas pa*

yayabādhakapramāṇa. (Td. 358, a 2) For example, if a jar [at the present moment] were admitted to maintain one and the same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to do so in the future, then we could point out [the absurdity] that it is [at the present moment] capable of producing the effects belonging to the past and future [moments of

dañ ma hoṅs paḥi dus kyi dños poḥi don bya ba [d. adds *dañ*] *da ltar gyi dus su mi byed do*
zés pa [p. 387a] *khyab par byed pa mi dmigs paḥo. ḥbrel pa las nus pa med paḥi skad cig*
pa ni ḥjig go zés pa thal bar ḥgyur ba dañ thal ba las bzlog paḥi tshad ma dag gis yod pa
ñid la skad cig pa ñid kyi[-s] khyab pa ḥgrub po. bsgrub par bya ba las bzlog pa [p. la]
gnod pa can gyi tshad mas sam zés bsad pa de brjod par bya ste. gañ zig rim gyis ḥbras
bu byed pa ñid dañ rim pa ma yin par ḥbras bu byed pa ñid du yod pa ma yin pa de ni don
bya ba nus pa ma yin te, dper na nam mkhaḥi pa-dma bzin; skad cig ma yin par yañ rim
gyis ḥbras bu byed pa ñid dañ, rim ma yin par ḥbras bu byed pa ñid dag yod pa ma yin no
zés pa khyab byed mi dmigs paḥi mtshan ñid can bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas,
skad cig ma yin pa ñid las khyab pa [p. omits *pa*] *byed rim dañ cig car bldog pas ldog bzin*
paḥi, don bya ba byed pa ñid kyi mtshan ñid can yod pa ñid ni skad cig pas ḥal ba med do
 [Read *skad cig pa la ḥal baḥo*], [d. 358 b] *de nas skad cig pa ñid kyis khyab po zés yod pa*
ñid la skad cig pa ñid kyis khyab pa ḥgrub po zés paḥo.

Sanskrit translation : *yathā ghaṭādinām¹ atitānāgatakālayoḥ svarūpaikyābhyupagame*
'titānāgatakālabhāvyarthakriyākāritvaprasaṅganam. tathā hi, yad yadā yatkriyāsamarthaṁ
tat tadā [tat]² karoty eva, yathā [antyā]³ kāraṇasāmagrī svakāryam; atitānāgatakālabhāvi-
kāryajananasamarthaś cāyaṁ ghaṭo vartamānakāle 'pīti svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ.

na karotīti ca viparyayaḥ. yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tadā tatra samartham, yathā
śālyāṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ śālyāṅkure; na karoti caiṣa ghaṭo vartamānakāle' titānā-
gatakālabhāvyarthakriyām iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ. sambandhād asamarthakṣaṇaṁ nivartata
iti⁴ prasaṅgaprasaṅgaviparyayābhyāṁ pramāṇābhyāṁ sattvasya kṣaṇikatvena vyāptis sidhyati.

sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇena vēty uktaṁ tad ucyatām. yat kramikāryakāryakrami-
kāryakāri ca na bhavati na tad arthakriyāsāmarthyam, yathā vyomapadmam; na vidyete
cākṣaṇikasya kramikāryakāritvākramikāryakāritve iti vyāpakānupalabdhilakṣaṇa⁵-viparyaya-
bādhakapramāṇenākṣaṇikatvād⁶ vyāpakaṁ kramayaugapadyaṁ vinivartyata iti vinivartya-
mānaṁ [vyāpyam] arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇasattvaṁ kṣaṇike viśrāmyati, tataḥ⁷ kṣaṇikatvena
vyāptam iti sattvakṣaṇikatvayor vyāptis sidhyatīti.

Notes : (1) *grub pa la sogs pa rnam* lit. means *siddhādinām* which Iyengar restores. But *siddha* or *prasiddha* (things well known) is very unlikely though not absolutely impossible. I assume this is a mistake for *bum pa* due to the orthographical similarity, though no Tibetan ed. gives this reading. (2) T drops *tat*. Cf. RNA 63, 14-17 : *yad yadā yaj janana-*
vyavahārayogyam tat tadā tat janayaty eva, yathāntyā kāraṇasāmagrī svakāryam; atitānā-
gatakṣaṇabhāvikāryajanavyavahārayogyas cāyaṁ ghaṭo vartamānabhāvikāryakaraṇakāle sa-
kalakriyātikramakāle'pīti svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ. (3) T omits *antyā*, which, however, is very important in this context. (4) RNA 64, 8-11 : *yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tadā*
tatra samarthavyavahārayogyam, yathā śālyāṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ śālyāṅkure; na karo-
ti caiṣa ghaṭo vartamānakṣaṇabhāvikāryakaraṇakāle sakalakriyātikramakāle cātītānāgata-
kṣaṇabhāvi kāryam iti vyāpakānupalabdhir bhinatti samarthakṣaṇād asamarthakṣaṇam. (5) RNA 77, 11-12 : *yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam, yathā śāśavi-*
śāṇasya; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramāu iti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. Iyengar : yat krami-
kāryakāri akramikāryakāri ca na bhavati na tad arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyomapadmam;

the jar]. For [it is inferred in the following way]³¹⁰ :

Whatever is capable of a certain action at a certain time, does make that [action] at that time, as e. g. the totality of cause and conditions at its last moment is capable of producing its own effect;

[According to the Naiyāyika], this jar is capable even at the present moment of producing the effects belonging to the past and future time;

[Therefore, this jar should produce the effects of the past and future, which is absurd].

This is a *prasaṅga* formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. The (*prasaṅga*-) *viparyaya* can be formulated by adopting 'not producing' [as *h*] :

Whatever does not produce a certain effect at a certain moment is incapable of producing that effect at that time as e. g. a grain seed which cannot produce a rice-shoot is incapable of producing a rice [-shoot];

This jar does not produce at the present moment the effects belonging to the past and future;

[Therefore, it is incapable of producing them, i. e. not permanent].

We have said that [the same *vyāpti* is proved] also by the *sādhyaviparyaya-bādhakaḥ* *pramāṇa*. This is to be stated :

Whatever does not possess causal efficiency in succession or in simultaneity, is not capable of causal action as e. g. the sky-lotus;

What is not momentary does not possess causal efficiency in succession and in simultaneity;

[Therefore, it is not capable of causal action, i. e. not existent].

akṣaṇikasya kramikāryakāritvaṁ anarthasya kāryakāritvaṁ ca nāstīti. No word for *anartha* is found in T. (6) T *skad cig pas ṅal ba med do* must be corrected into *skad cig pa la ṅal baḥo*. Otherwise, it is unintelligible. Cf. RNA 78, 8-9 : *tad ayam akṣaṇikād vinivartamānaḥ svavyāpyaṁ sattvaṁ nivartya kṣaṇike viśrāmayati*. *ṅal ba* means *vi-śram* (cf. J. Bacot, Dictionnaire Tibétain-Sanskrit, s. v.), which the Tibetan translator misunderstood. Iyengar's restoration *avilambāt* is not acceptable.

310. *Prasaṅga*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* and *viparyayabādhakaḥ* *pramāṇa* are used in order to establish the *vyāpti* of another independent syllogism (*svatantraprayoga*). In our present context the independent inference concerned is : *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ ; santaś cāmī vivādāspadibhūtāḥ padārthāḥ*. Thus, the *vyāpti* to be proved by *prasaṅga* is : whatever exists is momentary. We have to keep in mind that since Dharmakīrti's time, Buddhist logicians had defined 'existence' as 'being making effective action' (*arthakriyākāritva*). Hence, the concerned *vyāpti* can be proved by refuting that the non-momentary or permanent has no effective action ; *arthakriyākāritva* is the pervader of *sattva* (existence).

This is an inference sublating the opposite of the assertion to be proved (*sādhya viparyaya bādhaka*), formulated according to the formula of *vyāpakānupalabdhi*.³¹¹ Through this inference is excluded the pervader [of 'existence'], 'succession and non-succession' from the non-momentary : and so 'existence' defined as 'being causally efficient' (*arthakriyākāritva*), [the pervaded], which is also excluded from the non-momentary, necessarily rests with the momentary ; therefore 'existence' is pervaded by 'momentariness'. Thus, the *vyāpti* between 'existence' and 'momentariness' has been established.

24.2. (48.15) [Another example of *prasaṅga* is seen when] we deduce the plurality of a universal, when it is admitted [by the opponent] that a single universal (*sāmānya*) abides in many individuals. For the inference is formulated as follows :

Whatever abides in many things [at the same time] must be plural,
as e. g. the fruits of the fan-palm contained in many vessels;

A universal is said to abide in many;
[The absurdity that] follows is : Therefore, a universal must be plural.
[You have to admit this absurd conclusion], or if you do not admit it,
you may not assert the occurrence of a universal in many individuals.

24.3. Function of *prasaṅga*. (49.1) [objection :] "This inference called *prasaṅga* cannot be a valid means of proof since [*h* in this case] does not possess the three characteristics [of the valid probans]³¹². How can you argue by means of it?"³¹³ [Answer :] *Prasaṅga* is used in the same way as one term of a *vyāpti*³¹⁴ is stated in order to recollect

311. For *vyāpakānupalabdhi* see n. 212 and 216 above.

312. *M nanu yady etat prasaṅgākhyam sādhanam pramāṇam na bhavati trairūpyābhāvāt.*
trairūpyābhāvāt omitted in G, T ; *prasaṅgākhyam sādhanam* omitted in G.

313. In Indian logic the validity of hypothetical inference had long been disapproved both by the Naiyāyika and the earlier Buddhist school of logic. The three characteristics of a logical mark are possible only of categorical inference or what is called *svatantrānumāna* (independent inference). In *prasaṅga-anumāna*, which is hypothetical destructive inference, *h*'s subsistence in *p* is not real to one who formulates the *prasaṅga*, and breaches the first characteristic, which causes the fallacy of *asiddhi*. The conclusion deduced is evidently false to one who infers, which is not allowed in the case of independent inference. The Naiyāyika, who called this form of inference *tarka*, classified it under false knowledge, though they admitted its value as complementary means of an independent inference. Later Buddhist logicians, however, came to recognize *prasaṅga* as a valid inference.

314. *M vyāptyaikadeśa-*, but G, T *vyāptyekadeśa*.

the *vyāpti* itself. It is said [by Dharmakīrti] : ³¹⁵

Prasaṅga may be applied to show that when two terms are necessarily connected, the absence of one of them [viz., the absence of the pervader, necessarily] implies the absence of the other [the pervaded]. The meaning of this half-verse is as follows : When the universal concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader is admitted, if the pervader is not recognized [in a certain locus], the existence of the pervaded is also not allowed there. In other words, when the pervaded is recognized, the pervader is to be necessarily recognized.

25. Confutation. (49.7) According to the rule, when a debater has stated a proof, the opponent is to make a confutation (*dūṣaṇa*) of it. Confutation consists in pointing out the fallacy due to any illegitimate, incompatible or inconclusive *hetu* as defined [by Dharmakīrti] :

Confutation is pointing out the defect [of an inference] ³¹⁶.

[Objection :] “If Confutation consists of pointing out these [three kinds of fallacies] alone, where are others such as useless argument (*vaiyarthya*), inefficient argument (*asāmarthya*), unwarranted stretch of a rule (*atiprasaṅga*) etc. included ? ”

[Answer :] They are included in the same three fallacies. Of these, the useless argument can be included in the ‘*asiddha*’. For a probans is said to be a quality of *p* which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum] (*saṁdigdhasādhya-dharma*) ; and when useless argument is made of a certain thing, the probans fails to conform to the [above mentioned] definition of a probans, ‘being a quality of *p* which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum]’. Thus it can be called [a sort of] *asiddhi*, ³¹⁷... [because the essential characteristic of a probans is not existent in this case]....³¹⁷ The following is said [by Dharmakīrti in connection with this] ³¹⁸

A probans is stated concerning only a *p* which is not yet ascertained [to be *s* or non-*s*] ; and what has been rejected [to be *s* by other

315. PV IV, v. 12c-d : *prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekābhāve 'nyahānaye*. Rāhula Saṅkṛityāyana reads *prasaṅge* for *prasaṅgo*, but the latter is given in a foot-note. G *ekāpāye* for *ekābhāve*, but T, M *ekābhāve*.

316. NB III, s. 138 : *dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ*. According to III, s. 139 and NBT on it, any of the three kinds of fallacies, viz., *asiddha*-, *viruddha*- and *anaikāntika-hetu* is meant by *nyūnatā*.

317. Found only in M.

318. See § 20. 2 and n. 263.

valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans, viz., *p*.

Inefficient argument, on the other hand, is included in the fallacious probans which is illegitimate by itself (*svarūpāsiddhi*). For the essence of a probans is the efficiency of the probans, and because [the lack of efficiency] means the unreality of the probans (*hetor avastutva*).

The Unwarranted stretch of a rule should be included in the '*an-aiikāntika*', since [in it *h*] is connected even with the *vipakṣa*, stretching itself beyond the quality to be proved (*sādhyadharma*).

25.1. Refutation of ātman. (50.1) The confutation of *h* whose locus is unreal (*āśrayāsiddhahetu*)³¹⁹ takes place when a *p*, in which [a debater] starts to prove [the existence of] *s*, turns out to be sublated by another proof, as is the case with [the inference] "The soul (*ātman*) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere"³²⁰. [This can be confuted as follows:] Since Buddhists do not admit the reality of the soul itself, how then can it be established that it has the quality to be perceived in every place?

For this is said by the heretic: "There exists another substance called *ātman*, which is separate from things such as a body and which is the actor of good and evil deeds (*śubhāśubhakarmakarṭṛ*), the enjoyer of their results (*tatphalabhokṭṛ*), permanent (*nitya*) and ubiquitous (*vyāpin*)³²¹. Although it pervades the whole world, it is yet said that a living body, which is admitted³²² as a receptacle [of the soul's] experience [of pleasure and pain] (*upabhogāyatana*), is possessed of the soul"³²³.

But this is not tenable, since there is no proof for establishing [the existence of] the soul. For the soul is not apprehended by sense-perception, because [the five kinds of sense-] perceptions beginning with the visual have the five kinds of objects, colour etc., which are determined to their

319. M, G, *āśrayāsiddhir hetor dūṣaṇam*, T *gīi ma grub pa rtags kyi skyon no* = *āśrayāsiddhir hetor* (or *āśrayāsiddhahetor*) *doṣaḥ*. *Āśrayāsiddhahetor dūṣaṇam* may be better.

320. NB III, s. 67 : *dharmyasiddhāv apy asiddho, yathā sarvagata ātmēti sādhye sarva-tropalabhyamānaguṇatvam*.

321. TS v. 171-172 : *anye punar ihātmānam icchādinām samāśrayam, svato 'cidrūpam icchanti nityam sarvagatam tathā. śubhāśubhānām kartāram karmaṇām tatphalasya ca, bhoktāram cetanāyogāc cetanām na svarūpataḥ*. This represents the theory of *ātman* expounded by the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika.

322. M inserts *pareṇa* before *parigṛhitam*, but it should be omitted as in G, T.

323. NBh ad NS 1. 1. 9 : *tasya [=ātmāno] bhogāyatanaṁ śarīram*.

respective [senses, and the soul is not the object of any of these five sense-perceptions]. [Nor is the soul the object of] ego-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*) which is none other than mental perception (*mānasa*) [as defined by the Naiyāyika]. Since this has as its object the body and others [but not the soul]³²⁴, ego-consciousness occurs in the form of 'I am fair', 'I am big', 'I go' and so on ; and in this connection the Alamkāarakāra [Prajñākaragupta] said³²⁵ :

The knowledge of 'I' pertains to the parts of the body or sense-organs, since [our knowledge in the form of] 'I am one-eyed', 'I am happy', 'I am fair', takes place because of the experience of the receptacle common [to these conditions].

And there cannot be such qualities as fair complexion or bigness apart from the body of a person ; nor is the action of going, which is connected with a bodily substance, reasonably ascribed to the ubiquitous and formless soul. Nor can this [idea of soul] be applied [to the body] in the secondary sense of the word (*bhākta*), just as the idea of a lion is [figuratively] applied to a boy, since [if so,] it follows that this is after all false identification (*skhaladvṛtti*)³²⁶.

(51.1) [The existence of the soul] is not known by inference either, since we do not find a logical mark as effect or essential nature [for the proof]. Firstly, a logical mark as effect is not found because nothing is causally related to the soul, since this, being always beyond our perception, lacks the definite presence in a particular place, time and form³²⁷, while a causal relation is to be established by [the clear perception of]

324. While the Vaiśeṣika holds that *ātman* is not perceptible, but only inferable, the Naiyāyika thinks that the *jivātman* is an object of *mānasapratyakṣa*. Cf. NK s. v. *ātmā* ; TS v. 212 : *anyaiḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanaḥ parikalpitaṃ, svasamvedyo hy ahamkāras tasyātmā viśayo mataḥ*. TSP ascribes this theory of the perceptibility of *ātman* to Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta, etc. We have to note that *mānasapratyakṣa* of the Naiyāyika is quite different from that of the Buddhist.

325. =PVBh 368, 20 (III, v. 744) : *aham ity api yaj jñānaṃ tac charirendriyātmaṃ, ahaṃ kāṇaḥ sukhi gaurāḥ samānādhāraivedanāt*. M reads *aṅga-*, G and T *aṃśa-* instead of *-ātma-*. For a similar argument see TS v. 214 with TSP.

326. TSP 90, 21 ff. : *tataś ca yad uktam uddyotakaraḥ prabhṛtibhiḥ, upabhogāyatane śarīre 'yam ātmopacāraḥ, yathānukūle bhṛtye rājā brūte ya evāhaṃ sa evāyaṃ me bhṛtya iti, tad apāstaṃ bhavati. tathā hi yady ayaṃ gauṇaḥ syāt tadā skhaladvṛttir bhavet, na hi loke siṃham māṇavakayor mukhyāropitayor dvayor api siṃha ity askhalitā buddhir bhavati....*

327. M *deśakālākāravatyirekavikalena* ; G *deśakālavyatirekavikalena* ; T *yul dan dus dan rnam pa bral baḥi*=*deśakālākāravikalena*. My tr. here follows T.

the concomitance in agreement as well as in difference [between two terms]. Secondly no logical mark as essential nature is available just because the existence of the entity (*dharmin*) [which is to be called a soul and to which a logical mark is to belong] is itself not established. And there is no third logical mark [admitted by us]³²⁸.

You may propose another kind of probans to be pervaded by the probandum [or the soul], but how can the probans be pervaded by the latter, when this is not at all existent? Furthermore, we should ask if this soul is a conscious being or an unconscious being. If it is a conscious being and a permanent entity, it would necessarily follow that the eyes and other sense-organs are useless. If, on the other hand, it is an impermanent conscious being, then you have merely given the name *ātman* to knowledge; and there should be no difference of opinion between us. Or, if the soul is unconscious and invisible³²⁹, then the fact that it is not perceived does not permit its existence. Thus, the non-existence of the soul is proved beyond objection. Therefore, all things that are products are without *ātman*.

25.2. Confutation of svarūpāsiddha; untrue vyāpti is not different from anaikāntika. (51.13) A probans which is fallacious owing to its own unreality (*svārūpāsiddha*) is also called illegitimate (*asiddha*) as in the case of [the inference] ‘sound is impermanent, because it is visible’³³⁰.

[Objection :] “Why do you not mention [the disclosure of] the illegitimacy (*asiddhi*) of a *vyāpti* as a kind of confutation, when it renders what the opponent wants to prove impossible?”

[Answer :] It is not mentioned separately, since it is understood by the confutation of inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*). For *vyāpti* cannot be grasped between two particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), because a particular, which is determined in place, time and form³³¹, has no common aspect with other particulars. Instead, *vyāpti* should be grasped only between a probans and a probandum represented as universals. And in this case too, if the probans is not known as pervaded by the probandum, it is in fact inconclusive since the probandum may not be present when the probans

328. For a similar discussion see TS v. 207–209 with TSP.

329. G *abodhasvarūpo’dṛśyaś ca*, though M as well as T reads *abodhasvarūpo dṛśyaś ca*.

330. NB III, s. 60 : *yathā, anityaḥ śabda iti sādhye cākṣuṣatvam ubhayāsiddham*.

331. M *deśakālākāranīyatatvenāpy....*; *api* is omitted in G, T.

is present.

26. **The theory of apoha.** (52.3) [The following objection may be raised :] “The universals (*sāmānya*) are indeed not accepted [by you Buddhists] ; ³³² how then can you grasp a universally applicable (*sarvopa-sāmhāravatī*) *vyāpti* between a probans and a probandum that are universals ?”

[Answer :] There is no such a fault [in our theory]. Buddhists do not admit such a universal as that which others wrongly imagine, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. We do not, however, deny [the universal] called *apoha* (discrimination) which is defined as the negation of the opposite (*anyavyāvṛtti*) and which is well known in our verbal usage (*vyavahāra*).

[Objection :] “What is this *apoha* ? [It may be interpreted in the following three senses :]

1) An external object such as a jar as conceptually determined (*yathādhyavasāyam*) is called *apoha*, the term being understood as when we say ‘the other or the dissimilar is discriminated from this’ ;

2) Or *apoha* may mean the mental image (*buddhyākāra*) as it manifests itself (*yathāpratibhāsam*), the term being understood as in ‘the dissimilar is discriminated or made distinct in this mental image’ ;

3) *Apoha*, when taken as the negation of a proposition (*prasajya-rūpa*), may actually mean the mere absence [without implying the affirmation of the opposite] (*nivṛttimātra*), *apoha* being understood as negating (*apohana*)³³³.

332. T *ho na khyed la ci ma grub pa ma yin nam*. *Ci* here must be a mistake for *spyi*. Then, this passage may mean *nanu bhavatāṃ sāmānyam aprasiddham*. M, G *nanu sāmānyam ced aprasiddham*. Iyengar’s footnote 1 in M 52 is unreliable.

333. Our author reproduces these three kinds of wrong interpretations of *apoha*, following the *pūrvapakṣa* in Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi* (RNA 53, 2-4) : *nanu ko’yam apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva vivakṣitam ; buddhyākāro vā ; yadi vāpohanam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayasṃ pakṣāḥ*. Professor Frauwallner once wrote (WZKM Bd. 38, 231, 17 ff.) : “Ratnakīrti scheint nämlich in seiner Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Udayana nicht zu kennen... Dagegen schliesst sich der *pūrvapakṣaḥ* seiner *Apohasiddhiḥ* (SBNT S. 1-3, 4) [=RNA 53, 2-24] eng an eine Stelle aus Udayanas *Ātmatattvavivekaḥ* an (B. I., S. 278, 1 ff.), und ein grösserer Absatz ist fast wörtlich daraus übernommen (S. 1, 15-2, 11 [=RNA 53, 9-16] =S. 279, 17-282, 5). Der *Ātmatattvavivekaḥ*, Udayanas ältestes Werk, ist also aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach zwischen Ratnakīrti’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ und *Apohasiddhiḥ* verfasst”. This observation, together with others, led Frauwallner to the following conclusion :

And if [*apoha*, i. e. negation] means affirmation [of a positive entity] (*vidhi*) as conceptually determined, then it indeed comes to mean the same as an object (*viṣaya*) [which renders the designation *apoha* meaningless ; and the other two interpretations are also untenable]³³⁴.”

[Answer :] [These three interpretations are] not [acceptable]. [By *apoha*] we mean the affirmation [of a positive entity] qualified by discrimination (*apohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*)³³⁵. However, those who stress affirmation (*vidhivādin*) think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow ; those who stress the negative function of *apoha* (*nivṛtṭy-*

(232, 21 ff.) “Ratnakīrti muss daher ein älterer Zeitgenosse Udayanas sein. Wir werden infolgedessen nicht fehlgehen, wenn wir seine Blütezeit um 950 ansetzen. Damit ist aber auch die Zeit seines Lehrers Jñānaśrī bestimmt. Er muss in der ersten Hälfte des X. Jahrhunderts gelebt haben und der Höhepunkt seines Wirkens dürfte ungefähr in das Jahr 925 fallen”. This insight of Frauwallner which was once so significant, however, must be corrected, now that we have the edition of Jñānaśrīmitra’s works which were then unknown to Frauwallner. The *pūrvapakṣa* of Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi* is in fact an abbreviation of that of Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Apohaprakaraṇa* (JNA 201-202). The three kinds of wrong interpretations of *apoha*, which we have seen in RNA as well as TBh, are found in JNA 202, 12-24 ; the passage beginning with *atha yady api nivṛttim ahaṁ pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ*..., which Ratnakīrti quotes and whose authorship Frauwallner ascribed to Udayana, is originally cited by Jñānaśrīmitra (JNA 201, 17-202, 1). Since I think no one would dare to say that Jñānaśrīmitra is indebted to Udayana for these passages, we have to infer that Ratnakīrti, Mokṣākara and Udayana owe these to Jñānaśrīmitra who in his turn must have cited these from an author unknown to us.

For the Buddhist theory of *apoha* readers are referred to E. Frauwallner’s Beiträge zur Apohalehre, a German translation from the Tibetan text of the portion treating *apoha* in PV I (WZKM Bd. 37, 39, 40 and 42) and of the *Apohaprakaraṇa* of Dharmottara (Bd. 44) ; Mookerjee’s exposition in his *Universal Flux* 107-139 ; Dharmakīrti’s elucidation is now available in Skt. original, being included in Gnoli’s edition of PV I ; Śāntirakṣita’s view of *apoha*, as well as Kamalaśīla’s, is found in TS and TSP, *Śabdārthaparīkṣā*. Among other Sanskrit texts containing *apohavāda*, the most important are JNA 201-232, *Apohaprakaraṇa* and RNA 53-61, *Apohasiddhi*.

334. JNA 202, 13-14 : *tena na kaścid upayogaḥ, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt, na ca nāmāntarakaraṇe vastunaḥ svarūpaparāvṛttiḥ*.... The other two interpretations are also refuted by the opponent in JNA 202-203 and RNA 53, 5-8. The argument is, in brief, as follows : The first two meanings of *apoha* signify affirmation, which renders the use of the name *apoha* (negation) useless ; the third is absurd, since in our cognitive experience we get a positive idea, say, fire in a mountain, and not the mere negation ‘there is no non-fire’.

335. RNA 54, 1-2 : *atrābhidhiyate, nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo 'bhipretah, nāpyanyavyāvṛttimātram, kiṁ tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, tataś ca na pratyekapakṣopaniṣādoṣāvakāśaḥ*.

apohavādin) are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz. the cow. Thus [both the interpretations] are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which [negation or affirmation] occurs first. In fact it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication (*arthāpattitah*), or that one, having understood the negation, later confirms what is discriminated [from the dissimilar]. Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.

(53.3) Although it is pointed out that the word denoting discrimination from the dissimilar is not clearly expressed through the word 'cow' which is actually pronounced, we do not remain unconscious of the discrimination of the dissimilar which is the qualifier [of the cow]. For the word 'cow' is applied by verbal agreement to the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow. Just as on hearing the word *indivara* on which we are agreed to mean the blue lotus, we unavoidably represent blueness at the very moment³³⁶ we understand the lotus, just so on hearing the word 'cow' denoting in verbal agreement the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow, we unavoidably represent the negation of the non-cow at the same time as we understand the cow, since the former is the qualifier of the latter. To cite direct perception as another instance, its function of grasping the mere non-existence in the form of *prasajya-pratiṣedha* is none other than its function of generating the concept of non-existence; in the same way, of the affirmative concept, its function representing the likeness [of its object]³³⁷ is said to be the same as the grasping of the non-existence [of the dissimilar]. Otherwise, If the discrimination of other things is not comprehended even when the meaning of the word 'cow' is known, how then does a person who so knows begin to look after a cow, leaving aside other animals? It would then follow that a man who has been commanded to tether a cow may tether horses

336. G, T *tatkāla eva*; M *tulyakālam eva*, but the manuscript of M seems to agree with G, T (cf. M 53, n. 2).

337. T *rjes su mthun pa rjes su sgrub pa ḥbyin par nus pa* = *anurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśa-kti* (cf. RNA 54, 13).

too³³⁸. Thus, it has been settled that the external object is placed in [i. e. superimposed as] the content of the word through logical construction (*adhyavasāya*), but not through the manifest perception of the discrete nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) [of the object]. This is attested by the fact that the discrete nature of an individual thing as determined in a particular situation, i. e. in place, time and form, is not manifested [in the word] as it is in direct perception³³⁹. Concerning this the supreme lord of logic (*nyāyaparamēśvara*) [Dharmakīrti] said :

Unless one's visual organ operates, the object [of a word] does not become visible in his knowledge by [simply hearing] the word ; it is not as in visual perception³⁴⁰.

(54.3) Moreover, if a thing discrete and distinct (*svalakṣaṇātma- vastu-*) formed the content of a word, it would be entirely comprehended [when the word is heard] ; this renders both the affirmative and negative usage [of the word] impossible. For when the object is present, [the statement] that it is is useless and [the statement] that it is not is incoherent ; and when the object is not present, it is useless to say that it is not, and it is incoherent to say that it is. But [in practice] we use the words 'it is' and so forth. Therefore, it is settled that a word does not signify a

338. RNA 54, 3-15 : *yat tu goḥ pratitau na tadātmāparātmēti sāmāthyād apohaḥ paścān niścīyata iti vidhivādināṃ matam ; anyāpohapratitau vā sāmāthyād anyāpoḍho 'vadhāryata iti pratiṣedhavadīnāṃ matam, tad asundaram. prāthamikasyāpi pratipattikramādarśanāt, na hi vidhiṃ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitah paścād apoham avagacchati ; apoham vā pratipadyānyāpoḍham. tasmād goḥ pratipattir ity anyāpoḍhapratipattir ucyate....* (RNA up to 54, 15 well corresponds to M up to 53, 15). The so-called *vidhivādin* may be represented by Śāntirakṣita (cf. TS, TSP 1019-1021), while the *pratiṣedhavadīn* (or *nivṛttivādin*) is likely to refer to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (cf. Frauwallner's citation from Śāṅkaramiśra in WZKM Bd. 38, 230 : *kīrti-dīnnāgādibhir gaur iyam ityādivikalpe vidhisphuraṇam nāsty evēty uktam, jñānaśriyā tu vidhisphuraṇam adhyupagamya niṣedhasphuraṇam api tatra bhavatīti svikṛtam. yad āha : tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyata iti.* The last part of the passage is found in JNA 206, 3). Mookerjee classifies three stages in the development of *apoha*-theory, represented by 1) Dignāga, 2) Śāntirakṣita, and 3) Ratnakīrti (Mookerjee, 132), which seem to correspond to *pratiṣedhavadāda*, *vidhivāda* and the synthetic theory of Jñānaśrīmitra respectively. By Ratnakīrti referred to by Mookerjee, we have to understand both Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti.

339. RNA 55, 16-18 : *tatra bāhyo 'rtho' dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācīyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇaparispūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapravyaktasvalakṣaṇāśphuraṇāt.*

340. *śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt, arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva* (=JNA 208, 17-18 =RNA 55, 19-20). JNA as well as RNA ascribes the verse to Śāstra, i.e. Dharmakīrti ; but it is not found in PV.

particular entity³⁴¹.

(54.8) [Objection :] “Just as you, having grasped a jar as a particular, later apply another means of valid knowledge [i. e. inference] to the same object in order to determine [other qualities of it such as] momentariness, just so even if we have by the word ‘tree’ apprehended an element of it ‘tree-ness’, we may again use the word ‘exist’ in order to determine ‘existence’ as another element [of the tree]”.

[Answer :] This is untenable. Since direct perception is indeterminate by nature, we apply another means of knowledge [even after we have perceived] an object with a nature with which we are not well acquainted. In the case of conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) which is itself determinate, however, if the nature [of an object] is once grasped, there remains nothing else to be grasped by another means of knowledge³⁴².

27. Refutation of a universal. (54.15) We do not find any proof to establish the existence of a universal (*sāmānya*) which is conceived by others as inherent in many individuals (*anekavyaktisamaveta*), visible (*drśya*), single (*eka*) and permanent (*nitya*)³⁴³. Therefore, it is not correct to maintain the existence [of a universal]. For when we experience an individual (*vyakti*) such as a cow, no single dependent (*anuyāyin*) [to be called a universal] other than the characteristics of the individual consisting of a [peculiar] colour and form appears in our perception, just because such a thing is not directly experienced.

Nor is it reasonable to imagine the existence of a universal because it is otherwise inexplicable (*anyathānupapatti*) that we get an idea reflecting on one [class-] form immediately after we perceive the particular

341. RNA 56, 6-9 : *kiṃ ca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvātmanā pratipatteḥ vidhi-
niṣedhayor ayogaḥ, tasya hi sadbhāve'stīti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham ; asadbhāve tu nāstīti
vyartham, astīty asamartham, asti cāstyādīpadaprayogaḥ.*

342. The same kind of objection is quoted as of Kumārila in RNA 56, 20-21 = JNA 212, 20-21 : *yac cōktaṃ kaumārilaiḥ, sabhāgatvād eva vastuno na sādharmaṇyadoṣaḥ, vṛkṣatvaṃ hy
anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ śabdād avagamyate, tasya anyatareṇa śabdāntarāvagatena sam-
bandhyata iti....* But Mokṣākara's passage is more akin to RNA 56, 28-57, 5 : *nanu vṛkṣaśabde-
na vṛkṣatvāmśe codite sattvādyaṃśaniścayanārtham astyādīpadaprayoga iti cet, niraṃśatvena
pratyakṣasamadhigatasya svalakṣaṇasya ko'vakāśaḥ padāntareṇa dharmāntaravidhiniṣedhayoḥ
pramāṇāntareṇa vā. pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇāntarāpekṣā dṛṣṭīti cet, bhavatu tasyāniścayātmakatvād
anabhyastasvarūpaviśaye ; vikalpas tu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra grāhi tatra kim apareṇa....
(cf. JNA 212, 25 ff, too).*

343. NK s. v. *sāmānya* : *sāmānyaṃ nityam ekaṃ syād anekasamavāyi ca ; SBNT 94, 3 :
vyāpakam nityam ekaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ yaiḥ prakalpitam....*

characteristic [of an individual]. For this idea may arise indirectly (*paramparayā*)³⁴⁴ from individuals with generative efficiency effected by their own causes [so as to give rise to an idea]. Though individuals are all different from one another, some alone are capable of generating [a certain class-idea], but not all ; in this way, a relation of cause and effect [between individuals and a class-idea] is cognized by perception and non-perception, and cannot be violated. And in fact we experience that such efficiency belongs only to some individuals, though all are equally discrete and distinct (*bhedāviśeṣa*), as [only] the *Cocculus cordifolius* (*guḍūci*), neemb etc. are effective as anti-febrile [and not others]. Concerning this [Dharmakīrti] said :

Some things, though they are distinct and discrete, are determined by nature to bring out one and the same effect such as the same judgment, the cognition of one object and so forth, just as a sense-organ, [an object, light, attention, a soul and their contact bring out one cognition of colour, though they are distinct]³⁴⁵.

Furthermore, we may ask a question : We admit [for the sake of argument] that a universal [say cow-ness] is distinguished from all other dissimilars ; but how is it inherent only in individual [members] of [the class of] cow even when they are as much distinct and discrete as other individuals, and how can it generate the same form of mental image

344. Mookerjee, 90 : "The contention of the Naiyāyika that ideas of universals arise immediately on the operation of the sense-object contact is not true, because such ideas are conceptual in character and conceptual thoughts can emerge only after the name-relations are remembered. First of all, there is the sensuous presentation immediate and direct and divested of all foreign reference. Secondly, a mental energising towards the recalling of the verbal association ; thirdly, the remembrance of the name. So the mind has travelled far away from the immediate datum of presentation and the idea of the class-character arises only after a series of psychical operations, which have little bearing on the immediate objective datum".

345. The first half of this verse is omitted in G, T. PV I, v. 73-74 : *ekapratyavamarśārthajñānādyekārthasādhane, bhede 'pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenēndriyādivat. yathēndriyaviśayālokananaskārā ātmendriyamano'rthatatsaṁnikarṣā vā 'saty api tadbhāvanīyate sāmānye rūpavijñānam ekaṁ janayanti, evaṁ śiṁśapādayo'pi bhedāḥ parasparānanwaye'pi prakṛtyai-vaikam ekākāraṁ pratyabhijñānaṁ janayanti anyāṁ vā yathāpratrayaṁ dahanagṛhādikāṁ kṣāṭhasādhyaṁ arthakriyāṁ, na tu bhedāviśe'pi jalādayaḥ, śrotrādivad rūpādivijñāne. jvarādiśamane kāścīt saha pratyekaṁ eva vā ; dr̥ṣṭā yathā vauśadhayo nānātve 'pi na cāparāḥ. yathā vā guḍūcivyaktyādayaḥ saha pratyekaṁ vā jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇam ekaṁ kāryaṁ kurvantī. na ca tatra sāmānyam apekṣante, bhede'pi tatprakṛtitvāt, na tadaviśeṣe'pi dadhitrapusādayaḥ....* Also see TS v. 723-726 ; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Apohalehre, WZKM Bd. 39, S. 264.

(*buddhi*) in relation to them [i. e. individual cows] and them alone? ³⁴⁶ And the opponent may reply that it happens so by nature (*svabhāvena*). But this [reply] lacks a proof. On the other hand, when we explain the phenomenon on the basis of their essential nature (*svabhāva*), it is well established by proof for us and is supported by logic.

(55.17) Similarly, the opponent proposes another syllogism in order to prove [the existence of] a class (*jāti*) :

“A distinct knowledge (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) is invariably connected (*nān-tariyaka*) with the cognition of a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), as the knowledge of a stick-holder (*daṇḍin*) ;

The knowledge ‘This is a cow’ is a distinct knowledge ;

[Therefore, it is invariably connected with a qualifier, the class of cow.]

This syllogism is in sense based on the principle of causality [since distinct knowledge is an effect of the cognition of a qualifier]’.

We reply : Is the probandum here the invariable connection of the distinct knowledge with the cognition of a separate qualifier or its invariable connection with the perception of a qualifier in general? If the first alternative is maintained, it is sublated by perception, since neither [the qualified nor the qualifier] is [separately] manifested in indeterminate perception which grasps the total reality as a whole. Moreover, distinct knowledge set forth as the probans of [the existence of] a universal³⁴⁷ contains the fallacy of inconclusiveness, since distinct knowledge is acquired even without the cognition of a qualifier separate from the qualified, as we know that this jar has its own form or that cow-ness³⁴⁸ is a universal. If on the other hand the second alternative is maintained, it only proves what is obvious (*siddhasādhana*) as one asserts that a jar has its own form, since [even Buddhists] admit the relation of the qualifier and the qualified as derived from the imagined

346. G *kim ca sarvato vijātiyād vyāvṛtte’pi sāmānye kim iti bhedāviśeṣe’pi govyaktiṣv eva samavetaṁ tatraiva caikākārāṁ pratitīm janayati*. M reads *sarvagata* (which is unfit) for *sarvato*, inserts *tat sāmānyam* before *tatraiva* and has *buddhim* instead of *pratitīm*. T seems to omit *ca* after *tatraiva* ; otherwise it agrees with M.

347. Both M and G wrongly have *viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ ca sāmānyam ity anaikāntiko hetuḥ*. T *khyad par can gyi blo ṇid kyaṁ spyi la gtan tshigs ma ṇes pa yin te* = *viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ ca sāmānye ’naikāntiko hetuḥ*. See Ratnakīrti’s passage in n. 350.

348. Read *gotvaṁ* for *gotva* in M 56, 6.

difference, and use such an expression as 'This thing has the universal of a cow'³⁴⁹. For, in fact, the judgment 'This is a cow' is made by virtue of the cognition of what is discriminated from the non-cow. Thus, the universal cannot be established by this inference either³⁵⁰.

Since in this way the universal imagined by others does not withstand scrutiny, the following has been settled : The universal, which is merely an entity distinguished from the dissimilars and which is designated by the word 'discrimination' (*apoha*), forms part of our verbal convention according to our logical construction ; this is quite immune from faults.

(56.14) The following syllogism should also be formulated in order to refute the universal : ³⁵¹

When a thing, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived at a given place, it is the object to be judged as absent then and there, as horns on the head of a horse ;

The universal, in spite of [your supposition that] it is by nature perceptible, is not perceived in the particulars which are actually seen ;

[Therefore, it is not existent.]

This is formulated on the ground of the non-cognition of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*).

No assumption of the fallacy of illegitimacy (*asiddhi*) can be made [concerning this inference], since, in spite of a thorough examination, we do not find anywhere [a universal which is] the second entity following

349. T, G *vyavahārakāraṇaṁ kṛtvā* for *bhedam upādāya*. T *spāṣṭatvāt* (*gṣal ba ñid*) for *-syēṣṭatvāt*.

350. Mokṣākara verbally follows RNA 59, 21-60, 3 : *athēdaṁ jātīprasādhakam anumānam abhidhiyate. yadvīṣṭajñānaṁ tadviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanāntariyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam ; vi-
ṣṭajñānaṁ cēdaṁ gaur ayam ity arhataḥ kāryahetuḥ, viśeṣaṇānubhava-kāryaṁ hi dṛṣṭānte
viṣṭabuddhiḥ siddhēti. atrānuyogaḥ, viṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanāntariyakatvaṁ
vā sādhyāṁ viśeṣaṇamātrānubhavanāntariyakatvaṁ vā. prathamapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabā-
dhā sādhanāvadhānam anavakāśayati. vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasyōbhaya-pratibhāsābhāvāt.
viṣṭabuddhitvaṁ ca sāmānyahetur anaikāntikaḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇam antareṇāpi darśanāt,
yathā svarūpavān ghaṭaḥ, gotvaṁ sāmānyam iti vā, dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasāadhanam, svarūpa-
vān ghaṭa ityādivat gotvajātīmān piṇḍa iti parikalpitaṁ bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhā-
vasyēṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānubhava-bhāvitvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya.*

351. Mokṣākara owes this inference to Paṇḍita Aśoka. Cf. *Sāmānyadūṣaṇadikprasārītā*, SBNT 97, 8-11 : *yad yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ san nōpalabhyate tat tad asad iti pre-
kṣāvadbhir vyavahartavyaṁ yathāmbarāmburuham ; nōpalabhyate cōpalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ
sāmānyam kvacid apīti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ*. The same logic, however, is applied by Bud-
dhists to the negation of *avayavin*, see e. g. TSP 188, 5 ff.

[a particular], independent of the particular entity characterised by colour and form. Nor is it tenable that it is, in spite of its invisibility, established by perception as in the case of knowledge. For, while knowledge, though not grasped by visual cognition, is established by the proof of self-consciousness (*svasamvedana*), this universal, being a quality of an object of the senses (*arthadharmā*), should be grasped by visual cognition. And in fact the opponent admits its perceptibility. Thus the universal fictitiously conceived by the opponent does not withstand scrutiny ; only an entity which is [by logical construction] discriminated from others is said to be a universal. And it is settled that all things that are products are void of such a universal as is imagined by others.

28. Refutation of God as the permanent agent. (57.7) It should not be understood that [all produced things] are made by some intelligent being. For if there were an operator of this world, he would be either a permanent being or an impermanent one. Of these, first, he cannot be permanent, because when the operator is active permanently, the creation, preservation and destruction [of the world] would certainly occur simultaneously. The very nature by which he is [said to be] the operator of preservation and destruction should continue to be present in him even at the time of creation, and accordingly he would at the very time [of creation] effect preservation and destruction. It may be contended that he will not act so because he lacks auxiliary causes (*sahakārin*), but this is not correct. For he is never dissociated from permanent auxiliary causes which are always present with him ; and again he is never dissociated from impermanent auxiliary causes, since these must be dependent on him for their origination. Therefore, it would follow that he effects all [the three kinds of operations] at the same time³⁵².

(57.17) [The opponent :] “There is not such a fault, since God is endowed with intelligence. For an agent deprived of intelligence may effect simultaneously all the works which are caused by its presence alone. An intelligent being, on the other hand, need not work when he does not wish, though he is always capable of doing so. Why then is he criticised ? ”³⁵³

Answer : He is to be criticised in this way : These wishes are also

352. For a similar argument see BCAP 258, 22-30 ; TSP ad TS v. 87.

353. A similar objection is ascribed to Uddyotakara in TSP 55, 4-8.

caused by his own existence alone ; and why does he not ³⁵⁴ work ? You may contentd that although he is efficient by his own existence, he has such a nature that he does not work without being given contingent powers which are defined as auxiliary causes. But this [objection] has no sense at all, since [in the same way] one can show you a conclusion that [a woman], who is by birth a barren woman, is also a mother.

(58.6) [The opponent :] “An effect indeed has such a nature that it is not produced merely by the efficiency [of an operative cause], but comes into existence after having depended on auxiliary causes too ; [so, you should not criticise as above]”³⁵⁵.

[The author :] This is not correct. For efficiency will necessarily produce its effect without expecting the help of auxiliary causes, because otherwise it would be just inefficient.

28.1. The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually. (58.9) Again it is not correct that a permanent [agent such as God] produces an effect gradually (*kramaṇa*), since it does not require [anything else for its action]. Regarding this, Dharmakīrti whose name is celebrated all over the world said : ³⁵⁶

Successive [change] cannot occur to the permanent, since this is independent [of other causes], and since this remains the same self at both times whether it is doing an action or not doing it.

By this it is refuted that the permanent such as a soul or momentary things such as a jar etc. produce an effect gradually³⁵⁷. And in this argument there is no fault of incompatibility with perception, since we cannot grasp the permanent by indeterminate cognition. For indeterminate cognition that is momentary cannot perceive what is not mo-

354. G as well as T inserts *na* before *karoti*.

355. TSP ad TS v. 87 (54, 23-25) : *syād etat, nēśvara eva kevalaṁ kāraṇam api tu dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaram apekṣya karoti, nimittakāraṇatvād iśvarasya, tena dharmādeḥ kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyād avikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti* ; BCAP ad BCA IX, 125 a (259, 17-23).

356. M dharmakīrtiḥ ; G and T have only kīrtiḥ. PV II, v. 268 b-269 a : *nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramotpattir viruddhyate, kriyāyām akriyāyām ca kriyā ca sadṛśātmanaḥ*. T of TBh agrees with this verse completely ; but M and G change *viruddhyate* into *na yujyate* and *kriyā ca* into *kālayoḥ ca*.

357. M, T read : *ātmādinām akṣaṇikānām ghaṭādinām kṣaṇikānām ca kramaṇa kāryakaraṇam pratyuktam*. G *nityānām ātmādinām akṣaṇikānām [ca] ghaṭādinām....* is unintelligible. A momentary thing cannot operates for many moments in order to produce an effect gradually.

mentary. The non-momentary [or the permanent] indeed means what operates for many moments ; and how can it be grasped by indeterminate cognition which lasts only for a moment ? What resided in the past or will reside in the future does not manifest itself at the present time, for otherwise it would follow that it belongs to the present. Or it would follow that the termini of the birth and destruction [of the present thing] are manifested. Therefore, indeterminate cognition is not able to grasp a thing which pervades the past and future time³⁵⁸.

28.2. Refutation of recognition. (59.3) The same argument serves to explain that recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is not of the nature of indeterminate cognition. Indeterminate cognition is indeed [defined as] intuitive knowledge (*sākṣātkāri jñānam*) ; and what resided in the past is not to be put before the eyes, but only to be remembered. Indeterminate cognition, on the other hand, is not of the nature of remembrance (*smṛti*).

The following objection may be raised : “While remembrance is that which does not intuit the present state of a thing, how can that [recognition] which is intent upon intuiting it [=the present state] be called remembrance ? Regarding this, Kumārilabhaṭṭa said : ³⁵⁹

Remembrance takes place in the form ‘[I remember] that’, pertaining only to what has been cognized before ; recognition, on the other hand, is in the form ‘This is the same as that’, and is quite different [from remembrance]”.

[The Author :] If so, recognition would have a twofold nature, that of remembrance and that of grasping, and is not of the nature of grasping alone, since what is remembered cannot be grasped and what is grasped cannot be remembered. However, it is impossible that there are remembrance and grasping in one cognition, because these two are incompatible with each other. No sane person can contend that we grasp [a thing] by the same function of [knowledge] by which we remember ; ³⁶⁰

358. M *pūrvāparakālavāptam artham*, but G *-vyāptim*, with which T (*sñā ma dañ phyi mañi dus la khyab pañi don*) agrees.

359. This verse is not found in SV, but in TS v. 453 : *pūrvapramitamātre hi jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ, sa evāyam itiyam tu pratyabhijñā'tirekiṇi*. TSP ascribes the opinion to Kumānila.

360. M *yena hi svarūpeṇa* (G *rūpeṇa*) *smaraṇam na tena svarūpeṇa* (G *rūpeṇa*) *grahaṇam ity anunnattena* (G inserts here *na*) *śakyate vaktum*. T omits the first *na* and retains the second, which is most intelligible.

and if you say that grasping is made by a function different [from that of remembrance], there cannot be both remembrance and grasping in one [cognition]³⁶¹. Even if this [possibility] were admitted, it would mean that [the knowledge] has at the same time the nature of *pratyakṣa* and that of non-*pratyakṣa*, and not that it is only of the nature of *pratyakṣa*, for *pratyakṣa* cannot occur in an object which is being remembered³⁶². Therefore, the knowledge of [the so-called] recognition is simply erroneous, because it has no proper object. [Our argument may be formulated into] the following syllogism :

The knowledge of recognition has in reality not a single object as in the case of grass which, having been once cut, grows again ;

‘This blue [thing] is the same as that’ is the knowledge of recognition ;

[Therefore, it has not a single object].

This is a negative inference derived from the cognition of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the denied object (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*). Since oneness and plurality are incompatible with each other, two perceptions respectively pertaining to the one and the other are also mutually incompatible. Thus, the knowledge of recognition is pervaded by ‘having plural objects’ which is incompatible with ‘having a single object’, as the logic explained above shows. Accordingly recognition does not sublate our inference of momentariness.

(60.6) Again, it cannot be contended that [recognition] pertains to a single object because, when hair and other things are recognized, it has the universal [of hair etc.] as object. For in fact it is only particular hairs that are recognized. If, on the contrary, a universal is recognized, we would [acquire the knowledge that] this hair-ness is the same as that, and not that this hair is the same as that [as we actually recognize]. Therefore, when one object is concerned, the occurrence of the knowledge of recognition, be it successive or simultaneous, is incongruent ; and you

361. M *rūpāntareṇa caikasya smaraṇagrahaṇe na syātām*, but G *rūpāntareṇa grahaṇe na ekasya smaraṇagrahaṇe syātām* ; T seems to read *rūpāntareṇa grahaṇena*. I follow G.

362. I follow G : *bhāve’pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣatvaṁ syāt, na tu pratyakṣatvam eva, smaryamāṇe pratyakṣāyogāt*. M : *bhāve’pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣe syātām, na tu smaryamāṇe pratyakṣam eva, pratyakṣāyogāt* ; T agrees with M, though it has *pratyakṣapratyakṣe* for *pratyakṣāpra-* by mistake. M and T may be understood as meaning ‘... and not that there is only *pratyakṣa* when an object is being remembered, since this cannot be *pratyakṣa*’.

should not suspect the possibility of [the probans of our inference] being incompatible or inconclusive. Nor can you say that the very recognition determines the singleness of the object, since it is just the object of the present examination. Thus, it has been settled that there is no permanent agent³⁶³.

28.3. Karman or the mind is the sole cause of the world. (60.12)
[The Opponent :] “If the permanent agent is not the [supreme] cause of the world, what then is the cause of it?”

[The Author :] Actions of sentient beings, called good or evil, [form the instrumental cause of the world,] as is said [in the following]³⁶⁴ :

The mind alone produces the world of sentient beings as well as that of inanimate things in all their various aspects ;
for all the universe is said to have been produced by actions, and no actions are possible apart from the mind.

Employing the view³⁶⁵ of the Vaibhāṣika school the omniscient Buddha said : ³⁶⁶

Ether and the two kinds of cessation [i. e. that due to wisdom and that not due to wisdom], these three are the non-produced which are eternal ;
all produced things are momentary, devoid of *ātman*, and have no creator [other than *karman*].

29. The existence of an omniscient person proved. (61.3) “It may be fitting for you to adduce the words of the omniscient one if and only if the existence of the latter is established. What proof do you put forward

363. See n. 234 above.

364. *sattvalokam atha bhājanalokaṃ cittam eva racayaty aticitram, karmajaṃ hi jagad uktam aśeṣaṃ karma cittam avadhūya na cāsti.* Cf. AK IV, v. 1 : *karmajaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ cetanā tatkr̥taṃ ca tat, cetanā mānasaṃ karma tajje vākkāyakarmaṇi.*

365. M *Vaibhāṣikaṃ āśritya* ; G=T *vaibhāṣikamatam āśritya*. The expression of course means that the Vaibhāṣika understands the Buddha as teaching the following.

366. *ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca nityaṃ trayam asaṃskṛtaṃ, saṃskṛtaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sarvaṃ ātmaśūnyam akartṛkaṃ.* The first half is omitted in G. The verse is identical with JSS v. 21 (Yamaguchi, 292 : *nam mkhaḥ ḥgog pa gñis dag daṅ, ḥdus ma byas gsum po ni rtag, ḥdus byas bdag gis kun stoṅ la, byed pa po med skad cig ma.*) Cf. AK I, v. 5 ff. : *anāsravā mārgasatyaṃ trividhaṃ cāpy asaṃskṛtam, ākāśaṃ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśaṃ anāvṛtiḥ....* Regarding *akartṛka*, on which Bodhibhadra comments that there is no agent other than *karman*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad AK IV, v. 1 (de la Vallée Poussin, IV, 1 : *Ce n'est pas Dieu qui la fait intelligemment... La variété du monde naît des actes des être vivants.*) Two kinds of *nirodha* means *pratisaṃkhyā*- and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*.

for the existence of an omniscient one?"

We answer :

A quality of the mind, when brought about by repeated meditation which is made ardently, incessantly and for a long time, can be manifested clearly, as e. g. the figure of a girl [is clearly manifested] to her lover ;

The mental images having the four noble truths as objects are also the qualities of the mind produced by the practice as described above ;

[Therefore, they can be manifested clearly.]

This is an inference formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. [Regarding this inference] you may not suspect the fallacy of illegitimacy (*asiddha*-) either in respect of the locus of *h* or in respect of *h* itself. The *p* [of this inference, i. e.] the mental images which are brought under conceptual knowledge and which have the four noble truths as their objects, and *h*, a quality of the mind in general, are [real and legitimate] since they are both the contents of everyone's self-consciousness (*pratyātmavedyatva*). Nor is this [*hetu*] incompatible, because it is present in a lover as a *sapakṣa*. Nor is it inconclusive, for we can establish by means of perception and non-perception a universally applicable causal relation between a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation, as cause, and its vivid manifestation as effect, just as between a potter and a jar ; and once this relation is established, it is also established that the probans 'a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation' is pervaded by [the probandum] 'fitness for manifesting itself clearly'³⁶⁷. [The procedure of grasping the causal relation in question is as follows :]

The locus (*adhikaraṇa*) of the *vyāpti* in question is the figure of a girl occurring in [the mind of] a man who is in love with her. (1) We do not see the manifestation [of the figure] before it has become a quality of [the lover's] mind through earnest, incessant and prolonged meditation upon it [*anupalabdhi* No. 1] ; (2) later we come to see the meditation [by him] [*upalabdhi* No. 2] ; (3) and then we see the clear manifestation [of her figure] [*upalabdhi* No. 3]. Thus the causal relation between clear manifestation and the mental image produced by repeated medita-

367. M *sphuṭapratibhāsakāraṇavogyatā* ; G *-karaṇa-* ; T *gsal bar snañ bar byar ruñ ba*. G's reading is better. Cf. Ratnakirti's passage in n. 368 below.

tion is established by three cognitions consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhaṇpratyakṣānupalambha*). And from this we know the universal *vyāpti* [between the probans and the probandum in question]. Therefore, there being no fallacy of inconclusiveness, our *hetu* is faultless³⁶⁸.

29.1. Proof of the existence of an all-knowing person. (62.4)³⁶⁹
[The opponent :] “By the inference stated above you may indeed prove [the possible existence of] an omniscient being (*sarvajña*) who is meant to be a person intuiting the images of the four noble truths, from the fact that he intuits the images of the four noble truths ; but you cannot establish one who intuits everything without restriction (*aviśeṣeṇa sarvadharmasākṣātkārin*). Therefore, to prove this, you have to state another inference”.

[The Author ;] We will answer :

368. This section consists of verbatim citations from RNA 1, 16-21 and 3, 12-19 : *yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇaḥ sa sarvaḥ sphuṭibhāvayogyah, yathā yuvatyākāraḥ kāmīnaḥ puruṣasya ; yathoktābhyāsasahitacetoguṇāś cāmī caturāryasatyaviṣayā ākāra itī svabhāvo hetuḥ. tatra na tāvad āśrayadvāreṇa hetudvāreṇa vāsiddhisambhāvanā, saṃkalparūḍhānām caturāryasatyākārāṇām cetoguṇamātrasya ca hetoḥ pratyātmavedyatvāt... na caīṣa viruddho hetuḥ, sapakṣe kāmīny ākāre sambhavāt. na cānaikāntikaḥ, abhyāsasahitacetoguṇasphuṭapratibhāsayoḥ kāryakāraṇayor ghaṭakumbhakārayor iva sarvopasaṃhāreṇa pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhāv abhyāsasahitacetoguṇatvasya sādhanasya sphuṭapratibhāsakāraṇayogyatayā vyāptisiddheḥ. tathā hi, vyāptyadhikaraṇe kāmāturavartini yuvatyākāre sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇāt pūrvam anupalabdhiḥ sphuṭābhasya, paścād abhyāsasaṃvedanaṃ sphuṭābhasaṃvedanam itī, trividhaṇpratyakṣānupalambhasādhyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ sphuṭapratibhāsābhyāsasacittākārayor iyaṃ upapannā sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāptiḥ. ato'naikāntikatāpy asambhavinīty anavadyo hetuḥ.* For *trividhaṇpratyakṣānupalambha* see n. 305.

369. At the beginning of *Sarvajñasiddhi* (RNA 1, 9-14) Ratnakīrti quotes PV II, v. 33 in which Dharmakīrti declares that he means by the supreme source of knowledge one who knows the truths regarding what are to be abandoned and what are to be acquired together with their means, but not one who merely knows everything (*heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ, yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ*). Ratnakīrti calls this supreme source of knowledge *sarvajña* and a knower of everything *sarvasarvajña*. For Buddhists following Dharmakīrti *sarvajña* is more important than *sarvasarvajña*. And Ratnakīrti says that his inference beginning with *yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇaḥ...*, [which Mokṣākara cites in § 29] is meant for proving *sarvajña*, and not *sarvasarvajña*. He continues to say, however, that he will quench the thirsty desire of common people for the proof of the existence of a *sarvasarvajña*, and he formulates an inference proving it in RNA 28, 10 ff. Thus, we have to bear in mind that there are two kinds of omniscient beings. Mokṣākara deals with *sarvajña* in § 29 and *sarvasarvajña* in § 29, 1.

Words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object presuppose directly or indirectly the knowledge intuiting that object, as e. g. the words 'fire burns';

The words 'all produced things are momentary' also agree with a proof and have definite objects ;

[Therefore, the words presuppose the knowledge intuiting all things, i. e. there must be an all-knowing person.]

[This inference] is in content based on the principle of causality.

It has not the fallacy of illegitimacy (*asiddhi*), since we prove the momentary destruction of all things and accordingly these words are true. Nor is [the probans] incompatible, since it is present in the *sapakṣa*. Nor is it inconclusive, since, though words in general may be preceded by doubt or error, we know by perception and non-perception that the words agreeing with a proof³⁷⁰ and having a definite object are directly or indirectly preceded by the knowledge intuiting that object³⁷¹. If this were not admitted, all the probans as effect would be annihilated, since even smoke etc. would not have their cause³⁷².

29.2. Proof of the succession of lives. (62.17) The following objection may be raised : "Conceptual ideas which are meditated upon would be manifested³⁷³ only after a long time expressible in terms of a succession of many lives. But what proof do you adduce in order to establish a succession of lives (*bhavaparamparā*)?"

We answer :

[A moment of] the mind is necessarily joined together with (*prati-*

370. Read *pramāṇasaṁvādi* instead of *-saṁvadi* in M 62, 13.

371. M 62, 15 *-pūrvakatvena*, but G, T *-tvaṁ*, which is better. Or we may construe the passage reading *vyāptēḥ* (M 62, n. 2) so that it may run : ...*vacanasya...-tvena...vyāpter upalambhāt* (we know the *vyāpti* between the words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object on the one hand and the precedence of the knowledge intuiting that object on the other.)

372. RNA 28, 11-19 : *yat pramāṇasaṁvādinīścītārthavacanāṁ tat sākṣāt paramparayā vā tadarthasākṣātkārijñānapūrvakam, yathā dahano dāhaka iti vacanam ; pramāṇasaṁvādi niścītārthavacanāṁ cēdaṁ kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṁskārā ity arthataḥ kāryahetuḥ. nāsyāsiddhiḥ, sarvabhāvākṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanaḥ asya vacanasya satyārthatvāt. nāpi virodhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na cānaikāntikaḥ, vacanamātrasya saṁśayaḥ paryāśapūrvakatve'pi pramāṇaniścītārthavacanasya sākṣāt paramparayā tadarthasākṣātkārijñānapūrvakatvāt. anyathā niyameṇa pramāṇasaṁvādāyogāt.*

373. G ...*bhāvyaṁ mānasya saṁkalpārūḍhatvaṁ sambhāvyaṁ*, but M=T *bhāvyaṁ saṁkalpārūḍhasya sphuṭābhatvaṁ sambhāvyaṁ*.

saṃdhatte) another [viz. the next moment of] the mind, as the present moment of mind;

That belonging to the moment of death is also a [moment of the] mind; [Therefore, it necessarily engenders another moment of the mind]³⁷⁴.

[This is an inference] formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. There is no deviation [from the *vyāpti* of this inference] even in the case of the last moment of the mind of an arhat (*arhaccaramacitta*). For it is known only from a Buddhist tradition (*āgama*) that [an arhat, having destroyed all passions, does not receive another life after his death];³⁷⁵ and [some Buddhists are of the opinion that even the last moment of the mind of an arhat] engenders another mind free from passions³⁷⁶; moreover, the probans [of this inference] implies the qualification 'so long as [the mind is accompanied by passions]'³⁷⁷. Thus is proved the existence of the future lives. It is commonly said that all people enter into religious practices (*abhyāsa*) such as austerity, liberality,

374. A similar argument is found in TS v. 1899 and TSP : *marāṇakṣaṇavijñānaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamam, rāgiṇo hinasāṅgatvāt pūrvavijñānavat tathā. yat sarāgaṃ cittaṃ tat svopādeyacittāntarodayasamarthaṃ sarāgatvāt pūrvāvasthācittavat ; sarāgaṃ ca marāṇacittam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*

In this inference *h* is not a mind in general, but the mind beset with passions; this is implied in Mokṣākara's inference, since he says : *hetuḥ kleśe satiti viśeṣaṇāpekṣaṇāt*. Malliṣeṇa cites this inference of our author for the sake of criticism, ascribing it to Mokṣākara (SVM 123, 18-20 : *yac ca mokṣākaraguptena yac cittaṃ tac cittāntaram pratisaṃdhatte yathēdānīmītanam cittaṃ, cittaṃ ca marāṇakālabhāvīti bhavaparamparāsiddhaye pramānam uktam tad vyartham....*

375. Cf. E. Krishnamacharya's commentary in G 98-99. In TS, the Lokāyata formulates a syllogism which denies the next life (TS v. 1863) saying that a mind at death and beset with desires does not engender another moment of the mind because it is also a mind at death, just as the last moment of the mind of an arhat. To this replies TS v. 1916, pointing out that the opponent cannot adopt the Buddhist doctrine that the last moment of the mind of an arhat does not engender another moment of the mind. For if he presupposes a Buddhist doctrine for his inference, he has to admit another Buddhist doctrine, that of the next life too. Mokṣākara's expression *tasyāgamamātrapratitvat* is too brief to convey his intention. But probably he means the same as TS, i.e. the doctrine of the last moment of the mind of an arhat is known to the opponent only by a Buddhist tradition; so he cannot point out the *vyabhicāra* utilizing this theory which is not accepted by himself.

376. TS v. 1917-1918 and TSP say that some of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, say, the Mādhyamikas, are of the opinion that Buddhas reside neither in *nirvāṇa* nor in *saṃsāra*. This means that the last moment of the mind of Buddhas engenders another free from passions.

377. See n. 374 above. M *hetuḥ kleśe sati viśeṣaṇa....*, but G, T *...kleśe satiti viśeṣaṇa....* which is better,

learning etc. [because of the impressions caused by] their practices in former lives. And in order to establish this, we will formulate a proof :

Every [moment of the] mind is preceded by another [moment of the] mind, as the present moment of the mind;

That belonging to the time of birth is also a [moment of the] mind; [Therefore, it is also preceded by another, viz. a past mind].

This inference is based on a logical mark as effect³⁷⁸.

30. The doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika. (60.10) [The opponent :] “Is emancipation not possible by intuiting the truth? And the truth is unique as [Dharmakīrti himself] says :

Emancipation is [accomplished by] seeing emptiness ;
all other religious practices are for that purpose³⁷⁹.

How then can there be two kinds of omniscient beings [i. e. *sarvajña* and *sarvasarvajña*] and also different schools among Buddhists ?”

[The author :] This is not to be confuted, because the Blessed One [or the Buddha] taught all these [different doctrines] in order to introduce sentient beings [of different capacities] into truths. Thus, the Vaibhāṣika holds :

Ether and two kinds of cessation, these three are the non-produced which are eternal ;

All produced things are momentary, devoid of *ātman*, and have no creator [other than *karman*]³⁸⁰.

³⁸¹...[Although the knowledge born out of sense-organs has not the form [of atoms], the assemblage of atoms appears as an existent.] ...³⁸¹

31. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika. (63.17) The Sautrāntika holds the following theory : All that is manifested in the form of blue etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (*bāhyo'rthaḥ*), since an insentient

378. TS v. 1897 : *tasmāt tatrādivijñānaṁ svopādānabalodbhavam ; vijñānatvādihetubhya idānīmītanacittavat*, and TSP.

379. PV II, v. 254 : *sā [=saṃskāraduḥkhatā] ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmyadṛg-āśrayaḥ, muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭes tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ*. Our text seems to cite the last half of this verse. M as well as G has *muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tadarthāśeṣabhāvanā*, but T (*ston pa ṅid lta bas grol bar ḥgyur, bsgoms pa lhag ma de don yin*) agrees with PV.

380. See n. 366.

381. This verse which is found only in T is also identical in sense with the first half of JSS v. 22 (Yamaguchi, 292) : *mig las skye blo rnam med cin, mñon sum rig pa rdul gyi tshogs, blo dan ṣes bya kha che yi, bye brag smra baḥi gsuñ du bsad*. (The last half means : This is said to be the theory of the wise Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir).

(*jada*) thing is not able to become visible (*prakāśa*). Concerning this it is said :

The range of the senses [i. e. the external reality] (*indriyagocara*) is not perceptible itself, though it gives rise to the knowledge with the form of it [or the objective reality]³⁸².

The author of the [*Pramāṇavārttika*-] *Alaṃkāra*, [Prajñākaragupta] says too :

If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge] ?

If a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external³⁸³?

[The opponent :] “If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is an external reality?”

[The author :] The proof of an external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (*vyatireka*) : Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time ; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only because of our own material cause (*upādāna*=*samanantarapratyaya*)³⁸⁴, since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Therefore, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (*samanantara-pratyaya*), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality³⁸⁵.

31.1. Refutation of the soul. (64.9) However³⁸⁶, this external reality

382. *svākārajñānanakā dṛśyā nēndriyagocarāḥ*. This is identical with JSS v. 23 a-b : *mthoñ ba dbaṅ poḥi yul min te, śes pa rnam pa bcas pa skye* (Yamaguchi, 296). T of TBh translates it : *rañ rnam can śes skyed byed pa, dbaṅ poḥi spyod yul snañ ruñ min*. This verse is quoted in SVM 110, 18, in which *-jñāna-* is changed into *-buddhi-*.

383. =PVBh 366, 17 (III, v. 718) : *yadi saṃvedyate nilaṃ kathaṃ bāhyaṃ tad ucyate, na cet saṃvedyate nilaṃ kathaṃ bāhyaṃ tad ucyate*. Quoted in SVM 110, 20-21.

384. M, G *svopādānamātrabalabhāvitve sati* ; T *rañ gi ñe bar len pa tsam las ñes par snañ ba ñid du gyur na yañ*=*svopādānamātrabalapratibhāsītve sati*.

385. About the *sākāravāda* of the Sautrāntika see n. 148 above. For a similar and more detailed description of the epistemology of this school see SDS 33, 220-38, 271. Jadunatha Sinha gives a good account of it in his *Indian Realism* Chap. II. Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the accounts of the Sautrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works (E. Kanakura, Gekyo no Bunken ni mieru Kyobu-setsu, *Studies in Indology and Buddhology, presented in honour of Prof. S. Yamaguchi on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday*, pp. 55-68).

386. G *kaḥ punar* ; M=T *na punar....*

is neither a composite whole (*avayavin*), nor any of quality (*guṇa*) and the other categories conceived by other schools as depending on substances (*dravyāśrayin*), nor any of the nine kinds of substances including atoms (*paramāṇu*).

Of these, neither quality nor the others [i. e. *karman*, *sāmānya*, and *viśeṣa*] are [the external reality], since their existence is negated through the negation of the substance [which forms their substratum]. And since [the relation called] inherence (*samavāya*) cannot possibly exist when there is no substance in which [quality etc. is said to] be inherent, we do not care for a separate criticism of this [inherence] here³⁸⁷. Substance is of nine kinds, i. e., earth (*prthivī*), water (*āpas*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), direction (*diś*), soul (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*).

(64.14) Firstly, the following inference may be formulated for the negation of the soul :

Knowledge which occurs occasionally is necessarily preceded by an occasionally existent cause, as e. g. the knowledge of lightning.

The consciousness of the self (*ahamkārajñāna*) occurs only occasionally,

[Therefore, it is preceded by, or has as its object, an occasionally existent cause, and not a permanent thing such as a soul].

This inference is in sense based on the principle of causality. The probans has no fallacy of illegitimacy, since the presence of knowledge-ness [*h*] in self-consciousness (*ahamkāra*), *p*, is established by perception. Nor is the qualifier 'occasionally existent' illegitimate, because actually we are not always conscious of ourselves. It is not incompatible, since we see it in the *sapakṣa* : nor is it inconclusive, since the *vyāpti* between the occasionally occurring knowledge and the occasionally occurring cause of it is as well attested by perception and non-perception as that between smoke and fire. If otherwise occasional knowledge occurs because of a non-occasional cause, the absurdity would follow that it does not occur because of an occasional cause. If [you contend that it has] not a definite cause, it is tantamount to saying that it has no cause at all. If none the less this inference is said to be inconclusive, even a well known probans such as smoke [for the proof of fire] would be inconclusive too, because we see no difference between them. Or, we may say, if the consciousness of the

387. G *dūṣaṇam api*, but M, T *taddūṣaṇam atra...*

self is preceded by a non-occasional cause, it would occur continually, which is obviously not the case. For a cause must be by nature functioning ; what is not functioning can be called a cause only figuratively ;³⁸⁸ and what is functioning and what is not are not identical. If they were identical, then even that which is functioning would become that which is not functioning, since it could have the nature of that [which is not functioning]³⁸⁹. Moreover, if the consciousness of the self were [constantly] produced by a non-occasional cause, other knowledge would necessarily occur together with it [which is not permissible to the opponent³⁹⁰], since [a non-occasional, or a permanent cause is] a self-contained totality [depending on nothing else] (*avyagrasāmagrīka*) [and should occur always]. You may contend that a soul is not the cause, but the object of the consciousness of the self. But we say 'No'. There cannot be an object [of knowledge] which is not a cause [of knowledge], since otherwise everything could be its object (*atiprasaṅgāt*).

31.2. Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind. (65.13)

As to the problem whether or not³⁹¹ there is any real entity called ether, we say there is not. For at a place where there is already a resisting substance (*sapratigham dravyam*), ether does not make room [for it] ; and at a place where there is nothing, room [for a thing] is made by virtue of the very absence [without the intervention of ether]. Where then will ether make room ?³⁹² Inasmuch as [the essential function of] ether is said to consist in making room (*avakāśapradā*), if ether were existent, there should be room at all times, at all places and by all means ; but this is not the case. Therefore, we comprehend that there is no ether. This refutation, however, is made from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika³⁹³.

(66.1) Others [like the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas] hold that ether has sound as its quality ; besides, it [=ether] is said to be a single entity. [But this is untenable, since] if so, no sounds, depending on the common substratum, could be heard separately. Thus, a sound sup-

388. G=T *upacārikakāraṇatvāt* ; M *upacārataḥ kāraṇatvāt*.

389. G *kurvato'py utpattiḥ*, but M=T *kurvato'py akurvadrūpāpattiḥ*.

390. In connection with this, perhaps we should recall NS 1. 1. 16 : *yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam*.

391. M *ta nāsti vā*. *ta* must be omitted.

392. *vā* in M 65, 15 and 16 are omitted in G, T.

393. Read *Vaibhāṣika*- instead of *vaimāṣika*.

posed to have occurred at a distant place would be heard as loud as that at a close place ; or otherwise there should be the necessary corollary³⁹⁴ that if a distant sound is not heard, a close sound would not be heard either. Again, direction as well as time is also held to be a single unity. This entails that the notion of 'east' and 'before' (*pūrva*) as well as 'west' and 'after' (*apara*) is impossible. The same logic may be applied to [the proof that] the mind (*manas*) cannot be permanent. For, the present opponent infers the existence of a mind on the ground that [two or more pieces of] knowledge do not in reality occur simultaneously [and that this fact is due to the existence of a separate entity called mind which mediates between the soul and knowledge]³⁹⁵. [But this is against our experience] for we experience plural knowledge simultaneously as when we see many girls dancing. And if the mind is permanent³⁹⁶, then it is not correct to maintain that plural knowledge [occur successively]. Therefore there is no mind either.

31.3. Refutation of earth, water, fire and air. (66.10) [The substances of] earth and the rest are still left [to be examined]. They are regarded [by the opponent] to be of two kinds according as they are seen as a composite whole (*avayavin*) or as the component atoms (*paramāṇu*).³⁹⁷ Of these, a composite whole such as a jar is known to have been made up of atoms through a definite process of formation beginning with the combination of two atoms, etc.; but we [have refuted it] saying that the

394. G *anaikāntikaḥ*, but M=T *ekāntaḥ*.

395. See n. 390 above.

396. *nityam* omitted in G, T. In this case the sentence may be translated : If there will be a mind, then [the simultaneous occurrence of] plural knowledge [which we experience, for instance, when seeing dancing girls] will not be possible. Mokṣākara might mean this, but if so, the permanency of a mind referred to at 66, 5 would remain unrefuted, though the singleness of it could be refuted. TS v. 632 (*nitye tu manasi prāptāḥ pratyayā yaugapadyataḥ, tena hetur iha prokto bhavatiṣṭavighātakṛt*) as well as the verses cited in G 203, 7-11 (of which the source is not mentioned by Krishnamacharya) refutes the permanency of a mind, saying that if a mind is permanent, plural knowledge would occur simultaneously. Thus, if we read *nityam* of M 66, 7 we must understand the sentence to mean : If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would not occur successively ; or dropping *na* in M 66, 8 we should read : If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would occur simultaneously, which contradicts your theory.

397. Of the nine substances, the first four, viz. earth, water, fire, and air are permanent when seen as atoms, and impermanent as effects made of atoms ; ether, time and direction are single, permanent and ubiquitous ; the soul is permanent and ubiquitous ; the mind is permanent. Cf. NK 370, 20-23 ; TS v. 550, etc.

non-perception of that [composite whole] which is [said to be] by nature perceptible does sublate [its existence].³⁹⁸ [The following objection may be raised:] “Without the composite whole, how is this [jar] manifested as a single entity?” To this we have already replied [quoting the verse of Dharmakīrti :]³⁹⁹

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i. e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.

[The opponent:] “What is meant by the manifestation of parts?”

[The Sautrāntika:] It is simply the manifestation of atoms, which, being placed in different directions are piled together (*saṃcita*).

[The opponent:] “If so, why did Dharmottara say that grossness (*sthaulya*) is the quality of the manifested (*pratibhāsadharmā*)⁴⁰⁰ [and not the quality of the real]?”

[The Sautrāntika:] The significance of the words is as follows: An [external] reality (*artha*) is not known itself, because it is said that the knowledge of an [external] reality is possible only in the secondary sense.⁴⁰¹ Therefore, this manifestation of blue etc. is perceived as pervading different spots; the very manifestation is none other than the manifestation of grossness [and there is no separate, gross entity].

(67.2) To the Vaiśeṣikas it is atoms that make up the composite whole; according to the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas, atoms [when united together] come directly into the range of perception; according to the Sautrāntikas [however, they are not perceptible themselves, but] are just liable to leave an impress of their own forms [in our knowledge]. But these atoms are not existent at all according to the theory of the Yogācāras.

398. See § 7. 2.

399. See § 7. 2 and n. 140. T *tha dad pa thag ñe bar gnas pa rnams kyi kho na de lta de lta snañ ste, de dañ* (n. *dbañ*) *ldan pa ḡgaḡ žig kho na slar yañ dbye ba med par rtogs par ḡgyur ro*. The Tibetan translator seems not to have realised that this is the same verse as that in M 22, 14 (§ 7.2) where he gives a different translation. In the present translation he missed out *na* in the last half.

400. *pratibhāsadharmāḥ sthaulyam*, not identified. But a similar passage is found in DP 43, 8-10 : *ekajñānagrāhyās tathāvidhā bahavaḥ paramāṇavaḥ sthūla iti. eko'yaṁ sthūla iti tu tathābhūtapratibhāsāśrayeṇa vyavasthāpyamānatvāt pratibhāsadharmā ity ucyate, na vastudharmāḥ, pratyekam aparisaṃpāter iti*.

401. *bhāktam syād arthavedanam*. Not identified.

32. The doctrine of the Yogācāra school. (67.5) [The Yogācārin's argument for the refutation of atoms is as follows:] A single atom can never be established, for when an atom is placed in the middle, surrounded by [other] atoms existing over, below, and on the four sides of it, it would necessarily have six parts [thus the argument for the alleged indivisibility of an atom falls to the ground]. For [if it is an indivisible entity] the same atom in the middle which is in contact with another atom in the front is not able to be in contact with another at the back, since the former two atoms would necessarily occupy one and the same spot. ⁴⁰²...In the same way, if the atom at the back is in the same spot [in which the middle and front atoms are placed], then the middle atom alone could be in contact with it. ⁴⁰² Even when there is no direct contact [between atoms], if they face each other, it will come to the same thing. Thus, a bodily object would be reduced to the size of an atom [which is absurd].

(67.13) Or we can examine the problem as follows : ⁴⁰³...What is visible cannot consist of one [atom] as is understood by the examination stated immediately above ; ⁴⁰³ nor can it consist of many [atoms] since one atom is not united with another. ⁴⁰⁴ That is to say, if this [atom] has parts, how can it be an atom [which must be indivisible]? Or if it has no parts, all bodily objects, say a mountain or the earth, would be reduced to the size of an atom, because conjoined atoms, being wholly united, all occupy one and the same spot. Therefore it is necessary to admit that two atoms [i.e. that in the front and that at the back] are distinct in existence from each other. And just as they are [distinct], just so are those conjoined atoms at the upper, lower, southern and northern part distinct in existence from one another. Thus, it will be a necessary corollary that an atom is six-sided (*ṣaḍaṃśatā*), as is said by [Vasubandhu] as follows :

If an atom were conjoined with six other atoms simultaneously, it would be six-sided ; if six atoms occupied the same spot, a bodily

402. G *evaṃ ca sa pūrvaparamāṇusahitasvabhāvo'paraḥ paramāṇuṃ pratyāsided yadi so 'pi tatra syāt* ; T *de ltar ni rdur phra rab śar ma dañ ñe baḥi rañ bzin de rdur phra rab ma rtogs pas gal te ḥgyur na de yañ der ḥgyur ro*. Both G and T seem to be defective. I follow M.

403. Omitted in G.

404. T *rdul phra rab kyi* [n. inserts *cha*] *śas la* (p. d. *las*) *rdul phra rab mi dmigs paḥi phyir ro*. I follow M, G.

object would be of the size of an atom.⁴⁰⁵

And when an atom is not established, a number [of atoms] are also not established; thus there are no atoms at all.⁴⁰⁶

(68.6) [The opponent:] “If there is no external object, what is this cognized image (*pratibhāsa*) related to?”

[The Yogācārin:] The image of our cognition occurs because of our untrue, latent seeds of representation [which have been stored in subconsciousness] since the beginningless past (*anādivitathavāsana*),⁴⁰⁷ and is seen⁴⁰⁸ [as if external], though it has nothing [external] as its object. Thus: the image of our cognition will have an object only if there existed an external reality to be referred to. But this [external reality] must be either a composite whole or the accumulated atoms. But both the contentions have been refuted by the proof contradicting them which we have stated just above, and have no more reality than a day-lotus in the sky. Concerning this the following is said:

There is no composite whole, nor are atoms real; the image of cognition has no object, but resembles experiences in a dream.⁴⁰⁹

Knowledge in a dream is known to have no [external] object; and there is no difference between the experience in a dream and that in a state of waking, since both are seen to be the same in every respect. Knowledge, when it has not acquired a different feature from the knowledge having no [external] object, is not able to experience what is related to an [external] object. [This argument may be formulated into the following

405. =*Viṃśatikā*, v. 12 : *ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā, ṣaṇṇāṃ samāna-deśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ*.

406. Detailed refutation of *paramāṇu* by the Yogācārins is found in various texts such as *Viṃśatikā*; *Dignāga's Ālambanaparikṣāvṛtti*; TS *Bāhyārthaparikṣā* v. 1967–1998.

407. M=G *vitata*, but T *ji lta ba bzin ma yin paḥi*=*vitatha*.

408. G *sambhāvyate* (made possible); M=T *lakṣyate*.

409. *na sann avayavi nāma na santi paramāṇavaḥ, pratibhāso nirālambaḥ svapnānubhavasamṇibhaḥ*. The first half is missing in G, T, and M has *san nāvayavi* which must be corrected into *sann avayavi*. The source is not identified, but this verse is again identical with JSS v. 25 (Yamaguchi, 302) : *cha śas can źes bya med ciñ, phra rab rdul rnam med pa dañ, so sor snañ ba dmigs med dañ, ñams su myoñ ba rmi lam ḥdra*. Here, however, the last *pāda* reads ‘experience resembles a dream’.

410. G *dvitīyam*; M *dvitīyaṃ jñānam*; T *dvitīyam ākāśakeśadarśanam*. *Ākāśakeśa*, a hair in the sky, is the illusion of a hair floating in the sky seen by a man with diseased eyes, and is used as a simile of a cognition which occurs without depending on an external reality.

syllogism :]

Knowledge, which is not different from the knowledge having no [external] object, has no [external] object, as the second cognition [of a hair in the sky]⁴¹⁰ is not different from the first cognition of it.

The knowledge in a state of waking, the present subject of controversy, is not different from the knowledge in a dream [which has no external object].

[Therefore it has no external object].

(69.2) [The opponent:] “If there is no external thing, then what is the ultimate reality?”⁴¹¹

[The Yogācārin:] The ultimate reality is the pure consciousness without manifoldness which is freed from stains beginning with [the bifurcation of] cognitum and cognizer (*grāhyagrāhakādikalāṅkānaṅkitam niṣpra-
pañcavijñānamātram*), as is expressed in [the following verse:]⁴¹²

Consciousness freed from cognitum and cognizer is the ultimate reality.

Again, the following is said [by Dharmakīrti:]⁴¹³

[Excepting knowledge itself], there is nothing to be experienced by knowledge, and [likewise] it has no experience other [than self-experience]; since knowledge is deprived of cognitum and cognizer, it is illuminated by itself.

The Blessed One said too:⁴¹⁴

External objects are not existent as ignorant people imagine; the mind, urged by the latent seeds of representation, takes the form of the external thing.

411. M *paramārthasat* ; G, T *sat*.

412. *grāhyagrāhakanirmuktaṁ vijñānaṁ paramārthasat*. This is identical with JSS v. 26 a-b (Yamaguchi, 302) : *gzuñ dañ ḥdsin pa las grol baḥi, rnam śes dam paḥi don du yod*. A very similar verse is found in JNA 435, 9 : *grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryād vijñānaṁ paramārthasat, ekānekaviyogena vijñānasyāpi śūnyatā*.

413. PV III, v. 328 : *nānyo'nubhāvyas tenā [=jñānenā] sti tasya nānubhavo'paraḥ, tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate*, which is changed by our author into *nānyo'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo'paraḥ, grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate*. This change is followed by Vādirājasūri (NVV I, 317, 19), Hemacandra (AYV 111, 1-2), Mādhava (SDS 31, 196-197) and Guṇaratna (TRD 40, 13-14).

414. *bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate, vāsanāluṭhitam cittam arthābhāsaṁ pravartate*. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Nanjio ed. 285, 4-5, where *vāsanair luṭhitam* is given for *vāsanāluṭhitam*.

32.1. Sākāravāda and nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins. (69.11) Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i. e. Sākārajñānavādins] maintain the following: All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or the object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, we conclude that there is neither cognitum nor cognizer for anyone; through logical construction (*kalpanā*), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (*ākāra*),⁴¹⁵ is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer.

Others [i. e. Nirākārajñānavādinaḥ Yogācāriṇaḥ] however, argue as follows: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday].⁴¹⁶ Those images of cognition (*ākāra*) are indeed not real and become perceptible by being shown by nescience (*avidyā*). Therefore the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is not existent,⁴¹⁷ the quality of cognizer, which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized], also does not exist.⁴¹⁸

33. The doctrine of the Mādhyamika. (69.19) According to the view of the Mādhyamikas, however, even that knowledge [which is admitted as real by the Yogācārins] is not in reality existent, since it cannot withstand scrutiny. For in the world they say that what is endowed with independent essence (*svabhāva*) is ultimately real. But when examined, that [knowledge] cannot have an independent essence, be this single or plural [i. e. uniform or variegated],⁴¹⁹ since it does not withstand the ex-

415. Read *sākāram* instead of M 69, 15 *sākāra*. This word is missing in G, T, but has a very important significance.

416. The second simile is found only in T: *ston ka dri ma med paḥi ṇin phyed kyi nam mkhaḥ lta bu*.

417. M, G *grāhyābhāvāt*; T *rnam pa thams cad du de med paḥi phyir*=*sarvathā tad-abbhāvāt*.

418. See Appendix II.

419. M *pūrvavicārāsahatvāt*; T *gcig paḥam du ma rnam par dpyad pa śhar bjod paḥi phyir ro* (since we have before stated the examination of singleness and plurality); G omits it totally. The author refers to the negation of the existence of an atom as well as atoms, which is demonstrated at the beginning of the present section. A more elaborate argument of the Mādhyamika against the existence of cognition is found in PV III, v. 209–210: *citrāvabhāseṣu artheṣu yady ekaṭvaṃ na yuḥyate, saiva tāvat kathaṃ buddhir ekā citrāvabhāsinī. idaṃ vastubalāyātāṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ, yathā yathārthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā*. When a controversy as to how cognition which is by nature

amination which is stated above [regarding atoms]. Concerning this, the following is said:⁴²⁰

To the wise, that knowledge [which the Vijñānavādins admit as real] is also not ultimately real, since it, as the sky-lotus, is deprived of single or plural essence.

The revered Dharmakīrti said too:⁴²¹

An essential form by which things are defined does not in truth exist; because single or plural essence is not present in these things.

In the same way, the following is said by the author of the [*Pramāṇa-vārttika*]-*Alaṃkāra* [Prajñākaragupta]:

When neither conceptual knowledge nor the other [i.e. indeterminate perception] has validity, who is then to blame even if everything is shattered? ⁴²²

In the sense of the highest truth, there is no difference between the fettered and the emancipated, since no difference appears to those who see that all things are equal.⁴²³

The syllogism [for the proof] also runs as follows:

A thing of which the essential quality is determined neither as single nor as plural is not ultimately real, as e.g. the sky-lotus;
Knowledge has not an essential quality either single or plural;
[Therefore, it is not ultimately real].

single can grasp its object having plural aspects is going on, the Mādhyamika enters into the arena and argues that after all cognition is not ultimately real because we cannot determine cognition to be either single or plural, which means it has no *svabhāva*, and that therefore the Mādhyamika's doctrine of universal emptiness is superior to the Vijñānavāda. The same argument is abbreviated by Jñānaśrīmitra at the beginning of the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (JNA 367, 22-368, 5).

420. *nēṣṭaṃ tad api dhirāṇāṃ vijñānaṃ pāramārthikam, ekānekaśvabhāvena viyogād ga-ganābjavat.* This is again identical with JSS v. 27 (Yamaguchi, 315): *rnam śes dam paḥi don ldan pa, de yaṅ brtan rnam mi ḥdod de. gcig daṅ du maḥi raṅ bzin daṅ, bral phyir nam mkhaḥi padma bzin.*

421. =PV III, v. 360: *bhāvā yena nirūpyante tad rūpaṃ nāsti tattvataḥ, yasmād ekam anekaṃ ca rūpaṃ teṣāṃ na vidyate.* In our text *ca* and *teṣāṃ* are changed into *vā* and *teṣu* respectively.

422. =PVBh 382, 24-25 (III, v. 107): *yadā tu na vikalpasya na cānyasya pramāṇatā, tadā viśīryamāṇe 'pi sarvasmin ko'parādhyatu.*

423. =PVBh 382,8 (III, v. 902): *baddhamuktādibhedo'pi naivāsti paramārthataḥ, bhedo hi nāvabhāty eva sarvatra samadarśinām.* Mokṣākara changes *naivāsti* into *na cāsti*. For *baddhamukta*, G has *bandhamukta*- and T *buddhasvapna*-(*sad daṅ rmi lam sog*s).

This inference is based on the principle of the non-perception of the pervader [of the probans] (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). Firstly, this is not an illegitimate probans, since it is quite manifest that an essential quality, single or plural, cannot be possessed by knowledge with an image, just as it is not by an external thing. For the object, concerning which ordinary people talk of the external thing, is none other than cognition itself to those who maintain [that the world is merely] knowledge with various images (*sākāravādin*). Therefore, the [argument], which, against [the view of ordinary] people, contradicts externally existent things plays the same role of a contradictor also concerning the internally existent. A gross object is not admitted as consisting of one atom or many atoms.⁴²⁴ And this image which [according to you] consists of knowledge⁴²⁵ may be a single gross image or plural images divisible into many atoms [of knowledge]; but in either case you cannot avoid the [same kind of] criticism [as was] made against the assertion of [the reality of] external objects.

⁴²⁶...The distinguished Bodhisattva [Śāntirakṣita] said in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* :

If knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms....⁴²⁶

424. M=T...*tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bādhakaṃ tad evāntarbhāve'pi bādhakam, na hi sthūlam ekam anekaṃ ca paramāṇurūpam apīṣyate. G tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bhāvabādhakaṃ tad evāntarbhāve'piti bādhakena hi...paramāṇurūpam apophyate.* I follow M, but G is not different from it in sense.

425. M *viññānātmakānām ayam ākāro*, but G, T (*rnam par śes paḥi bdag ñid du gyur paḥi rnam pa ḥdi...*) *viññānātmakaś cāyam ākāro...* The latter reading is definitely better. About *viññānātmaka-* *paramāṇu-* and *sthūla* see for instance RNA 123, 4ff.

426. This is inserted between *bhinnaḥ* and *ubhayathāpi* (M 91, 3) only in T : *dbu ma rgyan du bdag ñid chen po bo-dhi-sa-tva yis, ci ste rnam paḥi graṃs bzin du rnam par śes pa khas len na, de tshe rdul phran ḥdrar gyur paḥi dpyad pa ḥdi las bzlog par dkaḥ, źes gsuṃs so.* Iyengar gives his own restoration into Skt. in M 93, 13-16, which is not very faithful to the Tibetan especially in the last half of the verse. The verse is a verbatim quotation from *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v. 47 (Peking ed. 50, b4). Śāntirakṣita's own interpretation of it is found in *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, Peking ed. 62, b7-63, a5 : *gal te bar med par gnas paḥi rdul phra rab kyi ño bo rnams ltar rigs mthun paḥi rnam par śes pa maṃ po ḥdi dag kyaṃ ḥbyuṃ na, deḥi tshe rdul phra rab la dpyad pa ci ḥdra bas śnar byas pa de ḥdra ba ñid rnam par śes pa rnams la yaṃ bzlog par dkaḥ bar ḥgyur te....* Then he gives his criticism of atoms which is very similar to the passage we met in M 67, 7-12. It is quite likely that this portion is a later interpolation, and so I have translated it after the present Skt. sentence is finished.

For that is not [meant merely as] a criticism relating to external things but also as applicable to what is not [external.]⁴²⁷

The objection that a contradiction pertaining to a bodily object (*mūrti*) is not [applicable] to a bodiless [image] consisting of knowledge is also not cogent. For even knowledge, inasmuch as it is [maintained to be] endowed with a form, has a shape, since this image pervading a certain space⁴²⁸ is none other than a shape (*mūrti*).

Here ends the chapter 'Inference for others' of the *Tarkabhāṣā* written by the Buddhist monk Mokṣākaragupta, great doctor⁴²⁹ of the monastery of Jagaddhala.⁴³⁰

By the merit I have gained by writing this *Tarkabhāṣā* may all people in this world attain Buddhahood !

427. The text seems confused here and I follow the amended text of G which reads : *na hi tad bahirbhāvanibandhanam dūṣaṇam, yena tadabhāvena bhavet* (cf. *Śuddhipātra* in G, 111). M has : *na hi tadviññāne bahirbhāvanibandhanam dūṣaṇam yena tadbhāvena bhavet* (Concerning knowledge you cannot put forward a criticism relating to external things, which is possible only as that relating to external things.) This may be understood as a part of the objection in M 71, 5-6. T. : *gañ gi phyr gañ gis de yod na yod par ḥgyur ba rnam par śes pa de phyi rol gyi dños poḥi rgyu mtshan can* (d. p. omit *can*) *ma yin te* could be understood as M.

428. G *deśacittānām ākāro* ; T *yul la rnam par rgyas pa dañ ldan paḥi rnam pa...* = M *deśavitānavān ākāro*.

429. G *mahāyati*, but M, T *mahāpaṇḍita*.

430. G *śrīmadrājajagaddhala* ; M, T *śrīmanmahājagaddhala*.

APPENDIX

Appendix I=n.212. Buddhist logicians set forth various kinds of the classification of negative inference (cf. the diagram). Dharmakīrti himself classified it into four kinds with four subordinate forms (PV I, v. 4 and *Svavṛtti*), three kinds (HB), and eleven kinds (NB). The four basic kinds proposed in PV I, v. 4 are : 1) *viruddhasiddhi*=*svabhāviruddhopalabdhi* (illustrated by *na śītasparśo 'trāgneḥ*) ; 2) *viruddhakāryasiddhi*=*svabhāviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (*na śītasparśo 'tra dhūmāt*) ; 3) *hetvasiddhi*=*kāraṇānupalabdhi* (*nātra dhūmo 'nagneḥ*) ; 4) *dṛśyātmanor asiddhiḥ*=*svabhāvānupalabdhi* (*nātra dhūmo 'nupalabdheḥ*). However, in his *Svavṛtti* on the same verse Dharmakīrti actually enumerated six forms, adding a derivative form to each 1) and 4), viz., 1a) *vyāpakaviruddhasiddhi*=*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* (*na tuśārasparśo 'trāgneḥ*) ; 4a) *vyāpakasvabhāvāsiddhi*=*vyāpakānupalabdhi* (*nātra śīmśapā vrkṣābhāvāt*). Furthermore, in PV I, v. 5 he adds 3a) *tadviruddhanimittasyôpalabdhiḥ*=*kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi* (*nāsya romaharśādiviśeṣāḥ santi samnihitadahanaviśeṣatvāt*), and in the *Svavṛtti* on it he gives 3b) *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (6, 15-16 : *etena tatkāryād api tadviruddhakāryābhāvagatir uktā veditavyā yathā na romaharśādiviśeṣayuktapuruṣavān*

ayaṃ pradeśo dhūmāt). Thus he concludes that non-cognition is eightfold due to the variety of application or syllogistic argument (6, 18 :*iyam prayogabhedād aṣṭadhānupalabdhiḥ*). These eight formulae correspond in the order of our enumeration to Nos. 5, 9, 3, 1, 8, 4, 7, 11 of Mokṣākara's classification respectively. It is to be noted that *kāryānupalabdhi* and its three subordinate forms (Nos. 2, 6, 10, 14 in TBh) are totally missing in PV.

In HB Dharmakīrti proposes a classification into three kinds, viz., *kāraṇānupalabdhi*, *vyāpakānupalabdhi* and *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (HBT 202, 15 ff. : HB Reconstruction, 68, 12-13). These three formulae form the principle which underlies the classification in PV, for *kāraṇānupalabdhi* can subsume Nos. 3, 3a, and 3b in PV, *vyāpakānupalabdhi* Nos. 4a, 1a. and *svabhāvānupalabdhi* Nos. 4, 1, and 2. Arcaṭa, when commenting on HB followed Dharmakīrti's classification into three, but at the same time he enumerates at another place (6, 5-6) four kinds of *anupalabdhi*, viz., the above-named three forms of HB with *viruddhavidhi* as the fourth.

In NB Dharmakīrti gives more derivative forms than in PV, the total amounting to 11. The three new forms added in NB are : No. 6 *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* as a subordinate form of *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, No. 2 *kāryānupalabdhi* and its derivative No. 7 *kāryaviruddhopalabdhi*. *Kāryānupalabdhi* appears in NB for the first time ; adding this to the three forms in HB, we get four forms which seem to offer the basic principle for the classification of negation. In NB, however, Dharmakīrti does not explain his principle, nor does Dharmotara in his com. on NB.

What we have referred to just above form Mokṣākara's principle of classification. He takes up *svabhāva*-, *kārya*-, *kāraṇa*- and *vyāpaka-anupalabdhi* as the four basic forms. Dharmakīrti in NB has already given four forms related to *svabhāva* (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6) and this suggests that three subordinate forms may be enumerated under each of the four basic forms, although Dharmakīrti himself actually gave only one subordinate form under *kāryānupalabdhi*, two under *kāraṇānupalabdhi* and one under *vyāpakānupalabdhi*. Now Mokṣākara formally gives three subordinate forms to each of the four basic forms, adding as the result five forms which lacked in NB. Thus, the total number becomes 16. TSop followed TBh in classifying *anupalabdhi* into 16 forms, though the order of enumeration is a little different between the two.

Durvekamiśra, the commentator on NBT clearly knew the classification into 16. He says in DP 124, 15 that negation is to be regarded as of 16 kinds (...*ṣoḍaśaparakārēti tu draṣṭavyam*) and in DP 140, 10 ff. that 11 forms enumerated in NB and NBT are a synecdoche (*upalakṣaṇa*) since more forms may be added. Saying so, he enumerates three more forms : *vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (No. 12 of TBh), *kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (No. 10) and *vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi* (No. 16), illustrating each of them by the same inference as in TBh. And then, he says (DP 141, 1-2) that there are some people who add another two forms, viz. *kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi* (No. 14 of TBh) and *kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi* (No. 15), giving again the same illustrations as in TBh. Thus, Durveka himself classified negation into 14 forms and at the same time knew that the classification into 16 was made by some people.

The problem is : Who are some people referred to by Durveka ? So far as we know, the classification into 16 forms is clearly described only in TBh and TSop, both of which seem to be posterior to DP. According to the editor of DP, Durvekamiśra is a pupil of Jitāri, who was a teacher of Atīśa. That is to say, Durveka is a contemporary of Jñānaśrīmitra, who preceded Mokṣākara by more than two generations. Therefore, Durveka cannot refer to Mokṣākara as well as Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop. It is most likely, therefore, that the classification of negation into 16 kinds existed before Mokṣākara. Jñānaśrīmitra mentions *vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*, which is admitted by Durveka and

Classification of anupalabdhi

TBh	PV	HB	NB ; NBT	DP	Tsop
1 svabhāva-anupalabdhi	4 dṛśyātmanor asiddhi	3 svabhāva-anup.	1 svabhāva-anup. (s. II, 32)	ibid	1
5 svabhāva-viruddha- upalabdhi	1 viruddha-siddhi		4 svabhāva-viruddha- upa. (II, 35)	ibid	5
9 svabhāva-viruddha- kārya-upa.	2 viruddha-kārya- siddhi		5 viruddha-kārya- upa. (II, 36)	ibid	13
13 svabhāva-viruddha- vyāpta-upa.			6 viruddha-vyāpta- upa. (II, 37)	ibid	9
2 kārya-anupalabdhi			2 kārya-anupalabdhi (II, 33)	ibid	4
6 kārya-viruddha-upa.			7 kārya-viruddha- upa. (II, 38)	ibid	8
10 kārya-viruddha- kārya-upa.				10 kāryaviruddha- kārya-upa.	16
14 kārya-viruddha- vyāpta-upa.				15 kāryaviruddha- vyāpta-upa.	12
3 kāraṇa-anupalabdhi	3 hetv-asiddhi	1 kāraṇa-anup.	9 kāraṇa-anupa. (II, 40)	ibid	2
7 kāraṇa-viruddha- upa.	3a tad-viruddha-nimi- ttasya-upalabdhi		10 kāraṇa-viruddha- upa. (II, 41)	ibid	6
11 kāraṇa-virudha- kārya-upa.	3b kāraṇa-viruddha- kārya-upa.		11 kāraṇa-viruddha- kārya-upa. (II, 42)	ibid	14
15 kāraṇa-viruddha- vyāpta-upa.				16 kāraṇaviruddha- vyāpta-upa.	10
4 vyāpaka-anupalabdhi	4a vyāpaka-svabhāva- asiddhi	2 vyāpaka-anup.	3 vyāpaka-anup. (II, 34)	ibid	3
8 vyāpaka-viruddha- upa.	1a vyāpaka-viruddha siddhi		8 vyāpaka-viruddha- upa. (II, 39)	ibid	7
12 vyāpaka-viruddha- kārya-upa.				12 vyāpakaviruddha- kārya-upa.	15
16 vyāpaka-viruddha- vyāpta-upa.				14 vyāpakaviruddha- vyāpta-upa.	11

corresponds to No. 12 of TBh (cf. JNA 190, 2), and this suggests that Jñānaśrī knew more forms than PV, NB and NBT, and that it is the group of logicians headed by him who first proposed the classification into 16 kinds. But I cannot produce further evidence for it.

Appendix II=n. 418. A similar description of the *sākāra*- and *nirākāra-vijñānavāda* of the Yogācārins appears in Bodhibhadra's commentary on JSS, Peking ed., 51, b3 ff. which is translated into Japanese by Yamaguchi (308): *hdir rnal hbyor spyod pa ni rnam pa gñis te, rnam pa dañ bcas pa dañ, rnam pa med paḥo. de la rnam pa dañ bcas pa ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glañ po la sogs pa dag gi ḥdod pa ste, rnam pa gžan gyi dbaṅ du ston pas ji skad du : nañ gi šes byaḥi ño bo ni, phyi rol ltar nañ (snañ?) gañ yin te, don yin šes bya ba la sogs pa ste rnam par šes paḥi tshogs drug tu smra baḥo. rnam pa de med pa ni slob dpon hphags pa thogs med la sogs pa ste, de dag rnam pa kun tu brtags pa rab rib can gyi skra šad la sogs pa ltar smra bas, don ni don tu grub ḥgyur na, mi rtog ye šes med par ḥgyur, de med pas na sañs rgyas ñid, thob par ḥthad pa ma yin no. de bzin du, mi rtog ye šes rgyu ba la, don kun snañ ba med phyr yañ, don med khoñ du chud par bya, de med pas na rnam rig med ces brjod ciñ, rnam par šes paḥi tshogs brgyad dañ, kha cig cig pur smra ba ste. gcig pu ñid ni rnam pa dañ bcas pa dag la yañ kha cig go.*

Tr. : Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, [those who maintain that knowledge is] always [endowed] with images (*sākāra*) and [those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is] without images (*nirākāra*). Of these, *sākāra* is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), as is said [in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* v. 6 as follows]: “The object of cognition is the same as the internal image which appears as if it were externally existent...” They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. *Nirākāra* is taught by Ācārya Ārya Asaṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) and are [as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness. It is said [in *Mahāyānasamgraha*, ed. Lamotte, Chap. II, 14b. c=VIII, 20. c]: “If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained”. And again [*Mahāyānasamgraha*, Chap. II, 14b. f=VIII, 20. f]: “Where non-conceptual knowledge occurs, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object. Since it is not existent, the content of cognition is also not existent”. They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind [of cognition]. This theory of one kind [of cognition] is maintained also by some of the *Sākāravādins*.

In continuation to n. 148 above, I will give here a brief description of the development of the *sākāra*- and *nirākāra-vāda* in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to Ratnākaraśānti (see the quotation from his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* below), the Mādhyamikas as well as the Yogācārins are each divided into two groups, one maintaining *sākāravāda* and the other holding *nirākāravāda*. But the most important development is that among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntikas thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārins advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all and that the world is none other than our ideas which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārins, the image of cognition is the representation of our mind: and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus all the Yogācārins must be *sākāravādins* so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to an emancipated person, who is supposed to

have acquired *nirvikalpakajñāna* or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is free from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they thought this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal specks born from our *vāsanā*. This is the essential of the *nirākārajñānavāda* held by some of the Yogācārins. But others from the same school criticised this theory saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise a sort of the unfavourable doctrine of *asatkhyāti* would follow. Every cognition, so long as it is knowledge, must have an image, and there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking. This is the essential point of the *sākārajñānavāda* of the Yogācārins.

What I have depicted above is the fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding *sākāra* and *nirākāra*, and must have been developed after Dharmakīrti and reached its final phase at the time of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra. Jñānaśrimitra, a *sākāravādin*, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakīrti, while Ratnākaraśānti, a *nirākāravādin*, seems to be akin to Śāntirakṣita. We are not sure of characteristics of the controversy before Dharmakīrti. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, etc. represented the *sākāravāda*, and Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc. the *nirākāravāda*. His opinion seems to be mainly based on the above passage of Bodhibhadra's and Hsüan-chuang's description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* with K'uei-chi's com. As well known, however, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. None the less, I think that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to the controversy of *sākāra* and *nirākāra* that is known from Sanskrit sources. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives the best survey.

Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, S. 396-397 : Die folgende Übersetzungsprobe behandelt ... die Lehre von den Teilen des Erkennens. Über diesen Gegenstand herrschten nach den Mitteilungen Hiuan-Tsang's die verschiedensten Ansichten. Teilweise hielt man an der Auffassung Vasubandhus fest, nach der im Erkennen das Bild des Objektes erscheint, ohne dass ausdrücklich Teile unterschieden würden. Meist nahm man nach dem Vorgang Dignāgas drei Teile an. Das war auch die Ansicht Sthiramatis. Dharmapāla fügte schliesslich noch einen vierten Teil hinzu. Der Gegensatz zwischen Sthiramati und Dharmapāla beruht aber auf diesem Gebiet weniger auf der Zahl der angenommenen Teile, sondern auf folgendem. Nach Sthiramati ist nur der Bewusstseinsteil (*svasaṃvedana-bhāga*) wirklich, der Bild- (*grāhya-*) und Blickteil (*grāhaka-bhāga*) ist bloss Vorstellung. Nach Dharmapāla sind alle Teile wirklich. Diese Meinungsverschiedenheit hat ihre tieferen Gründe. Sthiramati folgt nämlich der Ansicht Maitreya-nāthas und Vasubandhus, nach der jedes Erkennen Vorstellung ist. Infolgedessen gehört der Bild- und Blickteil jedes Erkennens dem vorgestellten Wesen (*parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ*) an und ist unwirklich. Nur der Bewusstseinsteil fällt ins Bereich des abhängigen Wesens (*paratantraḥ svabhāvaḥ*) und ist wirklich. Dharmapāla greift dagegen den Gedanken Asaṅgas auf, dass die Vorstellung nur dem Denken zukommt, und führt ihn, vielleicht im Anschluss an Dignāga, weiter aus. Für ihn umfasst das vorgestellte Wesen daher nur die Beschaffenheit, welche vom Denkerkennen (*manovijñānam*) und vom Denken (*manaḥ*) den Gegenständen der übrigen Formen des Erkennens zugeschrieben wird. Der Bild- und Blickteil aller dieser Erkenntnis-

formen zählt jedoch zum abhängigen Wesen und ist wirklich. Für Sthiramati ist somit die ganze Erscheinungswelt blosser Vorstellung. Für Dharmapāla kommt ihr Wirklichkeit zu, nur handelt es sich nach seiner Lehre um keine Aussenwelt, sondern bloss um Erscheinungsformen des Erkennens. Auch in der Erlösungslehre wirkt sich diese Meinungsverschiedenheit aus, wobei sich wieder der Anschluss an Maitreya-nātha und Asaṅga zeigt. Für Sthiramati verschwindet bei der Erlösung im Zusammenhang mit der Umgestaltung der Grundlage (*āśraya-parāvṛttiḥ*) jedes Erkennen, da es blosser Vorstellung ist, und nur die Soheit bleibt bestehen. Nach Dharmapāla erfahren sämtliche Formen des Erkennens eine Umgestaltung, bestehen aber auch beim Erlösten weiter.

Frauwallner's opinion that the origine of Dharmapāla's theory is traced back to Asaṅga is different from the description of Bodhibhadra who ascribes the *nirākāravāda* to the same Asaṅga, if Dharmapāla is accepted as a genuine *sākāravādin*. Apart from the controversy of early Yogācārins, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakīrti represent the *sākāravāda* while Ratnākaraśānti the *nirākāravāda* in the latest stage of Indian Yogācāra school— in this connection it is interesting to remember that Jñānaśrī and Ratnākara held different opinions also on *bahir-* and *antar-vyāptivāda*, which may suggest opposition in general between these two great scholars. Fortunately, the controversy between Jñānaśrī and Ratnākara is attested by rich materials.

PPU, 161, a5-161, b4: *de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam dañ, rnam par śes pa tsam dañ, gsal ba tsam yin pas rnam par rig paḥi gzuñ ba phyi rol gyi don yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa rnam kyañ ḥdsin paḥi rañ bzin du yod pa ma yin te. ḥdi gñis ni yid kyi mñon par brjod paḥi phyir chos thams cad kyi kun brtags paḥi rañ bzin yin no. gañ la brtags śe na, don med par yañ kun tu brtags paḥi ño bo ñid la mñon par zen paḥi bag chags las skyes paḥi don du snañ baḥi yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog paḥo. yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog pa de ni chos rnam kyi gzan gyi dbaṅ gi ño bo ñid dañ ḥkhrul pa dañ, phyin ci log dañ, log paḥi śes pa yañ yin no. ḥdi ltar deḥi gzuñ ba dañ ḥdsin paḥi rnam pa ni ḥkhrul pa dañ bslad paḥi dbaṅ ḥbaḥ zig gis snañ bas brdsun paḥi phyir, yañ dag pa ma yin paḥi kun tu rtog pa de la de skad ces bya ste, deḥi rañ bzin de ni yañ dag pa ma yin paḥo. yañ dag pa ñid gañ yin ze na, gsal ba tsam mo. de ñid kyi na rnam pa de ni ḥkhrul paḥi mtshan ma dañ, spros paḥi mtshan ma zes bya bar brjod de, ḥkhrul paḥi dmigs pa yin paḥi phyir ro. gñis kyi mtshan zes kyañ bya ste, gñis ltar snañ baḥi phyir ro. spros paḥi mtshan med (Read ma) thams cad ḥjig rten las ḥdas paḥi ye śes la ḥgag par ḥgyur la, des na de ni ma ḥkhrul pa dañ yañ dag paḥi ye śes su yañ dag brjod do. de ñid kyi phyir de yañ yoñs su grub paḥi ño bo ñid yin te.*

Tr.: Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. An external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent; and accordingly the cognition is also not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two [i.e. cognitum and cognizer] are the expression (*abhi-lāpa*) of the thinking (*manas*) and as such belong to the represented nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) of things. Where are they represented? [They are represented in] the wrong representation (*abhū-ta-parikalpa*) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born from the latent seeds of representation (*vāsanā*), which are attached to [constructing] represented images where there are no [external] realities. This *abhūta-parikalpa* is the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) of things, and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognitum and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only because of falsity (*bhrānti*) and confusion (*viplava*). This is why it is said that [the two are represented] in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (*prakāśamātra*) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (*ākāra*)

[of cognition] are marked by falsity (*bhrāntinimitta*), marked by manifoldness (*prapañca-nimitta*). It is because they are objects of false [cognition]. They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two [i.e. cognitum and cognizer]. All manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (*lokottarajñāna*). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).

ibid. 167, b8-168, a3: *śnon po la sogs pa de gsal bzin pa yin yañ gnod pa yod paḥi phyir brdsun pa yañ gurb po. de brdsun par grub pas na deḥi bdag ñid de yañ brdsun par grub po. yañ gsal ba de rigs pa ni ḥkhrul pa dañ bral bas mñon sum yin paḥi phyir dños po ñid du grub pa yin te. gañ gi phyir gsal ba ni gsal ba ñid kyis gñug maḥi rañ bzin yin te, gañ gi myoñ ba ḥdi ḥkhrul par ḥjog paḥi bslad pas bžag pa med paḥi phyir ro. yañ śnon po la sogs paḥi rañ bzin yin paḥi phyir bslad pas byas par ḥgyur la, de ltar gyur bas na de myoñ ba yañ ḥkhrul par ḥgyur ro. de bas na śnon po la sogs pa la ni gnod pa ḥjug paḥi skabs yod kyī gsal ba la ni ma yin no.*

Tr.: [Represented images] such as a blue thing etc, though they are being manifested, are proved to be unreal (*alika*), since they are contradicted [by another cognition]. Since they are proved to be unreal, their substratum itself is proved to be unreal. However, the consciousness of illumination (*prakāśa*) itself is directly intuited as free from falsity, and accordingly is established as real. For illumination has as its inborn nature illuminating function, and cannot be approached by confusion (*viplavopānita*), so that the consciousness of it might be false. On the other hand, blue is another thing [different from the illumination itself], and can be approached by confusion; therefore, the knowledge of it may be false. Thus, there may be occasions in which [the knowledge of] blue, etc. is [negated] by another contradicting cognition, but it cannot happen in the case of the illumination itself.

This passage of Ratnākara is cited as a *pūrvapakṣa* by Jñānaśrīmitra in JNA 368, 6-10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time: *bhavatv ākāraṇāṃ bādhanād alikatvaṃ, prakāśamātraṃ tu satyam āmnāyaḥ, tadātmavedanasya bhrāntatvāyogena pratyakṣatvāt. prakāśasya prakāśa eva nijaṃ rūpam iti na tat tasya viplavopānitam, yena tadvedanaṃ bhrāntiḥ syāt. nīlaṃ tu rūpāntaratvāt viplavopānitam api syād iti syāt tadvedanaṃ bhrāntiḥ. tato'sti nīlātau bādhakasyāvatāro na prakāśe. . .*

PPU Peking ed., 168, a4ff.: *rnal ḥbyor spyod pa pa dañ, dbu ma pa śes pa rnam pa dañ bcas par smra ba kha cig na re, śnon po dañ gsal ba dag brdsun pa dañ brdsun pa ma yin par gyur na, chos ḥgal ba ñid kyis na deḥi bdag tu ḥthad par mi ḥgyur la, deḥi bdag ñid ma yin na yañ śnon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ḥgyur na śnon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. sgro (ma) btags paḥi dños por gyur paḥi gsal ba las gžan ma yin paḥi phyir śnon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags paḥi dños por gyur ba yin źes zer te. de dag gi ltar na gsal ba thams cad phyin ci ma log paḥi rañ gi ño bo myoñ baḥi phyir, thams cad ḥkhrul pa med par ḥgyur ro. des na sems can thams cad rtag tu grol bar ḥgyur la, rtag tu yañ dag par rdsogs paḥi sañs rgyas ñid du ḥgyur ro. . .*

Tr.: Some of the *sākārajñānavādins* of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika school say as follows: "If [as the *nirākāravādin* maintains, the image of cognition] such as blue is unreal and the illumination [of cognition] is real, they, being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if [blue] would not be identical with the illumination, blue could not be illuminated [i.e. could not become visible]. But it is a fact that blue is seen. Then, [i.e. if they were identical] blue, etc. would not be imagined things, since it is not different from the illumination which is not imaginary." [Answer] If it is as they say, all cognitions

would know the corret nature [of things]; this would result in that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i.e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones. . . .

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel to the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8-23 and RNA 129, 1-12 : *tathā hi sarvair eva prakāśair avi-
paritārthasvarūpasamvedanād bhrānter atyantam abhāvaḥ syāt, tataś ca sarvasattvāḥ sadaiva
saṁyaksambuddhā bhaveyuḥ*.... I refrain from quoting farther, though parallels may be in-
creased more, since this is not a place to enter into a detailed account of the controversy.

SANSKRIT INDEX

In the following Indices free numbers refer to pages; numbers in the roman numerals preceded by n. refer to Notes of Introduction; numbers in the arabic numerals preceded by § and n. refer to Sections and Notes of Translation. Index 3 (Proper names) includes names and epithets of: authors and titles of Sanskrit works, places, schools, and a few Tibetan and Chinese persons and works.

1. Verses

akṣais tad vyapadiśyate n. 87a
 ajñātārthaprakāśo vā n. 8
 atyantāyogam eva ca n. 132
 atha dharminī tasyaiva n. 156
 'darśanān na na darśanāt n. 270
 aduṣṭakāraṇārabdham n. 8
 adṛṣṭam kalpayed anyam n. 59
 adṛṣṭāv api sattvataḥ n. 282
 anāsravā mārgasatyam n. 366
 aniṣiddhaḥ pramāṇābhyām n. 263
 'niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ n. 104
 (a-)niṣṭhāsakteḥ smṛtādivat n. 8
 anuktāv api pakṣasya n. 185
 anuktir nyūnatōditā n. 185
 (a-)nupākhyodāhṛtir matā n. 204
 anumānam dvidhā svārtham n. 151
 anumeye'tha tattulye n. 156
 anuviddham iva jñānam n. 77
 anyaiḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam n. 324
 apratyakṣopalambhasya n. 106, 115
 apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānam n. 205
 apravṛttiphalā'sati n. 205
 aprasiddhopalambhasya n. 115
 abhiprāyanivedanāt n. 16
 abhiprāyasamvedane n. 187
 abhūtān api paśyanti n. 124
 amukhye'py ekadeśatvāt n. 159
 ayogam yogam aparair n. 132
 ...arthakriyāsthitir n. 13
 arthasya dṛṣṭāv ivēti n. 340
 arthāntarānapekṣatvāt n. 214
 arthābhāsam pravartate n. 414
 artho jñānānvito vaibhā- n. 148
 avācyo'nugṛhītatvān n. 156
 avikalpam api jñānam n. 88
 avinābhāvanīyamo n. 270
 avisamvādanam śābde n. 16
 'vyatibhinnārthamātradrk n. 119
 asaktasūcanān nāpi n. 187
 asambandhān na sāksād dhi n. 187
 asāadhanāṅgabhūtāt n. 185

asādhāraṇahetutvād n. 87a
 asti hy ālocanājñānam n. 70
 asya yā'jaḍarūpatā n. 101
 aham kāṇaḥ sukhī gaurāḥ n. 325
 aham ity api yaj jñānam n. 325
 ākārasahitā buddhir n. 148
 ākāśam dvau nirodhau ca n. 366
 ātmanaḥ parikalpitam n. 324
 ātmano na prakāśakam n. 110
 ātmaśūnyam akartṛkam n. 366
 ātmānam ātmanaivātmā n. 103
 iti cet grāhyatām viduḥ n. 74
 ity ajñajñāpanāyaika- n. 204
 idaṁ vastubalāyātam n. 419
 idānīmītanacittavat n. 378
 iyam evātmasaṁvittir n. 101
 iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt n. 117
 īdṛśam vā prakāśatvam n. 110
 ucyate sādhyasiddhyartham n. 236
 upādhibhedāpekṣo vā n. 236
 ekapratyavamarśārtha- n. 345
 ekasāmagryadhīnasya n. 191
 ekasyānamśārūpasya n. 102
 ekā citrāvabhāsinī n. 419
 ekānekaviyogena n. 412
 ekānekasvabhāvena n. 420
 ekābhāve'nyahānaye n. 315
 eva tatra kriyā matā n. 17
 kaḥ sambandho'navasthā ca n. 40
 katham bāhyam tad ucyate n. 383
 kartā ced vyatirekasiddhividhurā vyāptiḥ
 katham sidhyati n. 269
 karma cittam avadhūya na cēsti n. 364
 karmajam lokavaicitryam n. 364
 karmajam hi jagad uktam aśeṣam n. 364
 kalpanāpi svasamvittāv n. 117
 kalpitaḥ karmakartrādiḥ n. 103
 kas tām kṣapayitum kṣamaḥ n. 126
 kāmaśokabhayonmāda- n. 124
 kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā n. 270
 kāryatvasya vipakṣavṛttihataye sambhā-

vyate'tindriyaḥ n. 269
 kāryotpādo'numīyate n. 214
 kālayoḥ ca sadṛśātmanaḥ n. 356
 kim anyat tena mīyate n. 156
 kimartham nānumeyatā n. 156
 kecid dharmāntaram meyam n. 156
 kevalam saṁvidam svastham n. 148
 kramotpattir viruddhyate n. 356
 kriyayā ca sahōditaḥ n. 132
 kriyayā saha yatra nañ n. 62
 kriyākārahābhāvena n. 102
 kriyākāraṇayor aikya- n. 143
 kriyā ca sadṛśātmanaḥ n. 356
 kriyāyām akriyāyām ca n. 356
 gr̥hītagrahaṇān nēṣṭam n. 8
 grāhyagrāhakanirmuktam n. 412
 grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryād n. 412, 413
 grāhyadharman tadamśena n. 157
 -grāhyo'rtho na bahir mataḥ n. 148
 cārvākās tāvad ekaṁ dvitayam api punar
 bauddhavaīśeṣikau dvau n. 27
 cittam eva racayaty aticitram n. 364
 citrāvabhāseṣv artheṣu n. 419
 citre'pi dṛṣṭamātreṇa n. 17
 cetanā tatkr̥tam ca tat n. 364
 cetanā mānasam karma n. 364
 -caurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ n. 124
 chede dravyavyapekṣayā n. 132
 jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ n. 359
 jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ n. 13, 16
 jñānam ity eva tat kutaḥ n. 116
 jñānam tu jñātātāvaśāt n. 111
 jñānam nātmānam ṛcchati n. 110
 jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam n. 74
 jñānādyekārthasādhane n. 345
 jñānāntareṇ nūbhāve n. 104
 jñānābhīdhanāsamdeham n. 204
 jñeyasvarūpasamsiddhir n. 17
 jvarādiśamane kāścit n. 345
 tac charirendriyātmavit n. 325
 tajje vākkāyakarmaṇi n. 364
 taj jñānam tatra kalpanā n. 117
 tattyāge'pi tadā tṛṇādikam iti vyaktam
 vipakṣekṣaṇam n. 269
 tat pakṣavacanam vaktur n. 187
 tatra prasiddham tadyuktam n. 156
 tatrākāśam anāvṛtiḥ n. 366
 tatrādhyakṣam ato'khilam n. 117
 tatrāpūrvārthavijñānam n. 8
 tatrābhāvapramāṇatā n. 61
 tatrārthadr̥ṣṭir vijñānam n. 98
 tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati n. 110
 tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate n. 104
 tadarthaḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ n. 379

tadā viśīryamāṇe'pi n. 422
 taddvāreṇa bhavaty ataḥ n. 88
 tad rūpam nāsti tattvataḥ n. 421
 tadvān kaścit punar naiva n. 140
 tadviśeṣe tu caitasāḥ n. 98
 tasmāt tatrādivijñānam n. 378
 tasya nānubhavo'paraḥ n. 413
 tasya lakṣayitum kṣamaḥ n. 116
 tasya śaktir aśaktir vā n. 126
 tasyātmā viśayo mataḥ n. 324
 tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt n. 413
 tasyārthānubhavātmakam n. 110
 tasyārtho'yaṁ pratiyate n. 132
 tena nārthāntaram phalam n. 5, 146
 tena prakāśakatve'pi n. 110
 tena hetur iha prokto n. 396
 teṣām tad bhāvanāmayam n. 119
 trirūpāl liṅgato'rthadr̥k n. 151
 trividham cāpy asaṁskṛtam n. 366
 triṣv anyatamarūpasyaiva- n. 185
 trairūpyānupapattitaḥ n. 102
 dṛṣyā nēndriyagocarāḥ n. 382
 dṛṣyo'tha vyatirekasiddhimanasā kartā
 samāśriyate n. 269
 dṛṣṭā yathā vauśadhayo n. 345
 dvayor ekābhisambandhāt n. 40
 dharmabhedābhyupagamād n. 143
 dharmamātre'tha dharminī n. 159
 dharminam gamayiṣyati n. 156
 dharmenānyatra dṛṣyate n. 156
 ...dhī pramāṇatā n. 21
 dhūmendhanavikāravat n. 191
 na cājñāte viśeṣaṇe n. 106
 na cātmānubhavo'sty asya n. 110
 na cānyasya pramāṇatā n. 422
 na cāsau liṅgasamgataḥ n. 156
 na cet saṁvedyate nilam n. 383
 na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ n. 369
 na śakyam apabādhitum n. 58
 na santi paramāṇavaḥ n. 409
 na sann avayavī nāma n. 409
 na sambandhamatis tathā n. 40
 na so'sti pratyayo loke n. 77
 na svasaṁvittir asya tu n. 102
 nāgr̥hitaviśeṣaṇa- n. 106
 nāgr̥hitaviśeṣaṇā n. 106
 nānātve 'pi na cāparāḥ n. 345
 nānyo'nubhāvyas tenāsti n. 413
 nānyo'nubhāvyo buddhyēsti n. 413
 nāmajātyādiyojanā n. 67
 nārthatattvanibandhanam n. 16, 48
 nārthadr̥ṣṭiḥ prasidhyati n. 106, 115
 nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati n. 115
 nāśe kāryatvasattvavat n. 236

niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgam n. 88
 nityatvād acikitsyasya n. 126
 nityam tam āhur vidvāṃso n. 125
 nityam trayam asaṃskṛtam n. 366
 nityasya nirapekṣatvāt n. 356
 nitye tu manasi prāptāḥ n. 396
 nipāto vyatirecakaḥ n. 132
 nirbhāgaḥ pratibhāsate n. 140
 niścitam bādhavarjitam n. 8
 nihantīti nirucyate n. 103
 nêṣṭam tad api dhīrāṇām n. 420
 naivāsti paramārthataḥ n. 423
 pakṣadharmas tadāṃśena n. 157
 paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā n. 405
 paramārtho na vidyate n. 103
 pararūpe viparyayaḥ n. 118
 parārtham iti varṇyate n. 185
 parokṣatvāprasiddhitaḥ n. 117
 parokṣam yadi taj jñānam n. 116
 parokṣasya svarūpaṃ kas n. 116
 paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo n. 62
 pāramparyeṇa yujyate n. 187
 pārtho dhanurdharo nilam n. 132
 piṇḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ n. 405
 purato'vasthitān iva n. 124
 pūrvapramitimātre hi n. 359
 pūrvavijñānavat tathā n. 374
 prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye'rthe n. 110
 pratijñādivaco'py anyaiḥ n. 185
 pratijñānupayoginī n. 185
 pratibhāsadharmāḥ sthauilyam n. 400
 pratibhāso nirālambaḥ n. 409
 pratiśedhaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ n. 62
 pratiśedhāc ca kasyacit n. 28
 pratyakṣam anumānam ca n. 22, 128
 pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham n. 66, 85
 pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ n. 61
 pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati n. 66
 pratyabhijñā'tirekiṇī n. 359
 pratyayā yaugapadyataḥ n. 396
 prathamam nirvikalpakaṃ n. 70
 pramāṇataḥ phalaṃ nānyat n. 5
 pramāṇapañcakaṃ yatra n. 61
 pramāṇam avisamvādi- n. 6, 16
 pramāṇaṣaṭkavijñāto n. 59
 pramāṇam na phalāt param n. 5
 pramāṇam phalaṃ eva sat n. 5, 146
 pramāṇam lokasammatam n. 8
 pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ n. 28
 pramāṇabhāva ucyate n. 61
 pramāṇe... n. 22
 pramāṇetarasāmānya- n. 28
 pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayam n. 128
 pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād n. 21

prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād n. 315
 prasajyapratīṣedhas tu n. 62
 prāg uktaṃ yoginām jñānam n. 119
 prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya n. 16, 48
 prāhuḥ prābhākarāḥ pañcakam api ca vāyam
 te'pi vedāntivijñāḥ n. 27
 phalaṃ parisamāptimat n. 17
 baddhamuktādibhedo'pi n. 423
 bālamukādivijñāna- n. 70
 bāhyo na vidyate hy artho n. 414
 bijasyāśattvadarśanāt n. 282
 buddhāv apratibhāsanāt n. 340
 -buddhir viśeṣye vartate n. 106
 bodhāyānyat pratiyate n. 110
 bhavatiṣṭavighātakṛt n. 396
 bhāktaṃ syād arthavedanam n. 401
 bhāgā eva ca bhāsante n. 140
 bhāvā yena nirūpyante n. 421
 bhāsarvajñāś ca sāmānyas tritayam udaya-
 nādyāś catuṣkaṃ vadanti n. 27
 bhinnakālaṃ katham grāhyam n. 74, 148
 bhūjalāntargatasyāpi n. 282
 bhūyodarśanagamyā hi n. 259
 bhūyo'vayavasāmānya- n. 58
 bhede'pi niyatāḥ kecit n. 345
 bhedo hi nāvabhāty eva n. 423
 manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ n. 148
 maraṇakṣaṇavijñānam n. 374
 mānasam cārtharāgādi- n. 90
 muktis tu śūnyatādr̥ṣṭes n. 379
 yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo n. 369
 yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte n. 77
 yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati n. 125
 yatas caitro dhanurdharaḥ n. 132
 yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet n. 59
 yatrōttarapadena nañ n. 62
 yathā'dāhād apāvakaḥ n. 204
 yathā bālair vikalpyate n. 414
 yathā yathârthāś cintyante n. 419
 yadā tu na vikalpasya n. 422
 yadi saṃvedyate nilam n. 383
 yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate n. 419
 yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ n. 419
 yasmād ekam anekam ca n. 421
 yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā n. 126
 yogācārasya sammatā n. 148
 yoginām gurunirdeśa- n. 119
 -yogo jātyantarasya tat n. 58
 yogyatāyām ayogasya n. 132
 yo'rtho buddhau prakāśate n. 16, 48
 rāgiṇo hīnaśaṅgatvāt n. 374
 rūpaṃ teṣāṃ na vidyate n. 421
 rūpāde rasato gatiḥ n. 191
 rūpādu cakṣurādinām n. 110

- līṅgaṁ dharme prasiddhaṁ cet n. 156
 līṅgasyāvyabhicārataḥ n. 156
 līṅgasyāvyabhicāras tu n. 156
 vakṛṭvyāpāraaviśayo n. 16, 48
 vasturūpe na jāyate n. 61
 vastusattāvabodhārtham n. 61
 vastvabhinnam itiśyate n. 143
 vāsanālūṭhitam cittam n. 414
 vikalpotpattisaktimat n. 88
 vijñānatvādihetubhyaḥ n. 378
 vijñānaṁ jaḍarūpebhyo n. 101
 vijñānaṁ paramārthasat n. 412
 vijñānaṁ pāramārthikam n. 420
 vijñānaṁ vānyavastuni n. 61
 vijñānasyāpi sūnyatā n. 412
 vidhūtakalpanājālam n. 119
 vindhyādrirandhradūrvāder n. 282
 viyogād gaganābjavat n. 420
 -virodha iti cet asat n. 143
 vivakṣāto'prayoge'pi n. 132
 viśīryante tathā tathā n. 419
 viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyām n. 132
 viśeṣyabuddhir iṣṭēha n. 106
 viśeṣye buddhiḥ... n. 106
 viśayāntarasamcāras n. 104
 viśayāsattvatas tatra n. 204
 viśayi pratiṣidhyate n. 204
 vyavacchinatti dharmasya n. 132
 vyavacchedaphalaṁ vākyam n. 132
 vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā n. 110
 vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ n. 263
 vyāpṛtaṁ cārthasamvittau n. 110
 vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayor n. 259
 vyāpto hetuḥ... n. 157
 vyāvṛttam upajāyate n. 101
 śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani n. 110
 śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra n. 117
 śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya n. 340
 ṣaṭkaṁ paurāṇikās tv aṣṭakam abhidadhire
 sambhavaitihyayogāt n. 27
 ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt n. 405
 ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt n. 405
 ṣaṣṭhi śrūyeta tadvati n. 156
 (Vaibhā-)ṣikeṇa bahu manyate n. 148
 saṁskṛtaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ sarvam n. 366
 sa evāyam itiyam tu n. 359
 sa cōpagama iṣyate n. 263
 sati prakāśakatve ca n. 110
 sattvalokam atha bhājanalokam n. 364
 -sadṛśam mugdhavastujam n. 70
 sadbhāvo nāstitā'sati n. 157
 saṁdigdhe hetuvacanād n. 263
 saṁniviṣṭas tathā tathā n. 140
 samānādhāravedanāt n. 325
 samudāyārthasādhyatvād n. 159
 sambandhaṁ kecid icchanti n. 156
 sambandhe'pi dvayaṁ nāsti n. 156
 sambandho yadi tadvayoh n. 40
 sarojaṁ iti vā yathā n. 132
 sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate n. 77
 sarvatra samadarśinām n. 423
 sarvasmin ko'parādhyatu n. 422
 sarvādṛṣṭiś ca saṁdigdhā n. 282
 savyāpārapratitativāt n. 146
 sasvabhāvo'nuvarṇitaḥ n. 214
 saha pratyekam eva vā n. 345
 sā ca tasyātmabhūtaiva n. 5, 146
 sā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ n. 379
 sātmano'pariṇāmo vā n. 61
 sādṛśyasya ca vastutvam n. 58
 sādhyatvam upacaryate n. 159
 sā nairātmyadṛgāśrayaḥ n. 379
 sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ n. 369
 sāmāgryapekṣayānyasya n. 132
 sā yuktārthopapādikā n. 187
 sārthāpattir udāhṛtā n. 59
 siddhatvād dharmadharminoḥ n. 156
 siddher apratibandhataḥ n. 185
 siddho'tyantaṁ ca karmaṇi n. 132
 saiva tāvat kathaṁ buddhir n. 419
 sautrāntikena pratyakṣa- n. 148
 -sthiter anyadhiyo gateḥ n. 28
 spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate n. 119
 svapnānubhavasamñibhaḥ n. 409
 svabhāvaḥ kevalo'tha vā n. 236
 svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt n. 270
 svabhāvenēndriyādivat n. 345
 svayaṁ saiva prakāśate n. 413
 svarūpaṁ ca na śabdārthas n. 117
 svarūpasyāvikalpatvāt n. 117
 svarūpe sarvam abhīrāntam n. 118
 svasamvittir akalpikā n. 90
 svasamvedyo hy ahamkāras n. 324
 svākārajñānanajanakā n. 382
 svādṛṣṭir vyabhicāriṇī n. 282
 svopādānabalodbhavam n. 378
 svopādeyodayakṣamam n. 374
 hetutvam eva yuktijñā n. 74
 hetudharmānumānena n. 191
 hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa n. 214
 heyopādeyatattvasya n. 369
 heyopādeyavastuni n. 21

2. Technical Terms

- akartṛka n. 275, 366
 akramikāryakāritva n. 309
 akṣaṇika n. 309, 357
 agr̥hitaviśeṣaṇabuddhi n. 106
 acikitsya n. 126
 atideśa n. 49
 atideśavākyārthasmarāṇa § 4.3
 atideśasmarāṇa n. 54
 atiprasaṅga § 5, 7.2, 25, 31.1; n. 260, 274, 275
 atyantāyogavyavaccheda n. 132
 adarśanamātra § 20.2.2; n. 282, 288
 adoṣodbhāvana § 20.2.3; n. 288
 adhikaraṇa § 29, 6.3.1
 adhyakṣa n. 117
 adhyavasāya § 2.2, 6.3.1, 7.1.3, 16.2, 26; n. 12, 88, 123, 137, 339
 adhyavaseya § 7.1.1; n. 133, 135
 anadhigatārthagantṛ n. 8
 anavasthā § 4.2; n. 40
 anavasthāprasaṅga n. 55
 anākāravādin n. 148
 anādivitathavāsanā § 32
 anirbhāsaññānavāda n. 148
 aniṣṭāpādana § 24
 aniṣṭhā n. 8, 104
 anupalabdhi § 11, 29; n. 62, 184, 198, 202, 204, 205
 anupalabdhiprayoga n. 253
 anupalabdher vaidharṃyavān prayogaḥ § 19.1
 anupalabdher sādharṃyavān prayogaḥ § 19
 anupalambha § 4.1; n. 201, 259
 anubhavasiddha § 6.3.1
 anumāna § 3, 9; n. 110
 anumeya § 9.1, 10; n. 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 162, 185
 anumeye'stitā n. 159
 anuyāyin § 27
 anekavyaktisamaveta § 27
 anaikāntika (-tā,-tva) § 10.2.4, 20.1, 20.2.5, 23, 25, 25.2; n. 258, 290, 350, 368, 372
 anaikāntikahetu n. 316
 antarjalpa § 5, 13.1
 antarvyāpti n. 301, 418 (p. 156)
 antyadaśāprāpta § 13.5
 andhabadhirādyabhāvacodya n. 92
 anyathānupapatti § 27
 anyayogavyavaccheda § 7.1; n. 132, 133, 162, 169
 anyavyāvṛtti § 26
 anyavyāvṛttimātra n. 333, 335
 anyāpoḍha n. 338
 anyāpoha n. 338
 anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ n. 335
 anyopaladhi n. 62, 204
 anvaya § 4.2, 10.1, 10.3, 14, 21; n. 280, 300
 anvayaprayoga § 10.3
 apūrvagocara § 1, 2.5; n. 4, 8
 apoha § 26, 27; n. 106, 132, 197, 333, 334, 335, 338
 apohana § 26
 apohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ § 26
 apratibaddhasāmarthya § 13.5; n. 214, 218, 222, 227
 apratisamkhyānirodha n. 366
 apratyakṣopalambha n. 106, 115
 aprasiddhopalambha n. 115
 abhāva § 4, 4.5, 13.1; n. 27, 61, 65, 181, 203, 205
 abhāvavyavahāra § 13.1; n. 201, 204, 205, 211
 abhinnaviśeṣaṇa n. 236
 abhiprāya n. 187
 abhilāpa n. 418 (p. 156)
 abhilāpasamsargayogya n. 67
 abhūtaparikalpa n. 418 (p. 156)
 abheda § 16.2
 abhyāsa § 29.2
 abhyupāya n. 369
 abhrānta § 5, 5.1; n. 66, 85, 118
 ayogavyavaccheda § 7.1; n. 132, 133, 162, 169
 arthakriyā n. 3, 15, 16, 345
 arthakriyākāritva § 24.1; n. 309, 310
 arthakriyāsāmarthya n. 309
 arthakriyāsthiti § 2.3; n. 13
 arthadharma § 27
 arthamātragrāhin n. 98
 arthaviśeṣadarśana n. 98
 arthasākṣātkāritva n. 75
 arthasārūpya n. 145, 148
 arthāpatti § 4, 4.4, 26; n. 59, 60
 arthābhāsa n. 414
 arhaccaramacitta § 29.2
 alika n. 418 (p. 157)
 alaukikapratyakṣa n. 259
 avakāśaprada § 31.2
 avayava n. 186

avayavidravaya § 7.2
 avayavin § 19, 31.1, 31.3; n. 409
 avikalpa n. 88
 avikalpatva n. 117
 avidyā § 6.3.1, 16.2, 32.1; n. 137
 avinābhāva § 9.1; n. 248
 avinābhāvanīyama n. 270
 avisamvādaka, -tva § 1, 2.2, 4.2; n. 6, 85
 avisamvādana n. 13, 16
 avisamvādi n. 16
 avisamvādi jñānam n. 6
 avyagrasāmagrīka § 31.1
 avyatiriktaviśeṣaṇa n. 236
 avyabhicāra n. 156
 avyavahāritva § 6.1
 aṣṭadhānupalabdhi n. 212
 asaṃskṛta n. 366
 asajjñānaśabdavyavahāra n. 204
 asatkyāti n. 418 (p. 155)
 asattva § 10.2.1, 10.2.3, 10.2.5
 asadvavahārayogyatva § 13.2, 13.5
 asadvavahāraṇiṣaya n. 250
 asapakṣa n. 165, 171, 172
 asaṃavyāpti n. 169
 asādhāraṇa § 10, 23; n. 129
 asādhāraṇakāraṇa § 6
 asādhāraṇahetu n. 87a, 162
 asādhāraṇānaikāntika § 23; n. 162, 301
 asiddha § 10, 20.1, 25, 25.2, 27, 29, 29.1;
 n. 58, 258, 304
 asiddhahetu n. 316
 asiddhi n. 313, 368, 372
 asiddho hetuḥ n. 32
 ahaṃkāra § 31.1; n. 324
 ahaṃkārajñāna § 31.1
 ahaṃpratyaya § 25.1
 ākāra § 32.1; n. 425
 ākārasahitā buddhiḥ n. 148
 ākāśa § 31.1; n. 257, 366
 ākāśakeśa n. 410
 āgama § 6.1, 29.2
 ātman § 6.3.1, 25.1, 28.3, 30, 31.1; n. 321,
 324, 345, 357
 ātmasaṃvitti n. 101
 ātmasaṃvedana n. 96
 ātmiya § 6.3.1
 ātmopacāra n. 326
 āpas § 31.1
 āptatva § 4.2.1
 āptopadeśa n. 44, 54
 ālocanājñāna § 5; n. 70
 āśrayaparāvṛtti n. 418 (p. 156)
 āśrayāsiddhahetu § 25.1
 āśrayāsiddhi n. 319

indriya § 3; 35, 87a, 259, 345
 indriyagocara § 31; n. 382
 indriyajñāna § 6; n. 87a, 90
 indriyapratyakṣa n. 137, 259, 289
 indriyavijñāna n. 88, 92
 īśvara § 20.1; n. 355
 udāharaṇa n. 186
 upakaraṇa n. 294
 upakāryopakāraṇatva § 8.2
 upakāryopakāraṇabhāva § 6.2
 upagama n. 263
 upacāra § 9, 14; n. 152
 upanaya § 11.2; n. 186
 upabhoga n. 294
 upabhogāyatana § 25.1; n. 326
 upamāna § 4, 4.3; n. 49, 52, 54, 55, 58
 upalakṣaṇa n. 212
 upalabdhamānadharmatva n. 202
 upalabdhi § 29; n. 205
 upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta § 13, 13.3; n. 198,
 200, 213, 250, 253, 259, 351
 upalabhyamānadharmatva n. 202
 upādāna § 6.1, 31; n. 294
 upādānakāraṇa n. 192
 upādānādyabhiññatva § 20.2.5
 upādānābhijñākarṭṛ n. 258
 upādhi § 20.2.1; n. 236, 270, 271, 274
 upādhibheda n. 241
 upādhibhedāpekṣa n. 236
 upādhirahita n. 259
 upādhiviraha n. 259
 ubhayāsiddha n. 160, 330
 uṣmagata n. 119
 ūrdhva n. 137
 ūrdhvatālakṣaṇa § 7.1.2
 ekajñānaśaṃsarga n. 199
 ekajñānaśaṃsargipadārthopalambha § 13
 ekajñānaśaṃsargivastuno jñānam § 4.5; n.
 65
 ekavākyatā n. 62
 ekasāmagrīpratibandha n. 289
 ekasāmagryadhīnatva n. 191
 eva § 10, 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.2.3, 10.2.5; n. 132,
 162, 164, 169
 aitiḥya n. 27
 aupādhikasambandha n. 271
 kadācitkāryakāritva § 13.5; n. 229
 karṭṛ § 2.1, 4.3
 karṭṛdharmapakṣa § 13.2; n. 202
 karmakarṭṛ n. 103
 karmakarṭṛbhāva § 6.2, 13
 karmaja, -tva n. 290, 364
 karmadharmapakṣa § 13.2; n. 202
 karman § 2.1, 7.2, 28.3, 30, 31.1; n. 290

kalpanā § 5, 32.1; n. 67, 75, 117, 119
kalpanājñāna § 5
kalpanāpoḍha, -tva § 6.3; n. 66, 85
kāḍacitkakāryotpāda § 11.3
kāraṇa § 16.3.3
kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 223
kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 228
kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 219
kāraṇānupalabdhi § 13.5; n. 204, 212, 215
kāraṇa kāryopacāraḥ n. 152
kāritra n. 276
kārya § 11, 20.1
kāryakāraṇabhāva n. 248, 270, 305, 368
kāryatva § 20.2.3; n. 258, 262, 269, 275, 290
kāryaliṅga n. 45, 60
kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 222
kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 227
kāryaviruddhopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 218
kāryahetu § 11.3; n. 29, 191, 350, 372
kāryahetoḥ prayogaḥ n. 247, 249
kāryahetoḥ sādharṃyavān prayogaḥ § 18
kāryānupalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 214
kāla § 31.1, 8.3
kevala 236
krama § 28.1
kramayaugapadya § 22; n. 309
kramikāryakāritva n. 309
krameṇa kāryakaraṇam n. 357
kramotpatti n. 356
kriyā § 8; n. 17, 62
kriyākārahābhāva n. 102
kṣaṇakṣayitva § 16.1
kṣaṇabhaṅga n. 235, 372
kṣaṇika § 6.3, 16; n. 309, 310, 357, 366, 372
kṣaṇikatva § 2.2, 17, 22; n. 235, 309
kṣānti n. 119
kṣīṇadoṣatva § 4.2.1
kṣetrajña n. 294
gamaka § 11.3
guṇa § 7.2, 31.1
gr̥hitagrahaṇa n. 8
gr̥hitagrāhitva, -tā n. 91, 92
gocara § 1
grahaṇa n. 360
grāhakabhāga n. 418 (p. 155)
grāhya § 7.1.1, 7.1.3; n. 133, 134, 135
grāhyagrāhaka § 32
grāhyagrāhakanirmukta n. 412

grāhyagrāhakavaidhurya n. 412, 413
grāhyadharma n. 157
grāhyabhāga n. 418 (p. 155)
grāhyāvaseya n. 133
cakṣurvijñāna § 6.2; n. 95
caturāryasatya § 6.3; n. 368
citta § 6.2; n. 98, 374, 414
cittacaitta n. 96, 114
cittaikāgratā § 6.3
citrāvabhāsin n. 419
cetana 321
cetanā n. 290, 364
cetas n. 259
cetoguṇa n. 368
caitasa n. 98
caitta § 6.2; n. 98
jaḍa § 6.2, 31
jaḍarūpa § 4.5; n. 65, 101
janyajanakabhāva n. 99
jāti § 27; n. 58
jātiprasādhakam anumānam n. 350
jijñāsītadharṃmaviśiṣṭo dharmī n. 159
jijñāsītaviśeṣa n. 159
jivaccharira n. 307
jīvātman n. 324
jñātātā § 6.2; n. 106, 111
jñānanajanakatva § 4.5
jñānamātra § 4.5
jñānarūpa n. 65
jñānākārāraṇakṣama n. 74
jñānabhīdhanāpravṛtti n. 205
jñāpaka § 11
tattulya n. 157
tatphalabhokṛt § 25.1
tadāmśa n. 157
tadutpatti § 4.2, 20.2.1, 20.2.3; n. 32, 35
tadutpattipratibandha n. 60
tadutpattisambandha § 20.2.1
tadviruddhanimitasyōpalabdhiḥ n. 212
tarka n. 313
tādātmatadutpattisambandha n. 284
tādātmya § 4.2, 20.2.1, 20.2.3; n. 32, 35
tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇapratibandha n. 285
tiṅanta n. 62
tiryak n. 137
tiryaglakṣaṇam sāmānyam § 7.1.2
tṛṣṇā § 6.3.1
tejas § 31.1
trirūpa n. 183
trirūpaliṅga § 9; n. 151, 152, 153
trirūpaliṅgākhyāna n. 152, 300
trirūpāṇi liṅgāni § 11
trividhapratyakṣānupalambha § 11.3, 22, 29;

n. 368
 trividhabhāvarāśi n. 268
 trairūpya n. 102, 188
 trairūpyābhāva n. 312
 diś § 31.1
 duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga § 6.3
 dūṣaṇa § 25; n. 316, 319
 drśya § 13, 27
 drśyaśariraviśiṣṭabuddhimat § 20.2
 drśyānupalambha § 4.3.1, 20.2; n. 29, 58, 65, 201, 264, 268
 drśyāvinirbhāgavartin n. 289
 drṣṭānta § 11.2, 20.2.1
 drṣṭāntadharmin § 10.1, 15, 22
 deśakālākāranīyata § 7; n. 331
 deśakālasvabhāvanīyama n. 276
 deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa n. 65, 209, 271
 deśakālāvasthānīyata n. 339
 dravyāśrayin § 31.1
 draṣṭṛ n. 21
 dveṣa § 6.3.1
 dharma § 7; n. 159, 355
 dharmadharmisamudāya n. 154
 dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmi n. 159
 dharmādharmā n. 294
 dharmin § 3, 9, 9.1, 10, 20, 25.1; n. 159
 dharmyasiddhi n. 320
 dhi n. 21
 nañ n. 62, 202
 nāntariyaka § 27, 350
 nāstitā'sati n. 157
 nigamana § 11.2; n. 186
 nigrāsthāna § 20.2.3; n. 287, 288
 nipāta n. 132
 nimittakāraṇa n. 355
 niranuyoḃyānuyoga § 20.2.3; n. 287, 288
 nirākāra n. 148, 418 (p. 154-5)
 nirākārajñānavāda n. 418 (p. 154-5)
 nirākārajñānavādinah yogācāriṇah § 32.1
 nirākāravāda § 32.1
 nirākāravādin n. 148, 418 (p. 157)
 nirākāravijñānavāda n. 418 (p. 154)
 nirātmaka § 6.3
 nirodha n. 366
 nirvāṇa n. 376
 nirvikalpaka n. 70, 118
 nirvikalpakajñāna n. 418 (p. 154-5)
 nirvikalpakam jñānam § 2.5
 nirviśeṣaṇa n. 236
 nirviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ § 16.3
 nirvedhabhāgiya n. 119
 nivṛttimātra § 26
 nivṛttirūpo'bhāvaḥ n. 65

nivṛttivādin n. 338
 nivṛtṭyapohavādin § 26
 niścitam § 10
 niścitakartṛka § 20.1
 niścitakartṛnivṛtti § 20.1
 niṣprapañcavijñāna § 32
 nairātmyadrś- n. 379
 nyāyavādin n. 100
 nyūnatā n. 185, 316
 pakṣa § 10.1; n. 159, 165, 185, 263, 264
 pakṣadharma n. 132, 154, 157, 159
 pakṣadharma-tva § 10, 11.1, 11.2, 14, 20.2.5; n. 157, 293
 pakṣadharmin n. 154
 pañcavidhapratyakṣānupalambha § 22
 pañcaskandha § 6.3
 padārtha § 4.2, 7.2; n. 112, 139
 paracitta n. 47, 289
 paratantrasvabhāva n. 418 (p. 154-156)
 parataḥ prāmāṇyam § 2.4; n. 19
 paramāṇu § 31.1, 31.3; n. 257, 294, 400, 402, 405, 406, 409, 424
 paramārtha n. 54, 103, 289, 423
 paramārthatas § 8, 8.3
 paramārthasat n. 412
 paralokapratīṣedha n. 29
 parāmarśa § 5
 parārthānumāna § 9, 14; n. 152, 185
 parikalpitasvabhāva n. 418 (p. 154-6)
 paricchedakatva § 2.6, 4.5
 pariniṣpannasvabhāva n. 418 (p. 157)
 parokṣa § 9, 13.5; n. 104, 116
 parokṣatva § 6.2; n. 117
 paryudāsapratīṣedha n. 62, 132, 202
 paryudāsavṛtti § 4.5, 13; n. 62, 65, 201, 202
 piṇḍaviśiṣṭam sādṛśyam § 4.3.1; n. 58
 pūrvavṛddhāḥ § 10.3; n. 181
 pṛthivi § 31.1
 prakarṣaparyanta n. 119
 prakāśa § 6.2, 31; n. 114, 418 (p. 157)
 prakāśatva n. 110, 118
 prakāśamātra n. 418 (p. 156-7)
 pratijñā § 11.2; n. 185, 186, 188
 pratibandha n. 32, 60, 260
 pratibhāsa § 7.2, 26, 32; n. 32, 75, 409
 pratibhāsadharma § 31.3; n. 400
 pratīṣedha n. 62
 pratīṣedhamātra n. 201
 pratīṣedhahetu n. 208
 pratīṣedhavādin n. 338
 pratisamkhyānirodha n. 366
 pratitaprāpaṇa § 2.2
 pratyakṣa § 3, 4.1, 28.2

pratyakṣabādhā n. 350
 pratyakṣānupalambha § 18, 22; n. 131, 248, 257, 289, 305, 368
 pratyabhijñā § 16.2, 28.2; n. 359
 pratyabhijñāna n. 345
 pratyaya § 16.3.3; n. 77
 pratyātmavedyatva § 29; n. 368
 prapañca n. 418 (p. 157)
 pramāṇa § 1, 2, 2.1, 4.1, 8, 8.2, 20.2.1
 pramāṇatā n. 21
 pramāṇapañcakābhāva n. 61
 pramāṇaphala § 8.2; n. 5, 99, 143, 145, 146
 pramāṭṛ n. 34
 pramiti § 8; n. 49
 prameyatva § 20.2, 20.2.3
 prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa § 16.3.3; n. 236
 prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvasya prayogaḥ § 16.3.3
 prayoga § 10.3; n. 32, 185, 212, 232, 233
 prayojanābhijñāḥ kartā n. 294
 prayojya § 2.1
 pravṛtti § 7
 pravṛttinimitta § 3
 prasaṅga § 22, 24, 24.1, 24.2, 24.3; n. 32, 65, 226, 302, 309, 310, 315
 prasaṅgaviparyaya § 22, 24, 24.1, 302, 309, 310
 prasaṅgasādhana n. 226
 prasaṅgākhyam sādhanam n. 312
 prasaṅgānumāna n. 313
 prasajyapratīṣedha § 26; n. 62, 132, 181, 202
 prasajyarūpa § 26
 prasajyarūpo'bhāvaḥ § 4.5
 prasajyavṛtti § 4.5, 13; n. 65
 prasañjana § 24
 prasiddhakartṛka n. 257
 prasiddhacetanakartṛka n. 257
 prākāṣya § 6.2; n. 112, 113
 prāpakatva n. 9
 prāpaṇayogya n. 9
 prāmāṇikalokayātrā § 20.2.1; n. 273, 283
 prāmāṇya n. 39, 47
 bahirartha n. 32
 bahirbhāva n. 424
 bahirvyāpti § 22; n. 302, 418 (p. 156)
 bādhaka § 2.4, 20.2.1; n. 418 (p. 157), 424
 bādhakam pramāṇam n. 260
 bāhyārtha n. 289
 bāhyārthavādin n. 289
 bāhya- artha- § 31; n. 110, 148, 339
 buddhimat § 20.1; n. 264, 268, 289, 294
 buddhimatkartṛka § 20.1; n. 257
 buddhimatkartṛpūrvaka n. 258

buddhimatpūrvaka, -tva n. 258, 290
 buddhimanmātrapūrvakatva n. 290
 buddhimātrasvabhāva n. 148
 buddhyākāra § 26; n. 333
 boddhṛtva § 2.6
 phala § 4.3, 8
 bhavaparamparā § 29.2; n. 374
 bhākta § 25.1; n. 401
 bhāvanāprakarṣa n. 119
 bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta § 6.3; n. 124
 bhāvarāśi n. 257
 bhinnaviśeṣaṇa n. 236, 242, 244
 bhinnaviśeṣaṇasya prayogaḥ § 16.3.2
 bhūtārthabhāvanā n. 119
 bhūyodarśana n. 259
 bhūyodarśananibandhana n. 259
 bhūyodarśanasahāya § 20.1; n. 259
 bhedāvasāya n. 137
 bhedāviśeṣa § 27; n. 345, 346
 bhoktṛ n. 321
 bhogāyatana n. 323
 bhrānta n. 118
 bhrāntam jñānam § 5.1
 bhrānti n. 83, 418 (p. 157)
 manas § 31.1; n. 259, 345, 390, 418 (p. 155-6)
 manaskāra n. 345
 manovijñāna n. 90, 92, 95, 418 (p. 155)
 maraṇakṣaṇavijñāna n. 374
 maraṇacitta n. 374
 mahattva n. 240
 māna § 3
 mānasa § 6, 6.1, 25.1; n. 89, 90, 93, 94, 259
 mānasapratyakṣa § 3, 20.1; n. 19, 259, 324
 mānasaṁ karma n. 364
 mārgasatya n. 366
 mithyājñāna n. 85
 mukta § 6.3.1; n. 423
 mukti n. 148, 379
 mukhyāropita n. 326
 mugdhavastuja n. 70
 mūrti § 33
 yugapajjñānānutpatti n. 390
 yoga § 6.3
 yogavibhāga n. 165
 yogijñāna § 2.4, 6, 6.3, 6.3.1; n. 19, 93, 119, 124
 yogin § 6.3; n. 119
 yogipratyakṣa § 3; n. 119
 yogyatā § 4.2; n. 35
 rajas § 13.1
 rāga § 6.3.1
 rūḍhi § 3, 6.1
 liṅga § 3, 11; n. 58, 154, 156, 158, 183,

390
 liṅgin § 3
 lūnapunarjātakusākeśādi § 16.2
 lokeśa n. vi
 lokottarajñāna n. 418 (p. 157)
 laukikāgradharma n. 119
 vastudharma n. 400
 vastusādhana n. 208
 vākyabheda n. 62
 vāyu § 31.1
 vāsanā n. 414, 418 (p. 156)
 vikalpa § 6.3.1, 7.1.1, 26; n. 65, 68, 342, 422
 vikalpanā n. 117
 vikalpajanakatva n. 88
 vikalpapratyaya § 8; n. 144
 vikalpabuddhi n. 196
 vikalpotpattiśaktimat n. 88
 vijātivyaṁṛtta n. 333
 vijñānavāda n. 419
 vijñānātmakaparamāṇu n. 425
 vidhi § 26; n. 62, 334, 335
 vidhiniṣedha n. 341, 342
 vidhivādin § 26; 338
 vipakṣa § 10.1, 10.2, 10.2.1, 10.2.2, 10.2.4, 10.3, 20.2, 20.2.2, 20.2.3, 22, 23, 25
 vipakṣaikaśeṣavṛtti § 10.2.5; n. 179
 viparyaya n. 118, 309
 viparyayabādhakapramāṇa n. 301, 302, 304, 310
 viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa- n. 260
 viparyāsa § 1, 6.3.1
 viplava n. 418 (p. 156)
 viplavopanīta n. 418 (p. 157)
 vibhūta n. 290
 vibhrama n. 80
 vimarśa n. 283
 viruddha § 20.2.5, 20.1; n. 167, 258, 368
 viruddhakāryasiddhi n. 212
 viruddhavidhi n. 212
 viruddhavyāptopalabdhi § 28.2; n. 212
 viruddhavyāptopalabhiprasaṅga n. 226
 viruddhasiddhi n. 212
 viruddhahetu § 10.2.1; n. 316
 virodha n. 99, 167, 372
 viśiṣṭabuddhi § 27
 viśiṣṭajñāna n. 350
 viśeṣa § 6.3.1, 7.2, 31.1
 viśeṣaṇa § 4.3.1, 27; n. 106, 241, 350
 viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya n. 132
 viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva n. 58, 350
 viśeṣasmṛtyapekṣa n. 273, 274, 283
 viśeṣāpekṣa n. 283
 viśeṣya § 4.3.1; n. 106

viśaya § 1, 4.3, 7.1, 11.3, 26
 viśayāntarasamcāra n. 104
 vedyavedakabhāva § 6.2
 vaidharṇyaprayoga § 10.3, 18.1
 vaidharṇyavat § 15; n. 232, 300
 vaidharṇyavataḥ prayogaḥ n. 253
 vaidharṇyavatprayoga n. 246
 vyakti § 27
 vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇa n. 236
 vyatireka § 4.2, 10.2, 10.3, 14, 20.2.1, 20.2.2, 21, 31; n. 269, 282, 300
 vyatirekaprayoga § 10.3, 17
 vyatirekāśiddhi n. 268, 288
 vyatirecaka n. 132
 vyabhicāra § 20.2.1; n. 258, 259, 264, 268, 271, 272, 285
 vyabhicāraviśaya § 20.2
 vyavaccheda n. 132, 169
 vyavacchedaphala n. 132
 vyavasthāpaka n. 144
 vyavasthāpanahetu n. 144
 vyavasthāpya n. 144
 vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva § 6.2; n. 99
 vyavahāra § 6.1, 13.1, 26; n. 88, 196, 205
 vyavahārikapaṭupratyakṣa n. 289
 vyāpaka n. 309, 343
 vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 225
 vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 229
 vyāpakaviruddhasiddhi n. 212
 vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 220
 vyāpakasvabhāvasiddhi n. 212
 vyāpakānupalabdhi § 24.1, 33; n. 32, 204, 212, 216, 309, 311
 vyāpin § 25.1
 vyāpta § 4.3, 10.1; n. 157
 vyāpti § 7.1, 11.1, 11.2, 17, 20, 20.1, 20.2, 20.2.1, 20.2.2, 20.2.4, 20.2.5, 22, 23, 24, 24.1, 24.3, 25.2, 26, 29, 29.2, 31.1
 vyāptigrāhakapratyakṣa § 7.1.2
 vyāpya § 11; n. 309
 vyāvṛtti § 8, 12, 16.3.1; n. 240
 vyāvṛttikṛta § 8.3
 vyāvṛtṭyantaravyavaccheda § 16.3.1
 vyutpatti n. 333
 vyutpattinimitta § 3
 vyoman § 20.1
 śaṅkā n. 285
 śaṅkāpiśāci n. 270
 śabda § 5; n. 15, 16, 27, 32, 35, 44, 48, 54, 77, 78, 117, 187, 340
 śabdaśakti § 4.2

śabdānugama n. 77, 79
 śabdārtha n. 37
 śarīra n. 323, 326
 śabda § 4; n. 16
 śabda n. 75
 śuddha n. 236, 241
 śuddhasya svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ n. 238
 śūnya § 6.3
 śūnyatā n. 412
 śūnyatādr̥ṣṭi n. 148, 379
 śrotrajñāna § 2.3
 ṣaṭpadārtha n. 138
 ṣaḍamśatā § 32; n. 405
 ṣoḍaśaprakāra (of anupalabdhi) n. 212
 saṁvṛtisatya n. 289
 saṁśaya n. 18, 273, 274, 283, 372
 saṁsāra n. 376
 saṁskāra n. 259, 372
 saṁskṛta § 16; n. 366
 saṁketa § 4.2; n. 39, 43
 sajātiyakṣaṇa § 6.3.1
 sattva § 10, 10.1, 17, 22; n. 309, 310
 saddūṣaṇa § 20.2.3
 saṁtāna § 6.1; n. 12, 135, 137
 saṁtānāntara n. 192
 saṁtānāntarānumāna n. 289
 saṁdigdhakartṛka n. 257
 saṁdigdhacetanakartṛka n. 257
 saṁdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttika, -tva § 10.2.4,
 20.2, 20.2.3, 23; n. 268, 288
 saṁdigdhasādhyaadharma § 25
 saṁdigdhasiddha § 10; n. 161
 saṁdeha § 1
 sanirbhāsajñānavāda n. 148
 saṁnikarṣa n. 345
 sapakṣa § 10.1, 10.2.1, 10.3, 20.1, 20.2.2,
 29, 29.1, 31.1; n. 164, 165, 169, 172, 180,
 188, 258, 270, 368
 samanantarapratyaya § 6.1, 31; n. 90
 samavyāpti n. 169
 samavāya § 7.2, 31.1
 samākhyā § 4.3; n. 56
 samākhyāsambandha § 4.3; n. 54, 55
 samādhi § 6.3
 samāropa § 6.3; n. 152
 sampradāna n. 294
 sambandha § 4.2, 11.2; n. 37, 40, 54, 55,
 131, 156, 187, 259, 271, 276, 281, 309
 sambandhin n. 55
 sambhava n. 27
 samyagjñāna § 1; n. 3, 4, 6, 22, 85
 sarvajña, -tā, -tva § 29.1, 30; n. 290, 295,
 296, 369
 sarvasarvajña § 30; n. 369

sarvopasaṁhāra- pramāṇa- § 20.2
 sarvopasaṁhāravatī vyāptiḥ § 20.1, 26; n.
 368
 savikalpaka n. 118
 savikalpakam jñānam § 2.5
 saviśeṣaṇa n. 236
 saviśeṣaṇaprayoga § 16.3.1
 saḥakārikāraṇa § 11.3; n. 192, 355
 saḥakārin § 6.1, 27; n. 90
 sahopalambha n. 111
 sāmvr̥ta n. 8
 sāmvyavahārikapramāṇa § 6
 sākāra § 8.1; n. 415, 418 (p. 154-5)
 sākārajñāna § 8.1
 sākārajñānanaka n. 382
 sākārajñānavāda n. 418 (p. 155)
 sākārajñānavādin § 32.1; 418 (p. 157)
 sākāravāda § 32.1; n. 148, 385, 418 (p. 155)
 sākāravādin § 33; n. 148, 418 (p. 154, 156)
 sākāravijñānavāda n. 418 (p. 154)
 sākāravijñānavādi yogācārī n. 304
 sākṣātkāri- jñāna- § 28.2; n. 372
 sākṣātkāritva § 3
 sādṛśya n. 143, 232
 sādṛśyaviśiṣṭaḥ piṇḍaḥ § 4.3.1; n. 58
 sādḥaka § 2.4, 20.2.1
 sādḥana § 11, 20, 22; n. 143, 159, 290
 sādhanadharma n. 154
 sādhanapratyakṣa § 7.1.2; n. 137
 sādhanavākya § 11.2, 15, 20
 sādhanavyāpaka n. 271
 sādhanābhāva § 20
 sādharṁyaprayoga § 10.3
 sādharṁyavat § 15; n. 232, 300
 sādharṁyavatprayoga n. 246
 sādharṁyavat sādhanavākyaṁ § 15
 sādḥaraṇa n. 179, 284
 sādḥaraṇahetu § 10.1
 sādḥaraṇānaikāntika, tā § 20.2, 23, 268
 sādḥaraṇānaikāntiko hetuḥ n. 262
 sādḥya § 10.2.2, 20, 22; n. 143, 264, 268,
 290
 sādḥyadharma § 10.2.2, 25; n. 154, 193, 165
 sādḥyadharmin § 15, 22; n. 154, 232, 293
 sādḥyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa § 22, 24.1;
 n. 309
 sādḥyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvāt
 § 20.1
 sādḥyavyāpakatva n. 271
 sādḥyasādhanabhāva n. 99
 sādḥyahīna n. 290
 sādḥyād anyāḥ § 10.3
 sādḥyābhāva § 20
 sādḥyābhāvamātra § 10.3

sādhyena saha viruddhaḥ § 10.3
sāmānya § 7.1, 7.1.3, 7.2, 24.2, 26, 27,
31.1; n. 28, 58, 128, 131, 133, 137, 293,
289, 343, 345, 346, 351
sārūpya § 8; n. 52, 144
sārūpyajñāna § 4.3; n. 49, 54
siddhasādhana § 27; n. 133, 294, 290, 350
siddhasādhanatā § 20.2.5
subanta n. 62
sopādhikasambandha n. 271
skhaladvṛtti § 25.1; n. 326
sthūla n. 400, 424
sthaulya § 31.3; n. 400
sphuṭapratibhāsa n. 367, 368
sphuṭābha n. 124, 368
sphuṭibhāva n. 368
smaraṇa n. 118, 360
smaraṇagrahaṇa n. 361
smṛti § 28.2; n. 104, 273
smṛtyupasthāna n. 119
svataḥ prāmāṇyam § 2.4; n. 19
svatantraprayoga n. 310
svatantrānumāna n. 313
svadrṣṭārthaprakāśaka n. 185
svaprakāśa § 6.2; n. 99
svabhāva § 11, 13.2, 13.5, 27, 33; n. 43,
125, 126, 184, 193, 194, 236, 270, 305,
419
svabhāvaprati-bandha n. 60
svabhāvabhūta-dharmaviśeṣa n. 236
svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi n. 212, 221
svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi § 13.5; n.
226
svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi § 13.5; n. 212,
217

svabhāvahetu § 17, 22; n. 60, 236, 246, 374
svabhāvānupalabdhi § 13.5, 27; n. 203, 212,
213, 351
svabhāvānupalambha § 13.5; n. 204
svabhāvahetuprasaṅga n. 309
svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogaḥ
§ 17
svabhāvahetoḥ prayogaḥ n. 246
svabhāvahetoḥ sādharmyavān prayogaḥ
§ 16
svabhāvo hetuḥ n. 29, 368
svarūpa § 2.3, 16.1; n. 294
svarūpāsiddha § 25, 25.2
svalakṣaṇa § 7, 7.1, 7.1.3, 25.2, 26; n. 128,
129, 133, 339, 341, 342
svasāmvitti n. 90, 102, 117
svasāmvedana § 2.4, 3, 6, 6.2, 27; n. 19,
97, 99, 289
svasāmvedanabhāga n. 418 (p.155)
svasāmvēdya n. 324
svābhāvika § 20.2.1; n. 33
svābhāvikasambandha § 20.2.1; n. 259, 270,
271, 275, 276
svābhāvikāḥ sambandhaḥ § 20.2.1; n. 259,
274
svārtha n. 151
svārtham anumānam § 9
svārthānumāna n. 152
hetu § 10.1, 10.2.1, 10.2.2, 10.2.3, 11, 11.2,
20.2.5, 25, 29
hetudūṣaṇa n. 288
hetudoṣa n. 288
hetudharma n. 191
hetvābhāsa n. 301
heyopādeyatattva n. 369

3. Proper Names

Atiśa 7-10; n. xiii; n. 212
Anantavīrya 6
Antarvyāptisamarthana n. 235, 301
Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrīṁśikā 15; n. 413
Apohaprakaraṇa n. 333
Apohasiddhi n. 333
Abhidharmakośa 15; n. 21, 98, 119, 364, 366
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya n. 366
Arcaṭa 15; n. 62, 212, 226, 235
Alamkāra-kāra § 6.2, 25.1
Avalokitavrata n. 62
Aviddhakarṇa n. 255
Asaṅga n. 418 (p. 154-6)
Ācārya [=Dharmakīrti] § 5.1
Ātmatattvaviveka 8, 9, 15; n. xix, xx; n.
333

Āryadeva 5, 15
Ālambanaparīkṣā n. 418 (p. 154)
-Vṛtti n. 406
Īśvaradūṣaṇa n. 255
Īśvaravādādhikāra n. 255
Īśvarasāadhanadūṣaṇa 4; n. 255, 258, 289,
290
Īśvarasena n. 202
Udayana 8-11, 15; n. xix, xx, xxiii; n.
99, 271, 333
Uddyotakara 16; n. 156, 255, 324, 326, 353
Oḍviṣa 11; n. xxv
Kaṇakavarman 16
Kamalaśīla 16; n. 19, 187, 188, 235, 255,
333
Kaṇakagomin 15; n. 235

Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi n. 132, 305
 Kāśikākāra n. 259
 Kiraṇāvali n. xix
 K'uei-chi n. 418 (p. 155)
 Kumārilabhaṭṭa 2; § 6.2, 28.2; n. 61, 92, 202, 259, 342
 Keśavamiśra 1
 Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi n. 11, 235, 302, 309, 333
 Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya n. 235, 302
 Guṇamati 418 (p. 155)
 Guṇaratna 5, 16; n. 413
 Gautama 16
 Cakracūḍamaṇi § 4.5; n. 64
 Candrakīrti 16
 Cārvāka 2; § 4, 4.1; n. 27-29
 Citrādvaitasiddhi n. xx
 Jagaddalanivāsi n. viii
 Jagaddhala, Jagadd(h)ala-vihāra, Jagattala 6, 11; n. v, vi, viii, xxv; § 33; n. 2
 Jayanta, -bhaṭṭa 8; n. xvi
 Jinendrabuddhi 17; n. 159, 181
 Jaina 1, 3, 5; n. 148
 Jaina-tarkabhāṣā 1
 Jñānaśrī, -mitra 1-5, 7-10; n. xi, xiii, xix, xx; § 20.2; n. 107, 124, 132, 212, 235, 255, 260, 269, 302, 305, 333, 338, 418 (p. 155-7), 419
 Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali 15; n. xii, xiv, xx; n. 107, 115, 124, 131-133, 137, 212, 235, 255, 257, 258, 260, 263, 264, 269, 333, 334, 338, 340, 342, 418 (p. 157-8), 419
 Jñānasārasamuccaya 5, 15; n. 366, 381, 382, 418 (p. 154), 420
 Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana 6, 15
 Tattvasaṃgraha 16; n. 19, 21, 28, 29, 85, 88, 101, 102, 104, 108, 110, 115, 148, 185, 187, 188, 191, 235, 255, 321, 324, 325, 328, 333, 338, 345, 352, 355, 359, 374, 375, 376, 378, 396, 397, 406
 Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā 16; n. 19, 77, 85, 88, 104, 108, 115, 148, 187, 188, 191, 235, 255, 324-326, 328, 333, 338, 351-353, 355, 359, 374, 376
 Tarkabhāṣā by Keśavamiśra 1
 Tarkarahasyadīpikā 5, 16; n. ii; n. 98, 132, 148, 413
 Tarkasopāna 1, 4, 16; n. 9, 21, 23, 25, 27, 69, 77, 78, 104, 114, 140, 148, 152, 165, 185, 202, 212-223, 225-229, 236
 Tātparyāṭikākāra n. xiv
 Tāranātha n. xiii, xxiv; 16
 Trilocana 2.5; § 6.2, 20.2.1; n. 107, 131, 133, 255, 259, 270, 271, 275

Dānaśīla 11
 Digambara-Jaina § 10
 Dignāga 4, 5, 12, 16; n. 54, 85, 156, 157, 159, 181, 185, 338, 406, 418 (p. 154-5)
 Dipaṃkaraśrījñāna 7; n. xiii
 Durveka, -miśra 4, 15; n. ix; n. 212, 226, 235, 240
 Deb-ther sñon-po 15
 Dharmakīrti 1-5, 16; § 1, 2.3, 5, 6.2, 6.3.1, 7.2, 8, 12, 13.2, 25, 26, 27, 28.1, 30, 31.3, 32, 33; n. 28, 40, 85, 106, 115, 132, 140, 145, 157, 159, 181, 185, 191, 204, 209, 212, 226, 235, 236, 255, 305, 307, 333, 338, 340, 369, 418 (p. 155)
 Dharmapāla n. 418 (p. 155-6)
 Dharmottara 1, 4, 15; § 31.3; n. 11, 23, 85, 132, 142, 169, 179, 195, 226, 236, 240, 305, 307, 333
 Dharmottarapradīpa 15; n. 148, 165, 212, 226, 400
 Narasimha n. 255
 Naropa n. xiii
 Nālikera § 4.2
 Naiyāyika 1; § 4, 4.3, 7.2, 20.1, 20.2.3, 24.1, 25.1, 31.2; n. 31, 108, 255, 259, 260, 270, 271, 304, 313, 321, 324, 344
 Naiśadha n. xxiii
 Nyāyakaṇikā 16; n. 290, 293, 294
 Nyāyakusumāñjali n. xix
 Nyāyakośa 16; n. 112, 324, 343, 397
 Nyāyaparamesvara § 26, 7.2
 Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa n. xix
 Nyāyabindu 1, 4, 15; n. 3, 22, 67, 80, 86, 90, 96, 119, 128, 145, 146, 151-3, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 168, 170-173, 177-179, 181, 183-186, 194, 195, 198, 200, 208, 209, 211-223, 225-229, 231, 232, 236, 238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246-250, 253, 300, 307, 316, 320, 330
 Nyāyabinduṭīkā 1, 4, 15; n. 6, 7, 11, 12, 23-26, 67, 80, 85, 87a, 88, 98, 99, 119, 129, 134, 135, 143, 144, 152, 162, 163, 174, 175, 178-180, 182, 184, 195, 200, 201, 203, 205, 209, 214, 232, 236, 238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 248, 300, 316
 Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppanī 16; n. 88, 92, 95
 Nyāyabhāṣya 15; n. 49, 54, 59, 323
 Nyāyamañjarī 8; n. 107
 Nyāyamāṇidīpikā 5
 Nyāyamukha n. 181, 185
 Nyāyavādin § 13.4
 Nyāyavārttika 16; n. 49
 Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā 8, 10, 16; n. 49, 54, 156, 255, 257-259, 271, 273-276

- Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi n. xix ;
n. 99
- Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa 16 ; n. 28, 106,
140, 413
- Nyāyavaiśeṣika n. 148, 259
- Nyāyasūcīnibandha 9, 10
- Nyāyasūtra 16 ; n. 44, 49, 59, 255, 270,
283, 287, 323, 390
- Pag-sam Jon-zang n. xxiv
- Paṇḍita Aśoka n. 351
- Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa n. 139
- Parikṣāmukhasūtra 3, 16 ; n. 137
- Pāṇini n. 23, 165
- Pārthasārathimiśra 16
- Pāla 6, 7, 11
- Pūrvapakṣasamkṣepa n. 255
- Paurāṇika n. 27
- Prajñākaragupta 1, 2, 16 ; § 6.2, 25.1, 31,
33 ; n. 17, 255, 418 (p. 155)
- Prajñākaramati 15 ; n. 255
- Prajñāpāramitopadeśa 8, 16 ; n. 418 (p. 154,
156)
- Prajñāpradīpa n. 62
- Prabhācandra 16 ; n. 137
- Pramāṇavārttika 4, 16 ; n. 5, 6, 8, 13, 15,
16, 19, 21, 48, 66, 74, 104, 117, 119,
124, 125, 126, 132, 135, 143, 146, 187,
191, 202, 204, 205, 209, 212, 214, 226,
235, 326, 255, 263, 270, 315, 340, 345,
356, 369, 379, 413, 419, 421
- Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya = -alamkāra 16 ;
§ 6.2, 31, 33 ; n. 8, 9, 15, 17, 22, 90,
103, 104, 116, 117, 118, 128, 159, 202,
204, 234, 325, 383, 422, 423
- Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti 16 ; n. 4, 19, 106, 151,
202, 204
- Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 15 ; n. 204, 205,
235, 236, 209, 212
- Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭikā 15
- Pramāṇaviniścaya 16 ; n. 28, 74, 115, 132
- Ṭikā 16 ; n. 132
- Pramāṇasamuccaya 12, 16 ; n. 5, 8, 22, 66,
67, 87a, 90, 104, 117, 119, 146, 156, 157,
159, 181, 185
- Vṛtti 16 ; n. 128, 159, 181, 185
- Pramāṇāntarbhāvaaprakaraṇa 2 ; n. 28
- Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa 16 ; n. 28, 106,
137
- Prameyaratnamālā 5
- Praśastamati n. 255
- Prasannapadā (Mūlamadhyamakakārikāvṛtti)
16 ; n. 98
- Prābhākara § 4 ; n. 27
- Bāhyārthaparīkṣā n. 406
- Bodhicaryāvatāra 15 ; n. 255, 355
- Pañjikā 15 ; n. 255, 352, 355
- Bodhibhadra 5, 6, 15 ; n. ix ; n. 366, 418
(p. 154-6)
- Bauddha n. 27, 258
- Bhagavatyāmnāyanusārīṇivyaḥyā n. viii
- Bhagīratha n. xxiii
- Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra 15 ; n. 106
- Bhartṛhari 17 ; § 5
- Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka § 4 ; n. 112
- Bhāvaviveka 3 ; n. 62
- Bhāvivikta n. 324
- Bhāsarvajña n. 27
- Madhyamakālamkāra (kārikā) § 33 ; n. 426
- Vṛtti n. 426
- Manorathanandin 2, 16 ; n. ix ; n. 236
- Malliṣeṇa 6, 7, 16 ; n. x ; n. 374
- Mahābodhi n. viii
- Mahāyāna n. 376, 418 (p. 154)
- Mahāyānasamgraha n. 418 (p. 154)
- Māṇikyanandin 3, 16 ; n. 137
- Mādhava, Śāyana-Mādhava 5, 16 ; n. 413
- Mādhyaṃika 3, 5 ; § 33 ; n. 62, 148, 376,
418 (p. 154, 157), 419
- Mānapāla n. viii
- Mānameyodaya 15 ; n. 27
- Mīmāṃsaka § 4.3.1, 6.2 ; n. 8, 27, 31, 62,
104, 108, 148, 259
- Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa n. 62
- Mīmāṃsābhāṣya 15 ; § 6.2 ; n. 59, 110
- Mīmāṃsāslokaṇṭikā 16 ; § 6.2 ; n. 58, 59,
61, 70, 106, 108, 110, 111, 202, 259, 359
- Kāśikā 16 ; n. 106, 111, 259
- Ṭikā (Śākarikā) 15
- Muktākalaśa n. 235
- Mūlamathuranāthi Tattvacintāmaṇivyaḥyā
n. 112
- Maitreyaṇātha n. 418 (p. 155-6)
- Yaśovijaya 1
- Yogācārin, Yogācāra 5 ; § 31.3, 32, 32.1, 33 ;
n. 148, 406, 418 (p. 154-7)
- Ratnakīrti 2, 3, 5, 7-10 ; n. ix, xiii, xix,
xx ; n. 8, 28, 29, 49, 64, 107, 132, 133,
137, 255, 259, 269-271, 274, 276, 283, 289,
290, 294, 302, 304, 309, 333, 338, 369, 418.
(p. 156)
- Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī 16 ; n. xii, xv, xvii,
xviii ; n. 8, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 37, 39,
43, 47, 52, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61, 65, 131-
133, 137, 234, 235, 257-259, 262-264, 268-
276, 282-285, 288-290, 293-296, 304, 309,
333-335, 337-342, 350, 368, 369, 372, 418
(p. 158)
- Ratnakaraśānti 4, 5, 7, 16 ; n. xi, xiii ; n.

- 235, 301, 302, 418 (p. 154-7)
 Rāmacarita 16; n. vi, viii; n. 2
 Rāmapāla 7; n. viii, ix
 Rāmavati n. viii
 Rgyal tshab n. 226
 Rtog-geḥi skad 11
 Lakṣaṇamālā 9; n. xix
 Lakṣaṇāvali 9, 10; n. xix
 Laṅkāvatārasūtra n. 414
 Lokāyata n. 375
 Lokeśa n. 2
 Varendra, Varendrī 6, 7, 11; n. vi, viii;
 n. 2
 Vasudrarakṣita 16
 Vasubandhu 15; § 32; n. 418 (p. 155)
 Vākyapadiya 17; n. 28, 77
 Vācaspati, -miśra 5, 8-10, 16; n. xvi; §
 20.2.3; n. 49, 107, 156, 255, 258, 259, 270,
 271, 273, 274-276, 283, 294
 Vātsyāyana 16
 Vādirājasūri 16; n. 413
 Vārttikasaptaślokiṣyaḥ n. 255
 Viṃśatikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi) 17; n.
 405, 406
 Vikramaśīla, -Vihāra 7, 11; n. xiii
 (Vijñaptimātratā-) Siddhi (成唯識論) 16; n.
 418 (p. 155)
 Vijñānavādin § 33; n. 148, 289
 Vittoka n. 255
 Vidyākaraśānti 1, 4, 16; n. ix; n. 69, 212
 Vinitadeva n. 85
 Vibhūticandra 11
 Viśālamalavatī 17; n. 159
 Vedānta n. xvi; n. 27, 148
 Vaibhāṣika 5; § 28.3, 30, 31.2, 31.3; n. 21,
 148, 365
 Vaiyākaraṇa § 4; n. 27, 28
 Vaiśeṣika § 7.2, 31.2, 31.3; n. 27, 270, 321,
 324
 Vaiṣṇava 11
 Vyāptinirṇaya n. 259
 Śaṅkaramiśra n. xx; n. 338
 Śaṅkaravarman 8
 Śaṅkarasvāmin n. 255
 Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya 16
 Śabara 15; n. 111
 Śabdārthaparikṣā n. 333
 Śākyaśrībhadra 11
 Śāntideva 15; n. 255
 Śāntirakṣita 2, 5, 16; § 6.2, 33; n. 29, 85,
 118, 235, 255, 333, 338, 418 (p. 155), 426
 Śāstra n. 340
 Śāstradīpikā 16; n. 110
 Śrīharṣa 10; n. xxiii
 Śrīhira n. xxiii
 Saṃtānāntaradūṣaṇa n. 289
 Sandhyākaranandin 16
 Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇi n. 132
 Sambandhaparikṣā 2, 16; n. 40
 Sarvajñasiddhi 8; n. 369
 Sarvadarśanasamgraha 5, 16; n. 28, 29, 148,
 385, 413
 Śākārasiddhiśāstra 8; n. 419
 Sāṃkhya § 4; n. 27, 76, 148, 204
 Sāmānyadūṣaṇadikprasāritā n. 351
 Sucaritamīśra 16; n. ix; n. 259
 Subhāṣitaratnakōśa 16; n. vii, viii, xiii
 Sumpa Khan-po n. xxiv
 Sena 11
 Saugata n. 260
 Sautrāntika 1, 5; § 16, 31, 31.3; n. 99, 148,
 289, 385, 418 (p. 154)
 Sthirabhāva-parikṣā n. 235
 Sthiramati 418 (p. 155-6)
 Syādvādamāñjarī 6, 7, 16; n. x; n. 235,
 374, 382, 383
 Haribhadra 16
 Hetubindu 4, 15; n. 199, 201, 202, 212, 226,
 235
 -Ṭikā 15; n. 62, 140, 192, 202, 204, 205,
 212, 226
 -Ṭikāloka n. 235
 Hetumukha n. 157
 Hemacandra 15; n. 413
 Hsüan-chuang, Hiuan-Tsang 16; n. 418 (p.
 155)

ERRATA

- Read *samyagjñāna* instead of *samhyag-* in p. 23, l. 12; n. 3, 4, 6, 22, 85.
 Read *purato' vasthitān* instead of *-vasthātān* in n. 124 (l. 2).